Himachal Pradesh High Court
Vikas Gupta vs "10. Accordingly on 17 December, 2021
Bench: Satyen Vaidya
REPORTABLE/NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
ON THE 17th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2021
.
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SATYEN VAIDYA.
CIVIL WRIT PETITION No. 3743 OF 2021 ALONGWITH
CONNECTED MATTERS.
Between:-
1. VIKAS GUPTA, AGED 48 YEARS, S/O SH. S.P.GUPTA,
RESIDENT OF WARD NO. 6, TATILA MOHALLA, VPO &
TEHSIL ARKI, DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P. PRESENTLY
WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT DIET, SOLAN,
DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
2. AMIT JOSHI, AGED 47 YEARS, S/O LATE SH.
SURESH CHAND JOSHI, RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO.
192, ANAND VIHAR COLONY, SAPROON, DISTRICT
SOLAN, H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR
ENGINEER AT DIET, EDUCATION BLOCK,
KANDAGHAT, DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
3. DHAWAN KUMAR, AGED 41 YEARS, S/O SH. ROOP
LAL, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE SARSKAN, P.O. BAROTI,
TEHSIL DHARAMPUR, DISTRICT MANDI, HP.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
EDUCATION BLOCK ARKI, DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
4. PARKASH CHAND, AGED 47 YEARS, S/O LATE SH.
HET RAM, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE GANEYOG, P.O.
NEHRA, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT SHIMLA, PRESENTLY
WORKING AS DRAUGHTSMAN CIVIL AT DIET, SOLAN,
DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
5. KULDEEP RAJ, AGED 46 YEARS, S/O SH. BODH RAJ,
RESIDENT OF VILLAGE ANSOLI, POST OFFICE
NATAUR, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
DIET, KANGRA, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
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6. BRIJ MOHAN, AGED 50 YEARS, S/O LATE SH. DHANI
RAM SHARMA, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE LOWER
DOBH, TEHSIL SHAHPUR, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
EDUCATION BLOCK RAIT, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
.
7. MRS. BANDNA, AGED 47 YEARS, D/O SH. DESH RAJ,
RESIDENT OF VPO & TEHSIL NAGROTA BAGWAN,
DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS
JUNIOR ENGINEER AT EDUCATION BLOCK
DHARAMSHALA, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
8. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA, AGED 45 YEARS, S/O SH.
R.D. SHARMA, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE ANSOLI, P.O.
MATOUR, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
EDUCATION BLOCK NAGROTA BAGWAN, DISTRICT
KANGRA, H.P.
9. BALVINDER KUMAR, AGED 57 YEARS, S/O SH.
CHANDER PRAKASH, RESIDENT OF V&PO NANDPUR
BHATOLI, TEHSIL HARIPUR, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
EDUCATION BLOCK PRAGPUR, DISTRICT KANGRA,
H.P.
10. AVTAR SINGH, AGED 44 YEARS, S/O SH. RAN SINGH,
RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE AMLELA,
TEHSIL JAWALI, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK NAGROTA
SURIAN, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
11. SHAKTI KUMAR, AGED 50 YEARS, S/O SH. BUA
DITTA, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE SNOUR, POST
OFFICE INDORA, TEHSIL INDORA, DISTRICT
KANGRA, H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR
ENGINEER IN DEVELOPMENT BLOCK INDORA,
DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
12. RAJEEV PRAKASH KAUSHAL, AGED 48 YEARS, S/O
SH. PREM PRAKASH SHARMA, RESIDENT OF WARD
NO. 6, NEAR BUS STAND CHOWARI, VPO CHOWARI,
TEHSIL BHATIYAT, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK NURPUR,
DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
13. ANIL KUMAR, AGED 39 YEARS, S/O SH. OM
PRAKASH, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
ICHHI, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
BAIJNATH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK,
BAIJNATH, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
14. CHARAN SINGH, AGED 37 YEARS, S/O SH. GULWANT
SINGH, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
BILASPUR, TEHSIL DEHRA, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK DEHRA
GOPIPUR, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
15. NARESH KUMAR, AGED 53 YEARS, S/O LATE SH.
AMI CHAND, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST
OFFICE SIMNI, SUB TEHSIL BHALIE, DISTRICT
CHAMBA, H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR
ENGINEER AT BRCC OFFICE, CHAMBA, DISTRICT
CHAMBA, H.P.
16. VIJAY KUMAR, AGED 42 YEARS, S/O SH. JAI RAM,
RESIDENT OF VILLAGE LADOH (DALIP NAGAR) POST
OFFICE PANCHRUKHI, TEHSIL PALAMPUR, DISTRICT
KANGRA, H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR
ENGINEER AT BRCC OFFICE, PANCHRUKHI,
DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
17. PAWAN KUMAR, AGED 49 YEARS, S/O SH. SANSAR
CHAND, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DEVI DEHRA, P.O.
BATHRI, TEHSIL DALHOUSIE, DISTRICT CHAMBA,
H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
BRCC OFFICE, SALOONI, DEVELOPMENT BLOCK
SALOONI, D.P.E.P., CHAMBA, DISTRICT CHAMBA,
H.P.
18. RAM KRISHAN, AGED 49 YEARS, S/O LATE SH.
UDHO RAM, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND P.O.
MUMTA, TEHSIL NAGROTA BAGWAN, DISTRICT
KANGRA, H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR
ENGINEER AT DIET, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA,
H.P.
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19. RAJIV SONI, AGED 51 YEARS, S/O LATE SH. BALDEV
SONI, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND P.O. BANIKHET,
TEHSIL DALHOUSIE, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT C.
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK, CHOWARI, TEHSIL BHATIAT,
.
DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
20. ARUN SINGH, AGED 48 YEARS, S/O SH. CHATTAR
SINGH, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BARENJAL, PO.
BHALEI, TEHSIL SALOONI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS DRAFTSMAN (CIVIL) AT
DPO OFFICE DIET-SARU, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
21. DIMPLE SOOD, AGED 48 YEARS, S/O LATE SH. PRAN
KRISHAN SOOD, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BADGWAR,
P.O. BHAWARNA, NEAR STATE BANK OF INDIA
BHAWARNA, TEHSIL PALAMPUR, DISTRICT KANGRA,
H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
BRCC OFFICE SULLAHAL BHEDU-MAHADEV, DISTICT
CHAMBA, H.P.
22. JAI NARAIN PARKASH, AGED 56 YEARS, S/O LATE
SH. KANSHI RAM, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND P.O.
SAROL, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER AT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK MEHLA,
DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
...PETITIONERS
(BY MR. ADARSH K. VASHISTA, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH THROUGH ITS
CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171002.
2. H.P. SCHOOL EDUCATION SOCIETY THROUGH ITS
CHAIRMAN, ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
(EDUCATION) TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL
PRADESH, H.P. SECRETARIAT, SHIMLA-171002.
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3. ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY (PWD) TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-
171002.
4. MISSION DIRECTOR, SARVA SHIKSHA ABHIYAN,
GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH-CUM-
.
DIRECTOR, ELEMENTARY EDUCATION,
DIRECTORATE OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION,
SHIMLA-171001.
....RESPONDENTS.
(MR. RAJINDER DOGRA, SENIOR ADDITIONAL
ADVOCATE GENERAL, FOR THE RESPONDENTS.).
CWP NO. 1339 OF 2021.
BETWEEN: r
1. RAVINDER KUMAR, AGED 48 YEARS, S/O SH. BANSI
DHAR, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BARLI, POST OFFICE
AND TEHSIL SALOONI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS LECTURER IN PLANNING &
MANAGEMENT AT DIET, KANGRA AT
DHARAMSHALA, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
2. RAJ SINGH KAPOOR, AGED 50 YEARS, S/O LATE SH.
PRAHALAD SINGH KAPOOR, RESIDENT OF KAPOOR
COTTAGE, SINTRU COLONY, POST OFFICE
CHOWARI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P. PRESENTLY
WORKING AS LECTURER AT DIET - KANGRA AT
DHARAMSHALA.
3. MANOJ KUMAR, AGED 50 YEARS, S/O LATE SH GIAN
CHAND, RESIDENT OF V&PO KOTI, TEHSIL AND
DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P. PRESENTLY WORKING AS
CLERK AT DIET, CHAMBA, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
4. RATTAN CHAND, AGED 44 YEARS, S/O SH. BHEEM
SINGH, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE TOGA, POST OFFICE
ATHER, TEHSIL SALOONI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS CLERK AT DIET CHAMBA,
DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
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5. RAKESH KUMAR, AGED 45 YEARS, S/O SH. SHAKTI
PRASHAD, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE KUPARA, P.O.
