Jharkhand High Court
Surendra Prasad vs Coal India Ltd on 19 August, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:24963
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S). No. 4812 of 2016
----------
Surendra Prasad, son of Sri Jadunath Singh, resident of New Karmik
Nagar, P.O. I.S.M., P.S. Saraidhela, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
.......... Petitioner
Versus
1. Coal India Ltd., a Govt. of India Enterprise, "Coal Bhawan", Premises
No. 04 MAR, Plot No. AF-III, Action Area-1A, New Town, Rajarhat,
Kolkata-700156 (W.B.) through its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director.
2. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd., a Govt. of
India Enterprise, "Coal Bhawan", Premises No. 04 MAR, Plot No.
AF-III, Action Area-1A, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata-700156
(W.B.).
3. The Director (P&IR), Coal India Ltd., a Govt. of India Enterprise,
"Coal Bhawan", Premises No. 04 MAR, Plot No. AF-III, Action Area-
1A, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata-700156.
4. The General Manager (Min.)/Vigilance, Coal India Ltd., a Govt. of
India Enterprise, "Coal Bhawan", Premises No. 04 MAR, Plot No.
AF-III, Action Area-1A, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata-700156.
5. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd., Koyala
Bhawan, P.O. Koyla Nagar, P.S. Saraidhela, District Dhanbad through
its Chairman-cum-Managing Director.
6. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., a
subsidiary of Coal India Ltd., Koyala Bhawan, P.O. Koyla Nagar, P.S.
Saraidhela, District Dhanbad.
7. The Director Personnel, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., a subsidiary of
Coal India Ltd., Koyala Bhawan, P.O. Koyla Nagar, P.S. Saraidhela,
District Dhanbad.
.......... Respondents.
----------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
-----------
For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajendra Krishna, Advocate
Mr. Mukesh Kr. Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, Advocate
Mr. Amit Kr. Sinha, Advocate
Ms. Astha Singh, Advocate
----------
C.A.V. on 06.08.2025 Pronounced on 19/08/2025
The instant writ application has been preferred by the Petitioner
praying therein for quashing of the order dated 15.06.2016 (Annexure-6),
passed by the 2nd Respondent and communicated vide letter dated
2025:JHHC:24963
15.06.2016 by G.M. (Min)/Vigilance, Coal India Ltd., Kolkata; whereby the
Petitioner has been dismissed from service for accepting illegal gratification
of Rs.5000/-.
2. Briefly stated, the Petitioner joined services under Respondent no. 5
in the year 1987 as Management Trainee and rose up to the post of Senior
Manager (Personnel). Thereafter, in the year 2013, on account of an FIR
lodged by CBI on 28.06.2013 against the Petitioner for having demanded
and accepted illegal gratification of Rs.5000/- from the complainant
through Md. Asin, who was his clerk for processing/passing his bills of
pending salary; a disciplinary proceeding was initiated and after detailed
enquiry, order of punishment of dismissal was passed.
3. The sole stand of the Petitioner, as has been argued by Mr. R.
Krishana, Ld. Counsel representing the Petitioner is that the person who
issued the Charge-Sheet was not competent to issue the same. He further
draws attention to the "Schedule Under Rule-27.0 and submits that as per
Rule 27.2 (a); the employees/officers in Grade E-1 to M-3 posted in Coal
India Limited for any of the subsidiary companies, the Chairman-cum-
Managing Director, Coal India Limited shall be the disciplinary authority.
4. Learned counsel further argued that the punishment which has been
imposed upon the petitioner is by the CMD of the BCCL; whereas Rule
27.3(a) clearly stipulates that for the officers in Grade E-1 to M-3 posted in
subsidiary companies; the CMD of the concerned subsidiary companies
would be the disciplinary authority except with regard to the penalties
referred to in Rule 27.1(ii)(b) to Rule 27.1(ii)(d) and in the instant case the
order of dismissal has been passed, which comes under Rule 27.1(ii)(b) to
Rule 27.1(ii)(d).
