Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 566 j&K
Judgement Date : 25 May, 2021
Serial No. 109
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
AT JAMMU
(THROUGH VIRTUAL MODE)
CRM(M) 282/2021
CrlM 797/2021
CrlM 798/2021
Prashant Satsangi ...Petitioner(s)
Through:- Mr. Aman Bhagotra, Advocate
v/s
Union Territory of J&K and another ....Respondent(s)
Through:-
Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE (ORAL)
ORDER
, 1. Through the medium of instant petition, the petitioner has
challenged order dated 07.04.2018 passed by learned Special Mobile
Municipal Magistrate, Jammu as upheld by learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Jammu in revision vide his order dated 21.09.2019, whereby the
learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence under S.498-A RPC,
beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
2. It is case of the petitioner that in the year 2012, a false and
frivolous FIR bearing No. 201/2012 for offences under Sections 452 and
498-A RPC came to be registered with Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu
on the basis of a complaint lodged by respondent No. 2 against him. After
investigation of the case, charge-sheet was ultimately presented by the
investigating agency before the learned trial court on 08.07.2016 after more
than three years of registration of the FIR.
2 CRM(M) 282/2021
3. It is contended that despite charge-sheet having been filed
beyond the prescribed period of limitation, which in the instant case is three
years, the learned Magistrate, in terms of his order dt.05.04.2018, took
cognizance of the offence and put the petitioner on trial for offence under
Section 498-A RPC. It is further averred that the petitioner challenged the
aforesaid order before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu by way
of a revision petition, but said revision petition came to be dismissed by the
learned Revisional Court vide its order dated 21.09.2019.
4. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders of the learned
trial Magistrate and the learned Revisional Court on the grounds that no
explanation for the delay in filing the challan was offered by the prosecution
but in spite of this, the learned trial Magistrate as well as the learned
Revisional Court ignored the mandate of Section 538-B of J&K Cr.P.C and
passed the impugned orders; that the reasoning for condoning the delay in
filing the challan by the learned trial Magistrate and learned Additional
Sessions Judge is not acceptable and that taking of cognizance of the
offence by the learned trial court against the petitioner has caused grave
hardship to him inasmuch as, he will have to attend the trial court on each
date of hearing.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the
impugned orders passed by the learned trial Magistrate and the learned
Revisional Court. I have also gone through the petition and the documents
attached thereto.
6. In the instant case, admittedly the challan has been presented
before the trial Court and cognizance of offence under S.498-A RPC has
been taken by the said Court against the petitioner beyond the prescribed 3 CRM(M) 282/2021
period of limitation, which is three years. Section 538-B of J&K Cr.P.C,
bars the taking of cognizance of an offence beyond the prescribed period of
limitation. However, Section 538-G of Jammu and Kashmir Code of
Criminal Procedure, which is applicable to the instant case, vests jurisdiction
with the Court to extend the period of limitation in certain circumstances. It
reads as under:-
"538-G. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice."
7. From a perusal of the afore quoted provision it is clear that a
Court is empowered to extend the period of limitation for taking cognizance
of an offence not only where it is satisfied on the facts and circumstance of
the case that the delay has been properly explained but also in a case where
the court forms an opinion that extension of period of limitation is necessary
in the interest of justice. In my aforesaid view, I am supported by the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vanka Radhamanohari vs.
Vanka Venkata Reddy and Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 4. In the said case, the
Supreme Court after noticing the provisions contained in S.473 Cr. P. C
(Central) which are in pari materia with S. 538-G of J&K Cr.P.C, observed
as under:
"In view of Section 437 a Court can take cognizance of an offence not only when it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly 4 CRM(M) 282/2021
explained, but even in absence of proper explanation if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. The said Section 473 has a non obstante clause which means that said section has an overriding effect on Section 468, if the Court is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of a particular case, that either the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice."
8. A perusal of the impugned orders passed by the learned trial
Magistrate as upheld by learned Revisional Court, shows that the period of
limitation in the instant case has been extended by exercise of power vested
in terms of the latter part of Section 538-G of Jammu and Kashmir Code of
Criminal Procedure. It has been clearly stated by both the courts below that
it will be in the interest of justice to extend the period of limitation in the
instant case.
