Jharkhand High Court

(An Application Under Article 226 ... vs The State Of Jharkhand on 27 July, 2021

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                  W.P.(S) No. 3945 of 2012
      (An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India)
Shivjatan Murmu                                     ..... Petitioner
                             Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Superintendent of Police, Sahebganj,
   Office at P.O., P.S. & District-Sahebganj.
3. Deputy Inspector General of Police,
  Santhal Paragana Range, Dumka,
  Office at- P.O, P.S. & District-Dumka.
 4. Director General & Inspector General of Police,
   Jharkhand, Ranchi, Office At- Project Bhawan,
   Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur,
   District- Ranchi                           .....    Respondents
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For the Petitioner : Ms. Saumya Pandey, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Rohan Kashyap, Advocate

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PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

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By Court: Heard learned counsel for the parties through V.C.

2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the

petitioner for quashing and setting aside the order of punishment as

contained in Memo No.274/Ra. Ka. dated 02.02.2010 issued by

respondent No.2; whereby the petitioner was dismissed from

service w.e.f. 02.02.2010. The petitioner has further assailed the

appellate order as contained in Memo No.1572/Sa. Sha dated

30.12.2010, passed by respondent No.3, whereby the appeal

preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and also the order

dated 04.05.2012 passed by the respondent No.4, whereby the

memorial filed by the petitioner was also rejected.

3. Ms. Saumya Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner draws attention of this Court towards the appellate order

(Annexure-9) and submits that the appellate authority has not given

any reason, whatsoever, in spite of the fact that the petitioner has

filed an extensive appeal raising several grounds before the

appellate authority but the appellate authority, in a cursory manner,

has rejected the appeal of the petitioner.

Ms. Pandey fairly submits the appellate authority

should re-visit its order and pass a fresh order after giving reasons

and considering the grounds raised by the petitioner in his appeal.

4. Mr. Rohan Kashyap, learned counsel appearing for

respondent State supports the impugned order of the termination

and further submits that there is no procedural irregularity;

however, he could not satisfy this Court with respect to the

appellate order which prima facie appears to be a non-speaking and

non reasoned order.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after

going through the documents available on record it appears that the

department has followed the procedure in terminating the

petitioner; as such this is not a case of procedural irregularity.

However, after perusing the appellate order it appears

that the appellate authority has simply referred about the inquiry

report and the impugned order and held that he is satisfied with the

finding of the disciplinary authority; but not even in a single line,

he has given any opinion on the grounds taken by the petitioner in

his memo of appeal. From record it further appears that the

petitioner has filed a detailed representation containing several

grounds; however, none of the grounds have been taken care of by

the appellate authority.

6. The highlighting need of reasons in any order is

condition precedent. Reference in this regard may be made to the

landmark judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in the case of Breen v.

Amalgamated Engineering Union & Ors. reported in (1971) 1

ALL ER 1148) in which the Court observed that giving of reasons

is one of the fundamentals of good administration.

Relevant paragraph of the judgment is quoted herein

below:

"...... It is now well settled that a statutory body, which is entrusted by statute with a discretion, must act fairly. It does not matter whether its functions are described as judicial or quasi-judicial on the one hand, or as administrative on the other hand, or what you will. Still it must act fairly. It must, in a proper case, give a party a chance to be heard : see Re K (H)(an infant) per Lord Parker CJ in relation to immigration officers; and R v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex parte Benaim by us in relation to the gaming board. The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this: the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the

decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith; nevertheless the decision will be set aside. That is established by Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, which is a landmark in modern administrative law."

Further, in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt &

Ors. v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable

Endowments Department & Ors. reported in (AIR 1980 SC 1), the

Apex court also quoted with approval the legal maxim Cessante

Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex, which means reason is the soul of

law and when reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law.

In State of West Bengal V. Atul Krishna Shaw (AIR 1990 SC

2205), the Apex Court reiterated that giving of reasons is an

essential element of administration of justice. A right to reason is,

thus, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review.

7. Again in the case of Jawahar Lal Singh versus Naresh

Singh and Others reported in (1987) 2 SCC 222, the aforesaid

principle has been reiterated at paragraph 3 which is quoted

hereunder under:

"3. .......................................................

A perusal of the judgment of the learned trial court also shows that all the reasons on the basis of which the whole of the prosecution evidence has been discarded is not so simple or reasons so good that they do not require examination. Under these circumstances therefore without going into the merits we feel that it would be better that the matter be examined by the learned judges of the High Court so that we may have the advantage of considering the considered opinion of the High Court on the reasons which weighed with the

learned trial court in discarding the prosecution evidence and acquitting the respondents."

After going through the aforesaid decisions it can be

said that reasoned decision is not only for the purpose of showing

that the citizen is receiving justice, but also for a valid discipline

for the tribunal or quasi judicial for itself. The statement of reasons

thus, forms one of the essentials of justice. The authority must

know that reason in an order is required as the right to reason is a

fact of natural Justice

8. In the instant case, the appellate authority has simply

noted the documents and held that he is satisfied with the finding

of the inquiry officer as well as with the order of disciplinary

authority but failed to give any reason; even in a single line, or any

opinion on the grounds taken by the petitioner in his memo of