5. Further case of the petitioner is that though in the instant case, the
punishment of Dismissal has been imposed by the CMD, Coal India
Limited but the charge-sheet has been drawn by the CMD of the subsidiary
Unit i.e. B.C.C.L and Rule 29.3 which deals with the procedure for
imposing major penalties; it has been categorically stated that where it is
proposed to hold an enquiry against an employee under these Rules the
2025:JHHC:24963
disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to draw up the substance of
imputation of misconduct or misbehavior into definite and distinct article of
charges and as per schedule referred to hereinabove; the penalty can be
imposed by the CMD of the Coal company and the Subsidiary Unit is only
for other penalties except the major penalty of compulsory retirement,
removal from service, dismissal and VRS.
6. Thus, the only question raised by learned counsel for the Petitioner is
that whether the charge-sheet has been issued by the competent person,
inasmuch as, he was CMD of the subsidiary Unit and not CMD of the Coal
India Limited. As such if the Court holds that the charge-sheet itself is
illegal; then all consequential orders would be vitiated. Relying upon the
aforesaid provisions, learned counsel submits that the disciplinary authority
has already been defined under Rule 29.3(a) read with Rule 27.2(a).
7. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Petitioner
relied upon paragraphs 50 to 54 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. B.V. Gopinath1. For
brevity the said paragraphs is quoted herein below:
"50. In our opinion, the Central Administrative Tribunal as well as the High
Court has correctly interpreted the provisions of Office Order No. 205 of 2005.
Factually also, a perusal of the record would show that the file was put up to the
Finance Minister by the Director General of Income Tax (Vigilance) seeking the
approval of the Finance Minister for sanctioning prosecution against one officer
and for initiation of major penalty proceeding under Rules 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(c) of the
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules against the officers mentioned in the note
which included the respondent herein. Ultimately, it appears that the charge memo
was not put up for approval by the Finance Minister. Therefore, it would not be
possible to accept the submission of Ms Indira Jaising that the approval granted by
the Finance Minister for initiation of departmental proceedings would also amount to
approval of the charge memo.
51. Ms Indira Jaising also submitted that the purpose behind Article 311, Rule 14
and also the Office Order of 2005 is to ensure that only an authority that is not
subordinate to the appointing authority takes disciplinary action and that rules of
natural justice are complied with. According to the learned Additional Solicitor
General, the respondent is not claiming that the rules of natural justice have been
violated as the charge memo was not approved by the disciplinary authority.
Therefore, according to the Additional Solicitor General, CAT as well as the High
Court erred in quashing the charge-sheet as no prejudice has been caused to the
respondent.
52. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General is
not factually correct. The primary submission of the respondent was that the charge-
sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority is without authority of law
and, therefore, non est in the eye of the law. This plea of the respondent has been
accepted by CAT as also by the High Court. The action has been taken against the
respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules which enjoins the disciplinary
authority to draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of
misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The term
(2014) 1 SCC 351
2025:JHHC:24963
"cause to be drawn up" does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of
charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The
term "cause to be drawn up" merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary
authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of
proposed "definite and distinct articles of charge-sheet". These proposed articles of
charge would only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary authority.
Undoubtedly, this Court in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. CAG [(1993) 1 SCC 419 : 1993
SCC (L&S) 206 : (1993) 23 ATC 645] has held that Article 311(1) does not say that
even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority.
However, at the same time it is pointed out that: (SCC p. 422, para 4)
"4. ... However, it is open to the Union of India or a State Government to
make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer
shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority."
It is further held that: (SCC p. 422, para 4)
"4. ... Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the
Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or
protection to the holders of a civil post."
53. Further, it appears that during the pendency of these proceedings, the
appellants have, after 2009, amended the procedure which provides that the charge
memo shall be issued only after the approval is granted by the Finance Minister.
54. Therefore, it appears that the appeals in these matters were filed and pursued
for an authoritative resolution of the legal issues raised herein."
