[Cites 31, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Munesh Yadav Aged About 40 Years vs The State Of Jharkhand on 4 December, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1474 of 2024
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1. Munesh Yadav aged about 40 years, son of Natho Yadav,
2. Pawan Kumar Yadav aged about 29 years, son of Natho Yadav,
Both resident of Village-Bhatbigha, P.O. & P.S.-Chauparan,
District-Hazaribagh;
3. Naresh Yadav aged about 26 years, son of Mahaveer Yadav
resident of village-Urwan, P.O. & P.S.-Chandwara, District-
Koderma. .... .... Appellants
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ..... .... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For Appellant No.1 : Mr. Anil Kumar, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Randhir Kumar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Subodh Kr. Dubey, A.P.P.
For O.P. No.2 : Mr. Nilesh Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Kumar Amit, Advocate
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C.A.V. on 17.11.2025 Pronounced on 04/12/2025
Prayer
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of
appellant no.1, namely, Munesh Yadav under Section 430(1) of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for suspension
of sentence dated 30.09.2024 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge-I, Koderma, in connection with S.T. No.76 of
2018, arising out of Chandwara P.S. Case No.16 of 2018,
whereby and whereunder, the appellant has been convicted and
sentenced and all the sentences have been directed to
concurrently as follows: -
sl Offences Sentence (R.I.) Fine Sentence
under (Rs.) in default
Sections of payment
of fine
(S.I.)
1 302/34 IPC R.I. for whole 50,0 S.I. for 2
natural life (i.e. till 00/- years
last breath)
2 120B IPC R.I. for whole 50,0 S.I. for 2
natural life (i.e. till 00/- years
last breath)
3 307/34 IPC R.I. for 10 years 5,00 S.I. for 6
0/- months
4 03 of R.I. for 12 years 5,00 S.I. for 6
Explosive 0/- months
Substance
Act
5 04 of R.I. for 10 years 5,00 S.I. for 6
Explosive 0/- months
Substance
Act
Factual Matrix
2. The case of the prosecution in brief, as per the written report
dated 13.02.2018 of the informant Hemlata Devi that on
13.02.2018 at about 2:30 O' Clock in the day, her husband
Shankar Yadav along with his private bodyguard Krishna
Yadav (now deceased) and driver Dharmendra Yadav, from his
Scorpio Vehicle, had gone at his mines and crusher unit
situated at village-Bhatbigha, P.S.-Chauparan, District-
Hazaribagh. Meanwhile, at about 4:25 O' Clock in the evening,
she got information that while running to his home from there,
near Pradeep Singh's mines on the road, by causing a bomb
explosion, the said Scorpio vehicle of her husband was blown
out, in which her husband died on the spot and his private
bodyguard also died at Sadar Hospital, Koderma, and the
driver Dharmendra Yadav (PW12) was referred to RIMS,
Ranchi, for treatment in a serious condition.
3. It has been alleged therein that for the last 4-5 years, a dispute
and a case in the court regarding mines and other money
transactions, was going on with her villagers, namely, Jivlal
Yadav, Ashok Yadav (A-5), Vijay Yadav and Shankar Yadav, all
sons of Late Gulli Yadav.
4. It has also been alleged that a dispute regarding stone mines
was also going on between her husband and the accused
Munesh Yadav (A-1) (present applicant/appellant), who is a
resident of Village Bhatbhigha, under Chauparan P.S., District-
Hazaribagh.
5. It has been further alleged that before this occurrence, the
said persons, in order to grab the mines of the informant and
her husband, in conspiracy with each other and in order to
commit murder of her husband (Shankar Yadav) had inflicted
gun-shot injury to her husband on 24.10.2017, regarding which
Chauparan P.S. Case No. 246/2017 (Ext.-5) had been lodged.
But for want of proper investigation in that case and 'due to no
arrest of the accused in that case on time, the accused of that
case, connived with extremists' association.
6. She has stated that she had also came to know that the said
accused persons were conspiring to commit murder of her
husband in connivance with the extremist associations. It has
further been alleged that the said persons have committed
murder of her husband in a well-planned manner, in
conspiracy with each other and also with the help of
extremists.
7. On the basis of the above written report, Chandwara P.S. Case
No.16/2018 dated 13.02.2018 under Sections
147/148/149/302/120-B of the I.P.C. and Sections 3/4/5 of
Explosive Substance Act, was registered against the accused
persons, namely, Jivlal Yadav, Ashok Yadav, Vijay Yadav,
Shankar Yadav and Munesh Yadav (present
applicant/appellant).
