Jharkhand High Court

Manoj Pathak vs Central Coalfields Limited on 2 January, 2025

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                    W.P.(L) No.785 of 2018
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Manoj Pathak, S/o Sri Ramashray Pathak, Village & P.O. Mou, P.S. Tekari, District Gaya (Bihar).

.......... Petitioner.

-Versus-

1. Central Coalfields Limited, through the General Manager (Personnel & Administrative), Darbhanga House, Ranchi.

2. The Project Officer, Rajrappa (Washery) Project, Rajrappa, District Hazaribag (now Ramgarh).

.......... Respondents.

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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Amit Kr. Sinha, Advocate

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Order No.06 Date: 02.01.2025

1. The present writ petition has been preferred for quashing and

setting aside the award dated 13.04.2015 passed by The

Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.

2 at Dhanbad in Reference No. 19/2000 whereby it has been

held that the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the

services of CCL with effect from 08.02.1999 is quite legal

and justified and that the workman/petitioner is not entitled

for any relief.

2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ

petition is that in the year 1994, the respondents requisitioned

list of eligible candidates from Ranchi and Ramgarh

Employment Exchanges for appointment on the post of

Mechanical Fitter in Category-I, having requisite qualification

of ITI. The petitioner had completed his ITI course in Fitter

Trade in the session 1984-86 and the respondents having

found him eligible issued letter dated 05.01.1995 to appear in written test to be held on 12.02.1995 for selection on the

aforesaid post. Thereafter the respondent authorities issued

letter No. 809 dated 13.10.1995, whereby the petitioner was

offered appointment as Trainee Category-l (ITI) and in

pursuance thereof, he submitted his joining on the said post

on 31.10.1995. After appointment, the petitioner was sent for

training at Central Excavation Training Institute (CETI),

Barkakana, where he successfully completed the training.

Further, he was posted at Rajrappa Washery Project of Central

Coalfields Limited vide letter under Ref. No.7123 dated

05.02.1997. The petitioner was subsequently issued order

of Suspension-cum-Charge-sheet vide letter No.6404

dated 21/22.03.1998, alleging inter alia that he

had fraudulently obtained employment under Land

Looser Scheme of Piparwar Area, CCL, claiming himself as the

dependent (nephew) of the land owner and he was directed to

submit his reply within seven days of receipt of the aforesaid

letter. The petitioner submitted his reply on 03.06.1968 and

the Project Officer, Rajrappa Washery Project-the respondent

no.2 initiated an enquiry against him vide memo No. 170,

dated 10.04.1998. Pursuant to the submission of enquiry

report by the enquiry officer, the respondent no. 2 vide order

as contained in memo No.5335 dated 08.02.1999 dismissed

the petitioner from service of Central Coalfields Limited,

Rajrappa Washery Project with immediate effect. The

petitioner raised an industrial dispute before the Ministry of

Labour, Government of India under Section 10(1)(d) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the same was referred

for adjudication before the Central Government Industrial

Tribunal No.2, Dhanbad vide Reference No.19/2000. The

petitioner filed his written statement and rejoinder as well as

led evidences in support of his claim that he was not appointed

against Land Looser Scheme, rather was appointed following

due procedure of selection and that mentioning of certain plots

with respect to the land in his appointment letter as well as his

relationship with the land owner was an error committed by

the respondents themselves. The petitioner also led his

evidences both documentary as well as oral, however, learned

Tribunal after conclusion of evidences and submission

of written notes by the petitioner erroneously passed the

award dated 13.04.2015 holding that the order of dismissal of

the petitioner was quite legal and justified and that the

petitioner was not entitled for any relief.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on bare

perusal of the evidences, pleadings filed by the workman/

petitioner, it would categorically transpire that mentioning of

details of plots with respect to land etc. in the appointment

letter of the petitioner was an error committed by the

concerned authority, whereas the petitioner was appointed

pursuant to due selection process through written test after

inviting names of eligible candidates from the Employment

Exchanges, Ranchi and Ramgarh. It is further submitted that

while rejecting the claim of workman/petitioner, the

Learned Tribunal has completely brushed aside the documents

and evidences produced by him without assigning any reason

and has proceeded to rely solely on the case of

the management to pass the impugned award

dated 13.04.2015. The learned Tribunal has not at all

discussed the admissibility, evidentiary value and inference of

the evidences produced by the petitioner.

4. It is also submitted that learned Tribunal in case of another

workman, namely, Dashrath Gope, who was also dismissed

from service on similar charges, was pleased to hold that the

order of dismissal of the said workman was not legal and

justified, directing his reinstatement with 50% back wages vide

award dated 23.03.2011 passed in Reference No.279/2000.