9. The question that arises for consideration is whether this Court
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C can interfere in the
discretion exercised by the trial Court, whereby it has extended the period of
limitation for taking cognizance by recording a satisfaction that it would be
in the interest of justice to do so. The answer to this question is that the
superior courts can interfere with discretion of extending the period of
limitation for taking cognizance of an offence by trial court only if the
discretion has not been exercised judicially and on well recognized
principles.
10. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the Ld. Trial Court
has, by a speaking order and after hearing the accused, extended the period
of limitation for taking cognizance on the ground that the victim in the case
happens to be a lady who, as per the challan, has been subjected to cruelty 5 CRM(M) 282/2021
by the accused. On this basis, the Ld. Trial Court has felt satisfied that it
would be in the interests of justice to take cognizance of the offence against
the accused. The reasoning adopted by the Trial Court is based on sound and
recognized principles, as the interests of justice demand that discretion
should be exercised in favour of the oppressed.
11. The Supreme Court has, in the case of Venka Radhamanohari
(Supra), while dealing with a similar issue, explained the principles that are
required to be followed while dealing with such matters. The observations of
the Court, that are relevant to the context, are reproduced as under:
" At times it has come to our notice that many courts are treating the provisions of Section 468 and Section 473 of the Code as provisions parallel to the periods of limitation provided in the Limitation Act and the requirement of satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act. There is a basic difference between Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 473 of the Code. For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whereas Section 473 enjoins a duty on the Court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the justice to condone or ignore such delay. As such, whenever the bar of Section 468 is applicable, the Court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. If the power under Section 473 of the Code is to be exercised in the interests of justice, then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture, cruelty and inhuman treatment, 6 CRM(M) 282/2021
by the husband and the relatives of the husband, the interest of justice requires a deeper examination of such grievances, instead of applying the rule of limitation and saying that with lapse of time the cause of action itself has come to an end. The general rule of limitation is based on the Latin maxim : vigilantibus, et non- dormientibus, jura subtenunt (the vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws). That maxim cannot be applied in connection with offences relating to cruelty against women."
12. Again, the Supreme Court, in the case of Arun Vyas and Anr.
Vs. Anita Vyas (1999)4 SCC 690, while reiterating the aforesaid legal
position, interpreted the expression 'in the interest of justice' appearing in
S.473 Cr.P.C. in the context of a case involving offence under S.498-A IPC.
While doing so, the Court observed as under:
"It may be noted here that Section 473 Cr.P.C. which extends the period of limitation is in two parts. The first part contains non obstante clause and gives overriding effect to that section over Sections 468 to 472. The second part has two limbs. The first limb confers power on every competent court to take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained and the second limb empowers such a court to take cognizance of an offence if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. It is true that the expression `in the interest of justice' in Section 473 cannot be interpreted to mean in the interest of prosecution. What the Court has to see is `interest of justice'. The interest of justice demands that the Court should protect the oppressed and punish the oppressor/offender. In complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, having been subjected to cruelty by the husband and the in-laws. It is, 7 CRM(M) 282/2021
therefore, appropriate for the Courts, in case of delayed complaints, to construe liberally Section 473 Cr.P.C.in favour of a wife who is subjected to cruelty if on the facts and in the circumstances of the case it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. When the conduct of the accused is such that applying rule of limitation will give an unfair advantage to him or result in miscarriage of justice, the Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation in the interests of justice. This is only illustrative, not exhaustive."
13. From the foregoing analysis of the legal position on the
subject, it is clear that no exception can be taken to the reasoning adopted by
the Ld. Trial Court in the impugned order. Thus there is no ground for this
Court to interfere in the impugned orders passed by the Ld. Trial Magistrate
and the Ld. Revisional Court.
14. The petition, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed.
(SANJAY DHAR) JUDGE Jammu 25.05.2021 Bir
Whether the order is speaking: Yes/No Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!