8. In reply to the aforesaid submission, Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, learned
counsel for the Respondents submits that the Petitioner has duly replied to
the charge-sheet issued to him and has not raised any objection at that time.
For the first time he is taking this ground of jurisdiction in the instant writ
application which is evident from Annexure-5 which is the reply to the
charge-sheet.
9. Mr. Mehta, further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of State of Jharkhand & Ors. Vs. Rukma Kesh
Mishra2 and also the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. R. Shankarappa3.
10. Both the counsel relied upon different provisions of Conduct,
Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 of Coal India Executives (respondents).
For brevity of Rule-27 and Rule-28 is extracted herein below:
"27.0 NATURE OF PENALTIES
27.1 The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed on
an employee for misconduct, viz.:
(i) Minor Penalties
a) Censure;
b) Withholding increment, with or without cumulative effect;
c) Withholding promotion; and
d) Recovery from pay of the whole of or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the
Company by negligence or breach of orders or trust (Rule 27.1 (i) (d) amended
vide CIL OM No. CIL/ C-5A (vi)/50774 /CDA/ 184 dated 23.11.05)
(ii) Major Penalties
2025 SCC OnLine SC 676
2005 SCC OnLine SC 1510
2025:JHHC:24963
a) Reduction to a lower grade or post or stage in a time scale;
Note:
The Authority ordering the reduction shall state the period for which
it is effective and whether, on the expiry of that period, it will
operate to postpone future increments or, to affect the employee's
seniority and if so, to what extent.
b) Compulsory retirement;
c) Removal from service; and
d) Dismissal
Note 1
Removal from service will not be a disqualification for future employment
in Coal India Limited and its Subsidiary Companies while dismissal
disqualifies a person for future employment.
Note 2
The following shall not amount to penalty within the meaning of this rule :
(i) With-holding of increment of an employee on account of his/her work
being found test unsatisfactory or not being of the required standard or
for failure to pass a prescribed test or examination.
(ii) Stoppage of increment at the efficiency bar in the time scale on the
ground of his/her unfitness to cross the bar.
(ii) Non-promotion, whether in a substantive or officiating capacity of an
employee, after consideration of his/her case to a service, grade or post
for promotion to which he/ she is eligible.
(iv) Reversion to lower service, grade or post of an employee officiating in
a higher service, grade or post on the ground that he/she is considered,
after trial, to be unsuitable for such higher service, grade or post or on
administrative ground unconnected with his/her conduct.
(v) Reversion to his/her permanent service, grade or post of an employee
appointed on probation to another service, grade or post during or at the
end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his/her
appointment or the rules and orders governing probation.
(vi) Replacement of the services of an employee whose services have been
borrowed from Central or a State Government or an authority under the
control of Central or a State Government at the disposal of the authority
which had lent his services.
(vii) Compulsory retirement of an employee in accordance with the
provisions relating to his/her superannuation or retirement.
(viii) Termination of the services:
(a) of an employee appointed on probation during or at
the end of the period of probation in accordance with the
terms of his/her appointment or the rules and orders
governing probation;
or
(b) of a person appointed in a temporary capacity
otherwise than under a contract or agreement in
accordance with the general conditions of service
applicable to temporary employment;
(c) of an employee employed under an agreement or
contract, in accordance with the terms of such agreement
or contract;
(d) of a person on reduction of establishment; and
(e) of a person who is liable to be discharged for failure to
qualify in certain duties or subjects under the conditions
of his/her service.
28.0 AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
28.1 The Disciplinary Authority or any Authority higher than it may institute
disciplinary proceedings against any employee.
28.2 A Disciplinary Authority competent under these rules to impose any of the
penalties specified in clauses (a) to (d) of rule 27.1 and clause (a) of rule 27.1 (ii)
may institute disciplinary proceedings against any employee for imposition of any
of the penalties specified in clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii) notwithstanding that
2025:JHHC:24963
such Disciplinary Authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of
the latter penalties.
28.3 Where a Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the penalties
specified in clause (a) to (d) of rule 27.1 (i) and clause (a) of rule 27.1 (ii) but not
competent to impose any of the penalties specified in the clauses (b) to (d) of rule
27.1 (ii), has itself inquired into or caused to be inquired into any charge and that
Authority, having regard to its own findings or having regard to its decision on any
of the findings of any Inquiring Authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that any
of the penalties specified in clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii) should be imposed on
the employee, that Authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such
Disciplinary Authority as is competent to impose the last mentioned penalties."
11. Further, Schedule under Rule-27.0 is also extracted herein below:
Schedule under Rule 27.0
Sl. Grade of Employee Disciplinary Penalties which Appellate Authority
No. Authority it may impose
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. CMD & Whole time President of India All penalties President of India
Directors of CIL and its
Subsidiary Companies to
whom the CIL Executives'
Conduct. Discipline &
Appeal Rules Apply
2.(a) Officers in Grade E-1 to M-3 Chairman-cum All penalties Board of Directors Coal
posted in CIL or any of the Managing Director, India Limited
Subsidiary Companies Coal India Limited
(b) Officers posted in CIL Hqrs. (1) Functional All penalties Chairman-cum
and other allied office(s) Directors of CIL in except those Managing Director, CIL
under the direct respect of officers under Rule
administrative control of working under them 27.1(ii)(b) to
Coal India Ltd. except NEC 27.1(ii)(d)
In E1 to M3 grade (2) Direcor (P & IR)
CIL, for all officers
Working in the
Departments directly
reporting to
Chairman, CIL
In E1 to E5 grade Head of Divisions of All minor (i) Concerned
CIL Hqrs in respect penalties Functional Director (ii)
of officers working Director(P&IR), CIL
under them for officers working in
the Departments
directly reporting to
Chairman, CIL
(c) Officers posted in NEC
(i) E1 to MЗ Director Incharge of All penalties Chairman, CIL
NEC except under
Rule 27.1 (ii) (b)
to 27.1(ii) (d)
(ii) E1 to E5 CGM/GM, NEC All minor Director(P&IR), CIL
penalties
3.(a) Officers in grade E-1 to M-3 CMD of the All penalties Chairman-cum-
posted in Subsidiary concerned Subsidiary except those Managing Director, CIL
Companies Company under Rule
27.1(ii)(b) to
27.1(ii)(d)
(b) Officers in grade E-1 to E-5 Functional Directors All minor Chairman-cum
post in Subsidiary of the concerned penalties Managing Director of
Companies Company in respect the concerned Company
of officers working
under them.
2025:JHHC:24963
(c) All employees from different Director (Technical), All penalties Chairman-cum
subsidiaries nominated as Coal India Ltd. except those Managing Director, CIL
leaders/ members of CIL under Rule 27.1
Coal Stock Measurement (ii)/(b) to
Teams 27.1(ii)(d)
The jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority shall be determined with reference to the
Company/Unit where the alleged misconduct was committed.
12. Having gone through the aforesaid Rules it appears that the
contention of Mr. Krishna, Ld. Counsel is not correct in view of 28.3 which
is again reproduced herein below:
28.3 Where a Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clause
(a) to (d) of rule 27.1 (i) and clause (a) of rule 27.1 (ii) but not competent to impose any of the
penalties specified in the clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii), has itself inquired into or caused to
be inquired into any charge and that Authority, having regard to its own findings or having
regard to its decision on any of the findings of any Inquiring Authority appointed by it, is of the
opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii) should be
imposed on the employee, that Authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such
Disciplinary Authority as is competent to impose the last mentioned penalties."
In the instant case, the CMD BCCL was competent to impose any of
the penalties specified in clause (a) to (d) of rule 27.1 (i) and clause (a) of
rule 27.1 (ii) but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in
the clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii), but inquired into the charges by
issuing Memorandum of Charge and appointed Inquiry Officer.
