Jharkhand High Court
Vijay Kumar Jha vs The State Of Jharkhand on 29 January, 2024
Author: S.N. Pathak
Bench: S.N.Pathak
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S). No. 1391 of 2009
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Vijay Kumar Jha .......... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Director, Secondary Education, Human Resources
Development Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi.
3. The Regional Deputy Director of Education, North Chhotanagpur
Division, Hazaribagh.
4. The District Education Officer, Dhanbad
.......... Respondents.
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CORAM: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N.PATHAK
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Arpan Mishra, Advocate
Ms. Aditee Dongrawat, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Aditya Raman, AC to GA-III
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20/ 29.01.2024 Heard the parties.
2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the
letter dated 24.06.2008 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition), by which the
claim of petitioner for payment of Super Selection Scale has been rejected
by the respondents.
Further prayer has been made for a direction upon the respondents to
provide Super Senior Selection Scale i.e. the scale of Rs.2200-4000 w.e.f.
01.04.1993 to which the petitioner is entitled for and to pay the difference
of salary after revising the scale of the petitioner w.e.f. 01.04.1993 till
30.04.2007.
Petitioner has further prayed for direction upon the respondents to fix
and revise all the retiral benefits of the petitioner after grant of Super Senior
Selection Scale and pay the arrears of salary/ pension w.e.f. 01.04.1993.
3. The case of the petitioner lies in a narrow compass. Petitioner was
appointed on 14.03.1967 as Untrained Assistant Teacher and continued to
work on the said post till his retirement i.e. 30.04.2007. At the time of
appointment, the petitioner was having the qualification of B.Sc.(Math).
Thereafter, petitioner obtained the degree of B.Ed. in the year 1970 and
M.Ed. in the year 1979 as well as the degree of LL.B. in the year 1993. It is
the case the petitioner that though initially he was appointed on Untrained
Scale but subsequently, he completed B.Ed. in the year 1970 and hence, his
pay has been fixed in trained scale w.e.f. 08.06.1970. Subsequently, the
respondents came out with a circular dated 19.12.1992, by which a decision
was taken to grant Super Senior Selection Scale i.e. Rs.2200-4000 to the
cadre of teachers of Government High Schools w.e.f. 01.01.1986 i.e. 20%
out of total strength of Senior Scale Teachers and accordingly, 376 posts
were sanctioned for North Chhotanagpur Division. Further, in view of
resolution dated 20.02.1993, issued by the Finance Department it has been
categorically stated that the Teachers who have got the 1 st time bound
promotion or junior selection grade are entitled for revised scale w.e.f.
01.01.1986 and those who have completed 12 years of service from the date
when they got time bound promotion or junior selection grade are entitled
to Super Senior Selection Grade.
4. It is further case of petitioner that from perusal of letter dated
05.06.1998 it will be evident that a decision has been taken that those who
have undergone and completed the training will be given the scale of
Rs.2200-4000 after their screening and if everything is found satisfactory.
From the list annexed with the said letter, it is evident that the case of
petitioner was also under consideration. A certificate of training was also
issued to the petitioner on 30.06.1998, in which it has categorically been
mentioned that the petitioner is also entitled for the scale of Rs.2200-4000
i.e. Super Senior Selection Scale. When the said scale was not provided to
the petitioner he represented before the respondents but the same went in
vain. It is the further case of petitioner that all of a sudden impugned letter
dated 24.04.1994 was issued stating therein that the petitioner is not entitled
for Super Senior Selection Scale of Rs.2200-4000 as he has not obtained the
degree of Post-Graduation. It has been further stated that in view of letter
dated 25.09.1997, Clause-3 and 5, the petitioner was granted Senior Scale
on 01.04.1981 and since the petitioner completed 12 years of service on
01.04.1993 whereas the Super Senior Selection Scale came into effect from
01.01.1986 hence, petitioner was not entitled for Super Senior Selection
Scale.
Aggrieved by non-consideration of his case for granting Super Senior
Selection Scale, the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court.
5. Mr. Arpan Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner vociferously
argues that petitioner is entitled for the Super Senior Selection Scale and
reasons assigned in the impugned order cannot be accepted in view of
various judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Learned counsel
emphatically argues that the requirement as per terms and condition for
granting Super Senior Selection Scale was Post-Graduation Degree.
Nowhere, it has been mentioned that it should not be Post-Graduation in
Education rather, it should be from other Discipline. Learned counsel
further argues that since petitioner was fulfilling the requisite qualification
he was entitled for financial benefits of Super Senior Selection Scale.
