Jharkhand High Court

Vijay Kumar Maheshwari @ Vijay ... vs The State Of Jharkhand on 1 March, 2023

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        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                   W.P.(C) No. 2109 of 2021

Vijay Kumar Maheshwari @ Vijay Kumar Chitlangia ... Petitioner
                               Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Revisional Authority-cum-Commissioner, South Chotanagpur
   Division, Ranchi
3. The Appellate Authority-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi
4. The Rent Controller-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ranchi
5. Sushil Kumar Banka
6. Pradeep Kumar Banka                    ...     ...     Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Gaurang Jajodia, Advocate For the Respondent Nos.1 to 4 : Mr. Vineet Prakash, AC to SC-IV For the Respondent Nos.5 & 6 : Mr. Shailesh, Advocate

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Order No. 09 Dated: 01.03.2023

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 20.01.2021 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 2 - the Revisional Authority-cum-Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi under Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 in J.B.C. Revision No. 26/2019, whereby the said revision preferred by the petitioner (the tenant) has been dismissed upholding the order dated 01.10.2019 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No. 3 - the Appellate Authority-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in J.B.C. Appeal No. 46 R 15/2017-18 as well as the order dated 11.10.2017 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4 - the Rent Controller-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ranchi in J.B.C. Case No. 43/2016 by which the defence of the petitioner was struck off. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 01.10.2019 passed by the respondent no. 3 in J.B.C Appeal No. 46 R 15/2017-18, whereby the order dated 11.10.2017 passed by the respondent no. 4 in J.B.C. Case No. 43/2016 has been upheld by dismissing the appeal. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order dated 11.10.2017 passed by the respondent no. 4 in J.B.C. Case No. 43/2016, whereby the defence of the petitioner was struck off.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had bonafide intention to deposit the arrears of rent as was directed by the respondent no. 4 vide order dated 12.05.2017 passed in J.B.C. Case No. 43/2016. Though the petitioner could not deposit the arrears of rent on the next date fixed i.e., on 24.05.2017 in the court of the respondent no. 4, however, on the next date i.e., on 05.06.2017, he was allowed to deposit the same with the respondent nos. 5 and 6 on 07.06.2017. However, on the said date, the respondent no. 4 did not hold the court and, therefore, the arrears of rent could not be deposited. It is further submitted that the bonafide of the intention of the petitioner to deposit the said amount in favour of the respondent nos. 5 and 6 is also evident from the fact that he had already got a demand draft of Rs.1,26,000/- prepared on 01.06.2017 itself (a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition) and if the respondent no. 4 had held the court regularly after 07.06.2017, the petitioner would have certainly deposited the said amount. Since the petitioner could not deposit the said arrears of rent in favour of the respondent nos. 5 and 6 due to compelling circumstance, his defence in the eviction proceeding should not have been struck off by the respondent no. 4.

3. On the contrary, Mr. Shailesh, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 5 and 6, submits that the petitioner had no intention to comply the order dated 12.05.2017 passed by the respondent no. 4 in J.B.C. Case No. 43/2016. He was required to make payment of Rs.1,26,000/- as arrears of rent in two installments on next two dates, however, the default occurred on 24.05.2017 itself i.e., the next date fixed on which he was required to deposit the first installment of arrears of rent. Otherwise also, the respondent nos. 5 and 6 had already furnished the details of their joint bank account on 24.05.2017 itself so as to enable the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent as was directed by the respondent no. 4, but the said amount was neither deposited in the court nor was deposited in the said bank account of the respondent nos. 5 and 6. The said aspect has duly been considered by the respondent no. 4 in the impugned order dated 11.10.2017.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

5. Undisputedly, the petitioner failed to make payment of the first installment of arrears of rent on the next date fixed i.e., 24.05.2017 as was directed by the respondent no. 4 vide order dated 12.05.2017. Hence, the default on his part occurred on that day itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had bonafide intention to deposit the said amount of arrears of rent as directed by the respondent no. 4, however, since he did not hold the court on 07.06.2017, the said amount could not be deposited.

6. I find no substance in the said submission of learned counsel for the petitioner as the petitioner could have deposited the said amount on 07.06.2017 in the joint bank account of the respondent nos. 5 and 6, the details of which were furnished by them before the court on 24.05.2017, if the court was not available on that day. Preparing a demand draft on 01.06.2017 and keeping the same with himself rather than handing it over to the respondent nos. 5 and 6 certainly does not prove the bonafide intention of the petitioner. On perusal of the order dated 11.10.2017 passed by the respondent no. 4 striking off the defence of the petitioner, it appears that the aforesaid aspects have duly been considered. Moreover, the appellate as well as the revisional courts have also applied their respective minds on the said issue and have rejected the appeal and revision preferred by the petitioner.

7. It is well settled that the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be exercised sparingly to keep the subordinate courts and tribunal within their bounds and not to correct mere errors. Otherwise also, the orders of the Rent Controller, appellate as well as revisional courts neither suffer from jurisdictional error nor are perverse in nature.

8. In the case of "Gulshera Khanam Vs. Aftab Ahmad", reported in (2016) 9 SCC 414, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"33. Likewise, when we peruse the impugned judgment, we find, as rightly urged by the learned

counsel for the appellant, the High Court did not keep in mind the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78] so also the principle laid down by this Court in relation to exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in [Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675] , while deciding the writ petition and proceeded to decide like the first appellate court. The High Court as is clear from the judgment probed all factual aspects of the case, appreciated evidence and then reversed the factual findings of the appellate court and the prescribed authority. This, in our view, was a jurisdictional error, which the High Court committed while deciding the writ petition. In other words, the High Court, in our view, should have confined its inquiry to examine as to whether any jurisdictional error was committed by the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal. It was, however, not done.

34. In our considered opinion, the question in relation to the bona fide need of the appellant's daughter to expand the activities of running the clinic was rightly held by the prescribed authority and the first appellate court in the appellant's favour by holding the appellant's need to be bona fide and genuine. We find no ground on which the High Court could have upset the concurrent finding on this question in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227, which is more or less akin to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court also failed to hold that findings of the two courts were so perverse to the extent that any judicial person could ever reach to such conclusion or that the findings were against any provision of law or were contrary to evidence adduced, etc."

9. In the case of "State (N.C.T. of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru & Ors.", reported in (2003) 6 SCC 641, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"28. Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court

itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise".

10. Under the aforesaid circumstance, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the original, appellate and revisional courts under writ jurisdiction.