Dr. Aarti Chaudhary vs Sree Rama Rao. 1964 2 Llj 150 = Air ...
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                                                                        REPORTABLE

              IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

                        ON THE 1ST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2022

                                          BEFORE




                                                                          .
                      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA





         CIVIL WRIT PETITION (ORIGINAL APPLICATION) NO. 5208 OF 2019
    Between:-





    DR. AARTI CHAUDHARY
    WIFE OF DR. GAURAV KUMAR,
    R/O VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE JASSUR
    TEHSIL NURPUR, DISTRICT KANGRA,
    HIMACHAL PRADESH





                                                                            APPLICANT
    (BY MR. LOKENDER PAUL THAKUR, ADVOCATE)

    AND

    1.

             THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

             THROUGH THE PR. SECRETARY (HEALTH) TO THE
             GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
             SHIMLA.

    2.       THE DIRECTOR HEALTH SERVICES,


             HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    3.       THE CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER,
             KANGRA DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.




                                                                       RESPONDENTS
    (BY MR. NARINDER GULERIA,





    ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
    WITH MR. SUNNY DHATWALIA,
    ASSISTANT ADVOCATE GENERAL)





         This petition coming on for orders this day, the court passed the following:

                                        O R D E R

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with issuance of Notification dated

23.3.2012, Annexure A-1, whereby services of the petitioner came to be

terminated on account of willful absence, petitioner approached erstwhile

Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal by way of OA No. 1482 of 2015,

which now on account of abolishment of learned Tribunal below, stands

transferred to this court and re-registered as CWPOA No. 5208 of 2019

praying therein for following relief

.

"(i) That the impugned Notification dated 23.3.2012 (Annexure A-1) may kindly be quashed and set aside and the applicant be

reinstated into service with all consequential benefits."

2. For having birds' eyes, certain facts relevant for adjudication of the

case at hand, are that the petitioner after having completed MBBS joined as

Medical Officer at Primary Health Centre Khundian under Rogi Kalyan Samiti

on 4.2.2009 on contract basis. However, her services were regularized vide

Himachal Pradesh Government Notification dated 4.1.2012 (Annexure A-2).

Petitioner applied for no objection certificate for appearing in examination

conducted by PGI MER Chandigarh for post graduation. Block Medical Officer

Jawalamukhi, while acceding to the request made by the petitioner, issued no

objection certificate to the petitioner vide letter No. 1363 dated 16.9.2011

(Annexure A-3). Petitioner after selection in PG course in General Surgery

Department in PGI Medical Education and Research Chandigarh, requested

respondent Department for grant of study leave enabling her to pursue higher

studies in MS General Surgery vide letter dated 12.1.2012 (Annexure A-4)

and handed over charge as per rules. Petitioner informed the Department

about her having joined at PGI Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh

vide letter dated 21.1.2012 (Annexure A-5) and requested to grant her study

leave/ Extra Ordinary Leave, as per service norms. However, respondents,

instead of considering the request of petitioner for grant of leave/ Extra

Ordinary Leave., proceeded to terminate her services vide Notification dated

23.3.2012 (Annexure A-1) with effect from 12.1.2012 i.e. from the date, she

allegedly remained absent from duty at her own will and joined new

assignment at PGI MER Chandigarh. Petitioner, vide representation dated

16.4.2012, (Annexure A-6), requested respondents to revoke termination

.

order and reinstate her, however no heed was paid to her request. Petitioner

kept on reminding the respondents by sending reminders to the respondents

to cancel termination order dated 23.3.2012 and in that regard, last reminder

was sent to Additional Chief Secretary (Health) on 22.2.2015 (Annexure A-7).

Office of Additional Chief Secretary (Health) wrote a letter dated 12.11.2014

(Annexure A-8) to respondent No.2 to examine the matter in accordance with

the Rules/Regulations in vogue andd complete proposal in a self contained

note be sent to said office, enabling it to proceed further in the matter

accordingly. Respondent No.2 issued letter dated 11.2.2015 (Annexure A-9)

to Additional Chief Secretary (Health) to consider the case of the petitioner.

3. Interestingly, respondent No.2 apprised Additional Chief Secretary

(Health) vide communication dated 7.3.2015, (Annexure A-10), enclosing

therewith copy of no objection certificate issued by Block Medical Officer,

Jawalamukhi, that the said Block Medical Officer was not competent to grant

no objection certificate to the petitioner, as a consequence of which, request

of the petitioner for revocation of termination was not considered. Being

aggrieved and dissatisfied with aforesaid action of termination of services of

the petitioner, she approached erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative

Tribunal, praying therein for the relief, as reproduced above, on the ground

that once, Block Medical Officer had issued no objection certificate permitting

her to participate in examination of MS General Surgery at PGI MER

Chandigarh, there was no occasion for the Department to deny Extra Ordinary

Leave, enabling petitioner to complete her studies at PGI MER Chandigarh.

Besides above, petitioner also claimed that before issuing termination order,

no opportunity of hearing was ever afforded to her as such, there is violation

.

of principles of natural justice.

4. Pursuant to notices issued in the instant proceedings, respondents filed

reply, wherein factum with regard to petitioner's being appointed on contract

basis at Primary Health Centre Khundian is not disputed. It is also not in

dispute that the petitioner had applied for no objection certificate to Block

Medical Officer Jawalamukhi under whom, she was serving as GDO PHC

Khundian, Kangra. Block Medical Officer, Jawalamukhi, instead of referring

the matter to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, himself proceeded to

grant no objection certificate to the petitioner and thereafter, she started

pursuing her PG course in General Surgery at PGI MER Chandigarh. It is not

in dispute that initially the petitioner was appointed on contact basis under

Rogi Kalyan Samiti and at that particular time, she was working under the

supervision and control of Block Medical Officer, Jawalamukhi. Since the

petitioner had applied for No Objection Certificate for admission in MS

General Surgery as a direct candidate under Rural Area category, but she

was working on contract basis, she applied for No Objection Certificate to the

Block Medical Officer, Jawalamukhi, who, while acceding to the request of the

petitioner, proceeded to grant No Objection Certificate vide letter dated

13.9.2011 (Annexure A-3).

5. After grant of No Objection Certificate, services of the petitioner came

to be regularized vide Notification dated 4.1.2012 (Annexure A-2) issued by

Health and Family Welfare Department. As per aforesaid Notification,

candidate was to remain on probation for a period of two years and his/her

services could be terminated at any time, without issuance of any notice.

Since pursuant to issuance of No Objection Certificate dated 13.9.2011

.

Annexure A-3, petitioner after her being selected at PGI MER Chandigarh,

had joined the PG course and during this period, her services were ordered to

be regularized vide Notification dated 4.1.2012 (Annexure A-2), she applied

for Extraordinary Leave on 12.1.2012 (Annexure A-4). In the aforesaid

communication she apprised the Director Health Services, Government of

Himachal Pradesh that she has qualified the entrance examination of PGI

MER Chandigarh under RA Category on 10.1.2011 in the second round of

counseling. She also informed the aforesaid authority that the Block Medical

Officer, before appearing in the said examination, had granted No Objection

Certificate and as such, she be granted study leave for three years duration

for the Academic Session 2012-2015 to pursue studies at PGI MER

Chandigarh. Interestingly, no reply ever came to be given by authority to the

aforesaid communication as such, petitioner vide communication dated

27.2.2012, (Annexure A-5) again requested Director Health Services,

Himachal Pradesh to grant Extraordinary Leave as per service norms. In the

said communication petitioner apprised the aforesaid authority that she has

joined as Junior Resident under Rural Area category (non sponsored) on

16.1.2012. She claimed that since she is not sponsored by Himachal

Pradesh Government, therefore, her leave can be considered as

Extraordinary Leave as per service norms. Again on 16.4.2012 (Annexure A-

6), petitioner requested Additional Chief Secretary Health to consider her

request for grant of Extraordinary Leave but the matter remained pending and

vide communication dated 23.3.2012 (Annexure A-1), Government of

Himachal Pradesh, without serving any show cause notice upon the

petitioner, proceeded to terminate her service, from the date of her willful

absence from duties, at her own will. Vide communication dated 20.2.2015

.

(Annexure A-7), petitioner requested the Additional Chief Secretary to revoke

her termination. She also enclosed copy of No Objection Certificate issued on

13.9.2011 (Annexure A-3) in her favour by Block Medical Officer

Jawalamukhi. Additional Chief Secretary (Health) though called upon Director

Health Services to explain the position, but he vide communication dated

11.2.2015 (Annexure A-9) apprised Additional Chief Secretary (Health) that

the Block Medical Officer was not competent to grant No Objection Certificate

to the petitioner to appear in MS examination and as such, no action, if any,

ever came to be taken on the request of the petitioner to revoke her

termination.

