M/S Keshri Industries Through Its ... vs The State Of Jharkhand
2025 Latest Caselaw 2232 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

M/S Keshri Industries Through Its ... vs The State Of Jharkhand on 8 August, 2025

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

                                                          2025:JHHC:22662-DB




     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                W.P.(C) No.3560 of 2025
                                      ------
M/s Keshri Industries through its partner Satya Prakash, aged about
55 years, Son of Shiv Basant Kumar Keshri, Resident of Mohalla-
Choudhrana, Bazar, P.O. & P.S.-Garhwa District-Garhwa.
                                          ....            ....             Petitioner
                                 Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand Ranchi at Nepal House P.O
     & P.S-Doranda District-Ranchi.
3. The Deputy Commissioner Garhwa AT+ P.O-Garhwa, District-
     Garhwa
4. The District Mining Officer, Garhwa P.O+P.S-Garhwa District-
     Garhwa.                                   ....          ....      Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
                    ------
        For the Petitioner         : Mr. Kanti Kumar Ojha, Advocate
        For the State              : Mr. Devesh Krishna, SC(Mines)-III
                                  ------
C.A.V. on 31.07.2025                      Pronounced on 08/08/2025

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

seeking for the following reliefs: -

"For issuance of an appropriate Writ/Writs, direction/ directions, order/ orders for quashing the order dated 20.08.2014 passed by the Mines Commissioner Jharkhand at Ranchi in Rev. Case No. 104/2023 (Annex-2) as well as the order dated 16.10.2023 passed by the District Mining Officer Garhwa contained in memo no. 1337 Dated 16.10.2023 (Annex-1) whereby and whereunder the application filed by the petitioner for renewal of his mining lease covering over plot no. 48(1) Part

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consisting for an area of 8 acres under Mauza- Jogiral, Khurd has been rejected by the District Mining Officer Garhwa in view of the amended rule 9 (1) of the JMMC, Rules 2004 and subsequently with erroneous finding by ignoring the previous order passed in similarly situated matters with regard to provisions for renewal of mining lease over government land the order of the District Mining Officer, Garhwa has been affirmed against the law and;

Further to direct the Deputy Commissioner Garhwa to renew the mining lease in favour of the petitioner upon his application filed on 16.10.2023 forthwith by taking into consideration that the petitioner has already complied with all the necessary formalities for the purpose of renewal of the mining lease."

2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ

petition, requires to be enumerated, which read as under: -

(i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that the plot

corresponding to Khata No. 59 measuring an area of 8 acres of

land situated under Mauza Jogiral Khurd, a mining lease for

stone was granted to the petitioner sometime in the year 2004

for the period of 10 years, w.e.f. 07.02.2004 to 06.02.2014.

(ii) On the basis of the aforesaid lease, the petitioner had been

carrying the business of stone quarry by adhering all the Rules

and Regulations and payment of Royalty to the Government

regularly.

(iii) After expiry of the aforesaid term the renewal of the

aforesaid lease was made in the year 2014 and the lease was

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renewed further for 10 years w.e.f. 07.02.2014 to 06.02.2024.

(iv) Since, the term of the aforesaid lease is valid up to

06.02.2024 and accordingly, before expiry of the aforesaid term,

the application for its further renewal was submitted by the

petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa on

10.10.2023 in accordance with statutory Rules.

(v) After submission of the aforesaid application by the

petitioner on 10.10.2023, vide letter as contained in memo no.

1337 dated 16.10.2023, the petitioner was informed that his

application dated 10.10.2023 has been rejected in terms of the

amended Rules of 9(1) of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession

Rules, 2004 (in short 'JMMC Rules') and the intimation to that

effect was conveyed to the petitioner.

(vi) Being aggrieved with the order dated 16.10.2023

passed by the District Mining Officer Garhwa, the petitioner

moved before the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi in Rev. Case No.

104/2023 and finally, vide order dated 20.08.2024, the aforesaid

revision was dismissed by affirming the order of District Mining

Officer observing that the lease area of the petitioner is a

government land which is prohibited, as per the provisions of

JMMC Amended Rules, 2017 and 2019.

(vii) The petitioner had already applied for environment

clearance certificate, the same has been issued to the petitioner

vide letter no. 233 dated 09.01.2014 under the signature of the

member Secretary of the State-Level Environmental Impact

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Assessment Authority.

(viii) After due verification and inquiry made at the relevant

point of time by the revenue authority as well as Department of

Forest, the mining lease was granted to the petitioner.