8. During investigation of the case, accused persons were
arrested and their confessional statements were recorded and
recovery of mobile phones sets and others incriminating
materials were recovered from them. The statement of some
of the witnesses were also recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
9. On conclusion of investigation of the case, Charge Sheet No.
28/2018 dated 17.05.2018 for the offences under Sections
302/307/326/120-B/34 of I.P.C and Sections 3/4/5 of Explosive
Substance Act was submitted against the accused persons,
namely, Munesh Yadav (present applicant/appellant), Ashok
Yadav, Pawan Yadav, Sudeep Yadav (already produced before
J.J.B. as a juvenile), Naresh Yadav and Ramdeo Yadav,
keeping further investigation pending against other accused
persons, namely, Jivlal Yadav, Vijay Yadav and Shankar
Yadav.
10. On the basis of the said Charge Sheet, vide order dated
18.05.2018 cognizance of said offence was taken against the
said accused persons and thereafter, vide order dated
25.07.2018, the case against the accused persons was
committed before the Sessions Judge, Koderma. On the basis
aforesaid thereof, this case, i.e., S.T. No. 76 /2018 was
registered in the Court of the Sessions Judge.
11. From the record, it is evident that one of the accused, namely,
Sudeep Yadav, was found to be a juvenile at the time of his
arrest by the police and his production before the learned
Judicial Magistrate, and accordingly, his split-up case record
was sent to learned J.J. Board, Koderma, for inquiry/trial.
Charges, as stated above, were framed against the remaining
accused persons on 02.02.2019, to which, they pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial.
12. In order to substantiate the prosecution case, prosecution has
examined altogether 32 witnesses and the learned trial court
after appreciation of evidence has found the charges levelled
against the present applicant/appellant along with other
accused persons, have been proved beyond all reasonable
doubts and accordingly, the present applicant/appellant has
been convicted and sentenced, as aforesaid.
13. The instant interlocutory application has been preferred by the
applicant/appellant no.1, namely, Munesh Yadav with the
prayer for the suspension of sentence during pendency of the
instant appeal.
Submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant
14. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the
learned trial court has miserably failed to take into
consideration the fact that the entire case is based upon the
circumstantial evidence and there is no eye witness to show
the culpability of the present appellant in the alleged offence.
15. The learned trial court has also failed to appreciate the fact
that the alleged tempo bearing registration no. JH-10AH-5219
from which the explosion was made, was in possession of the
appellant/applicant.
16. It has further been submitted that the entire case of the
prosecution rests on the confessional statement of the
convicts, though, the Investigating Officer who has been
examined as P.W-32, has made statement specifically that in
the CCTV footage, the number of the alleged Tempo was not
visible.
17. It has also been submitted that the Investigating Officer has
made categorical statement that in course of investigation, he
came to know that the present appellant, namely, Munesh
Yadav, has purchased one Tempo from co-convict, Ramdev
Yadav, however, the source of such information has not been
disclosed by the Investigating Officer nor any witness has
supported the factum of purchase of alleged tempo by the
present appellant.
18. It has been submitted that none of the witnesses have seen
the explosion in the tempo nor any witnesses have stated that
explosives were loaded on the tempo.
19. It has further been submitted that in the cases of the
circumstantial evidence, the Court is required to be more
circumspect to see and ensure that there is no missing link in
the chain of circumstances to come to a conclusion of guilt of
the accused but in the facts of the present case, there is no
chain of the circumstance, to point out the guilt of the
appellant/applicant, rather, there is not a single circumstance
to point out the guilt of the appellant/applicant.
20. Moreover, the present appellant, namely, Munesh Yadav is
languishing in judicial custody since 19.02.2018.
21. Lastly, the learned senior counsel has raised the issue of parity
and contended that since the other accused persons Ramdeo
Yadav, Pawan Kumar Yadav and Naresh Yadav have been
allowed to be released from judicial custody after suspension
of sentence by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide orders
dated 23.04.2025, 21.07.2025 and 23.04.2025 passed in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.1369 of 2024 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1474 of
2024 respectively, therefore, present applicant/appellant is
also entitled for suspension of sentence during pendency of
the instant appeal.
22. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that it is a fit case for suspension of sentence during
pendency of the appeal.
Submission of the learned A.P.P for the respondent-State and
learned counsel for the Informant
23. While on the other hand, learned A.P.P. appearing for the
respondent-State assisted by learned counsel for the Informant
have vehemently opposed the prayer for suspension of
sentence.
24. It has been contended that the plan was well devised by
Munesh Yadav, the present appellant, who was provided
shelter by Ramdeo Yadav at his in-laws house after the
incident.
25. Further, it has been contended that P.W-25, who was an officer
of the recovery agency engaged by UCO Bank had managed
to purchase a Tempo which was subsequently handed over to
Munesh Yadav, who had executed his plan of eliminating
Shankar Yadav and from the aforesaid, it is apparent that chain
of circumstances has been completed which are sufficient to
prove the guilt of present appellant.
26. It has further been contended that the culpability and role of the
present applicant/appellant in the alleged commission of crime
is different to that of role of the other co-accused who have
been granted bail by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, as
such, law of parity will not be applicable herein and further, it is
settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its power
in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of
circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying
that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to
determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity
has been established.
