Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3880 Jhar
Judgement Date : 18 October, 2021
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.371 of 2020
------
Suresh Kumar Singh, son of Late Rameshwar Singh, resident of Quarter No.B-161, Central Colony, PO: Makoli, PS: Chandrapura, District-Bokaro .... .... Appellant Versus
1. Central Coalfields Limited, a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, having its Head Office at Darbhanga House, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District- Ranchi through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Darbhanga House, P.O. GPO, P.S.-Kotwali, Distt.-Ranchi
2. Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District-Ranchi
3. General Manager, Dhori Area of Central Coalfields Limited, PO: Dhori, PS: Bermo, District-Bokaro
4. Project Officer, Amlo Project, Central Coalfields Limited, PO: Dhori, PS:
Bermo, District-Bokaro .... .... Respondents
With
L.P.A. No.373 of 2020
------
Dhaneshwar Yadav, adopted son of Late Bhola Mahto, resident of Village-Bodia, PO: Kathara, PS: Bokaro Thermal, District-Bokaro .... .... Appellant Versus
1. Central Coalfields Limited, a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, a Government of India Undertaking having its Registered Office at Darbhanga House, PO: GPO Ranchi, PS: Kotwali, District-Ranchi through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director
2. General Manager (KTA), Kathara, Central Coalfields Limited, PO: Kathara, PS: Bokaro Thermal (BTPS), District-Bokaro
3. General Manager (Civil), Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, PO: GPO Ranchi, PS: Kotwali, District-Ranchi
4. Project Officer, Kathara Colliery, PO: Kathara, PS: Bokaro Thermal, District-Bokaro .... .... Respondents
------
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMBUJ NATH
------
L.P.A.No.371/2020 For the Appellant : Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate : Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate L.P.A.No.373/2020 For the Appellant : Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahani, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate : Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, Advocate
------
08/Dated: 18.10.2021
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:-
It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the parties that in
both the appeals since involving the similar issue, therefore, the same
may be heard together and disposed of with this common order. In view
thereof, both the appeals have been heard together and are being
decided with this common order.
L.P.A.No.371 of 2020
2. The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause-10 of Letters Patent
of Patna High Court directed against the order/judgment dated 05.11.2020
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.6725 of
2017, whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge while
dismissing the writ petition has refused to interfere with the charge-sheet.
3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ
petition is required to be enumerated which reads hereunder as:-
The writ petitioner who claims to have been adopted by registered
deed as son by late Rameshwar Singh. The said Rameshwar Singh was
appointed on the post of Security Guard on 10.11.1973. Late Rameshwar
Singh has opted for voluntary retirement in the month of October, 1988
making request for proper employment in favour of the writ petitioner as
his adopted son. The writ petitioner passed matriculation examination in
the year 1985 and based upon the said document appointed as Typing
Trainee Category-I on 03.05.1989. Subsequently, he has been promoted
to other post.
The disciplinary authority has issued charge-sheet on 02.02.2017
on the allegation that the deed of adoption signed on 25.01.1985 and on
that date, the writ petitioner has already crossed the age of 15 years and
in view of the provision as contained under the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, his appointment cannot be said to be proper in terms of
the aforesaid provision of the Act and on the ground of fraud, the name of
biological father is differing.
Show cause has been issued against him. Being aggrieved with
this, the writ petitioner has challenged the said show cause by filing the
instant writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6725 of 2017.
It was contended on behalf of the writ petitioner before the learned
Single Judge that the charge-sheet has been issued against the writ
petitioner is bad in Law in view of the fact that there is no misconduct on
the part of the writ petitioner as also on the ground that the show cause
has been issued after lapse of about more than 28 years. Further, the
adoption deed has been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge
in support of the argument to the effect that the writ petitioner is nephew of
late Rameshwar Singh and at the time of adoption, he was below 15 years
of age.
It has further been indicated that the adoption was made earlier,
however, the deed was executed later on and therefore, submission has
been made before the learned Single Judge that no fraudulent act on
behalf of the writ petitioner was committed rather in view of the Scheme of
respondent-Central Coalfields Limited.
