Tuesday, 12, May, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... vs Vayam Technologies Limited
2025 Latest Caselaw 2527 Jhar

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 2527 Jhar
Judgement Date : 11 February, 2025

Jharkhand High Court

The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... vs Vayam Technologies Limited on 11 February, 2025

Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                       L.P.A. No. 337 of 2019
     1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Urban
        Development & Housing Department, Project Building, P.O. & P.S.
        Dhurwa, District-Ranchi
     2. The Director, State Urban Development Agency, 4 th Floor, Project
        Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi
     3. The Director, Municipal Administration, Urban Development &
        Housing Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, 3rd Floor, Project Building,
        P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi.. ...      ...   Appellants
                              Versus
        Vayam Technologies Limited, a company registered under the
        Companies Act, 1956 and having its office at "Thapar House" 124
        Janpath, P.O., P.S. & District- New Delhi-110001, through its Vice
        President and authorized representative namely Rajesh Gupta, Son of
        Late Anand Prakash Gupta, aged about 44 years, resident of 8A/77,
        Ground Floor, WEA, P.O. & P.S.- Karol Bagh, District New Delhi
        110005                           ...        ...  Respondent
                              ---------

     CORAM:   HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

                            ---------
     For the Appellants : Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. S.C. II
     For the Respondent:    Ms. Aanya Advocate
                            Mr. Amitabh, Advocate
                            --------
     Reserved on: 23.01.2025              Pronounced on: 11 /02/2025
     M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.(Oral)

Re: I.A. No. 4288 of 2019 in LPA No. 337 of 2019

1) This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

by the applicants to condone the delay of 276 days in filing this appeal,

challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

2) In the application filing seeking condonation of delay, it is stated

that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 1036 of 2018

was passed on 28.6.2018, that the information about the judgment was

received in the applicants' department on 12.7.2018, and the concerned

Assistant made a note of it and placed the concerned file before the 2 nd

appellant. It is stated that the copy of the impugned judgment was not

available with the department and the 2nd appellant then asked the Section

Officer on 20.7.2018 to obtain the copy.

3) It is stated that in the meantime, the judgment was sent to the

applicants' department on 10.9.2018 by the High Court, and after receiving

it, the file was placed before the Assistant Section Officer on 12.9.2018 in

order that it be placed before the proper authority for taking appropriate

decision.

4) It is stated that the file was then sent to the Deputy Director of the

department on 12.9.2018 and he placed it before the Director on 14.9.2018.

The file was then placed before the 1st appellant on 3.10.2018 and he then

requested the Law department of the State Government to give opinion on

12.10.2018.

5) It is stated that the file then sent to the Law department on

22.10.2018. Ultimately the file was placed before the Advocate General on

5.11.2018 and he endorsed it to his Associate Counsel for drafting the

appeal and after collecting some relevant documents and material in

January, 2019, the appeal was filed on 30.4.2019.

6) It is stated that the delay in filing of the appeal was on account of

need to comply with procedural formalities and the same may be condoned.

7) From the facts narrated above, it is clear that though the impugned

judgment was pronounced on 28.6.2018 , application for certified copy was

not made and the processing of the file actually commenced after the copy

of the judgment sent by the High Court, was received on 10.9.2018 i.e. more

than 2 and 1/ 2 months later.

8) Even, thereafter, the file was being sent from table to table and

from officer to officer and though the Advocate General office received it

on 5.11.2018, the appeal came to be filed only on 30.4.2019, five months

later.

9) Thus, at every stage, there was a delay in taking steps to file the

appeal.

10) In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India

Limited and another1, the Supreme Court held:

"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9- 2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8- 1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other

(2012) 3 SCC 563

dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned.

Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government." (emphasis supplied)

11) These observations equally apply to the instant case where the

applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case.

12) The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in

several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex

Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise

Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India vs.

Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India &

Others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and

State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others6.

13) In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)

through his LR7, the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the

merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause

has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it

hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of

India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years;

length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into

consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned

or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that

they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the

proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it

is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on

merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-

deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead

that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the

technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for

(2022) 3 SCC 159

(2022) 2 SCC 327

(2021) 11 SCC 557

(2022) 9 SCC 263

(2022) 9 SCC 266

2024 INSC 262: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489

condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main

case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the

explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that

delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.

14) This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.

Ramkumar Choudhary8.

15) By allowing multiple people to deal with the question as to

whether or not the judgment of the learned Single Judge is to be

challenged and, without speeding up the process within the Department,

it is not open to the appellants to act as if they can take their own sweet

time and file the appeal as and when it suits them.

16) Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the

above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are satisfied that sufficient

cause has not been shown by the applicants for condonation of delay of

276 days in filing the appeal.

17) Accordingly, this application is dismissed. Consequently, the

Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed.

18) Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)

(Deepak Roshan, J.) N.A.F.R. Sharda/-

8 Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt. 29.11.2024

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : IJJ

 

LatestLaws Partner Event : Smt. Nirmala Devi Bam Memorial International Moot Court Competition

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter