Jharkhand High Court
Taiyab Mian vs The State Of Bihar Now Jharkhand on 14 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:23765-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 13 of 1997 (R)
[Against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated
29.11.1996 and 30.11.1996 respectively passed by learned Sessions
Judge, Giridih in Sessions Trial No. 327 of 1994]
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Taiyab Mian, Son of Karamat Mian, resident of Bankhajho, Police
Station Giridih, Dist.-Giridih ... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar Now Jharkhand ... ... Respondent
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PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
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For the Appellant : Mr. Tarun Kumar No.1, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Vineet Kr. Vashistha, Spl.P.P.
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C.A.V. on 21.07.2025 Pronounced on 14/08/2025
Per: Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J
The present criminal appeal arises out of Judgment of conviction
dated 29.11.1996 and order of sentence dated 30.11.1996 passed by
learned Sessions Judge, Giridih in Sessions Trial No. 327 of 1994
whereby and whereunder the appellant being husband of the deceased
has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304B of
IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.
2. It is pertinent to mention at the outset that originally this appeal
was preferred by the present appellant along with his father Karamat
Mian but due to death of said Karamat Mian, during pendency of this
appeal, his appeal has been abated vide order dated 10.12.2024.
3. We have already heard the arguments of learned counsel for the
appellant, Mr. Tarun Kumar No. 1 as well as learned Spl. P.P., Mr. Vineet
Kumar Vashisth appearing on behalf of State.
Submissions made on behalf of appellant: -
4. The follofwing grounds have been taken on behalf of the
appellant:-
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(i) It is a case where the appellant has been convicted for the offence
under Section 304B of the IPC without appreciating the evidence in right
perspective that the death cannot be said to be unnatural, rather, it was
natural.
(ii) The dying declaration given by the deceased in the hospital before
the investigating officer itself indicates her natural death.
(iii) It has further been contended that the falsity of the prosecution
version is also evident from the fact that UD Case for the same
occurrence was registered on the date of occurrence itself i.e. 01.01.1994
while the FIR was instituted on 03.03.1994, hence there is delay of about
two months in institution/registration of FIR that too without any
explanation.
(iv) The appellant has tried to save the life of the deceased and he has
rushed to the hospital since he was not available in the house at the time
of occurrence and in the meanwhile the deceased succumbed to burn
injury.
(v) The story of demand of dowry and consequent torture meted to
the deceased is absolutely false and concocted by the family members of
the deceased with a view to put pressure upon the appellant with some
ulterior motive of unlawful gain.
The learned counsel for the appellant based upon the aforesaid
grounds has submitted that the impugned judgment, therefore, suffers
from error of law and as such, not sustainable in the eye of law.
Submissions made on behalf of State
5. Mr. Vineet Kr. Vashisth, the learned Spl. P.P. has submitted that
there cannot be any benefit to defence even though FIR was instituted on
03.03.1994 reason being that the occurrence took place on 19.01.1994
and the UD case was instituted on the same day. But thereafter, the
informant in a situation of non-institution of FIR by the police had to file
a complaint case before the concerned magistrate and the magistrate in
exercise of the power under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C. has referred the
matter before the Police to conduct an enquiry and proceed in
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accordance with law. Thereafter, getting the possibility of commission of
cognizable offence, FIR was registered on 03.03.1994 based upon the
direction passed by the concerned Court on 09.02.1994. Hence, merely
on the ground of instituting the FIR on 03.03.1994 in such a situation
will not prejudice the case of the appellant since the informant has been
denied access to institute the FIR and for the said purpose, provision has
been provided. Therefore, reason for delay has sufficiently been
explained by the prosecution for instituting the FIR. It is further argued
that it is a case where the burn injury was inside the matrimonial house
and as per the post-mortem report the nature of burn injury is serious and
in such a serious injury it also affects the trunk of the body of the
deceased, there is no possibility to utter a word by the injured what to
say about giving statement, said to be dying declaration. Learned counsel
has further submitted that by virtue of mandate of provision under
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, the reverse onus is upon the
appellant to disprove the accusation against him but if the statement
recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of the present appellant will be taken
into consideration, it would be evident that the factum of date of death is
not in dispute and it has been stated by the appellant while answering the
question that due to the torture for dowry the death of the deceased was
committed, the appellant has simply answered that he is innocent by
denying the said allegation. It is further contended that the appellant has
not taken any specific plea that at the time of alleged occurrence he was
not present in the house and no such evidence has been adduced by the
appellant although onus lies upon him to prove by virtue of provision
under Section 105 of the Evidence Act. The appellant has not been able
to rebut the presumption raised under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
and also failed to show his bona fide as to what steps were taken by him
to save the life of the deceased, when she sustained bury injury, a
situation as would be evident from the postmortem report that the
extensive burn injury involving face, neck, trunk (both side), upper
extremity and both thighs half including perineum was found. But no
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efforts have been shown to be there to save the life. The plea of alibi of
the appellant is baseless and unfounded. It is further submitted that the
learned trial Court has very properly and wisely considered the overall
aspects of the case in the light of oral and documentary evidence
adduced on behalf of prosecution and defence, as such, arrived at
conclusion of guilt of the appellant, which suffers from no illegality or
infirmity calling for any interference in this appeal which is devoid of
merits and fit to be dismissed.