Learned counsel submits that Super Senior Selection Scale is not a regular
promotion rather it is financial upgradation and the petitioner fulfilling the
requisite qualification is entitled for the same. Admittedly, petitioner has
done Post-Graduation and has obtained his degree therefore, in view of
settled rules relied upon by the respondents themselves, the petitioner is
entitled for Super Senior Selection Scale w.e.f. 01.04.1993.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Aditya Raman, learned counsel appearing for
respondent-State by vehemently opposing the contention of learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that in no way petitioner is entitled for the said
benefits. Learned counsel submits that interpretation cannot be made as per
sweet-will of the petitioner just to get the benefits. To buttress his argument
learned counsel places heavy reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex
Court in case of Dr. Prit Singh Vs. S.K. Mangal & Ors., reported in 1993
Supp. (1) SCC 714, wherein it has been held that Master's degree in any
subject held in the context, does not comprehend Master's degree in
Education. Learned counsel submits that in view of logical sequitur, the
petitioner is not entitled for any benefits since he was Master in Education
and not Master in other Discipline. Learned counsel submits that M.Ed.
cannot be termed as Post-Graduation Degree and therefore, rightly his
promotion to Super Senior Selection Scale has been rejected. Justifying the
impugned order and distinguishing the judgments relied upon by the
petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the case in hand
relates to promotion whereas, the case laws relied upon by the petitioner is
of appointment and as such, ratio laid down in those cases are not binding
in the present case rather, the ratio laid down in case of Dr. Prit Singh
(supra) is wholly applicable and as such, petitioner is not entitled for any
benefits.
7. Having heard the rival submissions of parties and upon perusal of the
documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that the
case of petitioner needs consideration. Admittedly, petitioner is having the
Master Degree which is not in quarrel. The issue to be decided is as to
whether M.Ed. is Master Degree equivalent to Post-Graduation or not.
8. The said issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court
in case of Smt. Juthika Bhattacharya Vs. the State of Madhya Pradesh
& Ors., reported in (1976) 4 SCC 96, wherein their Lordships have held
that in the refined and elegant world of education, it is the holder of a
master's degree like the M.Ed. or the LL.M. who earns recognition as the
holder of post-graduate degree. That is the sense in which the expression is
used in the memorandum. No distinction can be made out in view of legal
propositions set at rest in the aforesaid case. The relevant para of the said
judgment reads as under:
"7. As regards the second limb of the argument that since
the appellant holds the qualification of B.A., B.T., she ought
to be considered as holding a "post-graduate degree",
regard must again be had to the context in which the
particular expression occurs and the purpose of the
prescription. It is not inconceivable that the expression
"post-graduate degree" may in a broad and general sense
mean in a given context any degree obtained after
graduation and which a graduate alone can obtain. But that
is not the sense in which the memorandum uses the
particular expression. By "post-graduate degree" is meant a
master's degree like the M.A. or M.Sc. and not a bachelor's
degree like the B.T. In other words, the expression connotes
the successful completion of a course of studies at a higher
level in any speciality, after the acquisition of a basic
qualification at the graduate level. The B.T. course of
studies, we are informed, is open only to graduates and in a
dictionary manner of speaking, the degree of "Bachelor of
Teaching" may be said to be a "post"-graduate degree in
the sense that the degree is obtainable only "after"
graduation. That is the sense in which the word "post" is
used in expressions like "post-nuptial", "post-prandial",
"post-operative", "postmortem" and so forth. In these
expressions, "post" means simply "after", the emphasis
being on the happening of an event after a certain point of
time. But the expression "post-graduate degree" has
acquired in the educational world a special significance, a
technical content. A bachelor's degree like the B.T., or the
LL.B. is not considered to be a post-graduate degree even
though those degrees can be taken only after graduation. In
the refined and elegant world of education, it is the holder of
a master's degree like the M.Ed. or the LL.M. who earns
recognition as the holder of a post-graduate degree. That is
the sense in which the expression is used in the
memorandum. Mr Sen says that in some foreign universities
even a bachelor's degree, obtainable only after graduation,
is considered as a post-graduate qualification. We are
concerned with the interpretation of an indigenous
instrument and must have regard for local parlance and
understanding. Such awareness and understanding compel
the construction for which we have indicated our preference.
Indeed, everyone concerned understood the rule in the same
sense as is evident from the permission sought by the
appellant herself to appear for the M.A. examination. She
asked for that permission in order to qualify for the
Principal's post."
9. Since, counsel for the respondents places reliance on the judgment of
Dr. Prit Singh (supra) which came much after the judgment of Smt.
Juthika Bhattacharya (supra), in view of conflict between the legal
propositions, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Anand Yadav & Ors. Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2021) 12 SCC 390, their
Lordships have clearly observed and held that We thus fail to understand
how the judgment in Prit Singh case can be considered a binding precedent
in the factual contours of the present case, more so in view of the
observations made in Ram Sevak Singh's case [(1999) 2 SCC 189], clearly
setting out as to what was the actual basis of the opinion of Prit Singh case.
