Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 09.04.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Other on 28 May, 2025
2025:HHC:16349
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 266 of 2024
Reserved on: 09.04.2025
Date of Decision: 28th May 2025.
Procter & Gamble Hygiene and Health
Care Ltd. & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & other ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Senior
Advocate, with Ms. Shardha
Karol, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma,
Additional Advocate General
for respondents Nos. 1 and
2/State.
Mr. Ashok Sharma, Senior
Advocate with M/s Anubhuti
Sharma, Mr. Jeevesh Mehta
and Mr. Nihit Dalmia,
Advocates, for respondent
No.3.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing the order dated 30.12.2023 passed by learned Judicial
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Magistrate First Class, Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P. (learned
Trial Court) vide which the Station House Officer (SHO),
Kandaghat was directed to register the FIR based on the
complaint made by respondent No. 3 (informant before the
learned Trial Court) and the consequential proceedings arising
out of the FIR. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the
same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court
for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the brief facts giving rise to the
present petition are that the informant made an application
under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.)
for seeking a direction to register an FIR for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 120B, 415, 420 and 405 of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant
is a Techno Innovator Entrepreneur. The accused No.1 is a
Multi-National Company having its Corporate Office in
Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A. The informant developed a method for
dyeing textile products using Neem and Holy Basil extract. This
product was tested for anti-viral, anti-microbial, anti-fungal,
anti-odour, UV resistance, insects, and mosquito repellent
properties. The informant patented this technology in India,
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USA and Europe. This technology won many awards. It has great
potential in textile products. The accused No.1 is running the
P&G Connect + Develop Programme, in which it invited the
innovators to partner with it to develop new products which
would be mutually beneficial to both parties. The informant
submitted his patent for the use of his technology in sanitary
pads and diapers. The accused acknowledged the informant's
submission. Subsequently, an email was sent to the informant
stating that the accused was not interested in further exploring
the relationship. However, the accused launched a product,
Whisper Ultra Clean (new with herbal oil), using the technology
submitted by the complainant. The accused No.1 deceptively
stole the idea of the informant and used it for commercial
purposes without giving any credit to the informant. Therefore,
it was prayed that the action be taken against the accused.
3. The learned Trial Court passed a detailed order on
30.12.2023 and held that the allegations in the application
showed that the accused had used the idea of the informant for
commercial exploitation. A prima facie case for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 120B, 415, 420 and 405 of
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IPC was made out against the accused. Hence, a direction was
issued to the SHO, Kandaghat, to take action as per the law.
4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the accused have filed the present petition asserting
that the accused No.1 is a Company which manufactures various
consumer goods. It also manufactures sanitary napkins under
the brand name Whisper. It was founded in the year 1837 and
has various brands in the international market. The process of
manufacturing sanitary napkins is automated and is carried out
with the aid of an Advanced Inspection System embedded in the
manufacturing lines. It includes different layers such as top
sheet, secondary top sheet, core, back sheet, required glue
between different layers, wrapper films, reseal tape etc. Herbal
oil containing neem, which is a P&G proprietary formulation, is
added directly to the core of the sanitary napkins. It does not
involve any dyeing process at all. The process patented by the
informant involves the preparation of a dye bath at a specific
temperature and dyeing natural textiles (again at specific
temperatures). It pertains to textiles and not to sanitary
napkins. The formulation of the petitioners is proprietary and
quite different from the process of the informant. The SHO,
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Police Station, Kandaghat, had refused to register the FIR before
the orders passed by the learned Trial Court. The Connect +
Develop Programme was launched more than 20 years ago and
has developed thousands of global partnerships, accelerating
innovation and increasing productivity. Thousands of proposals
were received. Hence, an Online Submission System was
designed, which is purely voluntary. No promise of partnership
or reward was held out. No inducement was made to any person.
Any submission does not create any confidential or contractual
relationship. The Company made it clear that it would not be
obligated to provide any explanation as to why the submission
was not pursued. The informant accepted the terms and
conditions laid down on the website. The Company
acknowledged the submission by sending an e-mail. The
Company also informed the informant that they do not wish to
pursue the application. The website provided a disclaimer that
all information submitted must be non-confidential, and if any
confidential document was submitted, it would be deleted from
the portal and the submission would be declined. There was no
contract between the parties. Petitioner No.1 launched a herbal
oil variant of their product, Whisper Ultra Clean (with herbal
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oil) variant in India. The informant sent a Cease-and-Desist
Notice dated 13.05.2022 through his Lawyer to the petitioners
for the infringement of Patent No.8697429 and his Trademark
Enliven. He asked the petitioners to stop the production and sale
of their product, Whisper, immediately. The petitioners filed
caveats before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the Hon'ble
Bombay High Court, apprehending that the informant might file
a commercial suit seeking an injunction. These were renewed
from time to time. Petitioner No.2 responded to the notice
issued by the informant alleging infringement. US Patent
No.8697429 was a publicly available document accessible to
anyone and was in no manner confidential. Whisper never
infringed any patent. A notice was received on 01.05.2023 from
the Police Station, Kandaghat, regarding the filing of a
complaint by the informant. Mr Raghav Ganesh, an authorised
representative of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2, appeared before the
Investigating Officer and provided a detailed response to the
information sought by the police. A civil case was being given a
criminal colour. The patent was for a specific process, namely
dyeing textiles with neem + holy basil. The petitioners did not
follow this process and merely added herbal oil containing
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neem to the inner layers of sanitary napkins. The informant
cannot claim a monopoly over the use of the neem, which has
been used in India for thousands of years. The Investigating
Officer issued notices dated 01.06.2023, 03.02.2024 and
07.02.2024 seeking information from the petitioners after the
registration of the FIR. Mr Raghav Ganesh personally visited
Kandaghat Police Station to provide a detailed response to the
queries raised. An email was received by Mr Raghav Ganesh on
05.04.2024 about a notice under Section 41A addressed to the
Managing Director seeking his appearance. Another notice was
received on 05.04.2024 addressed to the Chairman of the Board,
President and Chief Executive Officer seeking their appearance.