27. It has been contended that there was previous enmity of the
present applicant with the deceased and this fact has been
substantiated by the informant who had stated that a dispute
regarding stone mines was also going on between her
husband and the accused Munesh Yadav (A-1) (present
applicant/appellant), who is a resident of Village Bhatbhigha,
under Chauparan P.S., District - Hazaribagh.
28. Learned State Counsel as also the learned counsel for the
Informant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted
that there is material available on record, based upon which,
the learned trial Court has found the charge proved beyond all
reasonable doubts and hence, it is not a fit case for suspension
of sentence during pendency of the instant appeal.
Analysis
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
across the finding recorded by the learned trial court in the
impugned judgment, as also, the testimony of the witnesses
along with other exhibits, as available in the Trial Court
Records.
30. Since, it is case under Section 302 IPC and present
appellant/applicant has been convicted for offence of murder
therefore, at this juncture, it requires to refer herein the settled
position of law that in cases involving conviction under Section
302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of
suspension of sentence can be granted, reference in this regard
may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar
Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123, for ready reference, the
relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid Judgment are being
quoted as under:
"31. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra,
(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v.
Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal,
(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] , it was held by this
Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302IPC, it
is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of
sentence can be granted. In Vijay Kumar [Vijay Kumar v.
Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] , it was
held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a
serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302IPC,
the court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of
accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the
crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the
offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail
after they have been convicted for committing the serious
offence of murder.
33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the
endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see
as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and
accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which,
ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the
answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the affirmative, as
a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the
convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands
of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty
long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually takes
very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking
the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances
of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To
put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross
on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the court can
arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not
be sustainable. The appellate court should not reappreciate the
evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a
few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the
prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach."
31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently on 09th April, 2025, in the
case of Janardan Ray Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. ETC.
(Cr. Appeal Nos. 1892-1893 of 2025 arising out of SLP (Crl.)
Nos. 18326-18327 of 2024) while placing reliance upon
decision rendered in the case of Om Prakash Sahni Vs. Jai
Shankar Chaudhary and Anr., (supra) has observed at
paragraphs-6 and 7 as under:
"6. In our opinion, the decision of this Court in the case of Om
Prakash Sahni Vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr. (2023) 6
SCC 123 clinches the issue involved in the present appeals. It
has been observed while considering the scope of Section 389
of Cr.P.C as under.:-
"30. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa [Kishori Lal v. Rupa, (2004) 7 SCC
638], this Court has indicated the factors that require to be
considered by the courts while granting benefit under Section
389 CrPC in cases involving serious offences like murder, etc.
Thus, it is useful to refer to the observations made therein,
which are as follows : (SCC pp. 639-40, paras 4-6)
4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution
of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on
bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of
sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the
requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing
for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order
appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court can
direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The
requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that
there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects
and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail
should not be passed as a matter of routine.
5. The appellate court is duty-bound to objectively assess the
matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case
warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail.
In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have
weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of
sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of
misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the accused-
respondents were on bail.
6. The mere fact that during the trial, they were granted bail and
there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is really not of much
significance. The effect of bail granted during trial loses
significance when on completion of trial, the accused persons
have been found guilty. The mere fact that during the period
when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was
no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of
execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was
necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether
reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and
thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have
kept the in view.
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7. Having regard to the afore stated settled legal position,
we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed
gross error in appreciating the evidence already
appreciated by the Trial Court at the time of considering
the applications seeking suspension of sentence pending
the appeal. Since this was a case of conviction under
Section 302 IPC, the initial presumption available to the
accused before conviction, would not be available to him.
The High Court could not have suspended the sentence,
reappreciating the evidence at the stage of Section 389 and
trying to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there
in the case of prosecution. The consideration of High Court
to the submission made on behalf of the accused that he
had not misused the liberty during the trial or that the
appeal was not likely to be heard in near future, could not
be said to be the proper consideration for suspending the
sentence of the accused, who have been convicted for the
serious offence under Section 302, IPC. It is only in rare
and exceptional circumstances, the benefit of suspension
of sentence should be granted by the appellate court to the
accused convicted for the serious offence under Section
302, IPC."
32. Thus, it is evident from perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the
aforesaid judgment, is it is apparent that while considering the
prayer for bail, in a case involving a serious offence like murder
punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider
the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against
the accused, the manner, in which, the crime is alleged to have
been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability
of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted
for committing the serious offence of murder.
33. It is further evident from perusal of the relevant paragraphs of
the aforesaid judgment that the appellate court should not
reappreciate the evidence at the stage of consideration of
suspension of sentence and try to pick up a few lacunae or
loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such
would not be a correct approach and at this stage Court is only
to see the prima facie case for its satisfaction.
34. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Preet Pal Singh
vs. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645 has observed that there is
difference between grant of bail in case of pre-trial arrest and
suspension of sentence, post- conviction. In the earlier case,
there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental
postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be
liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case,
however, in case of post- conviction bail, by suspension of
operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the
question of presumption of innocence does not arise. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is
being quoted as under:
"35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section
439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence
under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In
the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence,
which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and
the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule
and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh
v. State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC
22 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post-
conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence,
there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of
innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the
rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction
upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for
suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the
prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors.
There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail,
notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of
sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be
recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section
389(1) CrPC."
35. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment, that during
considering suspension of sentence which is the post-conviction
stage, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused
cannot be available and at this stage, the Court's only duty is to
see that the prima-facie case is made out or not and as such
the detailed appreciation of evidence is not required at this
stage.
36. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the Hon'ble Apex
Court has categorically observed that since after conviction, the
initial presumption available to the accused before conviction,
would not be available to him, therefore the High Court could
not have suspended the sentence, reappreciating the evidence
at the stage of Section 389 and trying to pick up a few lacunae
or loopholes here or there in the case of prosecution.
37. It has further been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the
consideration of High Court to the submission made on behalf
of the accused that he had not misused the liberty during the
trial or that the appeal was not likely to be heard in near future,
could not be said to be the proper consideration for suspending
the sentence of the accused, who have been convicted for the
serious offence under Section 302, IPC and it is only in rare
and exceptional circumstances, the benefit of suspension of
sentence should be granted by the appellate court to the
accused convicted for the serious offence under Section 302,
IPC.
38. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled proposition of law this
Court is now adverting to the factual aspect of the case as well
as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and
State as also the informant, in order to find out that whether the
prayer of the applicant/appellant for suspension of sentence is
fit to be allowed or not.
39. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant has contended that
there is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the entire case is
based on circumstantial evidence wherein chain of the
circumstances has not been completed and the prosecution has
proceeded on imaginary theory and this fact has not been
appreciated by the learned Trial Court in the right perspective.
40. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that there is no
dispute about the settled position of law that the conviction on
the basis of circumstantial evidences, the proper consideration
is to be there by the learned trial court on the basis of principle
of completion of chain and the moment, the chain will break,
there cannot be conviction on the basis of the said
circumstances.
41. It requires to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
year 1952, in the judgment rendered in Hanumant Son of
Govind Nargundkar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1952
SC 343] has laid down the parameters under which, the case
of circumstantial evidence is to be evaluated, which suggests
that - "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence
is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be
fully established, and all the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words,
there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act must have been done
by the accused. ......"
42. The judgment referred in Hanumant (supra) has been
consistently followed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment
rendered in Tufail (Alias) Simmi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
[(1969) 3 SCC 198]; Ram Gopal Vs. State of
Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625] and Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116] and also
in Musheer Khan alias Badshah Khan & Anr. Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 2 SCC 748].
43. Thus, it is evident that for proving the charge on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, it would be necessary that evidence
so available must induce a reasonable man to come to a
definite conclusion of proving of guilt; meaning thereby there
must be a chain of evidence so far it is complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act must have been done
by the accused.
44. This Court, on the basis aforesaid settled position of law has
gone through the testimony of the witnesses as well as material
available on record in order to find out that the prayer of the
applicant/appellant for suspension of sentence is fit to be
allowed or not.
45. Admittedly, from impugned judgment of conviction, it is evident
that the instant case is based upon the circumstantial
evidences and further, there is no eye-witnesses of the alleged
occurrence.
46. P.W-1, informant (wife of the deceased) had testified that she
came to know that accused Munesh Yadav (appellant herein),
Jivlal Yadav, Vijay Yadav, Ashok Yadav, Shankar Yadav had
caused explosion at the place of occurrence and had blown up
their Scorpio by keeping / planting bomb in an auto rickshaw
(tempo) under conspiracy and thereby, they committed murder
of her husband. In para 10, PW 1 has further deposed that on
24.10.2017, the accused Munesh Yadav (A-1) had inflicted
gunshot injury to her husband, regarding which, she had
lodged a case at Chauparan Police Station. She had further
stated in the cross examination that one Nathu Yadav (father of
accused Munesh Yadav, appellant herein) was the khatiyani
raiyat, who had sold the land to her husband, but he was still
claiming that land and, in this regard, a Civil Suit had also been
filed by Natho Yadav, which was decided in their (informant's)
favour.
47. Thus, from the testimony of P.W.-1 prima facie, it appears that
there was inimical relationship between present applicant and
the deceased. Further the aforesaid fact of the inimical
relationship between the deceased and present appellant has
been substantiated by the testimony of P.W.2-wife of deceased
private bodyguard, namely, Krishna Yadav who had also stated
that about three months prior to the occurrence also, her
husband was working with the deceased Shankar Yadav, when
accused Munesh Yadav had caused gunshot injury to Shankar
Yadav and after that occurrence, a scuffle had taken place
between her husband and accused Munesh Yadav, in which
Munesh Yadav had caused injury on the head of her husband
with the butt of the gun, due to which, her husband had to be
given two stitches on his head.
