Jharkhand High Court

Ajit Kumar vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... on 11 August, 2025

Author: Deepak Roshan

Bench: Deepak Roshan

                                                                  2025:JHHC:23208

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                        W.P.(S) No. 912 of 2018
                                     .........

Ajit Kumar, S/o Mr. Deo Narayan Rana, age 41 years approx., Ex Project Officer [Majduriparak Skandh], District Rural Development Agency, Ramgarh (Jharkhand), permanent resident of Village-Pipcho, P.O. & P.S. Daru, District- Hazaribagh, PIN-825313 (Jharkhand). ..... Petitioner Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Rural Development Department, Jharkhand Mantralaya, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi-834001(Jharkhand).

2. The Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribag, At, P.O., P.S. & District-Hazaribag- 825301(Jharkhand).

3. The Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh, At, P.O., P.S. & District-Ramgarh-829122(Jharkhand)

4. The Deputy Development Commissioner, Ramgarh, At, P.O., P.S. & District-Ramgarh-829122(Jharkhand)

5. The Secretary to the Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribag, At, P.O., P.S. & District-Hazaribagh-

            825301 (Jharkhand).                    ..... Respondents
                                                 .........

 CORAM:            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
                                                 .......
          For the Petitioner                     : Mr. Arvind Kumar Singh, Adv
          For the Res.-State                     : Mr. Ajit Kumar, AC to GA-V
                                                 .........
C.A.V. ON 17/07/2025                             PRONOUNCED ON: 11/08/2025
           Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the

petitioner for the following reliefs;

(a)The illegal orders of the respondents No. 2 and 3 a s contained in Memo No. 448/Stha. Hazaribag dated 17.03.2017 {date wrongly typed as 17.03.2016} and Mem NO. 270/Ji.Gra. Ramgarh dated 23.03.2017 [Annexure-7 &7/1] respectively read with Anneuxre- 6/1] whereby the contractual appointment of the petitioner (Annexure-1) has been illegally cancelled with retrospective date of 28.01.2017 merely on the ground that the petitioner was allegedly found involved by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hazaribag (Annexure-3&9) in a completely false and fabricated case (Annexure-2,4 Series, 5 Series & 8).

(ii) For issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus thereby directing the concerned Respondents: -

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(a) To pay the amount of subsistence allowance to the petitioner for the period of his judicial custody from 28.01.2017 to 24.04.2017.

(b)To treat the petitioner in the service of the State Government and also on the pay Rolls from 03.05.2017 onwards (Annexure-10 series) and also to allow him to resume his duties forthwith (Annexure-11 series, 12 and 13 series) subject to the final outcome of the A.C.B. P.S. Hazaribagh Case No. 01/2017.

(c)To pay the cost of litigation for unnecessarily harassing the petitioner.

3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings are that

the Petitioner was a contractual employee of the State

Government and was taken into custody on 27.01.2017 by

the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hazaribag. While he was in the

judicial custody, his contractual services were straightway

terminated without even a show cause vide order dated

17.03.2017 with retrospective effect from 28.01.2017

merely on the ground of the alleged involved in the said

ACB Case.

4. The case of the petitioner is that, on the one hand; he

has been terminated without following principles of natural

justice; and on the other hand, the other similarly situated

contractual employees of the State Government were

allowed to continue in the service of the State subject to the

final-outcome of the respective cases against them. The

Petitioner filed several representations to treat his case at

par with other similarly situated persons after his release

from the judicial custody, but all in vain. Being aggrieved

the Petitioner has filed the present writ application.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

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Inspector of Police ACB requested Deputy Development

Commissioner to furnish information to the effect that

whether the work of making TIN number online was under

the control of Petitioner; to which it was replied by memo

dated 08.03.2017 which makes it crystal clear that the said

vigilance case was not related to the duties and functions

attached to the post of the Petitioner.

He further submits that the contractual appointment

of the Petitioner has been cancelled with retrospective effect

without affording an opportunity of hearing in violation of

principal of natural justice and the order passed is

stigmatic in nature.

He lastly submits that similarly situated Government

Employee against whom a criminal case was also lodged on

order by this Hon'ble Court in A.B.A. No. 1376 of 2016 that

no coercive action be taken against him on this score only

he was allowed to resume his duty and accordingly, he

prayed that the writ application deserves to be allowed.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently

opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner and submits that in the letter of appointment

itself it has been mentioned that the appointment of the

petitioner can be put to an end at any point of time without

assigning any reasons and Petitioner has accepted the

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terms and condition of the Contract and as such, there is

no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order.

He further submits that in view of serious allegations

levelled against the Petitioner, he is not entitled for

extension of the contract period in the MNAREGA Scheme

and if contract of the Petitioner is extended, wrong message

will go to other employees.