The learned Magistrate passed the orders mechanically. She
failed to appreciate that the petitioners were never made parties
before any proceeding, nor were they provided any opportunity
of being heard. The application filed by the informant was not as
per the provisions of Section 156(3) of CrPC. The learned
Magistrate had no jurisdiction over the matter as the informant
is a resident of Delhi, and the assertion made by the informant
that he had sent the e-mail from Kandaghat is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction. The ingredients to Sections 415, 420 and 405
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of IPC were not satisfied. The complaint was bereft of any detail,
and there was no evidence to support it. The police had
themselves closed the earlier complaint, finding it to be a civil
dispute. The criminal proceedings cannot be used as a weapon
of harassment. The notices issued under Section 41A of the Cr.
P.C. are contrary to the provisions of law. There was a delay of 3
years in filing the complaint and subsequent registration of the
FIR. The informant came to know of the launch of the product in
the year 2021, and he filed the complaint in the year 2023. He
failed to provide any reasons for the delay. He approached the
Court with unclean hands. He issued the Cease-and-Desist
Notices but failed to disclose them in the complaint filed by him.
The complaint discloses a violation of the patent, which is a civil
dispute. The petitioners had provided a detailed response to the
allegations of the informant. Whisper range of products does
not use any process patented by the informant. The rights of the
patentee are governed by Section 48 of the Patents Act. The
informant did not file any case deliberately because he had no
valid claim. Hence, he misused the Criminal Justice System by
filing false and malicious police complaints. The process
adopted by the petitioners is different from the process
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patented by the informant. The informant has a right to the
process and not to the use of the neem, which is an ancient
knowledge that has been used in India for thousands of years.
The petitioners never used the information provided by the
informant. The ingredients of criminal breach of trust or
cheating were not satisfied. No inducement was ever made to
the informant. The petitioners had provided all the information
on their website, which they would not have done if they had
any intention of cheating any person. Hence, the petition.
5. The petition is opposed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2
by filing a reply, asserting that FIR No.02/2024 dated 01.01.2024
was registered at Police Station, Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P.,
against the petitioners on the directions of the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Kandaghat. The statement of the
informant has been recorded, and documents in support of his
complaint were taken into possession. The petitioners were
served with a notice under Section 41A of the Cr. P.C. The
present petition is not maintainable. The petitioners have not
approached the Court with clean hands, and the petitioners are
estopped from filing the present petition on account of their act,
conduct, omissions, etc. The petitioners invited the innovators
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to collaborate with them as per the allegations of the complaint.
They told the informant that they did not wish to pursue the
partnership with him, but they launched the product Whisper
Ultra Clean sanitary pads (new with herbal oil) using the
technology of the informant. The matter is under investigation.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
6. A detailed reply was filed by respondent
No.3/informant reproducing the contents of the complaint. It
was asserted that the terms and conditions of the website are
entirely different from the frequently asked questions (FAQs)
uploaded on the website. The terms and conditions were not
mentioned on the website, and these were published as an
afterthought. The petitioners are misusing their dominant
position. The prayers sought by the petitioners can be granted
in very rare cases. The investigation is at the initial stage. The
petitioners have not come to the Court with clean hands, and
they want to avoid the investigation being conducted by the
police. The facts are hazy, and not all the evidence/material is
before the Court. It is impermissible to examine the merits of
the case while deciding the petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C.
The allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of
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cognizable offences punishable under Sections 120B, 405, 415
and 420 of IPC. The petitioners are using the process developed
by the informant. The petitioners never informed the informant
that they had the propriety formulation available to them.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7. I have heard Mr. Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate assisted by Ms. Shardha Karol, learned counsel for the
petitioners, Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for respondent No.1 and 2/State and Mr. Ashok Sharma,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by M/s Anubhuti Sharma, Mr.
Jeevesh Mehta and Mr. Nihit Dalmia, Advocates for the
respondent no. 3/informant.
8. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners, submitted that the petitioners invited the
innovators to collaborate with them. The submissions were
voluntary. It was expressly made clear that no confidential
information was to be submitted, and in case of submission of
any confidential information, the same would be deleted from
the portal. The petitioners were not bound to inform the reason
for the rejection of the submission. However, they informed the
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informant that they did not wish to pursue the submission made
by the informant. The offences of criminal breach of trust and
cheating cannot be committed simultaneously because they
require different mens rea. The informant issued Cease-and-
Desist Notices and failed to pursue the remedies available under
the Patent Act. The petitioners are using a different process to
manufacture their product and are not using any information
provided by the informant. The dispute between the parties is
purely civil and is being given a colour of criminality, which is
impermissible. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the FIR registered before the Police Station,
Kandaghat, be quashed. He relied upon Hridaya Ranjan Prasad
Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168, Sarabjit Kaur v. State of
Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360, G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC
693, Bharateesh Reddy v. Ramesh Ranganathan, (2022) 16 SCC
210, Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268,
G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, Sachin Garg v. State
of UP 2024 SCC OnLine SC 82, AM Mohan vs State 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 339, Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao
Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335, Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar 2006 (4) SCC 359,
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Mahmood Ali v. State of UP 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950, State of
Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 and Delhi Race Club
(1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 690 in support of his
submission.
9. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for respondent Nos 1 and 2/State, submitted that the
Police registered the FIR as per the directions issued by the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kandaghat. The Police
recorded the statement of the informant. The allegations in the
FIR constitute the commission of cognizable offences. These
allegations are being investigated to determine whether any
offence was committed or not. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
10. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for
respondent No.3/informant, submitted that the petitioners
invited the innovators to collaborate with them. The informant
submitted a proposal, which was rejected without assigning any
reason. The petitioners used the technology developed by the
informant to manufacture their product. They took advantage of
the process developed by respondent No.3/informant. The
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correctness or otherwise of the allegations is not to be seen
while deciding the petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It is a
matter of investigation/trial. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 7 as under: -
"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein
this Court has summarized some of the principles under
which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed
in the following words:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
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sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
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proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed."
13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice.
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These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited
by any other statutory provision. However, given the
broad and profound nature of this authority, the High
Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for
invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or
where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles
and guidelines that High Courts must follow before
quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby
pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case
before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter
alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the
criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the
FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii)
no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil
in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
14. It was held in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri)
234: 1988 SCC OnLine SC 80 that the Court has to determine
whether the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint
constitute the cognizable offence when the prosecution is at the
initial stage. It was observed on page 695
7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the
test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
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uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish
the offence. It is also for the court to take into
consideration any special features which appear in a
particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in
the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for
any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court
chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by
allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court
may while taking into consideration the special facts of a
case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.
15. The parameters for exercising jurisdiction to
interfere with the investigations being carried out by the police
were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401:
2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 and it was observed at page 444:
13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from
the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir
Ahmad [King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC
OnLine PC 29 : (1943-44) 71 IA 203: AIR 1945 PC 18], the
following principles of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into
cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information
report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.
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13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised
sparingly with circumspection, in the "rarest of rare
cases". (The rarest of rare cases standard in its
application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to
be confused with the norm which has been formulated in
the context of the death penalty, as explained previously
by this Court.)
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of
which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise
of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
initial stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
and a rarity rather than an ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the
State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The
inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to
secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the
process by Section 482CrPC.
13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.
13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in the miscarriage of justice, the Court and
the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences.
13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice.
13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
which must disclose all facts and details relating to the
offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by
the police is in progress, the court should not go into the
merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be
permitted to complete the investigation. It would be
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premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law.
During or after the investigation, if the investigating
officer finds that there is no substance in the application
made by the complainant, the investigating officer may
file an appropriate report/summary before the learned
Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but
the conferment of wide power requires the Court to be
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on
the Court.
13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks
fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and
the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the
parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960
SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], has the
jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.
13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power
under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or
not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of
a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on
merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable
offence or not and the court has to permit the
investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations
in the FIR.
16. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High
Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an
abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed on page 703:
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"7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue
would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the
ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve
a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled
object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the prosecution rests
and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the
proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice
are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has
got to be administered according to laws made by the
legislature. The compelling necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper realisation of the
object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save
the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice,
between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours of that salient
jurisdiction."
17. The term abuse of the process was explained in
Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740:
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the
remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-
established and recognised doctrine both by the English
courts and courts in India. There are some established
principles of law which bar the trial when there appears
to be an abuse of the process of court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2
All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)
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"There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. ... A court must enjoy such powers in
order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of its process.
***
The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction)
to prevent abuses of its process and to control its own
procedure must in a criminal court include a power to
safeguard an accused person from oppression or
prejudice."
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same
case observed that where particular criminal proceedings
constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to
refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR
495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined
the word "abuse of process" as something so unfair and
wrong with the prosecution that the court should not
allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other
respects, a perfectly supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates'
Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 :
(1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse
of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process
justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the
following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a
fair trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of
the process because it offends the court's sense of
justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in
the circumstances of the particular case.
23
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37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr
App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
"It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the
prosecution has manipulated or misused the process
of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a
protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage
of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability
the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the
preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the
part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable."
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R
94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
"The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many
different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main
strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases
where the court concludes that the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes
that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried."
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to
determine on the individual facts of each case.
18. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15
SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are
frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was
observed on page 498:
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes
a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court
24
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while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or
Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself
only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into
account the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials
collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance
the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over
a period of time. It is in the background of such
circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes
importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking
vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on
the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash
an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between
consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence
and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material
that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR
can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :
(Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda
Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC
p. 527, paras 5-7)
"5. ... Authority of the court exists for the
advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an
abuse of the process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent the
promotion of justice. In the exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the
court may examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has
25
2025:HHC:16349
alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this
Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash
the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want
of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at its face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or
may not support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The
judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument
of oppression, or, needless harassment. The court
should be circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing the
process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of
a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass
any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is
not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-
26
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circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death."(emphasis supplied)
19. It was held in Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4
SCC 359 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: 2006 SCC OnLine SC 417 that the
High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie opinion
when the facts are hazy and the evidence has not been collected.