The writ petitioner was offered appointed on 03.05.1989 and after
expiry of the period of 28 years of service, the charge-sheet in such nature
is not maintainable, which led the writ petitioner to file the writ petition
being W.P.(S) No.6725 of 2017.
L.P.A.No.373 of 2020
4. The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause-10 of Letters Patent
of Patna High Court directed against the order/judgment dated 05.11.2020
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.3229 of
2018, whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge while
dismissing the writ petition has refused to interfere with the charge-sheet.
5. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ
petition is required to be enumerated which reads hereunder as:-
The writ petitioner, namely, Dhaneshwar Yadav who claims to have
been adopted son of Bhola Mahto. Bhola Mahto was a permanent
employee working as Plant Helper (Excavator Plant Helper) in Kathara
Colliery of the respondent-CCL. He was declared medically unfit at the
age of 56 years. He has made an application under the provision of
Clause 9.4.3 of NCWA for employment of the appellant writ petitioner as
his adopted son. At the age of 5 years, his (Dhaneshwar Yadav) biological
father, namely, Gopal Chandra Yadav allowed adoption of the appellant
writ petitioner by Bhola Mahto, who was maternal grandfather of the
appellant writ petitioner.
On 29.08.1988, a registered deed of adoption was executed in
between the Bhola Mahto and Gopal Chandra Yadav, biological father of
the appellant writ petitioner.
On 29.01.1990, the appellant writ petitioner has attended the
interview at Kathara in response to the notice issued under letter
No.GM(KTA)/PD/9.4.2/90/4349. Thereafter, the case of the appellant writ
petitioner was sent and forwarded by the Project Officer, Kathara to the
headquarter of the respondent CCL at Ranchi for approval. Then, his case
was referred to Legal Department to report about the legality of the
adoption deed.
It has been stated that due to non-acceptance of the adoption deed
by the legal department on 10.03.1992, the appellant writ petitioner filed a
civil suit being Title Suit No.9 of 1992 before the learned Munsif Bermo at
Tenughat inter-alia for a decree declaring him as the adopted son of Bhola
Mahto and for declaration that the deed of adoption dated 29.08.1988 is
valid and legal document. The aforesaid title suit being Title Suit No.9 of
1992 was disposed of on the basis of compromise petition filed on
07.04.1992 and accordingly, a decree was drawn on 11.06.1992 and
signed on 23.06.1992.
On 27.07.1992, the Personnel Manager, Kathara Colliery and the
Project Officer Kathara Colliery forwarded the case of the writ petitioner for
consideration to the Personnel Officer, Kathara and on 28.07.1992, the
case was forwarded to the competent authority. Vide letter dated
19.01.1993, the respondent CCL issued an appointed letter to the writ
petitioner on the post of General Mazdoor, Category-I in the pay scale of
38.47-0.70-48.27. Accordingly, the writ petitioner has joined his service on
the said post in Kathara Colliery and the joining report was duly accepted.
The writ petitioner was granted promotion four times from the post
of General Mazdoor, Category-I to the post of Filter Plant Attendant
Category-IV. No adverse remark or misconduct was found against him
rather he was considered as sincere and thus, he was granted promotion
from time to time.
It has further been stated that vide letter dated 02.02.2017, the
Project Officer, respondent no.4 has issued a charge-sheet upon the writ
petitioner alleging therein that the name of his biological father has been
recorded in the School records in the year 1984 and he was more than 20
years of age on the date of his adoption which was in violation of Section
10(iv) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and his name
was also recorded as one of the dependents of service record of biological
father of the appellant. Thus, the allegation was made that the appellant
writ petitioner has committed misconduct in view of Clause 26.22 and
26.41 of the Certified Standing Orders of the Central Coalfields Limited
and in such circumstance, charge-sheet has been issued against him,
which led the writ petitioner to file the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.3229
of 2018.
LPA No.371 of 2020 & LPA No.373 of 2020
6. The respondent CCL has contested the case by taking the plea that
only a charge-sheet has been issued and the departmental proceeding is
still pending in view of the fact that there is stay operating in the writ
petitions and all the points which have been taken before the learned
Single Judge can well be agitated before the inquiry officer.