6. Precisely the case of the respondents, as emerges from the reply and

as has been canvassed by learned Additional Advocate General is that the

Block Medical Officer Jawalamukhi had no authority to issue No Objection

Certificate in favour of the petitioner, permitting her to appear in MS

examination at PGI MER Chandigarh, especially when such permission could

only be granted by the competent authority i.e. Secretary (Health) to the

Government of Himachal Pradesh. Besides above, respondents have also

stated in their reply that since the petitioner had not completed four years

regular service, she was not entitled to be granted No Objection Certificate to

pursue higher studies in PGI MER Chandigarh, being an in-service candidate.

No doubt, while petitioner was granted No Objection Certificate, Annexure A-

3, she was working on contract basis under Rogi Kalyan Samiti under the

supervision and control of Block Medical Officer Jawalamukhi, however, since

the petitioner had applied for No Objection Certificate to the Block Medical

Officer, Jawalamukhi, it was his duty to either have permission from the higher

.

authority or consult whether he is competent to grant No Objection Certificate

to the petitioner permitting her to pursue higher studies at PGI MER

Chandigarh. Factum with regard to competence, if any, of the Block Medical

Officer Jawalamukhi to grant No Objection Certificate may not be in the

knowledge of the petitioner, who otherwise being sincere employee, before

appearing in MS examination at PGI MER Chandigarh, applied for No

Objection Certificate to the authority, under whom she was working. It was the

duty of the Block Medical Officer Jawalamukhi to ascertain before granting No

Objection Certificate, whether he has the authority to issue the same or not.

Once, No Objection Certificate was issued by the official of the Department

under whose supervision and control, petitioner was working, now it does not

lie in the mouth of respondents to say that the No Objection Certificate was

not issued by competent authority. No doubt, immediately after issuance of

No Objection Certificate, services of the petitioner were regularized as such,

she applied for Extraordinary Leave. While making such request, petitioner in

detail apprised the Director Health Services that she has been selected

against Direct Rural Area category, but Director Health Services, instead of

answering aforesaid communication, remained silent till the time, termination

orders were issued on 23.3.2012.

7. If, respondent Department was of the view that the petitioner cannot be

permitted to continue studies in PGI MER Chandigarh, on the strength of No

Objection Certificate issued by Block Medical Officer Jawalamukhi, it ought to

have recalled the petitioner immediately but it straightway, without affording

opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, proceeded to terminate her services,

invoking power under sub-rule 5(1) of CCS(Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.

.

No doubt, at the time, when order of termination was issued, petitioner was on

probation, after being regularized, but that does not mean that no notice was

required to be issued by the respondents, before taking any disciplinary action

against the petitioner. In case, services of the petitioner were to be terminated

on account of her willful absence from duties, she ought to have been issued

show cause notice, calling upon her to explain that why her services be not

terminated on account of willful absence.

8. Interestingly, in the case at hand, petitioner remained absent from

duties for approximately for two months, after being selected in PGI MER

Chandigarh and during this period she had intimated the Department with

regard to her selection and with a request to grant Extraordinary Leave but

the Department, in a most cursory manner and without application of mind

proceeded to terminate services of the petitioner on 23.3.2012, that too

without initiation of disciplinary proceedings.

9. No doubt, the Department could remove any employee during the

period of probation but even for that purpose, notice was required to be

served upon the petitioner, enabling the petitioner to explain her conduct.

Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Raghupathi v. State of U.P., (2022) 6

SCC 346 has held that though nature of employment of employee concerned

may be temporary but his/her services cannot be terminated without following

due procedure of law. In the case before Hon'ble Apex Court, though

petitioner therein was appointed on contractual basis and his services were

terminated on the ground of expiry of contractual period of appointment,

Hon'ble Apex Court having taken note of the fact that the petitioner in that

case was appointed after following due selection process pursuant to

.

advertisement issued inviting applications from all interested candidates,

getting all benefits and allowance as per applicable Rules and terms and

conditions of his service, identical to regularly appointed candidate, ordered

that the Department. before proceeding to issue termination order, ought to

have provided due opportunity of hearing to the person concerned. Hon'ble

Apex Court held as under:

"9. As per the affidavit of the said University, it could thus clearly be seen

that, for every vacant post, the said University publishes an open

advertisement inviting applications from all the interested candidates. It would further show that the appointments are made only after the candidates are selected by the Selection Committee. It is thus clear that though the nomenclature given to the appointment is contractual,

candidates are required to undergo the entire selection process. It could further be seen that as per the affidavit of the said University itself, though the employees are technically appointed on a contractual basis, they get

all the benefits and allowances as per the Rules applicable. The affidavit would further show that even according to the said University, for permanency

in tenure, their terms and conditions of appointment are identical to those of regularly appointed candidates.