(ix) The ground of rejection taken by the District Mining

Officer Garhwa, was not applicable in the case of the petitioner,

since, the petitioner had applied for renewal of his mining lease

under the provisions of Rule 23 of JMMC Rules, 2004 which has

not been repealed as yet and accordingly, the amendment made

in the year 2017, 2019 and 2020 in JMMC Rules, 2004, has no

application in the case of the petitioner.

(x) It is the case of the petitioner that the Rule 23 of

JMMC Rules, 2004 provides for renewal of mining lease and

under the said rule, nowhere any prohibitions or restrictions have

been provided for renewal in respect of mining lease over Gair

Majarua land/government land and as such, while no any

prohibition for renewal of mining lease over government land has

been made, the rejection of the application of the petitioner for

renewal of his mining lease was not justified but without taking

into consideration of the provisions of the law/statute, the Mines

Commissioner, (Revisional authority) also affirmed the order of

the District Mining Officer irrespective of the fact that Rule 9

provides for grant of mining lease through public auction and no

amendment has been made under Rule 23 providing the

provisions of renewal of mining lease.

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(xi) The order dated 16.10.2023 passed by the District

Mining Officer as well as the order dated 20.08.2024 passed by

the Mines Commissioner in Rev. Case No. 104/2023, therefore,

suffers from infirmities. Hence this petition.

3. It is evident from the factual aspects that the writ petitioner has

made an application for renewal of license and when it was

rejected by the original authority, then the revision has been filed

before the Mines Commissioner being Rev. Case No.104 of 2023

but the same has also been rejected on the ground that the lease

area of the petitioner is a government land, the lease in

government land will be granted through electronic auction only

as per provision of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (JMMC)

Amendment Rules, 2017 and 2019. The said order is under

challenge in the present writ petition.

Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner

4. Mr. Kanti Kumar Ojha, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has

submitted that the revisional authority while passing the

impugned order dated 20.08.2024 has not appreciated the fact

that the prayer for extension of lease license made was not of

renewal and as such, the provision amended/incorporated in the

Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Amendment Rules, 2017

and 2019 will not be applicable.

5. It has been contended that the Coordinate Bench of this Court

has considered the similar matter in the case of Gopal Kumar

and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors., vide order

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dated 06.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024.

6. The submission, therefore, has been made that the case of the

writ petitioner is squarely covered by the order passed by the

Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 06.02.2025 passed in

W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, wherein, the issue of applicability of

Rule 9 has also been taken into consideration but applying the

implication of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral

Concession Rules, 2017 and 2019, the said order has been

passed and as such, herein also, in view of the applicability of

Rule 23 of JMMC Rules, 2017 and 2019, the order passed by the

revisional authority is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-State

7. Per Contra, Mr. Devesh Krishna, learned S.C. (Mines)-III

appearing for the respondent-State has submitted by taking aid of

the provision of Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral

Concession Rules, 2017 and 2019, wherein, it has been provided

that on or after 31.03.2022, there cannot be renewal of licenses

even by way of extension, rather, the licenses are to be granted

only by virtue of auction.

8. It has been contended that the quasi-judicial authority, on

consideration of legal implication of the aforesaid provision, since,

has passed an order, hence, the same does not require any

interference.

9. Learned State Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by

another Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 10.09.2024 passed

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in the case of Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand

and Ors. [In W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024].

10. Further, reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by

this Court in the case of Ghosh Stone Works represented

through its Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors.,

reported in (2023) SCC OnLine Jhar 3182.

11. Learned State Counsel has further submitted that the order, upon

which, reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner is not

applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case,

since, the said order has been passed without taking into

consideration the view already taken by the Co-ordinate Benches

in the aforesaid two cases.

12. It has further been contended that the order which has been

passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dated 06.02.2025

in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, wherein, the consideration has been

given with respect to the issue of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules, but

if the provision of Rule 23 will be taken into consideration, the

same will only with respect to the process of making application

for the purpose of renewal, i.e., in an occasion where the

application is to be filed within the period of 180 days for the

purpose of renewal, earlier it was 31.03.2020 and subsequently,

31.03.2022.

13. The submission has also been made that the provision of Rule 23

of the JMMC Rules, is to be taken into consideration along with

the provision of Rule 9(च).

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Analysis

14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone

through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the

reasons assigned by the quasi-judicial authority negating the

claim of the writ petitioner.