Learned Single Judge after considering the submissions advanced
on behalf of the parties has dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of
settled position of Law that the charge-sheet is not liable to be quashed as
it does not adversely affect the rights of the writ petitioners and it does not
give rise to any cause of action, however, it can be quashed on the ground
that issuing authority is not competent to issue the same, but, the
jurisdiction of the issuing authority is not under challenge, which is the
subject matter of the instant intra-court appeals.
7. Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the appellant writ
petitioner (In LPA No.371 of 2020) and Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahani, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant writ petitioner (In LPA No.373 of 2020)
have jointly submitted by raising the issue of jurisdiction of the issuing
authority of the charge-sheet by making submission that the charge-sheet
since has been issued by the Project Officer who is having no jurisdiction
to issue memorandum of charge against the writ petitioners in view of the
Certified Standing Orders, wherein power to initiate the departmental
proceeding has been vested upon the appointing authority.
According to them, however, the aforesaid aspects of the matter
were raised before the learned Single Judge but without appreciating the
issue, the finding has been arrived at by making reference that the
jurisdictional issue has not been raised while the jurisdictional issue was
already before the learned Single Judge for its appreciation but even
though the same has not been considered.
It has further been submitted that since the authority who has
issued the charge-sheet is having no jurisdiction, therefore, the entire
departmental proceeding will vitiate in the eye of Law and in view thereof,
the order passed by the learned Single Judge since has been passed
without appreciating the jurisdictional issue of the disciplinary authority, as
such, order impugned is not sustainable in the eye of Law.
8. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent CCL has submitted that in pursuance to the order dated
23.08.2021(In LPA No.371 of 2020), an affidavit has been filed bringing on
record the power of delegation by the competent authority appended as
Annexure-A and Annexure-B to the aforesaid affidavit which is kept at flag
"A" dated 01.10.99 and 25.08.2003 respectively.
He submits on the basis of the said documents that the competent
authority has delegated the power by way of nomination upon the Project
Officer, the authority who has issued charge-sheet against the writ
petitioners herein and therefore, it is incorrect on the part of the writ
petitioners who submit that the authority issued the charge-sheet, is
having no jurisdiction.
9. In response, Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-writ petitioner has submitted that rejoinder to the said affidavit
has been filed on behalf of the CCL Management rebutting the averments
made therein as also by raising the issue that the circular as has been
appended as Annexure-A and Annexure-B to the affidavit filed on behalf of
the CCL Management cannot be said to be in consonance of the Certified
Standing Orders since the said circulars have not been certified by the
Regional Labour Commissioner as required to be certified under the
provision of Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
1946, hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1946, which mandates for
certification of the standing orders, therefore, according to him, the
nomination which has been conferred upon the lower authority by the
competent authority cannot be said to be in consonance with the provision
of the Act, 1946.
It has further been submitted that even accepting the power has
been delegated upon the Project Officer then also the Project Officer of
the concerned colliery cannot assume the power of the disciplinary
authority, it is for the reason that the disciplinary authority will always be
the appointing authority and it cannot be the authority lower than the
appointing authority.
In support of his argument, he has relied upon the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of UCO Bank & Ors. Vrs.
Rajendra Shankar Shukla, (2018) 4 Supreme 257.
10. In furtherance to his reply, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent CCL submits that there is no requirement of getting
certification of the circular, by which, the power has been delegated to the
authority i.e., the Project Officer to act as the disciplinary authority as
because the certified standing order which has already been certified
under the provision of the Act, 1946 contains a provision as under Clause
2.3 which confers power of nomination by the Chairman/Managing
Director concerned by an order in writing for the purpose of these standing
orders, since, the provision as contained under Clause 2.3 of the Certified
Standing Order has already been certified in view of the provision of the
Act, 1946 and in purported exercise of the said power, the
Chairman/Managing Director has nominated the Project Officer to act as
disciplinary authority, therefore, there is no further requirement of getting
certification of the aforesaid circular and as such, the argument advanced
to that effect on behalf of the appellants writ petitioners, is of no worth.
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the
documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned
Single Judge.
