Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 1181 Jhar
Judgement Date : 9 March, 2021
1 [W.P.(S) No. 7024 of 2016]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
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W.P.(S) No. 7024 of 2016
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Dinesh Kumar Yadav, son of Sri Khublal Yadav, resident of Godhar Road, Dhansar, PO and PS-Dhansar, District-Dhanbad ..... Petitioner
-- Versus --
1.Union of India, through Director General, Central Reserve Police Force, Raksha Bhawan, Sansad Marg, PO and PS Sansad Marg, New Delhi
2.Inspector General, Central Reserve Police Force, Jharkhand Sector at Ranchi CTC Campus, Tiril Asharam Road, PO and PS Dhurwa, District Ranchi
3.Deputy Inspector General, Central Reserve Police Force, Sembo, PO & PS-Dhurwa, District -Ranchi
4.Commandant, Group Centre, Central Reserve Police Force, Sembo, PO and PS Dhurwa, District Ranchi ...... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioner :- Mr. Sameer Saurabh, Advocate For Resp.-UOI :- Mr. Jitendra Tripathi, Advocate
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9/09.03.2021 Heard Mr. Sameer Saurabh, the learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Jitendra Tripathi, the learned counsel for the
respondent Union of India.
2. This writ petition has been heard through Video
Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into
account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the
parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and
with their consent this matter has been heard.
3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing
the termination order dated 07.07.2014 contained in Annexure-5 and for
quashing the appellate order dated 14.11.2014 contained in Annexure-6.
4. The petitioner before approaching this Court, has
approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Patna Bench at
Circuit Court, Ranchi which was dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction.
5. The petitioner was declared successful in the Test/Interview
conducted by the respondents and was selected for appointment as Head
Constable(Ministerial) in Central Reserve Police Force and the
appointment letter to that effect was issued by letter dated 16.11.2013.
The services of the petitioner was liable to be terminated at any time on
one month's notice during the initial period of two years by the
appointing authority, meaning thereby, the petitioner was on probation
and the probation period was of two years from the date of joining. By
letter dated 19.05.2014, eleven persons including the petitioner were
selected for fourteen weeks' training at Group Centre, CRPF, Durgapur
which was scheduled to be started from 02.06.2014. On 05.07.2014, a
letter was issued by the respondent no.3 wherein it was stated that the
petitioner tried to commit suicide by hanging himself from ceiling fan and
in view of such, one Assistant Commandant was directed to conduct the
enquiry for the same and submit the report. The enquiry report was
submitted by the Assistant Commandant on 06.07.2014. The petitioner
was dismissed by the order dated 07.07.2014 under Rule 1 of Rule 5 of
the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services), Rules, 1965. The
petitioner has preferred the appeal which was also dismissed by order
dated 14.11.2014. Aggrieved with this, the petitioner has preferred this
writ petition.
6. Mr. Sameer Saurabh, the learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that without following the proper enquiry, the petitioner has
been terminated which is against the mandate of law. He submits that
without assessing the real object or the purpose of the enquiry, the order
has been passed. He submits that the order in question is punitive in
nature and in that view of the matter the impugned orders are required
to be interfered with by this Court. He relied in the case of "Chandra
Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P.", (2000) 5 SCC 152, paragraph nos.13 and 19
of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:
"13. Following the decision of Parshotam Lal Dhingra case this Court in State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad held that if the services of a probationer are terminated on the basis of an inquiry into the allegations of misconduct and inefficiency, the order would be punitive. It was pointed out that in the case of a probationer, it is always open to the Government to hold an inquiry merely to assess the merits of the employee to find out whether he was fit to be retained in service and confirmed. In another case relating to a probationer, namely, in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das where the services were governed by Rule 55-B of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules which provided that where the services of a probationer were intended to be terminated either during the period of probation or at the end of that period for any fault or on account of his unsuitability, he would be apprised of the grounds of unsuitability and would also be afforded an opportunity to show cause against it before orders are passed against him, it was held that the termination order would not become punitive merely because of an antecedent inquiry but the real object or purpose of the inquiry had to be found out whether it was held merely to assess the general unsuitability of the employee or it was held into charges of misconduct or inefficiency etc. In Ranendra Chandra Banerjee v. Union of India which again was a case relating to a probationer, it was held that on account of Rule 55-B of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules if the inquiry was held for the limited purpose of finding out whether the employee was fit to be retained or not, the said inquiry would not make the order
punitive as the inquiry could not be related to any misconduct of the employee. This view was reiterated in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India. In Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab the order by which the services of the employee were terminated was an order simpliciter in nature, which was innocuously worded, but it was held by this Court that the form of the order was not decisive and the Court could go behind that order to find out whether it was founded upon the misconduct of the employee.