10. It is thus clear that the appellant was appointed after he underwent the entire selection process. Even as per the University, though the appointment shows that it is on a contractual basis, for all the purposes, it is on a regular basis. It could thus be seen that even for the appointment on a contractual basis in the said University, a candidate is required to undergo the entire selection process. Though he is appointed on a contractual basis, his terms and conditions are almost like a regular employee. It will be relevant to note that the Annual Performance Assessment Report (for short "APAR") of the appellant during the period 201213 show his performance to be outstanding.

Every other parameter in his APAR is shown as excellent. With regard to his integrity, it is mentioned that there is nothing against the appellant adversely reflecting his integrity. It is further stated in his APAR that he enjoys a good reputation and his integrity is good."

.

10. At this stage, learned Additional Advocate General argued that since

the petitioner was on probation and it was specifically mentioned in her

appointment/regularisation letter that her services can be terminated without

issuing notice and without attracting operation of Art. 311 of the Constitution

of India, there was no requirement for the Department to serve show cause

notice before issuing termination order.

11.

However, this court finds it difficult to agree with the aforesaid

contention of learned Additional Advocate General. Hon'ble Apex Court in

Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 381, has held that

notwithstanding the provisions contained in statutory rules or employment

conditions permitting termination of services of probationers without reason, if

one was discharged on grounds of specific allegations or inefficiency without

proper enquiry and reasonable opportunity of hearing, such an action would

amount to 'removal' from service within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the

Constitution of India.

12. Reliance is placed upon a judgment dated 18.3.2020, rendered by

Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya & Anr., Civil

Appeal No. 8933-8934 of 2017, wherein, while taking note of Shamsher

Singh supra, it has been held as under:

14. The present case is one where the first respondent was a probationer and not a substantive appointee, hence not strictly covered within the umbrella

of Article 311. The purpose of such probation has been noted in Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil v. State of Karnataka4:

"25. The purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities

.

to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and performance of an officer under

probation. ..."

15. Similarly, in Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand5 it was

opined:

"... A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way

of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. ..."

16. It is thus clear that the entire objective of probation is to provide the employer an opportunity to evaluate the probationer's performance and test his suitability for a particular post. Such an exercise is a necessary part of the process of recruitment, and must not be treated lightly. Written tests and

interviews are only attempts to predict a candidate's possibility of success at a particular job. The true test of suitability is actual performance of duties which can only be applied after the candidate joins and starts working.

17. Such an exercise undoubtedly is subjective, therefore, Respondent No.1's

contention that confirmation of probationers must be based only on objective material is farfetched. Although quantitative parameters are ostensibly fair, but they by themselves are imperfect indicators of future performance.

Qualitative assessment and a holistic analysis of non quantifiable factors are indeed necessary. Merely because Respondent No. 1's ACRs were consistently marked 'Good', it cannot be a ground to bestow him with a right to continue in service.

18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental, difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet there has to be a difference in judicial approach between the two. Whereas in the case of

a confirmed employee the scope of judicial interference would be more expansive given the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution or the Service Rules but such may not be true in the case of probationers who are denuded of such protection(s) while working on trial basis.

.

19. Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until

confirmed, and they can be relieved by the competent authority if found unsuitable. Its only in a very limited category of cases that such probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are

'removed' in a manner which prejudices their future prospects in alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character or violates their constitutional rights. In such cases of 'stigmatic' removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sinequanon. Way back in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of

India 6, a Constitution Bench opined that:

"28.... In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil

consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the

Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a

punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with."

13. Though, in the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that

probationer has no right to continue in employment until confirmed and he/she

can be relieved by the competent Authority, if found unsuitable but, it also

held that probationer can seek protection under the principles of natural

justice, when, he/she is removed on account of misconduct and his/her

removal may prejudice his/her future prospects.

14. Thus, in the case at hand also, where services of the petitioner have

been terminated not in ordinary course of probation but on the ground of

'willful absence from duties', which allegation amounts to misconduct and may

debar the petitioner from being employed in public office, due to nature of

allegations of misconduct, as such, it was necessary for the respondents to

comply with the principles of natural justice, having not done so, thus, the

action of the respondents in terminating the services of the petitioner, is not

sustainable in law.