The case of the present petitioner is similar to the case of the

said workman.

5. It is further submitted that an apparent illegally in the order

of dismissal is that the appointment letter of the petitioner was

issued by the General Manager (Personnel and Administrative)

of respondent-CCL, whereas the order of dismissal was passed

by the respondent no.2. It is a well settled principle of law that

only the appointing authority can remove the

concerned employee from service by order of

dismissal/termination and under the said sole ground, the

impugned award is fit to be set aside.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contends that except

mentioning of certain details of land in the appointment letter

of the petitioner, there is not an iota of evidence on behalf of

the management/respondents to suggest that the

petitioner was appointed under Land Looser Scheme.

The documents with respect to requisitioning of the names

of eligible candidates from concerned Employment Exchanges

were official documents of the respondents and the petitioner

did not have any access to the same. However, the letter

issued by the concerned respondent inviting the petitioner to

appear in written test is an example which clearly demolishes

the case of the management and certainly raises

a presumption of validity regarding the contention of

the petitioner.

7. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal while

passing impugned award dated 13.04.2015 has failed to

appreciate the fact that the management has completely

failed to establish the charges levelled against the petitioner

and therefore the order of dismissal dated 08.02.1999 passed

against him cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The Learned

Tribunal has also failed to appreciate the fact that petitioner

was employed/appointed by the respondents after following

due procedure of law by inviting list of eligible candidates from

the Employment Exchanges, Ranchi and Ramgarh. Thereafter,

eligible candidates were subjected to process of selection

through written test and after being successful, they were

issued appointment letters.

8. Learned Tribunal has further failed to appreciate that

the narration of certain plots with respect to the land in the

appointment letter of the petitioner and showing

his relationship with the owner of the concerned plots were the

error committed by the concerned official of the respondent

CCL and the same would not change the fact that the petitioner

was appointed after being selected through the process of

written test. It is also submitted that the petitioner was denied

ample opportunity of hearing since he was not permitted

to summon and examine important witnesses and

thereafter the Enquiry Officer arbitrarily concluded the enquiry

and submitted the report holding the petitioner guilty

of allegations levelled against him.

9. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent-CCL submits that the petitioner had got

appointment as Trainee Category-I (ITI) under Land Looser

Scheme impersonating himself as nephew of the landholder,

namely, Salkhu Hazam against the land acquired by the CCL at

village Bahera, Block Tandwa, District Chatra without approval

of the competent authority. A departmental proceeding was

initiated against the petitioner by issuing chargesheet to him

and was dismissed from service after giving due opportunity of

hearing. As such there is no procedural error and infirmity in

the order of dismissal passed by the Project Officer (RWP) vide

order no. RWP/PO-9/98-99/5335 dated 08.02.1999.

10. It is further submitted that learned Tribunal has rightly not

interfered with the order of dismissal of the petitioner and the

same needs no interference in exercise of the power under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner himself

had admitted in his statement made during vigilance enquiry

that his father neither possessed any land at village Bahera nor

ever resided there. It is also submitted that the petitioner had

failed to adduce any evidence in support of his claim that he

was appointed after calling his name from the employment

exchange(s), rather the appointment letter of the petitioner

would itself reveal that he was appointed as nephew of the

concerned land owner.

11. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the

materials placed on record.

12. Before coming to the merit of respective contentions of learned

counsel for the parties, it would be relevant to refer few

judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing

with the power of superintendence of the High Court under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India both in judicial as well

as administrative matters over all courts and tribunals.

13. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind & Others,

reported in (2001) 1 SCC 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

held as under:-

"33. ------- The power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, while exercising the

power of judicial review against an order of inferior Tribunal being supervisory and not appellate, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the conclusion of the Tribunal, only when it records a finding that the inferior Tribunal's conclusion is based upon exclusion of some admissible evidence or consideration of some inadmissible evidence or the inferior Tribunal has no jurisdiction at all or that the finding is such, which no reasonable man could arrive at, on the materials on record."

14. In the case of State of W.B. & Others Vs. Samar Kumar

Sarkar, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 444, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has held as under:-

"12. Under Article 227, the High Court has been given the power of superintendence both in judicial as well as administrative matters over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It is in order to indicate the plentitude of the power conferred upon the High Court with respect to courts and the tribunals of every kind that the Constitution conferred the power of superintendence on the High Court. The power of superintendence conferred upon the High Court is not as extensive as the power conferred upon it by Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, ordinarily it will be open to the High Court, in exercise of the power of superintendence only to consider whether there is an error of jurisdiction in the decision of the court or the tribunal subject to its superintendence."

15. In the case of State through Special Cell, New Delhi Vs.

Navjot Sandhu alias Afshan Guru & Others, reported in

(2003) 6 SCC 641, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as

under:-

"28. Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep

subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise".