19. While the judicial pronouncements stood at that stage, the entire case-law was reviewed by this Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi in which it was contended that the legal and constitutional position with regard to an order of termination was not settled as there were conflicting decisions of this Court on that question. This contention was not accepted and on a review of the entire case-law, including the Seven-Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh case it was laid down that the Court has consistently held that the "motive", in passing an order of termination or reversion, operating in the minds of the Government was not a relevant factor for determining whether the order was passed by way of punishment. What was determinative of the true nature of the order was not its exterior form but the "foundation" on which it was based. If misconduct or negligence was the foundation of the order of termination, or for that matter, reversion, the order would be punitive in nature. The Court also referred to the decision in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey in which it was observed as under: (SCC p. 338, para 7) "7. We think that the principles involved in applying Article 311(2) having been sufficiently explained in Samsher Singh case it should no longer be possible to urge that Sughar Singh case could give rise to some misapprehension of the law.
Indeed, we do not think that the principles of law
declared and applied so often have really changed. But, the application of the same law to the different circumstances and facts of various cases which have come up to this Court could create the impression sometimes that there is some conflict between different decisions of this Court. Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts."
7. On this ground, he submits that the termination order is
required to be interfered with.
8. Per contra, Mr. Tripathi, the learned counsel for the
respondent Union of India submits that Rule 1 of Rule 5 of the Central
Civil Services (Temporary Services), Rules, 1965 has rightly been applied
in the case of the petitioner as the petitioner was a probationer. He
submits that the brother of the petitioner has also pointed out before the
authority concerned about his depression and that is fortified in view of
Annexure-R/2 of the counter affidavit, which is a letter of the brother of
the petitioner. He further submits that the petitioner was sent to
Composite Hospital, CRPF, Ranchi for further management vide GC, CRPF,
Ranchi letter dated 28.05.2014 and the said centre was requested to
provide him proper treatment. Owing to the abnormal health condition
that was informed to the higher authority i.e. IGP, Jharkhand Sector,
CRPF, Ranchi. He submits that looking to the health condition of the
petitioner, the basic training of the petitioner at Durgapur w.e.f.
30.05.2014 was deferred till the next upcoming training schedule. He
submits that the petitioner tried to end his life and when he was rescued,
he tried to snatch the rifle from one of the constable and after
preliminary enquiry and considering all these aspects, the termination
order has been passed and the appellate order also affirmed the
termination order. He submits that writ petition is fit to be dismissed.
9. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the
parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record. The C.R.P.F
is a para-military force and the physical fitness is a sine qua non for its
employees. After the appointment, the petitioner was required to go for
the basic training which was not done in view of his ailment. The
petitioner has not completed successfully the training as mentioned in his
offer of appointment. The petitioner was sent for management of his
ailment to Composite Hospital, CRPF, Ranchi. The appointing authority
has got the prerogative to discharge with one month's notice. The
petitioner was found not medically fit and the respondents have issued
termination notice in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 1 of Rule 5
of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services), Rules, 1965 which
provides that in case of termination of the service of a temporary
employee, the order of termination which should be passed by the
appointing authority should not mention the reason for such termination.
Therefore, the order of termination does not violate the principle of
natural justice. On perusal of the said order, it transpires that the
termination order is not punitive in nature. Rule 16 of the CRPF Rules,
1955 is applicable in the case of the petitioner which provides that the all
the members of the force shall be enrolled for a period of three years
and during this period of engagement, they shall be liable to be
discharged at any point of time with one month's notice by the
appointing authority. So far as the decision relied by the learned counsel
for the petitioner is concerned, it appears that in that case which the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering, in that case the petitioner has
already completed the training and has also completed two years of
probation period without any blemish record. Whereas the case of the
petitioner is governed under Rule 16 of the Central Reserve Police Force
Rules, 1955. Therefore, the case relied by the petitioner is distinguishable
from the facts and circumstances of the present case. The petitioner
being CRPF personnel is required to be physically fit. The petitioner has
not completed his basic training due to his such ailment and the
respondent authority in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 16
of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, has passed the
impugned order. The petitioner was also sent for health management to
Composite Hospital, CRPF, Ranchi.
10. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case,
the petitioner is not fit to discharge the duties of the CRPF. The decision
of the authority does not require to be interfered with.
11. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J) SI/,
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