15. The issue which requires consideration, i.e.,

(i) Whether the lease can be renewed after 31.03.2022

by way of extension.

(ii) Whether seeking extension of the lease period will

not amount to renewal of the lease period.

(iii) Whether exceeding to the prayer made on behalf of

the writ petitioner, will it not amount to violation of the

provision of Rule 9(च), wherein, the embargo has

been put under the statute for no renewal of the lease

license on or after 31.03.2022 and even, if the license

has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2022,

the same will list its force on 31.03.2022.

(iv) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench

of this Court dated 06.02.2025 in W.P.(C) No.6812 of

2024 in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The

State of Jharkhand and Ors., is to be considered on

the principle of judicial discipline if there is no

consideration of the earlier two judgments passed by

the Coordinate Benches of this Court in the aforesaid

case.

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(v) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench

in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State

of Jharkhand and Ors., is held to be per incuriam.

16. Issue no.(i) to (iii) are interlinked and as such, the same are to be

taken up together. However, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being dealt

with separately.

17. This Court, before dealing with the issue no.(i) to (iii), therefore, is

thought it proper to deal with the issues, i.e., issue no.(iv) and (v),

since, the learned counsel for the petitioner has given much

emphasis upon the applicability of the order dated 06.02.2025

passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.6812

of 2024 (Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand

and Ors.).

18. This Court, in order to consider the applicability of the order dated

06.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, needs to refer

herein the order passed by the Coordinate Bench, which is being

referred hereinbelow: -

1. In this writ petition, petitioners assail order dated 29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining Officer, Koderma refusing to grant renewal of the mining lease granted to the petitioners from 11.02.2015 to 10.02.2025.

2. In the impugned order, it is mentioned that because the land is Gair Majarua land and there is no provision for grant of renewal of mining lease for such a land, the application for renewal of mining lease is being rejected.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed

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before us Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 which provides for renewal of mining lease. The said rule nowhere prohibits grant of renewal in respect of a mining lease of Gair Majarua land. When there is no such prohibition for renewal of a mining lease of such a category of land, the respondents cannot invent such a prohibition and seek to reject the renewal application of the petitioners.

4. Reliance by the respondents on the notification issued on 22.02.2017 and 08.03.2019 amending the Rule 9 of the above rules is of no avail, since the said rule only provides for grant of mining lease for the first time through a public auction, and there has been no amendment to Rule 23 which deals with renewal of mining leases at all.

5. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. Order dated 29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining Officer, Koderma is set-aside and the respondents are directed to renew the mining lease granted to the petitioners forthwith subject to the petitioners complying with all other formalities.

19. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the Coordinate

Bench has considered the applicability of Rule 23 of the

Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004.

20. The reliance which has been placed on behalf of the respondent

about the applicability of Rule 9 of the above Rules has been held

to be not availed.

21. This Court, therefore, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision

of Rule 9(ङ), Rule 9(च), Rule 9(छ) and Rule 9(ज) of the JMMC

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Rules for the purpose of consideration of lis.

"9(ङ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त वैसे आवेदन पत्र धिसमें इस अधिसूचना धनर्गत होने की धतधि से पूवग झारखण्ड लघु खधनि समनुदान धनयमावली, 2004 के धनयम 11 अंतर्गत Letter of Intent (आशय का पत्र) धनर्गत हो चुका है, उसे इस अधिसूचना के धनर्गत होने की धतधि से 180 धदनों के अंदर पयागवरण स्वीकृधत एवं खनन योिन अधनवायग रूप से समधपगत करना होर्ा, अन्यिा उनका आवेदन स्वतः अस्वीकृत हो िाएर्ा। 9(च) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त खनन पटे को िो करकामेव व एवं पयागवरणीय स्वीकृधत खनन योिना प्राप्त नही राहत वैसे खर कालधतरोधहत हो र्ये हो, उन‌के पट्टे की अवधि पट्टा स्वीकृधत/नवीनीकरण की धतधि से 31 माचग, 2022तक के धलए अवधि धवस्ताररत मानी िाएर्ी, बशते धक अधिसूचना की धतधि के पूवग खनन पट्टा की अस्वीकृधत/रद्द/व्ययर्त होने का आदे श, नहीं पाररत धकया र्या है, परन्तु वैसे खानन पट्टे पर कोई खनन तब तक नहीं धकया िा सकेर्ा, िब तक खनन हेतु आवश्यक पयागवरणीय स्वीकृधत/वन एवं पयागवरण धवभार् की स्वीकृधत/खनन योिना स्वीकृधत प्राप्त नहीं हो िाता है। आवेदक को सभी वांधित अनापत्ती 180 धदनों के अंदर समधपगत कना होर्ा। 9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर स्वीकृत/नवीकृत खनन पट्टे की अवधि यधद उनकी स्वीकृधत/नवीकरण की अवधि 3[31 माचग, 2022 के बाद की धतधि हो, तो उनकी अवधि उनकी स्वीकृधत/नवीकरण की अवधि तक धवधिमान्य रहेर्ी। 9(ज)(12) धनयम-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (ि) तिा 9 (10) पूवग से स्वीकृत/आवधदत लघु खधनि के 5.00 हे क्टेयर क्षेत्र से कम क्षेत्र पर भी लार्ू होंर्ें।"