16. Thus, it is now well settled that under Article 227, the High

Court has been conferred power of superintendence both in

judicial as well as administrative matters over all courts and

tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it

exercises jurisdiction. The power of superintendence of the

High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is a

supervisory power and not an appellate one and as such an

order of the Tribunal would be interfered with, only when the

High Court records a finding that the Tribunal's conclusion was

based upon exclusion of some admissible evidence or

consideration of some inadmissible evidence or the Tribunal

had no jurisdiction at all or that the finding is such, which no

reasonable man could arrive at, on the materials on record.

This power of judicial superintendence under Article 227, must

be exercised sparingly as supervisory jurisdiction of High

Courts extends only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals

within the bounds of their authority as well as to meet the ends

of justice and not to correct mere errors. The jurisdiction under

Article 227 should not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal

in disguise".

17. Thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the

petitioner is that the petitioner was appointed pursuant to due

selection process by conducting written test after inviting

names of eligible candidates from the employment exchanges

of Ramgarh and Ranchi and mentioning of details of plots with

respect to land etc. in the appointment letter of the petitioner

was an error committed by the concerned authority for which

the petitioner cannot be held liable.

18. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner, this Court has perused the appointment letter of the

petitioner, which has been annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ

petition, and on bare perusal of the same it is evident that the

petitioner was appointed being the nephew of the owner of the

land under Khata Nos. 65, 35 & 105; Plot Nos. 183, 198,

500(P), 395, 431, 337, 278, 388, 349, 359, 51, 43, 45 & 46,

situated at village Bahera, P.S Tandwa, District Chatra. In the

said appointment letter, it has also been specified that if at any

time before or after final acquisition of land in question, any

person of the petitioner's family or any person

related/connected with the land causes any obstruction in

smooth running of the construction work/mining operation on

the land so acquired by CCL, the petitioner's service will be

liable for termination without assigning any further reason.

19. The petitioner has himself admitted that he is not related with

the owner of the concerned land. Though the petitioner has

claimed that it was wrongly mentioned in his appointment

letter that he was appointed under land looser scheme being

nephew of owner of the acquired land by the CCL, however,

he has failed to bring on record any document to suggest that

he had made any request before the concerned authority for

correction of such error. Thus, this Court finds no substance in

the claim of the petitioner that there was an inadvertent error

in the appointment letter of the petitioner with respect to

mentioning the details of the acquired land.

20. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to produce any document

either during disciplinary proceeding or before the learned

Tribunal to show that he was appointed pursuant to inviting

his name from employment exchange. Though, the petitioner

has brought on record "National Apprenticeship Certificate" in

the trade of "Fitter" issued in his name as well as one of the

pages of admit card containing guidelines of written

examination for selection on the post of Mechanical Fitter (ITI)

in CAT-I issued by the Central Coalfields Limited, however,

both these documents are not sufficient to substantiate the

claim of the petitioner that he was appointed after inviting his

name from Employment Exchange and pursuant to due

selection process.

21. The further claim of the petitioner is that ample opportunity of

hearing was not given to him during the departmental

proceeding and thus the order of his dismissal from service has

been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The

issue of fairness of the domestic enquiry was raised by the

petitioner before the learned Tribunal also and said objection

was decided as a preliminary issue by the Tribunal holding that

the domestic enquiry was quite fair, proper and in accordance

with the principles of natural justice. This court also finds that

the petitioner was issued chargesheet-cum-suspension letter

dated 21/22.03.1998 and after perusal of his explanation dated

03.06.1998 enquiry officer was appointed vide memo dated

10.04.1998. The petitioner was given ample opportunity by the

enquiry officer to adduce evidences. After proper enquiry, the

enquiry officer submitted its report to the disciplinary authority

and thereafter the second show cause notice was issued to the

petitioner providing him further opportunity to explain the

allegation. Finally, the order of dismissal of the petitioner from

service was passed by the respondent no. 2 vide order

no.RWP/PO-9/98-99/5335 dated 08.02.1999. Thus, no

procedural irregularity has been found in the departmental

proceeding.

22. The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the

petitioner is that the respondent no. 2 was not the competent

authority to pass the order of dismissal of the petitioner since

the appointing authority of the petitioner was General Manager

(Personnel & Admn.), Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga

House, Ranchi.

23. To appreciate the said contention of the petitioner, it would be

proper to refer the judgment rendered by learned Division

Bench of this court in the case of Suresh Kumar Singh Vs.

