Jharkhand High Court

Police 914 Bablu Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand on 1 February, 2024

Author: S.N. Pathak

Bench: S. N. Pathak

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 5276 of 2015
Police 914 Bablu Singh ... ... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Director General of Police, Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa,
Ranchi
3. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi
4. The Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police Mahila Batalian-10, Hotwar,
Ranchi
... ... Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S. N. PATHAK
For the Petitioner : Mr. Rishi Chandan, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Aman Kumar, AC to GP-I

10/01.02.2024 Heard the parties.
2. Petitioner has thrown challenge to the order of punishment dated
19.08.2014, as contained in Memo NO. 287/Confidential, passed by the
disciplinary authority (Respondent No. 4) which has been affirmed up
to the appellate authority vide order dated 02.06.2015, as contained in
Memo No. 1229/G.S., which is also under challenge.
3. Case of the petitioner lies in narrow compass. Petitioner was
appointed as a Police constable and posted in Jharkhand Armed Police-
10 and rendering his services to the satisfaction of the respondents. One
fine morning, chargesheet was issued vide memo no. 1238/RO, dated
21.05.2014 whereby he was put under suspension for the charges of
immoral work and illicit collection. In the departmental proceeding, the
charges were denied by the petitioner and it was submitted that the
entire allegation was based on anonymous letter. In the departmental
proceeding, after following the procedures, the enquiry
officer/conducting officer exonerated the petitioner from the charges.
The disciplinary authority, without differing with the findings of the
enquiry officer, inflicted punishment of withholding of increments for
six months equivalent to one black-marks and also withholding salary
for the period of suspension other than subsistence allowance. The
order of disciplinary authority was upheld by the appellant authority.
Being aggrieved, petitioner has knocked door of this Court.

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4. Mr. Rishi Chandan, learned counsel representing petitioner
vociferously argues that the impugned orders are not tenable in the eyes
of law. It has been argued that petitioner has been exonerated by the
enquiry officer. It is a case of no evidence. After examination of 11
witnesses in the course of proceeding, none of them have even
whispered against the petitioner and on that basis, the enquiry officer
exonerated the petitioner. The disciplinary authority, without assigning
any reason for differing with the report of inquiry officer and without
issuance of second show-cause notice, has inflicted punishment.
Learned counsel further argues that the appellate authority without
appreciating contention of the petitioner, has affirmed order of the
disciplinary authority mechanically, which is also capricious and not
tenable in the eyes of law. The orders are cryptic, capricious and fit to
be quashed and set aside.
5. Mr. Aman Kumar, AC to learned GP-I vehemently opposes
contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and further argues that
the charges against the petitioner are serious in nature. It is unbecoming
of a Police officer to indulge himself in such types of activities and,
therefore, even if he has been exonerated, the disciplinary authority was
fully empowered to inflict punishment, which was affirmed by the
appellate authority. Members of the police force are required to
maintain discipline but the same was not taken care of by the petitioner
and, therefore, no interference is warranted. The writ petition is fit to be
dismissed.
6. Having heard rival submissions of the parties across the bar, this
Court is of the considered view that the impugned order is not tenable
in the eyes of law in view of following facts and reasons:

(i) Admittedly petitioner has been exonerated by the enquiry officer.
Though the disciplinary authority was empowered to inflict
punishment, adhering to the rules but any order dehors the rule is
not tenable in the eyes of law. Without assigning any cogent
reason to differ with the enquiry report, without issuance of
second show-cause notice, the punishment is not tenable in the
eyes of law. It was permissible in the eyes of law to proceed for
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further inquiry but de novo and fresh inquiry is impermissible.

(ii) Petitioner had an unblemished service career but the same was not
considered by the respondents while inflicting harsh punishment
to him. The respondents ought to have considered his long
unblemished service career.
(iii) In the case of Prem Chand Ram Vs. State of Bihar and others
reported in 19991 SCC OnLine Pat 1015:(2000) 2 PLJR 918, the
Hon'ble Court has held as under:
"10. In the case of K.R. Dev V. The Collector of
Central Excise, Shillong [(1971) 2 SCC 102:AIR 1971 SC
1447], the Supreme Court held that in case of some defect
in the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer, the
disciplinary authority can direct the Enquiry Officer to
conduct further enquiry in respect of the matter, but it
cannot direct a fresh enquiry to be conducted by some other
officer."
11. Admittedly, it is always open to the disciplinary
authority to differ with the finding of the Enquiry Officer
and/or may remit the matter for further enquiry, if any
relevant evidence has not been taken into consideration by
the Enquiry Officer."