12. This Court, before proceeding to examine the legality and propriety
of the impugned order, deems it fit and proper to refer certain undisputed
fact which is relevant for proper adjudication of the lis i.e., the writ
petitioners appellants in LPA No.371 of 2020 and in LPA No.373 of 2020
claim to be adopted sons of late Rameshwar Singh and late Bhola Mahto
respectively, who were the permanent employees working under the CCL
Management with a request to provide appointment in favour of their
adopted sons i.e., the appellants writ petitioners herein.
The writ petitioners, at the relevant time, were submitted documents
and based upon the said document, the appointments have been offered
in their favour. They started discharging their duty but after rendering more
than 25 years of service the memorandum of charge has been issued,
against them as alleged irregularities of commission of fraud on getting
appointment on the basis of their claim of adopted sons who during the
relevant time have already crossed the age of 15 years.
The writ petitioners have questioned the memorandum of charge
inter-alia on the ground that no misconduct has been committed by the
writ petitioners. Further, the charge-sheet has been issued after delay of
about more than 25 years as also the writ petitioners were not entitled for
appointment since they have already crossed the age of 15 years and by
virtue of that, they cannot claim the benefit under the provision of Hindu
Adoption and Maintenance Act on the basis of the adoption deed.
13. While on the other hand, the plea has been taken on behalf of the
CCL Management that merely the charge-sheet has been issued and no
issue of jurisdictional error has been raised and as such, the writ petitions
being premature require no interference at this stage.
Learned Single Judge after appreciating the aforesaid argument has
declined to interfere with the memorandum of charge by dismissing the
writ petitions.
The issue has been raised while assailing the order passed by the
learned Single Judge on behalf of the writ petitioners about the
jurisdictional error of the authority who has issued the charge-sheet.
This Court, after considering the aforesaid submissions advanced
on behalf of the writ petitioner has passed the order on 23.08.2021 (In LPA
No.371 of 2020) calling upon the relevant documents from the CCL
Management to establish the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority.
14. At the outset, it requires to refer herein that circulars as appended
as Annexure-A and Annexure-B although have been annexed in the
counter affidavit filed in LPA No.371 of 2020 but since it is a circular of the
CCL Management, therefore, the same will be applicable in the facts of
the case i.e., in LPA No.373 of 2020.
The CCL Management in pursuance to the aforesaid order has filed
an affidavit bringing on record two documents i.e., circular dated 01.10.99
and circular dated 25.08.2003 as have been appended as Annexure-A
and Annexure-B to the affidavit respectively.
The aforesaid documents have been annexed to the said affidavit
has seriously been disputed on behalf of the writ petitioner on the ground
that the said documents cannot confer power upon the Project Officer to
act as disciplinary authority since the said has not been certified under the
provision of the Act, 1946 where the requirement is that the Certified
Standing Order is required to be certified in view of the provision of
Section 5 as contained therein as also the issue of delay of about more
than 25 years has been raised.
15. This Court, on appreciation of the aforesaid argument, deems it fit
and proper first to consider the question of jurisdiction but before
proceeding, it requires to refer herein that the issue of jurisdiction has not
been raised by the writ petitioner before the writ Court as would be evident
from the pleading made in the writ petition, save and except, a bald
statement has been made wherein it has been averred that the inquiry
proceeding is not sustainable in the eye of Law but even though, there is
no pleading to that effect but since the jurisdictional issue being a legal
issue and since it has been raised before the intra court, therefore, we
deem it fit and proper to answer the same.
There is no dispute about the fact that the appointing authority can
exercise the power of disciplinary authority which confers power under the
statute and in absence thereof, if any proceeding is being initiated, the
same will be nullity in the eye of Law due to jurisdictional error.
It is also not in dispute that the writ petitioners being a workmen
working under the CCL Management against whom a memorandum of
charge has been issued and the disciplinary authority is still at the stage of
inquiry which is being proceeded in pursuance to the provision as
contained under the provision of the Act, 1946.
The aforesaid Standing Orders contains a provision as under
Clause 2.3 which is being referred as hereunder:-
"'Competent Authority' means an officer specially nominated by the Chairman/Managing Director concerned by an order in writing for the purpose of these standing orders. Such orders shall be put on Notice Board and copies sent to the concerned registered trade unions."