SARCOW, TEHSIL BHARMOUR, DISTRICT CHAMBA,
H.P. WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC, BHARMOUR,
DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
.
6. GILLU RAM, AGED 45 YEARS, S/O SH. KHINKHER
RAM, RESIDENT OF VPO CHOBIA, TEHSIL
BHARMOUR, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P. PRESENTLY
WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC OFFICE, MEHLA,
DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
7. SARDAR SINGH, AGED 54 YEAR, S/O SH. RUMAL
SINGH, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE GAGAHAR, P.O.
RAIPUR, TEHSIL BHATIYAT, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC
CHOWARI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
8. DEVI CHAND, AGED 50 YEARS, S/O SH. KRISHAN
LAL, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE JUDDA, P.O.SIDOTH,
TEHSIL CHURAH, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC OFFICE,
TISSA, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
9. DEV PRAKASH, AGED 52 YEARS, S/O SH. MOHANU
RAM, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE JHAKRAL, P.O. KILOR,
TEHSIL SALOONI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC OFFICE,
SALOONI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
10. PAWAN KUMAR, AGED 49 YEARS, S/O SH. CHAND
RAM, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BEHROG, P.O.
DIGHAIE, TEHSIL SALOONI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC OFFICE,
SALOONI, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
11. MS. BHUVAN KUMARI, AGED 43 YEARS, D/O SH.
DEVINDER PURI, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE KATHANNA,
P.O. LUDDU, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
PRESENTLY WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC OFFICE,
CHAMBA, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
12. MADAN LAL, AGED 44 YEARS, S/O SH. GODHAN
RAM, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE SANCHUIN, P.O. AND
TEHSIL BHARMOUR, DISTRICT CHAMBA,
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PRESENTLY WORKING AS CLERK AT BRCC OFFICE,
BHARMOUR, DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SH. ADARSH K. VASHISTA, ADVOCATE)
.
AND
1. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH THROUGH ITS
CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171002.
2. H.P. SCHOOL EDUCATION SOCIETY THROUGH ITS
CHAIRMAN, ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
(EDUCATION) TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL
PRADESH, H.P. SECRETARIAT, SHIMLA-171002.
3. ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY (PWD) TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-
171002.
4. MISSION DIRECTOR, SARVA SHIKSHA ABHIYAN,
GOVERNMENT
r OF HIMACHAL PRADESH-CUM-
DIRECTOR, ELEMENTARY EDUCATION,
DIRECTORATE OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION,
SHIMLA-171001.
....RESPONDENTS.
(MR. RAJINDER DOGRA, SENIOR ADDITIONAL
ADVOCATE GENERAL, FOR THE RESPONDENTS.).
CWP NO. 1755 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
1. NIRMAL KUMAR SON OF SH. RAJINDER KUMAR,
AGED 45 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE SAIN,
POST OFFICE SURAJPUR BARI, TEHSIL
SARKAGHAT, DISTRICT MANDI, H.P.
2. HARISH KUMAR SHARMA SON OF SH. GANGA RAM
SHARMA, AGED 40 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VED
MATA GAYATRI NIWAS, VILLAGE AND POST
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OFFICE RATTI, TEHSIL BALH, DISTRICT MANDI,
H.P.
3. SAMEER GOEL SON OF SH. CHANDERMANI AGED
42 YEARS, RESIDENT OF NEAR BDO OFFICE
SADAR, BHIULI, TEHSIL SADAR, DISTRICT MANDI,
.
H.P.
4. RAMESH LAL SON OF SH. BHIM SEN, AGED 42
YEAR, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE SHILLING, POST
OFFICE MOORING, TEHSIL UDAIPUR, DISTRICT
LAHAUL AND SPITI, H.P.
5. VINOD KUMAR SON OF SH. JAI RAM, AGED 50
YEARS, VILLAGE KOTHI POST OFFICE DELGI,
TEHSIL KANDAGHAT, DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
6. JAGDISH CHAND SON OF SH. NAIYA RAM,
RESIDENT OF VILLAGE KHOD, POST OFFICE
JARAG, TEHSIL DADAHU, DISTRICT SIRMAUR,
H.P.