48. P.W. - 25, namely, Sachin Kumar Barnwal, is engaged in the
business of sale and purchase of second hand four wheelers
and he is an employee of "Air Agency and Services Pvt. Ltd.", a
private recovery company. He is also dealing in the vehicles
seized by banks, who had stated that he handed tempo
bearing registration No. JH-10AH-5219 to the accused
Ramdeo Yadav at Barhi Chowk. At para-8, he has identified the
accused Ramdeo Yadav in the court by saying that he had sold
out that tempo to him.
49. P.W. - 32, namely, Inspector Kailash Prasad Yadav, is the
Investigating Officer (I.O) of this case. He had also stated that
the Scorpio vehicle of deceased Shankar Yadav bearing
registration No. JH 12F-0858 was lying badly damaged in the
south direction of the road and the road is there in east - west
direction and the face of the Scorpio was in east direction. He
has further stated that different scattered parts of a tempo, as
its remnants, were also found lying on the same road in the
same direction in which the said Scorpio was lying.
50. He was informed that the dead body of deceased Shankar
Yadav was also found lying near his damaged Scorpio in the
south side. He was further told that the Scorpio of Shankar
Yadav was going from towards Salhara to Chandwara, and as
soon as the Scorpio got slowed down near the said temporary
speed breaker, a huge explosion took place in the tempo
standing there from before, and due to this explosion, the said
Scorpio got damaged and the occupants of the same, namely,
Shankar Yadav, his private bodyguard Krishan Yadav and
Driver-Dharmendra Yadav got seriously injured, causing death
of Shankar Yadav on the spot itself.
51. He had further stated that he again went to the place of
occurrence on 14.02.2018 and made a seizure list (Ext. 11/ 2)
regarding damaged Scorpio, damaged tempo, a rifle with
magazine and 09 cartridges and sent the same for examination
at the FSL, Ranchi. At para-33, he has stated that on
13.02.2018, several calls were made between the above-
mentioned mobile phone numbers of Pawan Yadav, Ramdeo
Yadav, Munesh Yadav and Sudeep Yadav. At para-54, he has
stated that another mobile phone number of Ramdeo Yadav
was found to be 9931956050 and on the date of occurrence,
i.e., 13.02.2018, several calls had been made between Munesh
Yadav (appellant herein) and Ramdeo Yadav from 16:48:45 till
21:22:06 hours.
52. At para-60, P.W.-32 (I.O.) has further deposed that on
20.08.2018, confessional statement of accused Munesh Yadav
was recorded in which he confessed his guilt. This witness in
his testimony had stated that then he proceeded to village -
Parhariya, from where electric wire of 1.5 metre length was
recovered at the instance of Munesh Yadav (appellant herein),
which was seized by making a seizure list in his handwriting
and signature. The photocopy of that seizure list has been
marked as X / 3 for identification.
53. At para-65, he has stated that on the disclosure made by
accused Munesh Yadav, he reached on the banks of Konar
River and from there, he recovered splinters of iron, which
were seized by making a seizure list (the photocopy whereof is
Marked as X / 4 for identification). He had further deposed at
para-67 that thereafter, he reached Patratu Basti at "Omkar
Accessories" shop of one Chandan Kumar, who disclosed that
he had sold the said remote control to accused Munesh Yadav
and he also identified Munesh Yadav at that time.
54. He had further stated that on the disclosure made by accused
Munesh Yadav, he reached at Vishwakarma Garage at
Hurhuru, where, for sampling, iron pipe etc. had been cut. At
that shop, statements of witnesses Subhash Vishwakarma and
Md. Imran were recorded, who disclosed that in their garage,
the work of iron pipe cutting had been got done by accused
Munesh Yadav and bolts had also been affixed over the same
and they had made setting in the tempo as told by Munesh
Yadav. At para-107, he had stated that the said tempo had
been purchased by the accused Munesh Yadav from Ramdeo
Yadav on the pretext of transporting diesel over the same.
55. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that recovery of
incriminating articles has been made on the basis of the
confessional statement of the present appellant and further the
fact of suitable changes made in the said tempo for purpose of
fitting of the explosive has come on the record.
56. Thus, Prima facie, it appears that earlier the accused Munesh
Yadav planned and conspired to eliminate Shankar Yadav
(deceased) and for this purpose, he also made a murderous
attack on him by firing bullet shots on him in which Shankar
Yadav got seriously injured and had to be hospitalized and
regarding the same, a case under Section 307 of I.P.C. etc.
was lodged against Munesh Yadav (present case and other
case being Chauparan P.S. Case No. 246 / 2017 (marked as
Ext. 5).