It was observed on page 366:
"20. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the
very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision
in the exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a
prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High
Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata
Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305: 1993 SCC (Cri) 36]
and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [(1964) 2 SCR
336: AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .]
20. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
27
2025:HHC:16349
21. Learned Trial Court directed the Police to register the
FIR under Sections 120B, 405, 415 and 420 of IPC against the
accused. It was rightly submitted by Mr. Neeraj Gupta, learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the offence of criminal
breach of trust and cheating cannot co-exist as they require
different mens rea. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171
that the same act of transaction cannot result in an offence of
cheating and criminal breach of trust. It was observed: -
10. The chargesheet also refers to Section 406 of the IPC,
but without pointing out how the ingredients of said
section are satisfied. No details and particulars are
mentioned. There are decisions which hold that the same
act or transaction cannot result in an offence of cheating
and criminal breach of trust simultaneously. Wolfgang
Reim v. State, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3341; Mahindra and
Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. Delta Classic (P.)
Ltd., (2011) 6 Gau LR 604; Mukesh Sharma v. State of
Himachal Pradesh, 2024: HHC: 35. For the offence of
cheating, dishonest intention must exist at the inception
of the transaction, whereas, in case of criminal breach of
trust there must exist a relationship between the parties
whereby one party entrusts another with the property as
per law, albeit dishonest intention comes later. In this
case, entrustment is missing; in fact, it is not even
alleged. It is a case of the sale of goods. The chargesheet
does refer to Section 506 of the IPC, relying upon the
averments in the complaint. However, no details and
particulars are given, when and on which date and place
the threats were given. Without the said details and
28
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particulars, it is apparent to us that these allegations of
threats, etc., have been made only with the intent to
activate police machinery for the recovery of money.
22. This position was reiterated in Delhi Race Club (1940)
Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 690, and it was held that an
offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust is independent
and distinct. They cannot coexist similarly in the same set of
facts. It was observed: -
"43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of
trust and cheating. For cheating, the criminal intention is
necessary at the time of making a false or misleading
representation, i.e. since inception. In a criminal breach
of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in
case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully
entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriates the same. Whereas, in the case of
cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly
induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any
property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-
exist simultaneously.
55. It is high time that police officers across the country
are imparted proper training in law so as to understand
the fine distinction between the offence of cheating vis-
à-vis criminal breach of trust. Both offences are
independent and distinct. The two offences cannot
coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts. They are
antithetical to each other. The two provisions of IPC (now
BNS, 2023) are not twins, and they cannot survive
without each other."
23. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the
informant, fairly conceded that the offence of criminal breach
29
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of trust and cheating would not be made out in the present case.
However, he submitted that the offence of cheating is prima
facie made out by the allegations contained in the FIR.
24. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State
of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786: 2000 SCC OnLine
SC 636 and it was observed at page 176:
13. Cheating is defined in Section 415 of the Code as:
"415. Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently
or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to
deliver any property to any person, or to consent that
any person shall retain any property, or intentionally
induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he were not
so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'.
Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section."
The section requires--
(1) deception of any person;
(2)(a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that
person
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any
property; or
(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to
do anything which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or
30
2025:HHC:16349
is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in
body, mind, reputation or property.
14. On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the
definition there are set forth two separate classes of acts
which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the
first place, he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly
to deliver any property to any person. The second class of
acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do
anything which the person deceived would not do or omit
to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases,
the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the
second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but
not fraudulent or dishonest.
15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind
that the distinction between mere breach of contract and
the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the
intention of the accused at the time of inducement which
may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this
subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of
contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is
shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is
the time when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist
of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is
necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise. From his
mere failure to keep up his promise subsequently such a
culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when
he made the promise cannot be presumed.
25. This position was reiterated in S.W. Palanitkar v. State
of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 wherein it was observed as under:
"10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i)
there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a
person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived
31
2025:HHC:16349
should be induced to deliver any property to any person
or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
(b) the person so deceived should be intentionally
induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not
do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases
covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one
which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the
person induced in body, mind, reputation or property.
11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench,
in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4
SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has
expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15)
"15. In determining the question, it has to be kept
in mind that the distinction between mere breach
of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one.
It depends upon the intention of the accused at the
time of inducement, which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct, but this subsequent conduct is
not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot
give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating
unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, that is,
the time when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is
the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of
cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of
making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up
a promise, subsequently such a culpable intention right
at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise,
cannot be presumed." (emphasis supplied)
12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating
and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court
interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed
the criminal proceedings.
32
2025:HHC:16349
13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp.
696-97)
"7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts.
While in the first part, the person must
'dishonestly' or 'fraudulently' induce the
complainant to deliver any property; in the second
part, the person should intentionally induce the
complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to
say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest
or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement
should be intentional. As observed by this Court
in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116], a guilty
intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of
cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the
conviction of a person for the offence of cheating,
'mens rea' on the part of that person must be
established. It was also observed in Mahadeo
Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ
1806] that in order to constitute the offence of
cheating, the intention to deceive should be in
existence at the time when the inducement was
offered."(emphasis supplied)
14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999)
8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of
existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on
criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings
are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing
of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482
CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception;
merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to
stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a
provision made in the agreement for referring the
disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a
criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a
criminal offence.