Central Coalfields Limited & Others, reported in 2021

SCC OnLine Jhar 1507, in which it has been held as under:-

"15. This Court, on appreciation of the aforesaid argument, deems it fit and proper first to consider the question of jurisdiction but before proceeding, it requires to refer herein that the issue of jurisdiction has not been raised by the writ petitioner before the writ Court as would be evident from the pleading made in the writ petition, save and except, a bald statement has been made wherein it has been averred that the inquiry proceeding is not sustainable in the eye of Law but even though, there is no pleading to that effect but since the jurisdictional issue being a legal issue and since it has been raised before the intra court, therefore, we deem it fit and proper to answer the same.

There is no dispute about the fact that the appointing authority can exercise the power of disciplinary authority which confers power under the statute and in absence thereof, if any proceeding is being initiated, the same will be nullity in the eye of Law due to jurisdictional error.

It is also not in dispute that the writ petitioners being a workmen working under the CCL Management against whom a memorandum of charge has been issued and the disciplinary authority is still at the stage of inquiry which is being proceeded in pursuance to the provision as contained under the provision of the Act, 1946.

The aforesaid Standing Orders contains a provision as under Clause 2.3 which is being referred as hereunder:

--

"'Competent Authority' means an officer specially nominated by the Chairman/Managing Director concerned by an order in writing for the purpose of these standing orders. Such orders shall be put on Notice Board and copies sent to the concerned registered trade unions."

The documents which have been appended as Annexure-A and Annexure-B to the affidavit and kept at Flag-"A" pertains to subject "delegation in terms of provisions of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to Central Coalfields Limited under Clause 2.3".

The content of the said circular stipulates that in pursuance of Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to Central Coalfields Limited, 'Competent Authority' for the purpose of these Standing Orders is to be nominated by the Chairman/Managing Director. Accordingly, the following Officers are nominated as Competent Authority for the purpose of Certified Standing Orders in respect of CCL. The 'Competent Authority' has been defined and the relevant for the present case which reads hereunder as:--

"(1) In respect of Areas of CCL, the Chief General Mangers/General Managers/Project Officers/Colliery Managers will be the Competent Authority to exercise the powers for implementation of the provisions of

Standing Orders and taking disciplinary action under the provisions of Certified Standing Orders."

Likewise, the 'appellate authority' has also been defined therein in view of the provision as contained under Clause-30 and Clause-31 thereof.

The documents appended as Annexure-A to the affidavit dated 9.9.2021 speaks about conferment of power to act as the competent authority in view of the provision as contained under Clause 2.3, however, the same has been issued under the seal and signature of the General Manager.

In furtherance to that circular, one another circular was issued on 25.8.2003 as has been appended as Annexure- B to the affidavit. The content thereof is that in pursuance and in terms of Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to all establishments of Central Coalfields Limited, the following Officers have been specially nominated as 'Competent Authority' by the Chairman-cum-Managing director, CCL in the matter of exercising powers for implementation of different provisions under the Certified Standing Orders including taking disciplinary action. Clause 1 thereof confers power upon the Project Officer to act as the Competent Authority.

16. Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the appellant writ petitioner has raised two issues on these circulars i.e., circular dated 1.10.99 and circular dated 25.8.2003 i.e.:--

(i) These two circulars have not been certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner as required to be certified in view of the provision of the Act, 1946 and

(ii) The power as under Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders is required to be conferred by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director but it has been conferred by the General Manager and therefore, the same cannot be said to be in consonance with the provision of Clause 2.3.

22. Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant writ petitioner has further tried to impress upon the Court that the disciplinary authority must be the appointing authority and cannot subordinate to it and in support of his argument, he has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of UCO Bank v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra).

23. This Court, has considered the aforesaid judgment and found therefrom that the said judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the facts of the case where the statute itself provides that the disciplinary authority cannot subordinate to the appointing authority.

But herein in the given facts of this case, learned counsel for the appellants writ petitioners have failed to demonstrate any Law which prohibits the respondent CCL to the effect that the disciplinary authority will not be subordinate to the appointing authority rather his fact is different in

view of the provision as contained under Clause 2.3, based upon the same, the power has been conferred upon the concerned Officer as would be evident from the circular dated 1.10.99 and circular dated 25.8.2003 as referred hereinabove."

24. In view of Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders

applicable to Central Coalfields Limited, 'Competent Authority'

for the purpose of these Standing Orders is to be nominated

by the Chairman/Managing Director and the Chief General

Mangers/General Managers/Project Officers/Colliery Managers

have been designated as the Competent Authority to exercise

the powers to implement the provisions of the Standing Orders

and to take disciplinary action under the provisions of Certified

Standing Orders. Thus, this Court finds no substance in the

argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the

respondent no.2 was not the competent authority to initiate

the departmental proceeding against the petitioner and to pass