Shiv Ji Chaupal vs The State Of Jharkhand
2022 Latest Caselaw 1724 Jhar

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          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

                         W. P. (S) No. 2030 of 2010

         Shiv Ji Chaupal, son of Late Bhular Chaupal, resident of Ramsakhi
         Apartment, Flat No. 4A, Kanke Road, Dam Side, Road No. 2, P.O.
         Jawahar Nagar, P.S. Gonda, District Ranchi, at present working as
         Block Development Officer, Balumath, District Latehar.
                                                   ...     ...        Petitioner
                                Versus
      1. The State of Jharkhand.
      2. Secretary, Personnel & Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha
         Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, Ranchi,
         P.O. + P.S. Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi.
      3. Joint Secretary, Personnel & Administrative Reforms and
         Rajbhasha Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project
         Bhawan, Ranchi, P.O. + P.S. Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi
      4. The State of Bihar.
      5. Secretary, Personnel & Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha
         Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, New Secretariat, P.O. +
         P.S.-Sachibhalay, P.O. G.P.O. Patna, Dist. Patna.
      6. Under Secretary, Personnel & Administrative Reforms and
         Rajbhasha Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, New
         Secretariat, P.O. + P.S.-Sachibhalay, P.O. G.P.O., Dist. Patna.
                                            ...        ...        Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

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10/02.05.2022

1. Nobody appears on behalf of the petitioner.

2. Learned counsel for the State of Jharkhand Mr. Jagdeesh and learned counsel for the State of Bihar Mr. Binit Chandra, are present.

3. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs: -

"a. To issue appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the resolution, issued vide Memo no. 6106 dated 6.5.1998, as contained in Annexure-9 to this writ application whereby and whereunder, punishment with censor had been inflicted upon the petitioner, which had to be entered in the ACR of the year 1988-89 and also two increments were stopped with cumulative effect and, thereafter, the petitioner has been debarred for further promotion for two years from the due date, which had been passed without into the facts of the case and also without giving any adequate opportunity of hearing, such as no enquiry report has been supplied nor any second show cause has been issued to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of punishment;

b. To issue appropriate writ, order or direction on the respondents not to give effect of the punishment inflicted

upon the petitioner vide Memo no. 6106 dated 6.5.1998, which is bad in law in view of the judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court followed by this Hon'ble Court; and c. Any other relief or reliefs for which the petitioner is legally entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case."

4. From the records of this case, it appears that in spite of repeated dates, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been appearing before this Court. Lastly vide order dated 25.04.2022, the matter was adjourned by way of last indulgence and was directed to be posted today i.e., 02.05.2022. Today also, neither any e-mail for adjourning the case has been received nor anybody is appearing for seeking adjournment in the present case. In such circumstances, this case is being decided on the basis of materials on record with the assistance of the learned counsel for the respondents.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Jharkhand has submitted that there is no merit in the present case. The present case is a stale case and the impugned order which are under challenge is of the year 1998 and the present writ petition has been filed on 04.05.2010.

6. The learned counsel for the state of Jharkhand has submitted that the petitioner has made a vague statement in paragraph-30 of the writ petition that he had no knowledge about the impugned order of punishment, but from the counter-affidavit, it is apparent that the petitioner had filed a written statement in the departmental proceeding and the statement of the petitioner in para 30 of the writ petition has been specifically denied by the respondents in paragraph-8 and 14 of the counter-affidavit .

7. The learned counsel for the state of Jharkhand submits that once the petitioner filed his written statement in the departmental proceeding, it cannot be said that he had no knowledge of the order passed in the departmental proceeding. The learned counsel has also submitted that the petitioner was initially put under suspension and subsequently, his suspension was revoked though prior to conclusion of the departmental proceeding. The learned counsel has also

submitted that the rejoinder to the counter-affidavit also does not dispute the aforesaid specific averments made in the counter-affidavit.

8. The learned counsel has referred to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 para 16, 17 and 33 as well as the judgment reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 para 10 and 11 in order to submit that the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on account of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner.

9. The learned counsel for the state of Bihar has referred to counter-affidavit filed by them to submit that as per the provision of Rule 64 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rule, 1935, the petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal but the petitioner did not prefer any appeal and filed the present writ petition after a gap of 12 years. The learned counsel has supported the arguments advanced on behalf of the state of Jharkhand.

10. After hearing the learned counsel for the respondents and upon going through the records of this case, this Court is of the considered view that the writ petition has been filed at much belated stage. The impugned order was passed on 06.05.1998 and the counter-affidavit reflects that the petitioner had due knowledge of the departmental proceeding and the plea of the petitioner that he had no knowledge has been specifically denied in the counter-affidavit to which no specific stand has been taken by the writ petitioner in the rejoinder to dispute the aforesaid averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the State of Jharkhand. As per the counter affidavit of the state of Jharkhand, the petitioner had also filed his written statement vide letter dated 09.02.2006 which has also not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder. The impugned order clearly shows that a copy was marked to the petitioner for communication. This court also finds that a statement has been made in the rejoinder at para 7 as follows: -

"7.......... It is also clear from the contentions made in the counter affidavit that during enquiry the petitioner had not been afforded any opportunity of hearing to defend his case, rather he came to know

about the impugned punishment for the first time in the year 1998 while his service record was sent by the finance department to the office of the Accountant General, Jharkhand for pay fixation and issuance of pay slip.........."

11. The aforesaid statement in the counter affidavit clearly shows admission of the petitioner that he received the order of punishment in the year 1998. The writ petition has been filed on 04.05.2010 alleging that the petitioner did not have any knowledge of the order of punishment which is falsified by his own statement in para 7 of the rejoinder to the counter affidavit.

12. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 (Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India and Others) it has been held in para 10 and 11 as follows: -

"10. In the case of pension, the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.

11. In the peculiar circumstances, we remit the matter to the High Court to hear the writ petition on merits. If it is found that the claim for disability pension is sustainable in law, then it would mould the relief but in no event grant any relief for a period exceeding three years from the date of presentation of the writ petition. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits as to whether the appellant's claim for disability pension is maintainable or not. If it is sans merit, the High Court naturally would dismiss the writ petition."

13. In the judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 (Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. T.T. Murali Babu) it has been held in para 16, 17 and 33 as follows: -

"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant -- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -- who compete with "Kumbhakarna" or for that matter "Rip Van Winkle". In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

14. Considering the facts mentioned above and in light of the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-state, this court is of the considered view that

the petitioner has approached this court after enormous delay of about 12 years and the statement made in paragraph 30 of the writ petition denying knowledge of the order of punishment is contradictory to the statement made in paragraph 7 of the rejoinder wherein the petitioner has specifically stated that he came to know about the impugned order of punishment for the first time in the year 1998. This court is of the considered view that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on account of delay and laches in approaching this court.

15. It further appears that the petitioner did not avail the alternative remedy which was available to the petitioner and has filed the present writ petition after delay of 12 years. In such circumstances, this court is not even inclined to give opportunity to the petitioner to avail alternative remedy at this belated stage.

16. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, this Court is not inclined to grant any relief to the writ petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed.

17. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

18. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed.

(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Mukul