57. Further, from a bare perusal of the photographs (Exts. 62 to 62
/4) of both the vehicles, i.e., tempo and the Scorpio, with FSL
report (Exts. 58, 59 & 60) and the postmortem reports (Exts. 19
& 19 / 1), it is evident that explosion took place in the tempo.
Prima facie, it has come on record that accused Ramdeo
Yadav had admitted that he supplied tempo to accused
Munesh Yadav (appellant herein) and this fact has also been
supported by P.W. - 25 and P.W. - 26, who had delivered the
said tempo to accused Ramdeo Yadav at Barhi Further, the
allegation of making special addition and alteration in that
vehicle and preparing of iron splinters have been supported by
P.W.-8 and P.W.-9 who had stated that P.W. - 8 Md. Altaf and
P.W. - 9 Shankar Vishwakarma that several days prior to the
occurrence, accused Munesh Yadav had reached on their
welding shop with the said blue tempo and got several works
done in the same including fixing of plate etc. and cutting of
600 - 700 iron splinters of about 2 -3 inches size.
58. Thus, it is clear that the said blue coloured tempo was sold out
by accused Ramdeo Yadav to accused Munesh Yadav and
subsequently, Munesh Yadav had got some suitable work /
settings done in the said tempo.
59. Further, the Chassis No. of the blown-up tempo was however
visible in the scattered parts of the tempo, which was seized
from the spot, alongwith other materials, i.e., Scorpio, rifle etc.,
which is clear from the seizure list (Ext. 11 / 2) dated
14.02.2018. Vide the seizure list (Ext. 11/2), Chassis No.
MDGDAGLXICAPO2959 of the said tempo was also seized.
The same Chassis Number has been mentioned in the
document (Ext. F) which is certified copy of the particular of the
tempo issue by the D.T.O. Office, Dhanbad. Further, the same
Chassis Number has also been mentioned in the Certificate
dated 16.02.2018 (Ext. G) of the UCO Bank, Hirapur Branch,
for which that tempo was seized by the recovery agency
through P.W. 25 Sachin Barnwal.
60. Thus, prima facie it appears that the finding of the learned trial
court that the same tempo with the same Chassis No. which
was seized by the Bank and was subsequently transferred to
Ramdeo Yadav who later given it to the present appellant, was
planted with explosives and it got blown up in the occurrence,
after which, its Chassis No. was found lying on the spot and
was subsequently seized by I.O. (P.W. 32) by the seizure list
(Ext. 11 / 2).
61. On the basis of discussions made hereinabove, prima facie this
Court is of the view that that all the chain of the circumstances
clearly point out to the guilt of the appellant/accused in the
alleged commission of crime.
Issue of parity
62. The learned counsel has raised the issue of parity and
contended that since the other accused persons have been
granted bail, therefore, present applicant/appellant is also
eligible for suspension of sentence during pendency of the
instant appeal. The learned counsel further raised the issue of
custody as the appellant is in custody since 19.02.2018.
63. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that this Court
is conscious with the settled position of law that the issue of
parity, is to be taken into consideration but the same is to be
taken into consideration by applying the factual aspect along
with the surrounding facts, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director
Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486
wherein, it has held as under:
"18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail
to the appellant on the ground that the other co accused who
were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail,
also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the
law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to
focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is
under consideration."
64. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed in the aforesaid
judgment, i.e., Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director
Directorate of Enforcement (supra) that it is axiomatic that
the principle of parity is based on the guarantee of positive
equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
However, if any illegality or irregularity has been committed in
favour of any individual or a group of individuals, or a wrong
order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or
multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing
similar wrong order. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate the
illegality or irregularity. If there has been a benefit or advantage
conferred on one or a set of people by any authority or by the
court, without legal basis or justification, other persons could not
claim as a matter of right the benefit on the basis of such wrong
decision.
65. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise
its power in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality
of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying
that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to
determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity
has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to
the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh
Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6
SCC 230, wherein, it has been held as under:
"25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by
the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law.
They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of
the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the
event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
527], this Court has held that while applying the principle of
parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious
manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before
granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17)
"17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand
was taken that the second respondent was a history sheeter, it
was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every
aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is
entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be
stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and,
therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non-application
of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on
record that the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in
respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has
failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave
the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would
tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside."
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the
manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of
parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12-2020 [Pravinbhai
Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] ,
[Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC
OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-
10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with
Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was
granted on 22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State
of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the
High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of armed
with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on
the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the
ground that Pravin (A10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13)
who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High
Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is
meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the
role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who
was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not
sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the
basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of
parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation
to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The
High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic
assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster
under the law."
66. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sagar Vs.