Factual Matrix
6. The deceased Abida Khatoon (20 years) was married with accused
Taiyab Mian on 06.05.1990. It is alleged that after the marriage of Abida
Khatoon (deceased), she went to her matrimonial home and hardly lived
for 8 days that the accused persons started subjecting her to physical and
mental torture compelling her to bring cash, television and other articles
from her parents. It is further alleged that since both the families i.e. the
informant and in-laws of the deceased were residing in the same village,
the deceased often used to inform regarding the atrocities of the accused
persons, for which appellant were taken to reconcile the matter but all in
vain. It is further alleged that just before a day from the alleged
occurrence, informant's daughter had come to fetch water from the
village handpump, where she expressed her apprehension to her mother
that the accused persons would not spare her because they were bent
upon to take away her life due to non-fulfillment of aforesaid demands.
The informant's wife pacified and consoled her daughter, but very next
unfortunate day i.e. on 19.01.1994 at about 09:00 am hearing the cries
"save save" coming from the in-laws house of his daughter, the
informant along with his wife and other villagers went there, they were
surprised to see that Abida Khatoon was under flames and was uttering
that her father-in-law, mother-in-law and husband have sprinkled
kerosine oil on her body and lit fire. It is further alleged that the mother
of the deceased took her daughter to the hospital at Giridih by Rikshaw,
where she died during treatment in the hospital. It is also stated that
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during treatment of the deceased, the Doctor and Police had also asked
the deceased about the matter then she disclosed them also that her
husband and in-laws have burnt her by sprinkling kerosine oil on her
body. After conducting postmortem of the deceased body, it was
cremated. The first informant has stated in FIR registered under Section
156(3) of Cr.P.C. that he kept waiting for an action to be taken by the
police, but when no action was taken against the accused persons in
connection with the said occurrence, he ultimately, filed a complaint
petition before the learned CJM, Giridih on 09.02.1994 which was sent
for registration of the case and investigation by police and as such FIR
was registered on 03.03.1994 for the occurrence which took place on
19.01.1994 at about 09:00 am.
The police investigated the case as per direction of the learned
CJM based under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and after completion of the
investigation submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons for the
offence under Section 304(B) of IPC. The case was committed to the
court of sessions vide order dated 21.09.1994 where S.T. No. 327 of
1994 was registered. The accused persons denied the charge leveled
against them for the offence punishable under Section 304(B) of IPC and
claimed to be tried.
7. In the course of the trial, altogether, seven witnesses have been
examined by the prosecution namely:-
(i) P.W.1- Munni Khatoon (Sister of the deceased)
(ii) P.W.2- Nuresha Khatoon (Mother of the deceased)
(iii) P.W.3- Wazir Mian (Father of the deceased -cum- first
Informant)
(iv) P.W.4- Dr. Bhupendra Pd. Singh
(v) P.W.5- Sattar Mian (Brother of the deceased)
(vi) P.W.6- Udho Singh (I.O. of the case)
(vii) P.W.7- Uday Shankar Prasad (Formal witness who proved
the FIR)
Apart from oral testimony of witnesses, the prosecution has relied
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upon following documentary evidence:-
(i) Exhibit-1 Post-Mortem Report of the deceased
(ii) Exhibit-2 Formal F.I.R.