Subsequently, after the report of Inquiry Officer, was of the opinion that the
penalties specified in clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii) should be imposed
on the employee, he accordingly forwarded the records of the inquiry to
such CMD, CIL who was the competent to impose the last-mentioned
penalties
Further, Clause-28.2 clearly stipulates that a Disciplinary Authority
competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in
clauses (a) to (d) of rule 27.1 and clause (a) of rule 27.1 (ii) may institute
disciplinary proceedings against any employee for imposition of any of the
penalties specified in clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii) notwithstanding that
such Disciplinary Authority is not competent under these rules to impose
any of the latter penalties.
13. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that Clause-28.3 further
clarifies that where a Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the
penalties specified in clause (a) to (d) of rule 27.1 (i) and clause (a) of rule
2025:JHHC:24963
27.1 (ii) but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in the
clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii), has itself inquired into or caused to be
inquired into any charge and that Authority, having regard to its own
findings or having regard to its decision on any of the findings of any
Inquiring Authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that any of the
penalties specified in clauses (b) to (d) of rule 27.1 (ii) should be imposed
on the employee, that Authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to
such Disciplinary Authority as is competent to impose the last mentioned
penalties.
14. Admittedly, in the instant case, the charge-sheet was issued by a
person who was not competent to impose punishment of dismissal but as
per provisions laid down in the aforesaid rules of the respondents under
Clause-28.3, he forwarded the entire records to the Disciplinary Authority
who was competent to pass order of major penalty.
15. Mr. Krishna, learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon
the judgment of B.V. Gopinath (supra), however, the said judgment has
been distinguished in the case of Rukma Kesh Mishra (supra), wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court has formulated a question which reads as follows:
"3. We are tasked to decide a solitary legal question : whether the order by which the
respondent was dismissed from service, following disciplinary proceedings, should have
been interdicted by the High Court on the specious ground that the charge-sheet had not
been approved by the Chief Minister of Jharkhand?"
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rukma Kesh Mishra (supra) has
specifically distinguished the judgment of B.V. Gopinath (supra) in para-37
which is extracted herein below:
"37. Lest confusion continues to prevail, thereby obfuscating the course of justice, we also
consider it expedient to clarify as regards the efficacy of the decisions in B.V.
Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra) as binding precedents. Both these decisions
by coordinate Benches of two Hon'ble Judges of this Court. All other decisions on the
topic are also by Benches of coordinate strength. Before the Bench in B.V.
Gopinath (supra), out of the 6 (six) decisions referred to by us in paragraphs 21 to 25
(supra), only the decision in Thavasippan (supra) was placed by counsel wherein one
would find reference to the earlier decision in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra).
Though Thavasippan (supra) had considered all the earlier decisions, it was not even
distinguished in B.V. Gopinath (supra). Importantly, the Bench after noting the law laid
down in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra), extracted two sentences from paragraph '4', quoted
above, to support the conclusion which the Bench intended to record. Having read
what P.V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra) in paragraph '4' laid down and our agreement
therewith, we see good reason to opine that there could be a healthy debate on the
correctness of the ratio decidendi of the decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra), or for that
matter, Promod Kumar (supra), in the light of the precedents which were binding on the
Benches deciding the same. However, for the purpose of deciding this appeal, we need not
venture that far to declare the decisions in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod
2025:JHHC:24963
Kumar (supra) as not laying down good law or that its efficacy as binding precedents
stands eroded for not considering the law declared in Shardul Singh (supra) on
Article 311(1) of the Constitution, as well as the other decisions that we have referred to
above, speaking in a different voice. Nonetheless, we are of the undoubted view that
whatever be the ratio decidendi of B.V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra), for
its application in future cases, the same have to be read and understood as confined to
interpretation of the rules governing the disciplinary proceedings in each of the two cases,
the facts and law presented before the coordinate Benches, and the exposition of law by
this Court for over half a century till this date."