33
2025:HHC:16349
26. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad,
(2000) 3 SCC 693 as under:
"4. "Cheating" is defined in Section 415 of the Penal
Code, 1860, which provides as under:
"415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any
person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the
person so deceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to consent that any person shall retain
any property, or intentionally induces the person so
deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived,
and which act or omission causes or is likely to
cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'.
Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section."
5. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on
the ground that Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860
deals with the offences against properties and, therefore,
Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property
which, in the instant case, is not involved and,
consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad
proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not
correct. While the first part of the definition relates to
property, the second part does not necessarily relate to
property. The second part is reproduced below:
"415. ... intentionally induces the person so
deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived,
and which act or omission causes or is likely to
cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'."
6. This part speaks of intentional deception, which must
be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do
34
2025:HHC:16349
or omit to do something but also to cause damage or
harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or
property. The intentional deception presupposes the
existence of a dominant motive of the person making the
inducement. Such inducement should have led the person
deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he
would not have done or omitted to do if he were not
deceived. The further requirement is that such an act or
omission should have caused damage or harm to the
body, mind, reputation or property.
7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While
in the first part, the person must "dishonestly" or
"fraudulently" induce the complainant to deliver any
property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a
thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be
dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the
inducement should be intentional. As observed by this
Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay
[AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483], a guilty
intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of
cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a
person for the offence of cheating, "mens rea" on the part
of that person must be established. It was also observed
in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954
Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of
cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence
at the time when the inducement was offered.
8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is
concerned, "property", at no stage, is involved. Here, it is
the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the
complainant as a result of intentional inducement by the
accused, which is material. Such inducement should
result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a
result of which the person concerned should have
suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body,
mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the
35
2025:HHC:16349
Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2
AWN 237], it was held by Mahmood, J.:
"That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste
different to the one to which she really belongs, with the
object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of
cheating by personation as defined in Section 416 of the
Penal Code, 1860, which must be read in the light of the
preceding Section 415."
27. A similar view was taken in Delhi Race Club (supra)
wherein it was observed:
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC, the
essential ingredients are:
(1) Deception of any person, either by making a false
or misleading representation or by other action or by
omission;
(2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person
to deliver any property, or
(3) The consent that any person shall retain any
property and finally intentionally inducing that person to
do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit
(see: Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of
Punjab [Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab,
(2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 620] ).
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea, i.e.
intention to defraud or dishonest intention, must be
present, and in the case of cheating, it must be there from
the very beginning or inception.
28. Therefore, it is to be determined whether these
ingredients are satisfied by the allegations contained in the FIR
or not.
2025:HHC:16349
29. It was held in Bharateesh Reddy v. Ramesh
Ranganathan, (2022) 16 SCC 210: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1061 that a
breach of contract will not amount to fraud. It was observed on
page 215:
16. In Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh [Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh,
(2009) 14 SCC 696 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 223] a two-judge Bench
of this Court held that a dispute arising out of a breach of
contract would not amount to an offence of cheating under
Sections 415 and 420. The relevant extract is as follows :
(SCC pp. 696-700, paras 9-10)
"9. The ingredients of Section 420 of the Penal Code are:
'(i) Deception of any persons;
(ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to
deliver any property; or
(iii) To consent that any person shall retain any
property and finally intentionally inducing that
person to do or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit.'
10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a
question as to whether any act of inducement on the part
of the appellant had been raised by the second
respondent and whether the appellant had an intention
to cheat him from the very inception. If the dispute
between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting
from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by
non-refunding the amount of advance the same would not
constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position
with respect to an offence of criminal breach of trust having
regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Penal
Code. (See Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [Ajay Mitra v. State of
M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 11: 2003 SCC (Cri) 703] )"(emphasis
supplied)
2025:HHC:16349
30. This position was reiterated in Sarabjit Kaur v. State
of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 210 wherein it
was observed on page 363:
"13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the
transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up
promise will not be enough to initiate criminal
proceedings. From the facts available on record, it is
evident that Respondent 2 had improved his case ever
since the first complaint was filed in which there were no
allegations against the appellant rather it was only
against the property dealers which was in subsequent
complaints that the name of the appellant was
mentioned. On the first complaint, the only request was
for the return of the amount paid by Respondent 2. When
the offence was made out on the basis of the first
complaint, the second complaint was filed with an
improved version making allegations against the
appellant as well which was not there in the earlier
complaint. The entire idea seems to be to convert a civil
dispute into a criminal and put pressure on the appellant
to return the amount allegedly paid. The criminal courts
are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise
parties to settle civil disputes. Wherever the ingredients
of criminal offences are made out, criminal courts have to
take cognizance. The complaint in question on the basis
of which FIR was registered was filed nearly three years
after the last date fixed for registration of the sale deed.
Allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse
of process of the court.
31. The gist of the allegations made in the FIR is that the
petitioners developed a P&G Connect + Develop Programme
promising to collaborate with the innovators for mutual value.
2025:HHC:16349
The informant submitted his innovation as per the terms and
conditions of the programme. The petitioners showed their
disinclination to pursue the partnership and thereafter used the
technology/process submitted by the informant. Prima facie,
these allegations show that the petitioners had invited the
informant to collaborate with the promise to enter into a
partnership. They refused to proceed further with the
partnership but used the process submitted by the informant.
These allegations show that a false promise of collaboration was
made to the informant. The informant was induced to deliver
the innovation which he would not have done but for the
promise of collaboration made to him, and in this manner, the
petitioners gained knowledge of the process developed by the
informant while the informant lost the money promised to him
by way of collaboration. These facts satisfy the ingredients of
cheating.