(iii) Exhibit-3 Inquest Report
8. On the other hand, defence has also examined as many as four
witnesses:-
(i) D.W.1-Ramchandra Hembrom
(ii) D.W.2-Madina Khatoon
(iii) D.W.3-Vijay Mian (Rikshaw Puller)
(iv) D.W.4- Mumtaz Ali (Garage owner)
9. The case of defence is denial from occurrence and false
implication. The specific plea of present appellant is that he had gone to
attend his duty at the garage of Mumtaz Ali (D.W.-4) where he came to
know about the accidental burn injury sustained by his wife and went
directly to the hospital where the deceased disclosed that while cooking
food she caught fire on her saree.
10. The learned trial Court after considering oral and documentary
evidence adduced by the parties and the provisions of law involved in
this case, recorded finding of guilt of the appellant and passed sentence
as stated above.
11. In view of the submission raised on behalf of both the parties, the
point for consideration is that "As to whether impugned judgment and
order of conviction and sentence of the appellant suffers from any error
of law calling for any interference?"
Analysis, decision and reasons:
12. Before imparting verdicts on above point, it would be appropriate
to extract the relevant provisions of law applicable in this case are
reproduced hereinbelow:
"304B. Dowry death. -- (1) Where the death of a woman is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of
her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death
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she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,
any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry
death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section,
"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
"113B. Presumption as to dowry death. -- When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman had been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, dowry death
shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
13. In view of the above provisions, in order to convict an accused for
the offence punishable under Section 304(B) of the IPC, the following
essentials must be satisfied:-
(i) the death of an woman must have been caused by burns or
bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her
marriage;
(iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her
husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection
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with, demand for dowry.
When the above ingredients are established by reliable and
acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such
husband or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death.
14. From bare perusal of provision of Section 304B of the IPC, it is
evident that it does not categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or
accidental. This is because death caused by burns can, in a given case, be
homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily
injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
Finally, any death occurring "otherwise than under normal
circumstances" can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or
accidental. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304-B IPC
are fulfilled, any death (homicidal or suicidal or accidental) whether
caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under
normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a
"dowry death" and the woman's husband or his relative "shall be
deemed to have caused her death". The section clearly specifies what
constitutes the offence of dowry death and also identifies the single
offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death.
15. In order to attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the
main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that
"soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for,
or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon
before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of
Evidence Act has been explained by Hon'ble Apex Court in plethora of
judgments, Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359; Mustafa
Shahadat Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 11 SCC 397; Ramesh
Vithal Patil v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 11 SCC 516, Maya Devi &
Anr. V. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 405. Satbir Singh & Anr. v.
State of Haryana (2021) 6 SCC 1. It has been observed that though the
language used is "soon before her death", no definite period has been
enacted and the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined
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in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period
which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be
determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the
interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment
concerned and the death in question. In other words, there must be
existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty
based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged
incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to
disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of
no consequence.
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Satbir Singh & Anr. v. State of
Haryana (2021) 6 SCC 1 has held that the phrase "soon before" in
section 304B IPC is a relative term which is required to be considered
under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can
be laid down by fixing any time limit. In relation to dowry deaths, the
circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the
deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a
course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time.
Thus, a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on
dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by
the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon
such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time
which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale
enough.
16. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act lays down rebuttable
presumption of law in respect of dowry. If the ingredients under Section
304-B IPC are attracted, the court shall presume and it shall record such
fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. However,
it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such
conclusive presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so
and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-
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examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the
defence side as such putting reverse onus of proving on the accused.
17. In the background of aforesaid jurisprudence of dowry death, we
have to appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the parties
apprising ourselves with the evidence adduced in this case by the
respective parties.
18. We have to consider as to whether the ingredients of Section 304B
IPC as discussed above has been established by the prosecution through
cogent and reliable evidence.
(i) The first ingredient regarding the death of a woman due to burns
or bodily injury or caused otherwise than under normal circumstance is
concerned, it is evidence from post-mortem report of the deceased
(Exhibit -1) as proved by P.W.-4 Dr. Bhupendra Pd. Singh, who has
made following observations on the dead body of the deceased Abida
Khatoon aged about 20 years wife of Taiyab Mian:-
Teeth intact, conjunctive congested. Tongue inside.