17. From a careful reading of the aforesaid judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rukma Kesh Mishra (supra) it is
apparent that the competency of controlling Officer with regard to issuance
of charge-sheet and/or dismissal has to be governed by the relevant rule of
the said Organization. Admittedly, in the instant case, the petitioner who
was in E-5 Grade, the disciplinary authority was Chairman-cum-Managing
Director of Coal India Ltd. but the charge-sheet was issued by the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, BCCL and not by the Coal India Ltd.
but as stated herein above in view of Rules-28.2 and 28.3, the punishment
has been imposed by the competent authority.
18. At this stage, it is also profitable to refer to the judgment passed in
the case of R. Shankarappa (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held as under:
"11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record
thoroughly.
12. In the present case, it is an undisputed fact that the charge-sheet was issued under Rule
14 of the CCS CCA Rules, which provides for a procedure for imposing major penalties. Rule 14
(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, reads as under:
"14. Procedure for imposing major penalties
(1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall
be made except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rule
and rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of
1850), where such inquiry is held under that Act."
13. The learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to point out violation of any
statutory provision of law and the disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in consonance
with procedure prescribed under the aforesaid Rule.
14. In the present case, as already stated earlier, the charge-sheet was issued for imposing
major penalties by the General Manager (Telecommunications). As per Appendix 3 appended to
the CCS CCA Rules, the Member Telecommunications Commission is competent authority to
impose major penalties and the General Manager, Telecommunications is competent to impose
minor penalties. Appendix 3 appended to the CCS CCA Rules is reproduced as under:
Serial Description of Service Appointing Authority Authority competent to impose penalties and
Number (2) (3) penalties which it may impose (with reference to
(1) item numbers in Rule 11)
Authority Penalties
(4) (5)
9. Telecommunication Member, Member, Telecommunications All
Engineering Service, Telecommunications Commission (i) to (iv)
Group 'B' Commission Adviser (Human Resources
Development) Department of
Telecommunications;
Head of Circle;
2025:JHHC:24963
General Manager; Telecommunication
Factories;
Head of Telephone District; Head of
Telecommunication
District/Telecommunications Area of
Senior Administrative Grade;
General Manager, Maintenance of
Senior Administrative Grade, General
Manager, Projects.
15. Rule 13 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
which provides for initiation of disciplinary proceedings reads as under:
"13. Authority to institute proceedings
(1) The President or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order
may -
(a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant;
(b) direct a disciplinary authority to institute disciplinary proceedings against any
Government servant on whom that disciplinary authority is competent to impose
under these rules any of the penalties specified in rule 11.
(2) A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties
specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings
against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the penalties specified
in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11 notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not
competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties."
16. A plain reading of Rule 13(2) of the CCS CCA Rules specifies that a disciplinary authority
competent under the rules "may institute disciplinary proceedings". When the aforementioned
Rule is read with Rule 14 and Appendix 3 of the CCS CCA Rules, it is very clear that an authority
empowered to inflict minor penalties (in the present case, the General Manager) can certainly
issue a charge-sheet even for imposition of major penalties.
17. Thus, in short, initiation of disciplinary proceedings can be done by Member
Telecommunications Commission as well as by General Manager, Telecommunication. In the
present case, initiation has been done by the General Manager, Telecommunication and,
therefore, in the light of the statutory provisions of the law, this Court is of the considered opinion
that issuance of charge-sheet by General Manager, Telecommunication could not have been
faulted upon by the High Court solely by placing reliance upon the judgment delivered by this
Court in the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra)."
19. As such, this Court restrains to accept the argument of Mr. Krishna,
learned counsel for the petitioner that the instant application should be
allowed on the ground that the charge-sheet was not drawn-up by an Officer
who was not competent to do so.
20. So far as other and further grounds mentioned in the writ application
have not been pressed. Even otherwise, after going through the entire
records it appears that principles of natural justice have been duly followed
and further there is no perversity in the order so as to interfere.
21. Accordingly, the instant writ application is hereby dismissed.
22. Pending I.As., if any, stand closed.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
kunal/-
AFR/NAFR