The documents which have been appended as Annexure-A and
Annexure-B to the affidavit and kept at Flag-"A" pertains to subject
"delegation in terms of provisions of the Certified Standing Orders
applicable to Central Coalfields Limited under Clause 2.3".
The content of the said circular stipulates that in pursuance of
Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to Central
Coalfields Limited, 'Competent Authority' for the purpose of these Standing
Orders is to be nominated by the Chairman/Managing Director.
Accordingly, the following Officers are nominated as Competent Authority
for the purpose of Certified Standing Orders in respect of CCL.
The 'Competent Authority' has been defined and the relevant for the
present case which reads hereunder as:-
"(1) In respect of Areas of CCL, the Chief General Mangers/ General Managers/Project Officers/Colliery Managers will be the Competent Authority to exercise the powers for implementation of the provisions of Standing Orders and taking disciplinary action under the provisions of Certified Standing Orders."
Likewise, the 'appellate authority' has also been defined therein in
view of the provision as contained under Clause-30 and Clause-31
thereof.
The documents appended as Annexure-A to the affidavit dated
09.09.2021 speaks about conferment of power to act as the competent
authority in view of the provision as contained under Clause 2.3, however,
the same has been issued under the seal and signature of the General
Manager.
In furtherance to that circular, one another circular was issued on
25.08.2003 as has been appended as Annexure-B to the affidavit. The
content thereof is that in pursuance and in terms of Clause 2.3 of the
Certified Standing Orders applicable to all establishments of Central
Coalfields Limited, the following Officers have been specially nominated
as 'Competent Authority' by the Chairman-cum-Managing director, CCL in
the matter of exercising powers for implementation of different provisions
under the Certified Standing Orders including taking disciplinary action.
Clause 1 thereof confers power upon the Project Officer to act as
the Competent Authority.
16. Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the appellant writ
petitioner has raised two issues on these circulars i.e., circular dated
01.10.99 and circular dated 25.08.2003 i.e.:-
(i) These two circulars have not been certified by the Regional
Labour Commissioner as required to be certified in view of the provision of
the Act, 1946 and
(ii) The power as under Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders
is required to be conferred by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director but it
has been conferred by the General Manager and therefore, the same
cannot be said to be in consonance with the provision of Clause 2.3.
17. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the CCL Management
has submitted in rebuttal to the said argument by taking aid of the
provision of sub-section 2 of Section 10 of the Act, 1946 which contains a
provision that any modification proposed to be made requires certification
by the Certifying Officer.
Herein, since the power to act as the competent authority has been
conferred in exercise of power as contained under Clause 2.3 of the
Certified Standing Orders cannot be treated to be a modification of the
Certified Standing Orders and therefore, there is no requirement to get its
certification from the competent authority as required under Section 5 of
the Act, 1946.
18. This Court, in order to consider the aforesaid argument, has gone
across the contents of the circular dated 01.10.99 and circular dated
25.08.2003 and the relevant part of the same are being quoted
hereinbelow:-
".........In pursuance of Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to Central Coalfields Limited, 'Competent Authority for the purpose of these Standing Orders is to be nominated by the Chairman/Managing Director. Accordingly, the following Officer are nominated as Competent Authority for the
purpose of Certified Standing Orders in respect of CCL.
COMPETENT AUTHORITY
1. In respect of Areas of CCL, the Chief General Managers/General Managers/Project Officer/Colliery Managers will be the Competent Authority to exercise the powers for implementation of the provisions of Standing Orders and taking disciplinary action under the provisions of Certified Standing Orders.
2. In respect of CCL Hqrs. and other Central Units, the HODs/CGM/GM will be the Competent Authority to exercise the powers of implementation taking disciplinary action under the provisions of Certified Standing Order. This will include all Regional Offices and centralised cadres.
3. In respect of Central Workshop, Barkakana, the General Manager, CWS, Barkakana shall be the Competent Authority to exercise the powers of implementation/taking disciplinary action under the provisions of Certified Standing Orders.
4. In respect of Central Stores, Barkakana, the Head of Central Stores at Barkakana shall be the Competent Authority to exercise the powers of implementation/taking disciplinary action under the provisions of Certified Standing Orders.
