Jharkhand High Court
Rabindra Kumar Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Its ... on 4 February, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 6095 of 2011
----------
Rabindra Kumar Singh ... ... ...Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand through its Chief Secretary.
2. The State Information Commission, Dhurwa, Ranchi.
3. Tapan Kumar Chatopadhyay.
... ... ...Respondents
with
W.P. (C) No. 6110 of 2011
----------
Rabindra Kumar Singh ... ... ...Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand through its Chief Secretary.
2. The State Information Commission, Dhurwa, Ranchi.
3. Shri J.P. Bakshi.
... ... ...Respondents
with
W.P. (C) No. 6108 of 2011
----------
Rabindra Kumar Singh ... ... ...Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand through its Chief Secretary.
2. The State Information Commission, Dhurwa, Ranchi.
3. Shri Bhairav Singh.
... ... ...Respondents
------------
CORAM :THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DR. S.N.PATHAK
(Through: Video Conferencing)
-----------
For the Petitioner : Ms. Surabhi, Advocate.
For the State : Mr. Rahul Saboo, SC-I
-------------
14/ 04.02.2021 Heard the parties.
2. Since the identical issues are involved in aforementioned writ petitions,
these are being heard together and are being disposed of by this common
judgment.
3. The petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the
order dated 14.07.2011, passed in Appeal Case No. 2716 of 2010 (in W.P.C. No.
6095 of 2011); order dated 08.07.2011, passed in Appeal Case No. 2062 of 2011
(in W.P.C. No. 6110 of 2011); order dated 08.07.2011, passed in Appeal Case
No. 2685 of 2011 (in W.P.C. No. 6108 of 2011); passed by learned Information
Commissioner, State Information Commission, Jharkhand, Ranchi, whereby a
sum of Rs.25,000/- each of the aforesaid three cases has been imposed upon the
petitioner as penalty for not providing the required information to respondent
No. 3 of the aforesaid cases.
4. The facts of the case lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner was posted
as General Manager in High Tension Insulator Factory, Namkum, Ranchi a unit
of Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (for short 'BSIDC').
While petitioner was discharging his duties, the concerned respondent No. 3
submitted applications under Right to Information Act asking certain
information from Information Officer and General Manager, Electric Equipment
Factory, Tatisilwai, Ranchi. Upon receipt of such applications, the petitioner
being the General Manager-cum-Public Information Officer, forwarded the same
to the Head Accountant for providing the required information. Thereafter, the
concerned Head Accountant sent letter to the respondent No. 3 stating therein
that the information sought by the respondent No. 3 could not be furnished on
time due to shortage of manpower. However, respondent No. 3 refused to
receive the said letter and filed first appeal before the First Appellate Authority
namely, Managing Director of the BSIDC and then filed second appeal before
the State Information Commission. Then the State Information Commission
summoned the PIO to appear before it on the next date of hearing. Upon being
summoned, the petitioner appeared before the State Information Commission
and submitted that he had already provided the information which he had in his
possession. However, the respondent No. 3 written protest letter to the learned
State Information Commissioning mentioning therein that the information
provided by the petitioner is incomplete and vague. The authorized
representative of the petitioner was present on 20.05.2011 and sought time for
filing reply to the protest letter of respondent No. 3, on which the matter was
adjourned to 20.06.2011, but nobody could appear on the said date and as such,
the petitioner was again adjourned to 14.07.2011. On 14.07.2011, the petitioner
was in Patna for some official work and hence, could not appear before the State
Information Commission. It is the case of the petitioner that due to lack of
manpower/ managerial staff, he was given the additional charge of all the four
Units of the Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation. However, the
learned Information Commissioner, without considering the aforesaid fact and
without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, by impugned orders,
imposed penalty of Rs.25,000/- in each of the aforesaid three cases.
Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court
for redressal of his grievances.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order is arbitrary, illegal and bad in law. Learned counsel further argues that the
learned Information Commissioner has failed to consider the fact that the Public
Information Officer can be held liable only for not providing those information
which are in his possession but in the instant cases, the petitioner has already
provided the information which he had in his possession and as such, the
impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned Information
Commissioner also failed to consider the fact that the Public Information Officer
can provide the required information only after collecting the same from the
concerned department/ person but in the instant cases since nobody was posted
in the factory as Accountant, it was not possible for the Public Information
Officer to find out the ledger and to prepare the account and submit the same to
the respondent No. 3. Learned counsel submits that for the aforesaid reasons, the
impugned orders passed in aforesaid writ petitions are fit to be quashed and set
aside.
6. Mr. Rahul Saboo, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State very
fairly submits that in absence of any instructions, he is not in a position to defend
the case of the respondent-State.
7. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties
and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the
considered view that the writ petitions require interference as the impugned
orders at the very face of it are bad in law and illegal and as such, fit to be
quashed and set aside for the following facts and reasons:
(I) The impugned orders have been passed in complete violation of
principles of natural justice.