State of UP & Anr., 2025 INSC 1370 has categorically
observed that while utilizing parity as a ground for bail, the
same must focus on the role of the accused and cannot be
utilized solely because another accused person was granted
bail in connection with the same offence, and neither can this
ground be claimed as a matter of right, the relevant paragraphs
are being quoted as under:
12. The High Court appears, plainly, to have erroneously
granted bail to the accused-respondent on the sole ground of
parity which it has misunderstood as a tool of direct application
as opposed to parity being focused on the role played by the
accused and not the thread of the same offence being the only
common factor between the accused persons. On this count
alone we can set aside the impugned judgment and order.
However, we propose not to do so and proceed to delve further.
14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been
referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the
High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground
on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct
position in law. The word 'parity' is defined by the Cambridge
Dictionary as "equality, especially of pay or position." When
weighing an application on parity, it is 'position' that is the
clincher. The requirement of 'position' is not met only by
involvement in the same offence. Position means what the
person whose application is being weighed, his position in crime,
i.e., his role etc. There can be different roles played - someone
part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an instigator of
violence; someone who throws hands at the other side,
instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who fired
a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will be
with those who have performed similar acts, and not with
someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by the
sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to hack
away at the opposer's limbs with a weapon.
67. It has been contended herein that other co-accused persons,
namely, Ramdeo Yadav, Pawan Kumar Yadav and Naresh
Yadav have been granted bail by the Coordinate Bench of this
Court, vide orders dated 23.04.2025, 21.07.2025 and
23.04.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1369 of 2024 and Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.1474 of 2024 respectively, therefore, present
appellant is also entitled for suspension of sentence even on
ground of parity also.
68. This Court is of the view that the aforesaid contention of the
learned counsel for appellant needs to be appreciated herein in
the backdrop of the settled position of law on the issue of parity
as discussed and referred in preceding paragraphs.
69. Since, the suspension of the sentence have been granted to
other co-accused persons, namely, Ramdeo Yadav, Pawan
Kumar Yadav and Naresh Yadav by the Coordinate Bench of
this Court vide orders dated 23.04.2025, 21.07.2025 and
23.04.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1369 of 2024 (I.A.
No. 4856 of 2025) and Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1474 of 2024 (I.A.
No. 5393 of 2025, I.A. No. 4852 of 2025) respectively, therefore
it would be apt to refer herein the relevant paragraphs of the
said order which are being quoted herein as under:
03/ Dated 23.04.2025 I.A. No. 4856 of 2025 (Cr. Appeal
(DB) No.1369 of 2024)
"-------
--------
It appears from the submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the respective parties that so far as the present
appellant is concerned, the angle of conspiracy as suggested by
the prosecution seems to be primarily focused with respect to the
shelter given to Munesh Yadav, prior to the incident and at the
behest of Munesh Yadav, he had purchased a Tempo from
P.W.25 who used to deal in sale and purchase of old vehicles. In
fact, it appears that the present appellant was also in the
business of sale and purchase of old vehicles and by using his
contact at the request of Munesh Yadav, P.W. 25, who was an
officer of the recovery agency engaged by UCO Bank had
managed to purchase a Tempo which was subsequently handed
over to Munesh Yadav, who had executed his plan of eliminating
Shankar Yadav. Admittedly, there was no recovery from the
conscious possession of the appellant and so far as the recovery
of some incriminating materials are concerned, the same was
from the in-laws' house of the appellant. The prosecution has
been unable to show that the shelter provided by the appellant to
Munesh Yadav and the subsequent transfer of the Tempo
purchased at the behest of Munesh Yadav was in the knowledge
of the appellant that the same would be used as an explosive
device to eliminate Shankar Yadav. The angle of conspiracy as
propagated by the prosecution appears to be weak in nature and
in the circumstances pointed out above, we are inclined to admit
the appellant on bail.
70. From the aforesaid order, it is evident that the Co-ordinate
Bench while allowing the prayer for suspension of sentence has
taken into consideration the factual aspect that there was no
recovery from the conscious possession of the appellant and so
far as the recovery of some incriminating materials are
concerned, the same was from the in-laws' house of the
appellant. Further consideration has been made that the
prosecution has been unable to show that the shelter provided
by the appellant to Munesh Yadav and the subsequent transfer
of the Tempo purchased at the behest of Munesh Yadav was in
the knowledge of the appellant that the same would be used as
an explosive device to eliminate Shankar Yadav.
71. But as discussed in preceding paragraphs, the case of the
present appellant/applicant is on different footing because the
P.W.32 who is investigating officer of the case had testified that
on basis of the confessional statement of the present appellant,
he recovered splinters of iron, which were seized by making a
seizure list (the photocopy whereof is Marked X / 4 for
identification). It requires to refer herein that this piece of
evidence is admissible by dint of Section 27 of the Evidence
Act. Further, in testimony of P.W.32 it has come at para 67 that
he reached Patratu Basti at "Omkar Accessories" shop of one
Chandan Kumar, who disclosed that he had sold the said
remote control to accused Munesh Yadav(appellant) and he
also identified Munesh Yadav at that time. Further from the
testimony of the witnesses it is apparent that there was
previous enmity between the deceased and appellant and it is
no where come on record about the animosity between
accused Ramdeo Yadav and the deceased, therefore, the
order of 23.04.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1369 of
2024, by which, prayer for suspension of co-accused Ramdeo
Yadav has been allowed will not provide any aid to the present
appellant.