Extensive burn injury involving face, neck, tongue both
sides, upper extremity and both thighs half including
perineum was found.
Singing of hair, eye lashes, eye brows and blackening of
skin were present.
Redness was found.
Characteristic smell of Kerosine Oil was found.
On dissection:- subcutaneous tissue in neck NAD. Larynx and
trachea congested. Hoid bone intact. Lungs congested.
Heart contained blood both sides. Liver, spleen and kidney
congested. Stomach contained semi digested food mixed
with liquid and its mucous membrane reddened. No
peculiar smell from the stomach contains. Urinary bladder
empty. Uterus normal size. Vagina NAL. Skull intact. Brain
and its meninges congested. No mark of violence was
found.
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One injury was antemortem in nature produced by flame.
Cause of death opined to be shock as a result of extensive burn
injury.
Time elapsed since death till P.M. examination about 18
hours to 24 hours. The body was identified by SI RN Singh and
Md. Taiyab and Md. Kurban.
The injuries caused to the deceased was sufficient in
ordinary course of nature to cause her death.
In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that the
entry is made in the hospital register for indoor patient.
19. It is admitted position that the occurrence took place on
19.01.1994 at about 9 AM and the deceased under extensive burnt
injuries was brought to the hospital by her mother namely Nuresh
Khatoon, (P.W.-2) and she was treated as indoor patient and succumbed
to death due to injuries at evening at about 6 PM, therefore the first
condition is established beyond doubt.
(ii) So far Second condition is concerned, it is also admitted fact that
the deceased was married with the appellant on 06.05.1990 and she died
on 19.01.1994 i.e. within seven years of her marriage.
(iii) Third and fourth conditions i.e. soon before her death the woman
must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relatives of her husband and such cruelty or harassment must be for, or
in connection with, demand for dowry.
In this connection, the oral testimony of witnesses, particularly
mother, father, sister and brother of the deceased have consistently
testified supporting the demand of arrear of dowry agreed at the time of
marriage to be paid later on.
P.W.3 namely Wazir Mian, father of the deceased-cum-
informant who has deposed in clear terms that at the time of marriage he
had given dowry according to his capacity, but some articles were left to
be given to the accused persons, therefore, after few days of her
marriage, the accused persons started demanding to bring those articles
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and cash from the deceased and compelled her to be fulfilled by her
parents. He has further deposed that due to non-fulfillment of their
demand, the accused persons always subjected the deceased to various
atrocities. He has also deposed that since the marriage of the deceased
was performed in the same village, therefore, deceased always used to
meet with her mother and other family members and use to complain
about the demand and consequent physical and mental tortures meted to
her. This witness also went to the house of the accused persons to assure
them that he will try to fulfill their demands but could not fulfill the
same due to paucity of fund. Thereafter, on 19.01.1994 at about 09:00
am in the morning he heard Halla coming from the matrimonial house of
his deceased daughter, he rushed towards the place of occurrence along
with his wife, P.W.-2, Nuresha Khatoon and P.W.-1 Munni Khatoon
another daughter and found his daughter was completely burnt but told
them that her husband and in-laws have sprinkled kerosine oil on her and
lit the fire. Thereafter his wife (P.W.-2) Nuresha Khatoon brought the
deceased to hospital on Rikshaw.
P.W.-2, Nuresha Khatoon is the mother of the deceased.
According to her evidence, Rs. 5000/- cash, one Television and one
Cycle were left to be given to accused persons as was agreed at the time
of marriage. The accused persons were raising consistent demand of
aforesaid articles from the deceased and compelled her to bring from her
parents. She has also stated that due to their poor financial condition,
aforesaid demands could not be fulfilled and the accused persons started
subjecting the deceased to harassment and cruelty both mental and
physical and she used to complain about the atrocities met with her to
her mother while going to fetch water from the handpump. On the
previous night of occurrence also, the deceased complained about ill
treatment and torture meted to her and her apprehension that she might
not be spared due to non-fulfillment of the demand of dowry.