32. It was submitted that the petitioners never used the
technology/process submitted by the informant, the process
used by the petitioners is entirely different from the process
patented by the informant. These are the questions of fact
which require investigation. It was laid down by the Hon'ble
2025:HHC:16349
Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand,
(2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot
conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section
482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397:
"17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is
not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference
can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan
Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the
judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. ... As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal
proceedings, while exercising the powers under
Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct
the mini-trial. ...
7. ... At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
'whether any sufficient material is available to
proceed further against the accused for which the
accused is required to be tried or not'."
33. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are
false. The petitioners never used the process of the informant.
This submission will not help the petitioners. This Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has to take
the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down
2025:HHC:16349
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: -
"29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the
Court must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that save in exceptional cases where non-
interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a
routine manner according to its whims or caprice."
34. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent
jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: -
"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage
of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission
of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At
the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face
value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or
make out a case against the accused. We are of the
considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
2025:HHC:16349
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC
1060:
"14. First, we would like to deal with the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel for
Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed,
the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable.
We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping
in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].
In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this
Court while deciding the question of whether the
High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition
for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was
filed by the police during the pendency of the
Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
"16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even
prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned
Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have
still examined whether the offences alleged to
have been committed by the appellant were
prima facie made out from the complainant's
FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not."
35. Therefore, this Court refrains from conducting any
inquiry into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations and
leaves the matter to the Investigating Officer to do so.
2025:HHC:16349
36. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties
was civil, and the registration of the FIR was impermissible.
There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that the civil
dispute cannot be turned into criminal proceedings1, however, it
does not mean that no civil action can give rise to a criminal
action. Professor Glanville Williams explained in his celebrated
book Learning the Law (Tenth Edition, Stevens and Sons) that the
facts by themselves cannot determine civil or criminal liability.
The same set of facts may give rise to criminal or civil liability.
The distinction between the two is not the nature of the act but
the nature of the proceedings that are taken to seek redressal. It
was observed:
"The distinction between a crime and a civil wrong,
though capable of giving rise to some difficult legal
problems, is in essence quite simple. The first thing to
understand is that the distinction does not reside in the
nature of the wrongful act itself. This can quite simply be
proved by pointing out that the same act may be both a
crime and a civil wrong. Occasionally, at a bus station,
there is someone who makes a living by looking after
people's impedimenta while they are shopping. If I
entrust my bag to such a person, and he runs off with it,
he commits the crime of theft and also two civil wrongs
--the tort of conversion and a breach of his contract with
me to keep the bag safe. The result is that two sorts of
G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, Sachin
Garg v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 82, and Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 268.
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legal proceedings can be taken against him: a
prosecution for the crime, and a civil action for the tort
and the breach of contract. (Of course, the plaintiff in the
latter action will not get damages twice over merely
because he has two causes of action; he will get only one
set of damages.)
To take another illustration, if a railway signalman, to
dumb forgetfulness a prey, fails to pull the lever at the
right moment, and a fatal accident occurs on the line, his
carelessness may be regarded as sufficiently gross to
amount to the crime of manslaughter, and it is also the
tort of negligence towards the victims of the accident and
their dependents and a breach of his contract with the
Railway Executive to take due care in his work. It will be
noticed that this time, the right of action in tort and the
right of action in a contract are vested in different
persons.
These examples show that the distinction between a
crime and civil wrong cannot be stated as depending
upon what is done, because what is done may be the
same in each case. The true distinction resides, therefore,
not in the nature of the wrongful act but in the legal
consequences that may follow. If the wrongful act is
capable of being followed by what are called criminal
proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a crime
(otherwise called an offence). If it is capable of being
followed by civil proceedings, that means that it is
regarded as a civil wrong. If it is capable of being
followed by both, it is both a crime and a civil wrong.
Criminal and civil proceedings are (in the normal case)
easily distinguishable: the procedure is different, the
outcome is different, and the terminology is different."
37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer
Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942,
that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong, as well as,
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the criminal offence and mere availability of civil remedies is no
ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed:
"34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as
well as a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is
available may not be a ground to quash criminal
proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no
criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with
the chargesheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The
other accused, Rajan Kumar, has died."
38. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra
Naranji Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625, wherein it was observed: -
"13. It may be true that in the event the court finds that
the dispute between the parties is civil in nature, it may
not allow the criminal proceedings to go on. But, no law,
in our opinion, as such can be laid down as in a given case
both civil suit and criminal complaint would be
maintainable although the cause of action for both the
proceedings is the same."
39. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Puneet Beriwala Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that simply
because a remedy is provided under the civil law cannot lead to
an inference that resort cannot be had to the criminal law or
that the civil law remedy is the only remedy available to the
parties. It was observed:
28. It is trite law that the mere institution of civil
proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to
hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court
in various judgments, has held that simply because there
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is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not
by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is
the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal
proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the
process of the court. This Court is of the view that
because the offence was committed during a commercial
transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the
complaint did not warrant a further investigation and, if
necessary, a trial. [See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine
Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun
Hee v. State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns
Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686]
40. Hence, the mere fact that the informant has a
remedy under the Patent Act to sue for the breach of the patent
will not take away the remedy available under the criminal law.
41. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the
matter to the police and the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed due to
the delay. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala (supra), that the F.I.R.
cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. It was observed:
37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for
offences punishable with imprisonment of more than
three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal
investigation. The delay will assume importance only
when the complainant fails to give a plausible
explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or
not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after
recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme
Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private
Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held,
"The mere delay on the part of the third respondent
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complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a
ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this
aspect to warrant any reference to precedents....." (Emphasis
supplied)
42. It was submitted that the Courts at Kandaghat had no
jurisdiction to hear and entertain the application. The police at
Kandaghat also do not have the territorial jurisdiction to
investigate the matter. Hence, the FIR is liable to be quashed.
This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 that SHO has a statutory authority to
investigate any cognizable offence and the investigation cannot
be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It
was observed:-
"8. In our view, the submission made by the learned
counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The
limited question is whether the High Court was justified
in quashing the FIR on the ground that the Delhi Police
Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate
the offence. From the discussion made by the learned
Judge, it appears that the learned Judge has considered
the provisions applicable to criminal trials. The High
Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the
allegations made by the parties that the SHO, Police
Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having
territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the
FIR lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry
items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and
that the alleged cause of action for the offence
2025:HHC:16349
punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at Patiala. In
our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the
face of it, illegal and erroneous because:
(1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section 156
of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any
cognizable case for which an FIR is lodged.
(2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question
of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code on the ground that the
investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction.
(3) After the investigation is over, if the investigating
officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of
action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within his
territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to
submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of
the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the
case to the Magistrate empowered to take
cognizance of the offence.
9. This would be clear from the following discussion.
Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers
the police officer to investigate any cognizable
offence. It reads as under:
"156. Police officer's power to investigate a cognizable
case.--(1) Any officer in charge of a police station
may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate
any cognizable case which a court having
jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of
such station would have the power to enquire into
or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such
case shall at any stage be called into question on
the ground that the case was one which such
officer was not empowered under this section to
investigate.
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(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190
may order such an investigation as above-
mentioned."
10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction is also prescribed
under sub-section (1) to the extent that the officer can
investigate any cognizable case in which a court having
jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such
police station would have the power to enquire into or try
under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-
section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no
proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any
stage be called into question on the ground that the case
was one which such officer was not empowered to
investigate. After the investigation is completed, the
result of such investigation is required to be submitted as
provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170
specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it
appears to the officer in charge of the police station that
there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of
suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a
Magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused under
custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of
the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or
commit for trial. Further, if the investigating officer
arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police
station, then the FIR can be forwarded to the police
station having jurisdiction over the area in which the
crime was committed. But this would not mean that in a
case which requires investigation, the police officer can
refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it.
11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for "jurisdiction of
the criminal courts in enquiries and trials". It is to be
stated that under the said chapter, there are various
provisions which empower the court for enquiry or trial
of a criminal case and that there is no absolute
prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local
territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, enquired
2025:HHC:16349
or tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177
to 188. For our purpose, it would suffice to refer only to
Sections 177 and 178, which are as under:
"177. Ordinary place of enquiry and trial.--Every
offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a
court within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed.
178. Place of enquiry or trial.--(a) When it is
uncertain in which of several local areas an offence
was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one
local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local areas than
one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas,
it may be enquired into or tried by a court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas."
12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it
clear that Section 177 provides for an "ordinary" place of
enquiry or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for place
of enquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several
local areas an offence was committed or where the
offence was committed partly in one local area and partly
in another and where it consisted of several acts done in
different local areas, it could be enquired into or tried by
a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held
that the SHO does not have territorial jurisdiction to
investigate the crime.
13. This Court in State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak [AIR 1963 SC
447 : (1963) 2 SCR 52] dealt with a similar contention
wherein the High Court had held that the statutory
powers of investigation given to the police under Chapter
XIV were not available in respect of an offence triable
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under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment
(Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the investigation
was without jurisdiction. Reversing the said finding, it
was held thus:
"The powers of investigation into cognizable
offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that
chapter deals with information in cognizable
offences and Section 156 with the investigation
into such offences and under these sections the
police have the statutory right to investigate into
the circumstances of any alleged cognizable
offence without authority from a Magistrate and
this statutory power of the police to investigate
cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power
under Section 439 or the inherent power of the
court under Section 561-A of the Criminal
Procedure Code. As to the powers of the judiciary in
regard to the statutory right of the police to
investigate, the Privy Council in King
Emperor v. KhwajaNazir Ahmad [(1944) 71 IA 203,
212: AIR 1945 PC 18] (IA at p. 212) observed as
follows--
'The functions of the judiciary and the
police are complementary, not overlapping
and the combination of individual liberty
with a due observance of law and order is
only to be obtained by leaving each to
exercise its own function, always, of course,
subject to the right of the court to intervene
in an appropriate case when moved under
Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code
to give directions in the nature of habeas
corpus. In such a case as the present,
however, the court's functions begin when a
charge is preferred before it, and not until
then. It has sometimes been thought that
Section 561-A has given increased powers to
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the court which it did not possess before that
section was enacted. But this is not so. The
section gives no new powers, it only provides
that those which the court already inherently
possesses shall be preserved and is inserted,
as their Lordships think, lest it should be
considered that the only powers possessed
by the court are those expressly conferred by
the Criminal Procedure Code and that no
inherent power had survived the passing of
that Act.'
With this interpretation, which has been put on the
statutory duties and powers of the police and of the
powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court
was in error, therefore in interfering with the powers of
the police in investigating the offence which was alleged
in the information sent to the officer in charge of the
police station."