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after

going through the respective affidavits filed by them, it

appears that the service of the petitioner has been

terminated merely on the ground of alleged involvement in

ACB case without affording an opportunity of hearing. For

brevity, the termination order is quoted herein below:

आयु त कायालय उ र छोटानागपुर मंडल, हजार बाग।

कयालय आदे श ाथ मक अ भयु त ी अजीत कुमार, प रयोजना पदा धकार (मजदरू परक कंध) मनरे गा, डी.आर.डी.ए., रामगढ़ को टाचार नरोधक यूरो, े ीय कायालय, हजार बाग थाना कांड सं. 01/2017 दनांक 26.01.2017 धारा-7/13 (2) . न. अ ध. एवं सहप ठत धारा-13 (1) (डी) . न. अ ध. 1988 म ल त पाएजाने के कारण उपायु त रामगढ़ क अनुशस ं ा के आलोक म इनक सं वदा आधा रत नयुि त दनांक 28.1.2017 से र द क जाती है।

आयु त के आदे श से ह./-

                                                          आयु त के स चव

 ापांक-45-06/2012-448/ था.        हजार बाग दनांक 17.03.2016
  त ल पः - उपायु त, रामगढ़ को उनके कायालय प ांक 169/िज.             ा. दनांक 20.02
2017 के आलोक म सूचनाथ एवं आव यक कायाथ           े षत ।
                                                          ह./-
                                                आयु त के स चव


                                                                       2025:JHHC:23208

8. In the instant case, after perusing the impugned order

of termination, I do not have any hesitation in holding that

the impugned order is stigmatic in nature. Thus, a full-

fledged enquiry was necessary. Further, from perusal of

record it appears that neither any full-fledged enquiry took

place; nor grounds of defence of the petitioner have been

considered by the Respondents. In this regard, reference

may be made to the case of Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v.

Central University of Kerala1 wherein the Hon'ble Apex

Court at paragraph nos. 10 to 14 has held as under:

"10. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences [Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 170] , the Court observed thus:

(SCC p. 528, para 21) "21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld."

11. In the present case, all the three elements are attracted, as a result of which it must follow that the stated order is ex facie stigmatic and punitive. Such an order could be issued only after subjecting the incumbent to a regular inquiry as per the service rules. As a matter of fact, the Internal Complaints Committee had recommended to proceed against the appellant appropriately but the Executive Council proceeded under the mistaken belief that in terms of Clause 7 of the contract, it was open to the Executive Council to terminate the services of the appellant without a formal regular inquiry as per the service rules. Indisputably, in the present case, the Internal Complaints Committee was constituted in reference to the complaints received from the girl students about the alleged misconduct committed by the appellant, which allegations were duly inquired into in a formal inquiry after giving opportunity to the appellant and culminated with the report recording finding against the appellant with recommendation to proceed against him.

12. Upon receipt of complaints from aggrieved women (girl students of the University) about the sexual harassment at workplace (in this case, University campus), it was obligatory on the Administration to refer such complaints to the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, within the

(2020) 12 SCC 426

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stipulated time period as predicated in Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (for short "the 2013 Act"). Upon receipt of such complaint, an inquiry is required to be undertaken by the Internal Committee or the Local Committee in conformity with the stipulations in Section 11 of the 2013 Act. The procedure for conducting such inquiry has also been amplified in the 2015 Regulations. Thus understood, it necessarily follows that the inquiry is a formal inquiry required to be undertaken in terms of the 2015 Regulations. The allegations to be inquired into by such Committee being of "sexual harassment" defined in Section 2(n) read with Section 3 of the 2013 Act and being a serious matter bordering on criminality, it would certainly not be advisable to confer the benefit on such employee by merely passing a simple order of termination. Such complaints ought to be taken to its logical end by not only initiating departmental or regular inquiry as per the service rules, but also followed by the other actions as per law. In such cases, a regular inquiry or departmental action as per service rules is also indispensable so as to enable the employee concerned to vindicate his position and establish his innocence. We say no more.

13. A priori, we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned termination order dated 30-11-2017 is illegal being ex facie stigmatic as it has been issued without subjecting the appellant to a regular inquiry as per the service rules. On this conclusion, the appellant would stand reinstated, but whether he should be granted back wages and other benefits including placing him under suspension and proceeding against him by way of departmental or regular inquiry as per the service rules, is, in our opinion, a matter to be taken forward by the authority concerned in accordance with law. We do not intend to issue any direction in that regard keeping in mind the principle underlying the exposition of the Constitution Bench in ECIL v. B. Karunakar [ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184] . In that case, the Court was called upon to decide as to what should be the incidental order to be passed by the Court in case after following necessary procedure, the Court/Tribunal was to set aside the order of punishment. The Court observed thus: (SCC p. 758, para 31) "31. ... Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law."

(emphasis supplied) Following the principle underlying the abovequoted exposition, we proceed to hold that even though the impugned order of termination dated 30-11-2017 is set aside in terms of this judgment, as a result of which the appellant would stand reinstated, but at the same time, due to flawed approach of Respondent 1 University, the entitlement to grant back wages is

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a matter which will be subject to the outcome of further action to be taken by the University as per the service rules and in accordance with law.

14. Accordingly, this appeal partly succeeds. We set aside the impugned judgments and orders dated 30-1-2018 [Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala, 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 22418] and 20-2-2018 [Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala, 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 22417] passed by the High Court including the order of termination dated 30- 11-2017 issued under the signatures of the Vice-Chancellor of Respondent 1 University; and instead direct reinstatement of the appellant and leave the question regarding back wages, placing him under suspension and initiating departmental or regular inquiry as per the service rules, to be taken forward by the authority concerned in accordance with law."

(emphasis supplied)

As stated hereinabove, the order of termination being

stigmatic in nature; as such, the impugned order requires

interference on this score alone.

9. The Petitioner has also claimed the ground of parity

and referred to paragraph no. 7 of the rejoinder to the

counter-affidavit and submits that in the Deoghar and

Chatra district, some persons working on contract basis

were terminated from service on certain charges but they

have been reinstated and this petitioner is similarly situated

with those employees; as such, he may also be reinstated.

This averment has not been denied by the