20. The above versions regarding conditions No. (iii) and (iv) finds
further corroboration from the evidence of P.W.-1, Munni Kumari, sister
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of the deceased and P.W.5, Sattar Mian, brother of the deceased. It is also
proved that it was consistent and persistent demand of money and other
articles like TV and Cycle at the hands of appellant and his relatives and
due to non-fulfillment of which the deceased was subjected to cruelty
and torture, soon before her death.
21. The defence has not been able to elicit any substantive materials
from the witnesses of facts examined by the prosecution to rebut their
testimony as regards demand of cash and other articles and due to non-
fulfillment of the same subjecting the deceased to ill treatment, torture
and harassment rather by way of suggestion there is general denial from
any demand and torture meted to deceased and they have been falsely
implicated due to ulterior motive of the witnesses to harass the accused
persons.
22. The defence has also attempted to rebut the prosecution story by
adducing oral and documentary evidence.
D.W.-1 Ramchandra Hembrom, A.S.I. who was posted at
Giridih Town, Police Station on the relevant date and time. According to
his evidence, on 19.01.1994, he had gone to Sadar Hospital, Giridih after
receiving information that a woman in a burnt condition has been
admitted there. He recorded the statement of injured Abida Khatoon at
about 1:30 PM which was basis of UD Case No. 01 of 1994 which was
investigated by A.S.I. Soudagar Yadav. According to this witness, the
injured woman told that while she was cooking food, her Saree caught
fire and she raised alarm and the neighboring people assembled over
there who tried to save her. The statement of the victim was read over to
her and she put her thumb impression finding the same to be correct.
23. It is pertinent here to mention that the said statement as alleged to
be recorded by this witness of the deceased containing her thumb
impression has not been brought on record rather summary of the said
statement was recorded in para 3 of the case-diary, which has been
marked as Exhibit A in this case.
Admittedly, no certificate was obtained from the concerned
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Doctor, who was treating the deceased about her mental and physical
condition nor the statement was recorded in presence of any witness
including the Doctor nor the record of the statement has been adduced in
evidence, therefore no reliance can be placed on the evidence of D.W.-1.
D.W.-2, Madina Khatoon, is a neighbor of accused Taiyab Mian,
who has simply expressed her no knowledge about any demand of
dowry from the deceased at the hands of her husband and in-laws but a
glaring fact supporting the prosecution story has been stated by her that
when she went at the place of occurrence at the house of Taiyab Mian
after hearing Halla from his house, Abida Khatoon (deceased) was badly
burnt and she was naked. She also admitted the presence of mother of
the deceased who rushed towards hospital along with injured Abida
Khatoon.
Being a close-door neighbor of accused persons, she might not
have chosen to inculpate them. Moreover, the demand of money or any
form of dowry pertains in between husband and in-laws of groom and
family members of wife, which often takes place within four walls of
house and for the sake of their prestige and honor in the society, no party
would like to make them public. Therefore, mere ignorance of D.W.-2
about such demand is not sufficient to turn down prosecution story.
D.W.-3, Vijay Mian is a Rikshaw Puller who has brought the
deceased in burnt condition to the hospital, but he has overheard the
conversation between injured Abida Khatoon with her mother and
reproduced the same as the injured was saying to her mother that she has
accidently caught fire on her Sharee while cooking food, which is
contrary to the evidence of mother of the deceased.
D.W.-4, Mumtaz Ali is the owner of the garage. According to
him, on 19.01.1994 at about 8:30am, Taiyab Mian came to his garage to
discharge his duties, but at about 09:30 AM one person came and told
him that his wife got burnt, then he immediately rushed towards hospital.
This witness was never interrogated by the police during
investigation nor the accused at any point of time during investigation or
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even at the time of cross examination of the prosecution witnesses has
ever taken such plea that he had gone to the garage for discharging his
duties early in the morning. There is no such time gap between
happening of the occurrence and presence of the accused at garage as
alleged. It is also possible to reach the garage after commission of the
alleged occurrence. Even in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the
accused has not taken such plea, therefore, above testimony of witness
holds no much water to disturb the prosecution story or otherwise cast
any doubt over the prosecution case.
24. The appellant had laid much emphasis that the death of the
deceased was natural one as per evidence of D.W.-1 who stated that the
victim herself stated before him in the hospital that while cooking food
she caught fire on her Saree and sustained burnt injuries.