Their Lordships further observed that on the basis of an expert
committee, that the two can be treated as equivalent for the post of Assistant
Professor in Education. Thus, it is neither for the contesting party i.e.
Respondent 3, nor for this Court to sit as a court of appeal over the
decision of the experts.
The relevant paragraphs of the judgment in case of Anand Yadav &
Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2021) 12 SCC 390,
reads as under:
"36. We have also gone through the judgment in Prit Singh
case [Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 714 : 1993
SCC (L&S) 246] . The impugned order [Sanjai Kumar
Dubey v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 5940] of the High
Court has almost been predicated entirely on this judgment, as if
there was no issue alive to be dealt with, even though the
distinction was recognised in a subsequent judgment of Ram
Sevak Singh case [Ram Sevak Singh v. U.P. Singh, (1999) 2 SCC
189 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 538] . It is trite to say that often, a
proposition of law as laid down in a case is as good as the facts
of the case. Prit Singh case [Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal, 1993
Supp (1) SCC 714 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 246] was concerned with
the dual requirements in the relevant advertisement i.e. a
postgraduate degree in any subject and a degree in Education.
There is no such dual qualification laid here. Not only that, the
recruitment was for the post of a Principal and that too the case
was concerned with a person with qualifications of not much
eminence in terms of the marks obtained. There was an
endeavour to help out the candidate by even amending the
norms and, thus, the Court rightly came to the conclusion that
the same was not appropriate. We are dealing with different
norms for the advertisement concerned, a requirement of having
a degree in the relevant subject, in this case being "Education",
and for eligible persons to have the requisite marks. We, thus,
fail to understand how the judgment in Prit Singh case [Prit
Singh v. S.K. Mangal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 714 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 246] can be considered a binding precedent in the factual
contours of the present case, more so in view of the observations
made in Ram Sevak Singh case [Ram Sevak Singh v. U.P. Singh,
(1999) 2 SCC 189 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 538] , clearly setting out
as to what was the actual basis of the opinion in Prit Singh
case [Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 714 : 1993
SCC (L&S) 246] .
37. We may note that, sometimes, without looking into the
real ratio decidendi, a judgment is followed as a precedent. This
is what appears to have happened in the impugned order [Sanjai
Kumar Dubey v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 5940] .
There are even some other judgments of the High Courts, which
in turn were then sought to be relied upon to canvas a
proposition that there is a widespread acceptance of MEd not
being equivalent to MA (Education). That they are two different
degrees is obvious; this is even recognised by NCTE while
emphasising the subtle distinction between the two degrees as
one being a Master's degree but not a professional degree, while
the other being a professional degree. If the two degrees are
identical, there is no question of equivalence. The issue of
equivalence only arises when there are two different degrees
and what is to be decided whether for certain purposes they can
be treated as equivalent. This is exactly what has happened as a
result of the respective expert committees set up by Respondents
2 & 5. The employer i.e. Respondent 2, had accepted the
recommendation of the expert committee. The UGC has also
taken a stand that insofar as the two degrees are concerned,
both are postgraduate degrees, and the equivalence authority
being Respondent 5 has also opined on the basis of an expert
committee, that the two can be treated as equivalent for the post
of Assistant Professor in Education. Thus, it is neither for the
contesting party i.e. Respondent 3, nor for this Court to sit as a
court of appeal over the decision of the experts. We may also
note that Respondent 3 has in fact been selected in the 2014
selection process as per the final list released on 22-5-2018."
10. The other arguments advanced by learned counsel for the
respondents-State that since fact of the cases are different inasmuch as in
that case petitioner was claiming appointment and in the instant case
petitioner is claiming promotion and as such, ratio of the aforesaid cases
cannot be applied directly in the instant is not accepted to this Court and the
same is fit to be turned down.
11. From the terms and conditions laid down by the respondents
themselves, it appears that since petitioner is fulfilling the requisite
qualification as it appears from the impugned order at Annexure-8 page 49
of the writ petition, this Court is of the view that the impugned order at
Annexure-8 is fit to be quashed and set aside and the same is hereby
quashed and set aside.
12. The respondents are directed to extend the benefits to the petitioner
within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/ production of a
copy of this order. Since reliefs as prayed for has already been granted, the
consequential benefits shall also be extended to the petitioner by revising
pensionery benefits. Needless to say the arrears, if any, accrued to the
petitioner shall also be calculated and extended to the petitioner within a
further period of four weeks.
13. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
(Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)
RC/ k