22. It is evident from Rule 9 particularly Rule 9 (ङ) and (च), wherein,

the issue of renewal of lease/license has been dealt with initially

for the period of 90 days thereafter, it was extended upto the

period of 180 which is to be renewed on the basis of making

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proper application by the applicant. The provision of Rule 9(च)

provides that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially,

the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020

by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has

been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022.

23. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license

has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of

the lease will be upto 31.03.2022.

24. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9(ि) as

referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity

of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will

remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any

extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of

Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction.

25. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (ज)(12) as quoted

and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(च) will be

applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares.

26. The provision of Rule 23 speaks about the procedure for filing an

application for the purpose of renewal of lease. The occasion to

insert the provision as under Rule 23 is to comply with the

procedure by the applicant, which is required at the time of filing

an application for renewal of license, if any applicant is making an

application in view of the provision of Rule 9(ङ).

27. But the specific provision has been given under Rule 9 (च) putting

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complete restriction of renewal on or after 31.03.2022, rather, the

allotment is to be made only through auction.

28. The aforesaid issue has been taken into consideration in the

judgment passed by the Coordinate Benches in two cases, i.e., in

the cases of Ghosh Stone Works represented through its

Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. and Rang Nath

Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.

29. We have considered the said judgments and found therefrom that

the consideration has been given regarding Rule 9(च) in the

situation wherein the issue of renewal of license is to be granted

beyond the period of 31.03.2022 or not.

30. The Coordinate Benches have passed order by taking the

implication of Rule 9(ङ) and Rule 9(च), which is based upon the

judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Goa

Foundation Vrs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2014) 6

SCC 590, holding therein that there cannot be any extension

contrary to the statutory command.

31. The issue of applicability of the judgment passed by the

Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., is

being considered by this Court.

32. This Court, on consideration of the judgment passed in the case

of Gopal Kumar and Ors., has found that the date of judgment is

dated 06.02.2025, while, the judgment passed by the Coordinate

Bench in the case of Ghosh Stone Works and Ors. is dated

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29.11.2023 and in the case of Rang Nath Singh is dated

10.09.2024, respectively.

33. These two judgments are prior to the order dated 06.02.2025

passed in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. But there is no

consideration of the said judgments in the case of Gopal Kumar

and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(C) No.6812

of 2024].

34. We are conscious that if two conflicting views are there, then, the

matter is to be referred to the larger Bench on the principle of

judicial discipline.

35. We are further conscious that the judicial discipline warrants the

order passed by the Coordinate Benches are to be given adhered

to.

36. But we are also conscious that if the judgment passed by the

Coordinate Bench without taking into consideration of the

judgment passed by the same Corum which is earlier to the

judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench, then, the principle of

judicial discipline is not to be made applicable.

37. The principle of per incuriam has been taken into consideration

by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and

Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436, for

ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment

are being referred as under: -

"Per incuriam -- Doctrine

64. "Incuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The courts have

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developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. Thus the "quotable in law", is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority.

65. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [(1975) 2 SCC 232 :AIR 1975 SC 907] this Court held : (SCC p. 235, para

7) "7. ... where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission."

38. Further, the concept of per incuriam was examined by the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Hyder Consulting (UK)

Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 where it was held

that decision can be said to be given per incuriam when the

court of record has acted in ignorance of any previous decision

of its own, or a subordinate court has acted in ignorance of a

decision of the court of record, for ready reference the relevant

paragraph is being quoted as under:

"46. Before I consider the correctness of the aforementioned decisions, it would be necessary to elaborate upon the concept of "per incuriam". The Latin expression "per incuriam" literally means "through inadvertence". A decision can be said to be given per incuriam when the court of record has acted in ignorance of any previous decision of its own, or a subordinate court has acted in ignorance of a decision of the court of record. As regards the judgments of this Court rendered per incuriam, it cannot be said that this Court has "declared the law" on a given subject-matter, if the relevant law was not duly considered by this Court in its decision. In this regard, I refer to State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals

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Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 139] , wherein R.M. Sahai, J. in his concurring opinion stated as follows : (SCC p. 162, para

40)

"40. 'Incuria' literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis.