.

15. True it is that High Court, while exercising power under Art. 226 of

Constitution of India, would not normally interfere with the finding recorded in

enquiry but if the findings of 'guilt' are based on no evidence, It would be a

perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. The power of

judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the

Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere

with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the

findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached

by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the

dictate of the superior authority. Reliance is placed upon judgment rendered

by Hon'ble Apex Court in Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner Of Police,

(1999) 2 SCC 10, wherein, it has been held as under:

"The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on

record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of the that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra

Pradesh vs. Sree Rama Rao. 1964 2 LLJ 150 = AIR 1963 SC 1723 = 1964 (3) SCR 25, in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India vs. Prakash Chand Jain, 1969 2 LLJ 377 (SC) = AIR 1969 SC 983 and Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors. 1976 Labour & Industrial Cases 4 (SC) = AIR 1976 SC 98 = 1976 (2) SCR 280 = (1976) 1 SCC 518. In Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others. AIR 1984 SC 1805 = 1985 (1) SCR 866 = (1984) 4 SCC 635, it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his

mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.

Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.

.

A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse, But if there is some evidence

on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."

16. It is quite apparent from law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court that

normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of

fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no

evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial

scrutiny.

17. In the case at had, what to talk about disciplinary proceedings, if any,

initiated before awarding penalty of dismissal, even no notice before passing

of termination order ever came to be issued to the petitioner, who otherwise,

before joining PG course at PGI MER Chandigarh had duly informed her

immediate officer, i.e. Block Medical Officer Jawalamukhi, who himself taking

note of request of the petitioner, granted No Objection Certificate, enabling

petitioner to appear in MS examination at PGI MER Chandigarh.

18. Interestingly, in the case at hand, petitioner, who at no point of time

was at fault, repeatedly apprised the Department with regard to her having

been granted No Objection Certificate by Block Medical Officer Jawalamukhi

and her having joined at PGI MER Chandigarh but yet the Department instead

of considering her request for grant of Extraordinary Leave/study leave,

proceeded to pass termination order, without opportunity of hearing to her,

which action of the respondents cannot be said to be justifiable.

19. As has been observed herein above, if the department was of the view

.

that the Block Medical Officer was not competent to issue No Objection

Certificate it could recall the petitioner to join duties in the Department, but

definitely, without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner,

respondents could not pass termination order, which if allowed to sustain,

would amount to violation of principles of natural justice.

20. Since in the case at hand, it stands established on record that initial

appointment of the petitioner on contract basis was strictly as per Recruitment

and Promotion Rules, for the post of General Duty Officer in the Health and

Family Welfare Department and her services were regularized in consultation

with Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, she was necessarily

required to be equated with the regularly appointed General Duty Officers in

the Department. If it so, she was required to be dealt with in accordance with

law.

21. Once services of petitioner stood regularized before the same being

terminated, it was obligatory for the Department to initiate disciplinary

proceedings against her before imposition of penalty.

22. In the reply, respondents have claimed that since the petitioner had not

completed four years regular service, she was not entitled to be granted No

Objection Certificate enabling her to pursue higher studies at PGI MER

Chandigarh but petitioner, in rejoinder, has placed on record details of

doctors, who had not completed four years regular service but were not only

granted No Objection Certificate to pursue higher studies but were also

granted Extraordinary Leave (Annexure A-11). No sur-rejoinder/response to

said documents ever came to be placed on record by the respondents, as

such, said fact stands duly established on record. Since similarly situate

.

persons Anilesh Thakur, Sofia, Pram Chand, Duni Chand, who had not

completed four years, were granted Extraordinary Leave, enabling them to

pursue higher studies, Department ought not have made any discrimination,

while considering case of petitioner for grant of Extraordinary Leave. Action

taken by respondents in terminating services of the petitioner, is without any

authority of law and cannot be allowed to sustain in law, especially, when

similarly situate persons, who had not completed 4 years, were granted

Extraordinary Leave by the Department enabling them to complete their

studies.

23. In view of above, this court finds merit in the petition and same is

allowed. Order dated 23.3.2012 Annexure A-1, whereby services of the

petitioner were terminated, is quashed and set aside and respondents are

directed to reinstate the petitioner in service, alongwith seniority and continuity

in service, without any back wages, immediately.

24. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms alongwith all

pending applications.

(Sandeep Sharma), Judge November 1, 2022 (vikrant)