(iv) While dealing with similar matter in the case of Madhurendra
Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand and others in W.P.(S) No.
2053 of 2018 reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 2964, this Court
has clearly observed that there was no occasion for conducting a
de novo and second inquiry as without assigning any reasons for
deferring with the first inquiry report, the disciplinary authority
had ordered for second inquiry, which is impermissible in the eyes
of law, as after deferring with the inquiry report and following the
principles of natural justice, a further inquiry could have been
initiated and not a fresh inquiry. There has been complete
violation of principles of audi alteram partem.
(v) The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Managing Director, ECIL &
Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 has
held that:
"26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the
enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the
reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a

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principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded
by the enquiry officer form an important material before
the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence
is taken into consideration by it to come to its
conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what
extent the said findings including the punishment, if any,
recommended in the report would influence the
disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The
findings further might have been recorded without
considering the relevant evidence on record, or by
misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is
to be one of the documents to be considered by the
disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice
require that the employee should have a fair opportunity
to meet, explain and controvert it before he is
condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a
denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the
findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer
without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it.
Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is
supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the
evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true
that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration
the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with
the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the
findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important
material before the disciplinary authority which is likely
to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were
only to record the evidence and forward the same to the
disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any
additional material before the disciplinary authority of
which the delinquent employee has no knowledge.
However, when the enquiry officer goes further and
records his findings, as stated above, which may or may
not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary
to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an
additional material unknown to the employee but are
taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority
while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the
reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of
natural justice, therefore, require that before the
disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the
delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply
to the enquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary
authority is then required to consider the evidence, the
report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the
employee against it."

Further in case of Ram Kishan v. Union of India, reported in
(1995) 6 SCC 157, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :

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"10. ............. The purpose of the show-cause notice, in
case of disagreement with the findings of the inquiry
officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the
disciplinary authority is persuaded not to disagree with
the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer for the
reasons given in the inquiry report or he may offer
additional reasons in support of the finding by the
inquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary
authority gives specific reasons in the show cause on the
basis of which the findings of the inquiry officer in that
behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to
satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary
authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the
inquiry officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in
the show-cause notice it amounts to an empty formality
which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent
officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact
that in the final order some reasons have been given to
disagree with the conclusions reached by the disciplinary
authority cannot cure the defect."

The same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari
Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84, relevant paras of which is
reproduced herein below:
"17. These observations are clearly in tune with the
observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier
and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The
aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the
authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to
give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry
officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar
case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to
the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority,
even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to
them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason
that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers
is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary
authority then no opportunity should be granted. The
first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the
disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The
principles of natural justice would demand that the
authority which proposes to decide against the
delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the
enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then
that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who
can make a representation before the disciplinary
authority takes further action which may be prejudicial
to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case,
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the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer
but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such
conclusions, then that authority which is deciding
against the delinquent officer must give him an
opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be
condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what
is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary
authority.
.........

19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer."

(vi) In the case of Prem Chand Ram Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 19991 SCC OnLine Pat 1015:(2000) 2 PLJR 918, the Hon'ble Patna High Court has held as under:

"10. In the case of K.R. Dev V. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong [(1971) 2 SCC 102:AIR 1971 SC 1447], the Supreme Court held that in case of some defect in the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority can direct the Enquiry Officer to conduct further enquiry in respect of the matter, but it cannot direct a fresh enquiry to be conducted by some other officer."

Admittedly, it is always open to the disciplinary authority to differ with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and/or may remit the matter for further enquiry, if any relevant evidence has not been taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer."

(vii) It is settled legal propositions that issuance of 2 nd show-cause notice along with copy of inquiry report is sine qua non and

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inflicting the punishment without seeking reply by way of 2nd show-cause notice is not tenable in the eyes of law.

7. Taking into consideration the ratio laid down in catena of Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and different High Courts, this Court, in case of Birju Prasad Vs. The State of Jharkhand and others [W.P.(S) No. 4649 of 2016] has reiterated the same view.

8. Admittedly, petitioner was fully exonerated by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority, without differing with the enquiry report and without assigning cogent reasons, has inflicted punishment of one black mark, which is in complete violation of cardinal principles of natural justice and also in violation of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and as such punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is not tenable in the eyes of law.

9. As a sequel to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order of punishment dated 19.08.2014, as contained in Memo NO. 287/Confidential, passed by the disciplinary authority (Respondent No. 4) as also the appellate order passed vide order dated 02.06.2015, as contained in Memo No. 1229/G.S., are hereby quashed and set aside. Petitioner is accordingly entitled for consequential benefits.

10. The writ petition stands allowed.

(Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)

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