14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an
offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere
with an investigation into the case and will permit an
investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If
the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an
offence, the court does not normally stop the
investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the
lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable
offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1
SCC 561: 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long
course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of
exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an
FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed
entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the
complaint or the documents accompanying the same per
se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or
otherwise of the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj
Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]
15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed
a grave error in accepting the contention of the
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respondent that the investigating officer had no
jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged
ground that no part of the offence was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi.
The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the
courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of the
investigation, the material collected by an investigating
officer cannot be judicially scrutinised for arriving at a
conclusion that the police station officer of a particular
police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In
any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c)
of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in
which of the several local areas an offence was
committed, or where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas, the said offence can be enquired
into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of
such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of the
investigation that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar,
New Delhi, was not having territorial jurisdiction is, on
the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section
156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a
police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he
has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court
has completely overlooked the said embargo when it
entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the ground
of want of territorial jurisdiction.
43. It was held in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of
Gujarat, (2010) 1 SCC 1, that once an investigation is commenced
under Section 156(1), it cannot be interrupted on the ground
that the Police Officer was not empowered. It was observed:-
24. From the aforesaid provisions, it is quite clear that a
police officer in charge of a police station can, without the
order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable offence
which a court having jurisdiction over such police station
can inquire into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Sub-
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section (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation
is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not
interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not
empowered under the section to investigate. It is in the
nature of a "savings clause" in respect of investigations
undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. In addition to
the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under Section
190 CrPC to order an investigation under sub-section (1) of
Section 202 CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also
empowers such Magistrate to order an investigation on a
complaint filed before him.
26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under
Section 181(4) CrPC has not yet been reached. Prior to
taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Bank, the
learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad had
directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) CrPC and as it
appears, a final report was submitted by the investigating
agency entrusted with the investigation stating that since
the alleged transactions had taken place within the
territorial limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action
had arisen in the State of Gujarat and therefore, the
investigation should be transferred to the police agency in
Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that the Economic
Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which had been
entrusted with the investigation, had, upon initial
inquiries, recommended that the investigation be
transferred to the police agency of Mumbai.
27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the Bombay
High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of
Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not within the
jurisdiction of the investigating agency to refrain itself
from holding a proper and complete investigation merely
upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had been
committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would
indicate that the major part of the loan transaction had, in
fact, taken place in the State of Gujarat and that having
regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 156
CrPC, the proceedings of the investigation could not be
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questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to
conduct such investigation. It was open to the learned
Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3)
CrPC without taking cognizance on the complaint and
where an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the
Magistrate, a police officer empowered under sub-section
(1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially
exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if
he was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction to
investigate the matter.
29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are
unable to accept Mr Syed's submissions that the High Court
had erred in upholding the order of the learned trial Judge
when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had
allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also
unable to accept the submission that it was for the
investigating officer in the course of the investigation to
decide whether a particular court had jurisdiction to
entertain a complaint or not.
30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a
criminal case follows the place where the cause arises, but
the distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the
stage of taking cognisance was yet to arrive. The
investigating agency was required to place the facts elicited
during the investigation before the court in order to enable
the court to come to a conclusion as to whether it had
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without
conducting such an investigation, it was improper on the
part of the investigating agency to forward its report with
the observation that since the entire cause of action for the
alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of
Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the investigation
should be transferred to the police station concerned in
Mumbai.
31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the
learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the
process should be based on the facts disclosed in the
complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the
Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this case,
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there are materials to show that the appellant had filed his
application for a loan with the Head Office of the Bank at
Ahmedabad and that the processing and the sanction of the
loan was also done in Ahmedabad which clearly indicates
that the major part of the cause of action for the complaints
arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on
the part of the investigating agency to make an observation
that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to proceed with
the investigation, which was required to be transferred to
the police station having jurisdiction to do so.
32. On the materials before him, the learned Magistrate was
fully justified in rejecting the final report submitted by the
Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), and to order a
fresh investigation into the allegations made on behalf of
the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not commit any
error in upholding the views expressed by the trial court. As
mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) CrPC deals with the
court's powers to inquire into or try an offence of criminal
misappropriation or a criminal breach of trust if the same
has been committed or any part of the property, which is
the subject of the offence, is received or retained within the
local jurisdiction of the said court.
33. The various decisions cited by Mr Syed, and in particular
the decision in Satvinder Kaur case [(1999) 8 SCC 728: 1999
SCC (Cri) 1503] provide an insight into the views held by the
Supreme Court on the accepted position that the
investigating officer was entitled to transfer an
investigation to a police station having jurisdiction to
conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before
us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to
consider whether the investigating officer in respect of an
investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) CrPC can file
a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate
into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen
outside his jurisdiction despite there being material
available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in
negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested
in the investigating authorities, under Section 156(1) CrPC,
did not restrict the jurisdiction of the investigating agency
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to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have
territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike in other cases, it was
for the court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were
placed before it."
44. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed on the ground
that the Police at Kandaghat have no territorial jurisdiction over
the matter.
45. No other point was urged.
46. The allegations in the FIR, if believed to be correct,
prima facie show the offence of cheating, and it is impermissible
to quash the same. Therefore, the present petition fails, and the
same is dismissed.
47. The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
( Rakesh Kainthla )
28 May 2025
th
Judge
(Rupsi)