72. Now coming to the order dated 23.04.2025 passed in I.A. No.
4852 of 2025, by which, prayer for suspension of the sentence
of the co-appellant, namely, Naresh Yadav has been allowed,
for ready reference, the relevant part of the order is being
quoted as under:
06/ Dated 23.04.2025 I.A. No. 4852 of 2025 (Cr. Appeal
(DB) No. 1474 of 2024):
"It appears that there is no direct evidence on record to show that
the appellant no. 3 was part of the conspirators or was directly
involved in committing murder of Shankar Yadav, as well as his
Bodyguard. Admittedly nothing was recovered from the
conscious possession of the appellant no. 3 and the only
incriminating substance appears to be the evidence of pw3 in
which it has been stated that the appellant no. 3 was seen going
on a motorcycle towards his village with Pawan Kumar Yadav
against whom certain implications have been made though the
same has been denied by Mr. Singh while submitting that the
remote which was used was basically a type of toy."
73. From the aforesaid order, it is evident that the co-ordinate
Bench while allowing the prayer for suspension of sentence has
taken into consideration that there is no direct evidence on
record to show that the appellant no. 3 was part of the
conspirators or was directly involved in committing murder of
Shankar Yadav, as well as his Bodyguard and the only
incriminating substance appears to be the evidence of P.W.-3,
in which, it has been stated that the appellant no.3 was seen
going on a motorcycle towards his village with Pawan Kumar
Yadav, against whom, certain implications have been made.
74. This Court is adverting to the order dated 21.07.2025 passed in
I.A. No. 5393 of 2025 (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1474 of 2024), by
which, prayer for suspension of the sentence of the co-
appellant, namely, Pawan Kumar Yadav has been allowed, for
ready reference, the relevant part of the order is being quoted
as under:
I.A No. 5393 of 2025. 10/21.07.2025 Cr. Appeal (DB)
No. 1474 of 2024:
"On consideration of the fact that the case of the
appellant no. 2 seems similar to that of appellant no.
3, who has already been granted bail by this Court in
I.A. No. 4852/2025 and the fact that the recovery of
the remote on the confessional statement of the
appellant no. 2 has not been fully ascertained by the
prosecution, we are inclined to admit the appellant no.
2 on bail."
75. Thus, from the aforesaid order, it appears that the co-ordinate
Bench of this Court while allowing the prayer for suspension of
sentence of the co-accused Pawan Kumar Yadav has taken into
consideration the order dated 23.04.2025 by which prayer for
suspension of sentence of the co-appellant, namely, Naresh
Yadav has been allowed.
76. Herein, the role and culpability of the present applicant is totally
different to the co-appellant, namely, Naresh Yadav and Pawan
Kumar Yadav because the P.W.-32 who is the Investigating
Officer of the case had testified in his testimony at para-67 that
he reached Patratu Basti at "Omkar Accessories" shop of one
Chandan Kumar, who disclosed that he had sold the said
remote control to accused Munesh Yadav (appellant) and he
has also identified Munesh Yadav and further angle of enmity
with deceased has specifically been alleged against the present
appellant, therefore, the benefit of parity cannot be extended to
the present appellant.
77. Further, it is settled position of law as discussed and referred in
the preceding paragraphs that parity is not the sole ground on
which the bail can be granted and when weighing an application
on parity, it is 'position' that is the clincher and the requirement
of 'position' is not met only by involvement in the same offence
but position means what the person whose application is being
weighed, his position in crime, his role and particular modus-
operandi of the said accused/ petitioner.
78. Thus, this Court, after having discussed the factual and legal
issues, is of the view that herein, the benefit of parity cannot be
extended in favour of the present applicant/appellant.
79. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove and
taking into consideration the culpability of the present
applicant/appellant, is of the view that the case of the present
appellant is on different footing in comparison to that of other
co-accused, who have been granted bail by the Coordinate
Bench of this Court, as referred above.
80. On the basis of discussions made hereinabove and by applying
the proposition laid down for the purpose of suspension of
sentence in the case of Preet Pal Singh vs. State of U.P.,
(supra) and Om Prakash Sahni (supra) as also applicability of
principle of parity as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, is
of the view that it is not a fit case for suspension of sentence
during pendency of the instant appeal.
81. This Court, after having discussed the factual and legal issues
as per the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the
present interlocutory application is not fit to be allowed.
82. Accordingly, the interlocutory application being I.A. No.5732 of
2025, is hereby, rejected.
83. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not
prejudice the issue on merit as the appeal is lying pending for
its consideration.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
04/12/2025
Rohit/-N.A.F.R.
Uploaded on 05.12.2025
