Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ashok Kumar Rangra And Another vs State Of H.P. And Another on 16 September, 2024
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1186 of 2023
.
Reserved on: 13.8.2024
Date of Decision: 16.9.2024.
Ashok Kumar Rangra and another ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. and another
Coram
r to ...Respondents
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Ashwani Pathak, Senior
Advocate, with Mr. Ganesh
Barowalia, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Ms. Ayushi Negi, Deputy Advocate
General, for respondent No.1/State.
Mr. Vipin Pandit, Advocate, for
respondent No.2/informant.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 79 of 2023, dated 23.8.2023, for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
506 read with Section 34 of IPC, registered at Police Station
Rekong Peo, Kalpa, District Kangra, H.P.
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed an application before the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur (learned Trial Court)
under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for registration of the FIR.
Learned Trial Court called for the report from the Station House
Officer. The complainant filed objections to the report submitted
by the police. Learned Trial Court listed the matter for recording
preliminary evidence vide order dated 19.9.2022 by treating it as
a private complaint. Statements of four witnesses were recorded
and the preliminary evidence was closed. Learned Trial Court
ordered on 8.6.2023 that there was sufficient reason to proceed
against the accused for the commission of offences punishable
under Sections 498-A and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. A
copy of the order was also sent to the Station House Officer,
Police Station, Rekong-Peo for registration of the FIR against
the accused. The police registered FIR No.79 of 2023 on
23.8.2023.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
3. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the petitioners have approached this Court for
.
quashing the FIR. It has been asserted that the petitioners are
innocent and have been falsely implicated. The civil dispute is
being converted into a criminal matter. The petitioners and the
informant never resided together under the same roof. The
Court had noticed that as per the opinion of the Investigating
Officer, the matter was civil; hence, a second round of
inquiry/investigation was not required. The police had
submitted a report that the dispute was civil and no criminal
case was made out against the petitioners. Therefore, it was
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be
quashed.
4. Notice of the petition was issued to the respondents.
Respondent No.1 filed a reply making preliminary submission
regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the
petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the FIR was
registered as per the order passed by learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kinnaur. The investigation is not complete and
petitioners have not joined the investigation. It was found that
the informant and her husband had resided together in
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
Chandigarh in the house of the petitioners. The informant
thereafter resided in Noida in preparation for a post-graduate
.
course in Delhi. She got admission to PGI, Rohtak in the year
2017. Petitioners No.1 and 2 harassed the informant in the year
2015 by saying that she did not earn anything and they forced
her to visit Delhi to take coaching. As per the investigation, the
matter pertains to jewellery, money and divorce between the
parties. Petitioners intended to purchase land in Himachal
Pradesh but in view of the bar under Section 118 of H.P. Tenancy
and Land Reforms Act, the land was purchased in the name of
the complainant. The allegations made in the complaint are
corroborated by the bank statement. Therefore, it was prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
5. Respondent No.2-informant filed a separate reply
denying the contents of the petition. It was asserted that the
petitioners committed the offence punishable under Section
498-A and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. The informant
resided with the petitioner in the shared household in
Chandigarh. She even visited Chandigarh during her course of
Doctorate of Medicine in PGI, Rohtak. The police failed to
discharge their duties and carry out the investigation. Hence,
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
the informant had to file an application under Section 156(3) of
Cr.P.C. before the competent Court. The petitioners treated the
.
informant with cruelty. The present petition is an abuse of the
process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
6. I have heard Mr Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr Ganesh Barowalia, learned counsel for
the petitioners, Ms Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate
General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr Vipin Pandit, learned
counsel for respondent No.2/informant.
7. Mr. Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they
were falsely implicated. The contents of the FIR do not show the
commission of any cognizable offence. Learned Magistrate had
himself held that he was taking cognizance and not referring the
matter to the police for investigation. The registration of the FIR
in the present case amounts to an abuse of the process of the
Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the FIR be ordered to be quashed.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
8. Ms Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for respondent No.1/State submitted that the police registered
.
the FIR as per the directions of the learned Magistrate. As per
the investigation conducted by the police, the version of the
informant that she was harassed for dowry was established. The
FIR discloses the commission of a cognizance offence.
Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
9. Mr. Vipin Pandit, learned counsel for respondent
No.2/informant adopted the submissions of Ms. Ayushi Negi,
learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and
submitted that the police are carrying out the investigation. The
present petition is premature and the same should be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. The parameters for exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it
was observed: -
9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and
criminal proceedings has been succinctly summarized by
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Limited (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 452 after
considering the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to
refer to the following observations of this Court in the
.
said case, which read thus:
"12. The principles relating to the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to quash complaints and criminal
proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this
Court in several decisions. To mention a few--
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri)
234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC
335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal
Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri)
1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro
Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri)
1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8
SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT
of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl
Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000)
3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad
Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC
645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical
Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC
122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our
purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out the case alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be
examined as a whole, but without examining the
merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed
inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material
nor an assessment of the reliability or
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is
warranted while examining prayer for quashing a
complaint.
.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a
clear abuse of the process of the court, as when
the criminal proceeding is found to have been
initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking
vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be
used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution.
The power should be used sparingly and with
abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid
in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few
ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of
the complaint is warranted only where the
complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts
which are necessary for making out the offence.
(v.) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a
civil wrong; (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a
civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual dispute,
apart from furnishing a cause of action for
seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a
criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil
proceeding are different from a criminal
proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or
has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash
the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal
offence or not.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
12. Similar is the judgment in Maneesha Yadav v. State of
U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -
.
12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations
of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect
that the power of quashing a criminal
proceeding should be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be
justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to
act according to its whim or caprice."
.
13. A perusal of the record shows that the Court had
specifically noticed in the order dated 19.9.2022 that the
Investigating Officer had already submitted a report stating that
the civil litigations were pending between the parties and no
investigation was to be ordered, hence, the complaint was
treated to be a private complaint. The Court had passed an order
of summoning the accused on 8.6.2023. It had nowhere ordered
that the complaint was to be sent to the police for registration of
the FIR. Hence, the letter written by the learned Trial Court to
the police for treating the same as FIR was without any legal
basis. The record also does not explain how a letter sending the
order to the police was sent.
14. The police had also registered the FIR reproducing
the order of the learned Trial Court summoning the accused for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A
IPC and Section 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. It is difficult to
see how the contents of the order of summoning the accused
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Thus, no FIR
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
could have been registered based on the order passed by the
Court.
.
15. The State has filed a detailed reply stating that it had
taken the material on record and it was found that the
petitioners were harassing the accused. It is not understood how
the police had investigated the allegations, which never showed
the commission of any cognizable offence.
16. The record shows that the learned Trial Court is
seized of the matter. It has treated the application as a private
complaint and ordered the summoning of the accused. In these
circumstances, the registration of the FIR on the same matter on
which the competent Court has taken cognizance and ordered
the issuance of the summons is not justified.
17. In the present case, the registration of the FIR
appears to be the result of some error committed by the
ministerial staff, who forwarded the order of the Court without
any order to do so. The police without verifying whether the
commission of a cognizable offence was disclosed in the order or
not, straightway proceeded to register the FIR and carry out the
investigation. It is trite to say that the FIR can only be registered
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
when the allegations made before the police show the
commission of a cognizable offence and not otherwise. Since in
.
the present case, there were no allegations of the commission of
the cognizable offence and the contents of the order were
confined to the act done by the Court, the FIR could not have
been registered.
18. Therefore, the plea of the petitioners that the
registration of the FIR in the present case was not justified and
the same amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court has to
be accepted as correct.
19. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the
FIR No. 79 of 2023, dated 23.8.2023, for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 506 read with
Section 34 of IPC, registered at Police Station Rekong Peo, Kalpa,
District Kangra, H.P. is ordered to be quashed.
20. The observations made here-in-before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8554 )
21. Registry is directed to send a cop of this judgment
along with complete records to the learned Trail Court
.
forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
16th September, 2024
(Chander)
r to