APPELLATE AUTHORITY UNDER CLAUSE-30 OF THE CERTIFIED STANDING ORDERS The Appellate Authority, as specified in Clause-30 of the Certified Standing Orders, will be the Director (Pers). Central Coalfields Limited in all cases.
APPELLATE AUTHORITY UNDER CLAUSE-31 OF THE CERTIFIED STANDING ORDERS The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coalfields Limited will be the Authority for review of punishment as specified in Clause-31 of the Certified Standing Orders................."
"..........In pursuance and in terms of Clause 2.3 of
the Certified Standing Orders applicable to all establishments of Central Coalfields Limited, the following officers have been specially nominated as 'Competent Authority' by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coalfields Limited in the matter of exercising powers for implementation of different provisions under the Certified Standing Orders including taking disciplinary action:-
1. In respect of Areas of CCL-CGM/GM/Project
Officer/Colliery Manager will be the Competent
Authority.
2. In respect of CCL-HQ, Ranchi-HOD/CGM/GM of
different department situated at HQ, Darbhanga House, Ranchi will be the Competent Authority. The officer heading the NEE Section will assist the HOD/CGM/GM of the concerned department in taking disciplinary action against their employees.
3. In respect of Gandhinagar Hospital, Ranchi, Central Hospital, Naisarai, C.C.L. Office, Kolkata and Mines Rescue Station, Naisarai - the respective Head of Establishment/Department will be the Competent Authority.
4. In respect of Central Workshop, Barkakana the CGM/GM will be the Competent Authority.................."
There is no dispute about the fact that the Certified Standing Order
which has been placed before this Court for its consideration has been
formulated in accordance with the provision of the Act, 1946.
The Act, 1946 has been enacted considering the requirement in
Industrial Establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions
of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to
workmen employed by them.
"Certifying Officer" has been defined under Section 2(c) of the Act
which means a Labour Commissioner or a Regional Labour
Commissioner, and includes any other officer appointed by the appropriate
Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to perform all or any of
the functions of a Certifying Officer under this Act.
Section 3 stipulates about the submission of draft standing orders
before the Certifying Officer, while Section 5 provides provision for
Certification of standing orders.
Section 10 contains a provision of duration and modification of
standing orders and sub section 2 of Section 10 thereof provides a
provision of making application before the Certifying Officer to have the
standing orders modified and such application shall be accompanied by
five copies of the modifications proposed to be made by agreement
between the employer and the workmen or a trade union or other
representative body of the workmen, a certified copy of that agreement
shall be filed along with the application.
Thus, it is evident by going through the provision as contained
under the Act, 1946 that the requirement of certification is provided as also
the requirement in case of modification of certified standing order.
19. The argument which has been put forth by the learned counsel for
the appellants writ petitioners that the circular dated 01.10.99 and circular
dated 25.08.2003 were required to be certified by the competent authority
as required under the Act, 1946 but having not done so, its binding effect
being not in consonance with the provision of the Act, 1946.
20. This Court, therefore, is required to examine "as to whether the
circular dated 01.10.99 and circular dated 25.08.2003 are by way of
modification or it is in terms of the provision of Clause 2.3 of the Certified
Standing Orders?"
It is evident from the Certified Standing Order which contains a
provision under Clause 2.3 as quoted and referred hereinabove which
defines the definition of 'Competent Authority' which means an Officer
specially nominated by the Chairman/Managing Director concerned by an
order in writing for the purpose of these standing orders.
21. We, on careful consideration of the circular dated 01.10.99 and
circular dated 25.08.2003 have found therefrom that the said circulars
have been issued in terms of the provision of Clause 2.3 and therefore,
according to our considered view, since the said circulars have been
issued in purported exercise of Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing
Orders which has already been certified under the provision of the Act,
1946, therefore, the circular issued in terms of the said provision cannot
be treated to be a modification which requires further certification in view
of the provision of Section 10 of the Act, 1946 as because it is explicitly
clear by going through the provision of sub section 2 of Section 10 that an
employer or workman may apply to the Certifying Officer to have the
standing orders modified. But herein, there is no question of modification
of the standing order and it cannot be a case of the writ petitioner because
issue of modification of standing order is not the subject matter rather the
issue of circular dated 01.10.99 and circular dated 25.08.2003 issued in
exercise of power conferred under Clause 2.3 as appended as Annexure-
A and Annexure-B to the said affidavit dated 09.09.2021 which cannot be
said to be a modification in the original standing order and certified
standing order.