25. The next point is that the UD case was investigated and matter
was dropped by the police but the father of the deceased with oblique
motive lodged the complaint case and consequently FIR was lodged after
two months of the occurrence without stating any explanation.
26. The above contentions could not be given any legal sanctity for
following reasons:- (i) firstly; it is admitted case of the prosecution and
also evident from the face of record that the deceased had got extreme
burnt injuries and admitted to hospital on the same day of occurrence at
about 10am and admitted as an indoor patient. It is also evident that she
succumbed to injury at about 6 pm. The doctor who conducted the
autopsy on the dead body of deceased has spelt about the extensive burnt
injuries covering face, neck, tongue both sides, upper extremity and both
thighs half including perineum was found. Singing of hair, eye lashes,
eye brows and blackening of skin were present. Redness was found.
There is no iota of evidence at all that at the time of admission, the
deceased was able to speak anything or was under conscious state and
able to give any statement. Story projected by defence taking assistance
from investigating officer of UD case and non-production of relevant
documents in spite of order of the Court and trying to put the case under
15 Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 13 of 1997(R)
2025:JHHC:23765-DB
natural death, cannot be entertained by any stretch of imagination. The
defence version that it was accidental burnt injuries caused due to
catching fire in the Aanchal (आँ चल) of the Saree while cooking food
would never cause such type of extensive burnt injuries as described
above even including inside tongue both sides, upper extremity and both
thigs half including perineum, Singing of hair, eye lashes, eye brows and
upper part of the body. It is not a case of defence that the deceased has
put any food on gas-stove which suddenly got exploded causing
extensive burnt injuries. The mode of cooking has also not been stated,
therefore the theory of natural/accidental catching of fire as the main
cause of the death of the deceased is absolutely beyond the evidence and
cannot be relied upon.
27. The further plea of the defence regarding delay in institution of
FIR has been explained by the prosecution with sufficient reasons.
28. In the instant case, the police registered an unnatural death case
No. 01 of 1994 and indulged in investigating the same in spite of claim
of the informant party that it was deliberate murder of the deceased
setting her on ablaze, the Informant waited for 20 days about the
outcome of the police investigation but all in vain. The complaint case
was filed before the learned CJM, Giridih on 09.02.1994 after 20 days of
the occurrence. Therefore, it cannot be said that not lodging of prompt
FIR cast any doubt over the prosecution story in the instant case. There
is no limitation for lodging FIR in the dowry death case. Moreover, in
the complaint petition as well as in the evidence of P.W.-3, Wazir Mian,
father of the deceased, the delay in lodging the FIR has reasonable been
explained.
29. In view of the above discussion and reasons, we do not find any
substance in the points of argument raised on behalf of the appellant. We
further find that the learned trial Court has very wisely and aptly taken
into consideration the overall materials adduced in the evidence by the
respective parties and has given due weightage to each piece of evidence
for arriving at the conclusion. We further find that the fundamental
16 Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 13 of 1997(R)
2025:JHHC:23765-DB
factual conditions required to be proved by the prosecution to attract the
offence under Section 304B IPC has been well established by the
prosecution. Further the conditions required to attract the presumption of
dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has also been
proved beyond doubt by the prosecution. However, the presumption of
law for dowry death is rebuttable one, therefore reverse onus is upon the
accused to prove his defence negating the prosecution case to the
satisfaction of the court.
30. In the instant case, we do not find any legal substance in the
rebuttal evidence of the defence to absolve from his culpability.
Therefore, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned
judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellant calling for any
interference and taking a different view, this appeal appears to be devoid
of merits and accordingly dismissed.
31. The appellant is enjoying the benefit of suspension of sentence
vide order dated 05.07.2000 which is hereby cancelled and the appellant
is directed to surrender forthwith before the concerned trial Court for
undergoing the remaining part of sentence, otherwise the learned trial
Court shall take all necessary steps for securing the presence of the
appellant and his imprisonment to serve the rest of the sentence imposed
by learned trial Court.
32. Let a copy of this judgment along with trial court record be sent
back to the concerned trial Court for information and needful.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Jharkhand High Court
Dated 14/08/2025
Basant/ A. F. R.
17 Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 13 of 1997(R)
