Jharkhand High Court
Maa Vaishnavi Construction Through Its ... vs Regional Commissioner Employee ... on 23 October, 2024
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(L) No. 3961 of 2023
Maa Vaishnavi Construction through its proprietor Arun Kumar S/o
Bharat Prasad aged about-34 years R/o Village-Khakin, P.O. & P.S.-
Chatarpur, District-Palamau. ... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. Regional Commissioner Employee provident fund besides Indra
Palace, P.O.-Hinu, P.S. Doranda, Ranchi.
2. Assistant Commissioner Employee provident fund besides Indra
Palace, P.O. Hinu, P.S. Doranda, Ranchi.
3. General Manger Cum-Chief Engineer Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam
Limited area both Medninagar, P.O. & P.S. Medninagar, District-
Palamau. ... ... Respondents
---
CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
---
For the Petitioner : Mr. Onkar Nath Tewary, Advocate
For the Resp. No. 1 & 2 : Mr. Anil Kumar Singh, Advocate
For JUVNL : Mr. Jayant Franklin Toppo, Sr. Standing Counsel
: Mr. Amrit Raj Kisku, AC to Mr. J.F.Toppo, Adv.
---
14/23.10.2024
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-
"A.For setting aside the order dated 8 June 2023
Annexure-2 passed by the Learned presiding officer,
CJIT Cum-Labour Court, Dhanbad.
B. For adjudicating the case of the petitioner on the basis
of merit by considering the facts and law by the CGIT
Cum-Labour Court, Dhanbad.
C. For to release the bank account of the petitioner which
was freezed by the concerned Respondent No. 2.
D.For further issuance of an appropriate
writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) as Your Lordships may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case and in the interest of justice."
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
was allocated work for supply of skilled manpower for maintenance of
33 KV/ 11 KV power substation by respondent No.3. He has further
submitted that an agreement was entered into between the parties and
the work order was also issued and as per the work order the petitioner
was to provide manpower to respondent No. 3 as per the rate chart and
all benefits including compensation, medical expense, provident fund,
EMI etc was payable as per the contribution of the respondent No. 3.
He has submitted that the payment of labour was made by the
petitioner in accordance with the payment made by the respondent No.
3 and the respondent No. 3 made payment only of labour cost and the
contribution of Employees Provident Fund was not paid which was a
reason for non-deposit of the dues under Employees Provident Fund.
4. He submits that a proceeding was initiated under section 7-A of
the Act of 1952 which was decided against the petitioner vide order
dated 28.10.2021 and in the said proceedings, the respondent No. 3
was not made party.
5. The learned counsel submits that the dues under section 7-A
was assessed and quantified against the petitioner and an appeal was
filed thereafter, before the appellate tribunal but the appeal has been
dismissed by a cryptic and non-speaking order holding that the appeal
was barred by limitation of approximately 18 months which was
beyond the period of filing of the appeal as per rule 7 of the EPF
Appellate Tribunal Rules 1997.
6. The learned counsel submits that as recorded in the impugned
order passed by the learned tribunal itself, it was submitted by the
petitioner that the petitioner was not aware of the order dated
27.10.2021 till January, 2022. The learned counsel has also referred to
the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Miscellaneous
Application No. 21 of 2022 [in Suo Motu Writ petition no. 3 of 2020]
and has submitted that as per the said judgment on account of Covid-
19, the period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 was to be excluded
while calculating limitation notwithstanding the actual balance period
of limitation remaining and all persons were entitled to limitation for a
period of 90 days from 01.03.2022.
7. The learned counsel has referred to paragraph 6 of the rejoinder
to submit that the petitioner came to know about the order dated
27.10.2021 only upon freezing of the bank account.
8. The learned counsel submits that the aforesaid facts and
circumstances having not been considered, the impugned order passed
by the learned tribunal is fit to be set aside and the matter to be
remitted back for fresh consideration.
9. The learned counsel on behalf of the respondent has opposed
the prayer and has submitted that the impugned order passed by the
learned tribunal though is short but is a well speaking order so far as
point of limitation is concerned. He has further relied upon the
judgment passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 5362 of 2021 dated
07.06.2022 which in turn had relied upon the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Division Bench in the case of M/S Nagarmal Modi Seva
Sadan reported in 2021 (2) JBCJ 410 which in turn had relied upon
the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein it has
been held that the maximum period for filing appeal would be 120 (60
+ 60) days.
10. The learned counsel has also submitted that once the appeal was
barred by limitation there is no question of entering into merits of this
case.
11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and
considering the facts and circumstances from the records of this case,
it appears that the order under section 7-A of the Act of 1952 was
passed on 27.10.2021 and the petitioner had filed the appeal before the
appellate authority on 16.05.2023. The order of the learned tribunal
reveals that a submission was made by the petitioner that the petitioner
was not aware of the order impugned till January, 2022. In the writ
petition there is no averment made that such submission recorded by
the learned tribunal is incorrect. Further, in the writ petition and even
in the rejoinder no date has been mentioned regarding knowledge
about the order passed under section 7-A of the Act. With regards to
the date of knowledge a reference has been made to paragraph 6 of the
rejoinder which reads as follows: -
"6. That it is further stated and submitted that the
petitioner could get to know about this case only after the
freezing of the account."
12. From the perusal of paragraph 6 also it is not clear as to which
order was being referred in paragraph 6 and what was the exact date
on which the petitioner came to know about the order. At best the date
of knowledge of the order impugned before the learned tribunal can be
taken as January as recorded in the submissions made by the petitioner
before the learned tribunal.
13. It is also important to note that the petitioner has filed a copy of
the petition seeking condonation of delay which was filed before the
learned tribunal wherein at paragraph 2 of the petition for condonation
of delay a prayer has been made to condone the delay of 150 days and
in the said petition also the date of receipt of the order passed under
section 7-A of the Act has not been mentioned. However, before the
learned tribunal as per own calculation of the petitioner the appeal was
barred by 150 days.
14. This court finds that even if the entire period from 15.03.2020
to 01.03.2022 is excluded and 60 days is granted to the petitioner from
01.03.2022 the period would have expired on 01.05.2022 and further
60 days would have expired on 01.07.2022. The appeal was filed on
16.05.2023 and there is no explanation in connection with delay
beyond 01.07.2022 even if the best case of the petitioner is taken in to
consideration based on materials on record. Otherwise, also in view of
the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent, the period for filing the appeal is 60 days and the
condonable period is further 60 days and not beyond a total period of
120 days.
15. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of this case,
this Court is of the considered view that the learned tribunal has
rightly dismissed the appeal on the point of limitation. This court is of
the considered view that the length of the order is not material and
what is material is the consideration of the point. The learned
appellate court has found the appeal barred by limitation in terms of
Rule 7 of the EPF Appellate Tribunal Rule, 1997 and there is no
perversity in such finding.
16. Consequently, this Court finds no reason to interfere in the
impugned order and accordingly this writ petition is hereby dismissed.
17. Pending interlocutory application, if any , is dismissed.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
Rakesh/-