The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority'."

39. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition that the word "per

incuriam" has been interpreted if any order/judgment has been

passed by the Court in complete ignorance of the judgment

already passed on the same issue or ignorance of any statutory

provision, then, such judgment will come under the fold of

principle of per-incuriam, exactly same is the case herein, since,

in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., even though, the views

have been taken by the Co-ordinate Benches in the cases of

Ghosh Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs.

State of Jharkhand and Ors. [W.P.(C) No.1511 of 2018] and

Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.

[W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024], since have not been produced, hence,

there is no consideration thereof.

40. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment passed by

the Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., is

having no binding effect on the principle of judicial discipline.

41. Accordingly, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being answered.

42. So far as the issue nos.(i) to (iii) are concerned, the admitted

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case of the writ petitioner is that during the subsistence period of

lease, the renewal application has been filed. The further

admitted fact is that the lease was to expire sometime in the year,

2024. The application for extension of the lease has been made

initially before the District Mining Officer and subsequently, when

the said relief has been rejected, the order passed herein has

been challenged before the Mines Commissioner, which has also

been rejected on the ground of applicability of provision of Rule

9(च) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules.

43. The factual aspect therefore is not in dispute that the application

for renewal has been made for extension of license on or after

31.03.2022. Such application has been filed on the pretext of

statutory restriction of expiry of the lease after 31.03.2022 even if,

the renewal has been granted, the aforesaid statutory restriction

has been taken into consideration by the quasi-judicial authority

in rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner.

44. The argument has been advanced by taking aid of Rule 23 of the

JMMC Rules but as has been referred that the Rule 23 of the

JMMC Rules lays down the procedure for making application for

the purpose of renewal in a case where the application is to be

filed under Rule 9(ङ) of the JMMC Rules and once the application

is being filed, then, the lease is to be renewed either by way of

renewal or extension but in no case, it is beyond the period of

31.03.2022 in view of the provision of Rule 9(च) .

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45. The quasi-judicial authorities have taken into consideration the

aforesaid statutory restrictions and therefore rejected the claim of

the writ petitioner.

46. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued by putting

reliance upon Rule 23 of JMMC Rules, but, the said submission

is not acceptable due to the application of the principle of

harmonious construction of the statutory provision.

47. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan vs.

Mohd. Shafi, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 540 has observed that

the statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole

and one provision should be construed with reference to the other

provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought

to be achieved. It has further been observed that the well-known

principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given

to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the

provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction, for

ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid

Judgment is being quoted as under:

"8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious

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construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. With respect to law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [(1990) 1 SCC 277] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16) "16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. 'Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged' as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. (Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)] ) Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said:

'Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.' (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553] )"

48. Thus, it is settled position of law that the statute is to be taken

into consideration harmoniously and not on the basis of picking

one provision whose suits the litigant and leaving another

provision which is against the interest of the litigant concerned.

Otherwise, the same will be in defiance of the principle of

harmonious construction of the statutory provision and in that

view of the matter, the very object of the statutory command will

be frustrated, which has been mandated in the judgment

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Goa

Foundation (supra).

49. It needs to refer herein that the writ petition has been filed for

issuance of Writ of Certiorari for interfering with the decision

taken by the Mines Commissioner, as available in the order dated

05.09.2024 appended as Annexure-2.

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50. We are aware with the settled position of law of issuance of Writ

of Certiorari, which can only be issued if there is any error

apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice,

reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs.

Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477,

wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under:

"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals:

these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had

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erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised."

51. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad

Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as

hereunder: -

"21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One

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consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari."

52. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and

Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, their Lordships, while

discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold

at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder:

"12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra).

13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them

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or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice."

53. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex

Court to issue Writ of Certiorari and basing upon the reason

assigned hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the

quasi-judicial authorities, cannot be said to suffer from an error,

hence, the same is not fit to be interfered with.

54. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed.

55. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.)

I Agree

(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.) (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

Rohit/-A.F.R.