(II) Before passing the impugned orders, the petitioner was not provided
ample opportunity of hearing to defend his case.
(III) The petitioner had already provided the required information which was
in his possession.
(IV) At the relevant point of time no one was posted as Accountant in the
factory and as such, it was not possible for the Public Information
Officer (petitioner herein) to find out all the details regarding accounts
and submit the same to the respondents.
(V) The petitioner was discharging his duties as Senior Officer and never
concealed any documents which were asked for by the Appellate
Authority but it was only due to prevailing circumstances and shortage of
employees, the said documents could not be provided as the petitioner
was not in possession of the same.
(VI) In absence of Class-III and Class-IV staff and also in absence of
Accountant, Controller of Accounts/ Chief Account Officer, it was not
possible for the petitioner to furnish those documents, which were
demanded by the respondent No. 3 under Right to Information Act and
the petitioner had already furnished the documents of which he was
having the possession.
8. It is also to be noted that petitioner was not getting salary since February,
1993 and it was only after interference by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and after
constitution of a Committee under the Chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice
(Retd.) Uday Sinha, a meagre amount is being paid from time to time due to
non-availability of fund
9. The learned Information Commissioner has awarded punishment dehors
the rules and in complete violation of principles of natural justice, which is self-
explanatory from Section 20 of the Right to Information Act. Section 20 of the
Right to Information Act reads as under:
20. (1) Where the Central Information Commission or the State
Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding
any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the
case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive
an application for information or has not furnished information
within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 or
malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given
incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed
information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in
any manner in furnishing the information, it shall impose a penalty
of two hundred and fifty rupees each day till application is received
or information is furnished, so however, the total amount of such
penalty shall not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees:
Provided that the Central Public Information Officer or the
State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall be given
a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is
imposed on him:
Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted
reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Public Information
Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be.
(2) Where the Central Information Commission or the State
Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding
any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the
case may be, has, without any reasonable cause and persistently,
failed to receive an application for information or has not furnished
information within the time specified under subsection (1) of section
7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly
given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed
information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in
any manner in furnishing the information, it shall recommend for
disciplinary action against the Central Public Information Officer or
the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the
service rules applicable to him.
None of the ingredients of Section-20 of the Act are applicable in the case
of the petitioner and as he was not provided a reasonable opportunity of being
heard before imposing penalty and as such, impugned orders are not tenable in
the eyes of law and are fit to be quashed and set aside.
10. The similar issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in
case of Manohar, s/o Manikrao Anchule Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.,
reported in (2012) 13 SCC 14, wherein the Hon'ble Court has held as under:
"22. We may notice that proviso to Section 20(1) specifically
contemplates that before imposing the penalty contemplated
under Section 20(1), the Commission shall give a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the concerned officer. However, there
is no such specific provision in relation to the matters covered
under Section 20(2). Section 20(2) empowers the Central or the
State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of
deciding a complaint or appeal for the reasons stated in that section,
to recommend for disciplinary action to be taken against the Central
Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer,
as the case may be, under the relevant service rules. Power to
recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which may
impose penal consequences. When such a recommendation is
received, the disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary
proceedings in accordance with law and subject to satisfaction of
the requirements of law. It is a 'recommendation' and not a
'mandate' to conduct an enquiry. 'Recommendation' must be seen in
contradistinction to 'direction' or 'mandate'. But recommendation
itself vests the delinquent Public Information Officer or State Public
Information Officer with consequences which are of serious nature
and can ultimately produce prejudicial results including misconduct
within the relevant service rules and invite minor and/or major
penalty.
23. Thus, the principles of natural justice have to be read into the
provisions of Section 20(2). It is a settled canon of civil
jurisprudence including service jurisprudence that no person be
condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action is an order in the
form of recommendation which has far reaching civil consequences.
It will not be permissible to take the view that compliance with
principles of natural justice is not a condition precedent to passing
of a recommendation under Section 20(2)."
11. Thus, the principle is clear and settled that right of hearing, even if not
provided under a specific statute, the principles of natural justice shall so
demand, unless by specific law, it is excluded. It is more so when exercise of
authority is likely to vest the person with consequences of civil nature.
12. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and legal
propositions, impugned order dated 14.07.2011, passed in Appeal Case No. 2716
of 2010 (in W.P.C. No. 6095 of 2011); order dated 08.07.2011, passed in Appeal
Case No. 2062 of 2011 (in W.P.C. No. 6110 of 2011); order dated 08.07.2011,
passed in Appeal Case No. 2685 of 2011 (in W.P.C. No. 6108 of 2011) are
hereby quashed and set aside.
13. Resultantly, all these writ petitions stand allowed.
(Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)
/
Kunal