The second question has been raised that the circular dated
01.10.99 as contained under Annexure-A to the affidavit dated 09.09.2021
since has been issued by the General Manager who has got no
jurisdiction to issue such notification in view of the explicit terms as
contained under Clause 2.3 that the power is to be delegated and
nominated by the order of the Chairman/Managing Director but we are of
the view that the said argument is having no force, as because, from the
very first paragraph of circular dated 01.10.99, it is evident that the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director has exercised the aforesaid power as
under Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders and further, the same
has been clarified in furtherance of the circular dated 25.08.2003 ,wherein
it has been stated that in pursuance and in terms of Clause 2.3 of the
certified standing order applicable to all establishments of CCL, the
following Officers have been specially nominated as Competent Authority
by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coalfields Limited in the
matter of exercising powers for implementation of different provisions.
Thus, both the circulars taken together clarify the position that it is the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, who has been conferred with the
power as contained under Clause 2.3 of the Certified Standing Orders,
has delegated/nominated the power to act as disciplinary authority.
The third ground has been taken about the delay in conclusion of
the proceeding and therefore, the charge is fit to be quashed but we are
also not inclined to interfere on this ground due to the proposition set out
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and
Anr. Vrs. Akhilesh Jha and Anr., 2021 SCC Online SC 696, wherein, at
paragraph-15, it has been laid down that every delay in conducting a
disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated.
It has further been observed that the prejudice caused by the delay
must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of
surmise.
Herein, even accepting that there is delay of about more than 25
years but what prejudice have been caused to the writ petitioners are not
pleaded in the writ petitions, therefore, applying the said ratio laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh
and Anr. Vrs. Akhilesh Jha and Anr (supra), we are of the view that the
delay cannot be a sole ground to vitiate the departmental proceeding.
22. Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant writ petitioner has
further tried to impress upon the Court that the disciplinary authority must
be the appointing authority and cannot subordinate to it and in support of
his argument, he has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of UCO Bank & Ors. Vrs. Rajendra Shankar
Shukla (supra).
23. This Court, has considered the aforesaid judgment and found
therefrom that the said judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the facts of the case where the statute itself provides that the disciplinary
authority cannot subordinate to the appointing authority.
But herein in the given facts of this case, learned counsel for the
appellants writ petitioners have failed to demonstrate any Law which
prohibits the respondent CCL to the effect that the disciplinary authority
will not be subordinate to the appointing authority rather his fact is different
in view of the provision as contained under Clause 2.3, based upon the
same, the power has been conferred upon the concerned Officer as would
be evident from the circular dated 01.10.99 and circular dated 25.08.2003
as referred hereinabove.
24. Moreso, the learned Single Judge has considered these aspects of
the matter and considering the fact that the memorandum of charge is
under consideration by the inquiry officer and therefore, the writ petitions
have been said to be premature and as such, declined to be interfered
with the charge-sheet, which according to our considered view, cannot be
said to suffer from error.
25. In one of the appeal i.e., in LPA No.373 of 2020 Mr. Ashim Kumar
Sahani, learned counsel for the writ petitioner appellant has submitted that
deed of adoption, based upon which, the appointment has been provided
being a valid document of the competent Court of Law, the same cannot
be questioned by the enquiry officer but at this stage, we cannot make any
remark upon the same, since it is yet to be considered by the enquiry
officer.
26. We, after taking into consideration the material available on record
and the discussion as has been made hereinabove as also the finding
recorded by the learned Single Judge is of the view that there is no reason
to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
27. Accordingly, the instant appeals fail and are dismissed.
28. In consequent to dismissal of these appeals, pending Interlocutory
Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Ambuj Nath, J.)
Rohit/-.A.F.R.
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!