Jharkhand High Court

Shyam Sundar Agarwal vs Ruby Kumari on 15 April, 2025

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar

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     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
             First Appeal No.104 of 2024
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Shyam Sundar Agarwal, aged about 45 years, Son of Kali Charan Agrawal, Resident of Village-Banshidhar Adukiya Road, Near Nagarmal Modi Seva Sadan, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand .... .... Appellant/Petitioner Versus Ruby Kumari, aged about 39 years, Wife of Shyam Sundar Agrawal, Daughter of Late Raghunath Prasad, presently resides at Village-C/o Ranjan Kr. Gupta Okni Lane No.II, Near Okni Talab, P.O.+P.S.- Lohsinghna, District-Hazaribagh, Jharkhand, Permanent Address R/o Bansidhar Adukiya Road, Near-Nagarmal Modi Seva Sadan, P.S:Kotwali, Distt.-Ranchi .... .... Respondent

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR

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For the Appellant : Mr. Ranjan Kr. Singh, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Arjun Narayan Deo, Advocate Mr. Karishma Kumari, Advocate

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07/Dated: 15.04.2025

1. The instant appeal preferred under Section19(1) of the Family

Courts Act, is directed against the judgment dated 06.02.2023

passed in Original Suit No.249 of 2021 by the learned Principal

Judge Family Court, Hazaribagh, by which, the Suit filed under

Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has been

dismissed on contest.

2. The instant appeal is barred by inordinate delay of 358 days,

therefore, an application for condoning the aforesaid delay has been

filed being I.A.No.4540 of 2024.

3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the

instant appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 358 days,

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deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation

application before going into the legality and propriety of the

impugned order on merit.

4. Mr. Ranjan Kr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has

submitted that the cause has been shown at paragraph-6 of the

instant interlocutory application said to be sufficient cause, as per the

appellant and as such, it is a fit case where the delay in filing the

instant appeal may be condoned.

5. While, on the other hand, Mr. Arjun Narayan Deo, learned

counsel for the respondent, who has appeared on being noticed by

filing Vakalatnama, has vehemently opposed the issue of condoning

the delay on the basis of sufficient cause said to be there as per the

pleading made at paragraph-6 of the instant interlocutory application.

6. According to him, an explanation which has been furnished at

paragraph-6 of the application, cannot be said to be sufficient cause,

reason being that, it has only been stated therein that the time has

been consumed in obtaining the relevant documents and

expenditure which was to be incurred in filing the appeal.

7. It has been submitted that the law is well settled that the delay

can be condoned in filing the appeal, subject to availability of

sufficient cause if has been shown on behalf of the litigant concerned

but the statement made at paragraph-6, cannot be said to be

sufficient cause as stated in the interlocutory application, is fit to be

rejected.

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8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone

through the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties

particularly the reason which has been shown in the instant

interlocutory application for the purpose of condoning the delay of

358 days.

9. This Court, before appreciating the reason which has been

shown in the instant interlocutory application, needs to refer the

definition of "sufficient cause".

10. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of

'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause'

has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition

Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the

Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of

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each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".

11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.

(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR

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2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."

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An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification,

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putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

11. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party

should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of

bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case

or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or

"remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each

case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to

exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises

discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must

satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"

from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is

furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation

of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide

or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been

held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.

Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs.

A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti,

(2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal

Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.

12. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the

expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation

to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as

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negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the

party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,

can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket

formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the

judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @

Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC

195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-

"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."

13. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and

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Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held

that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts

of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay

condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-

"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to

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the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.

14. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation

application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient

cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as

to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period

of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as

such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant

and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.

15. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition of law

and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to

condone the inordinate delay of 358 days, is proceeding to examine

as to whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient

cause for condoning the delay.

16. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein,

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expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which means that

the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a

want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of

a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted

deliberately" or "remained inactive".

17. Adverting to the reason which has been shown in the instant

interlocutory application as stated at paragraph-6, we have gone

through the said statements and found therefrom that day to day

delay in not filing the appeal, has not been referred therein, rather, it

has only been stated that the time has been consumed in obtaining

the relevant documents and the money has to incur in filing the

appeal which caused delay of 358 days, for ready reference,

paragraph-6 of the instant interlocutory application is being referred

as under:-

"6. That, after recovery of good health the

appellant/petitioner took advice and thereafter, he

obtained the relevant documents and arranged the

expenses and thereafter he came to Ranchi and

handed over the brief in third week of April, 2024

and thereafter, without any further delay after

drafting of the case, the same has been filed

immediately but delay in filing the instant appeal

was already occurred."

18. It needs to refer herein that the appellant is husband who has

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challenged the dismissal of suit, by which, decree of divorce has

been refused to be granted in favour of the appellant.

19. The law is well settled that the delay can be condoned, subject

to showing the sufficient cause. "Sufficient cause" has been defined,

as per the interpretation given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

judgments referred hereinabove and considering the reason shown

at paragraph-6, the explanation furnished therein, cannot be said to

be sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the delay.

20. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in absence of sufficient

cause, the delay of 358 days in filing the instant appeal, cannot be