7. HEM LATA WIFE OF SH. BHAG SINGH, AGED 50
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
BANJAR, DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
8. KIRNA DEVI WIFE OF RAMAL SHARMA, AGED 50
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE GHANDINAGAR,
POST IFFICE TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
9. SURESH KUMAR SON OF SH. SATYA NAND, AGED
53 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE SARLI, POST
OFFICE DALASH, TEHSIL ANNI, DISTRICT KULLU,
H.P.
10. KUSUM LATA WIFE OF SH. MADAN LAL, AGED 46
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
KAIS, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
11. KIRAN BALA WIFE OF SH. PRATAP SINGH, AGED
49 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE TALOGI, POST
OFFICE PUID, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
12. KAMLA DEVI WIFE OF SH. TSERING NORBU, AGED
52 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BADA BUIN,
POST OFFICE AND TEHSIL BHUNTER, DISTRICT
KULLU, H.P.
13. DURGA DEVI WIFE FO SH. CHATTER SINGH, AGED
48 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST
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OFFICE MOHAL, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KULLU,
H.P.
14. CHAMAN LAL SON OF SH. TEKU RAM, AGED 49
YEARS, RESIDNT OF VILLAGE BADAH, POST
OFFICE MOHAL, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KULLU,
.
H.P.
15. YOG DUTT SHARMA SON OF SH. PURAN CHAND
SHARMA, AGED 48 YEARS, RESIDENT OF BADAH,
POST OFFICE MOHAL, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT
KULLU H.P.
16. MOHINDER PAL SON OF SH. KULDEEP CHAND,
AGED 44 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BARI
LANJ, POST OFFICE URTOO, TEHSIL NIRMAND,
DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
17. DHANI RAM SON OF BAHADAR SINGH, AGED 55
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE MANDLI, POST
OFFICE AND TEHSIL, BANJAR, DISTRICT KULLU,
H.P.
18. RAVINDER KUMAR SON OF SH. RAMESH KUMAR,
AGED 38 YEARS RESIDENT OF BHARECH, POST
OFFICE JUNGA, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT, SHIMLA,
H.P.
19. OM PARKASH SAINI SON OF SH. PREM SINGH
SAINI, AGED 50 YEARS, RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO.
235/08, KAHAR GALI, RANITAL, NAHAN, DISTRICT
SIRMAUR, H.P.
20. JAI RAJ SINGH SON OF SH. DEV RAJ SINGH, AGED
48 YEARS, RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO. 222/12,
KATCHA TANK, NAHAN, DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
21. LAL SINGH SON OF SHRI DHYAN SINGH, AGED 47
YEARS, RESIENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
SHARLI MANPUR, TEHSIL PAONTA SAHIB,
DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
22. AMIT BAKSHI SON OF SHRI CHANDER BAKSHI,
AGED 46 YEARS, RESIDENT FO NEAR MAHIMA
LIBRARY, VILLA, NAHAN, DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
23. DEVENDER SINGH SON OF SH. MOHI RAM
PUNDIR, AGED 49 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE
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KOOL, POST OFFICE GHANDURI, TEHSIL
SANGRAH, DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
24. SHIWANI GUPTA, DAUGHTER OF SH. RAM KUMAR,
AGED 42 YEARS, RESIDENT OF BARA CHOWK,
NAHAN, DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
.
25. LAL CHAND SON OF SH. KAILASH CHAND, AGED
42 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE KOON, POST
OFFICE SHAMBHUWALA, TEHSIL NAHAN,
DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
26. JAGPAL SINGH SON OF SH. BAHADUR SINGH,
AGED 41 YEARS, VILLAGE DURECH, POST
OFFFICE KIYARI GHUNDHA, TEHSIL SHILLAI,
DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
27. RAJENDER KUMAR SON OF SH. MOHI RAM, AGED
45 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE PHOTA
MANAL, POST OFFICE GAWALI, TEHSIL SHILLAI,
DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
28. MUNISH KUMAR SON OF SH. JAI GOPAL SHARMA,
AGED 49 YEARS, RESIDENT OF NEAR RANI TAL
GATE, NAHAN, DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P.
29. ANJU DEVI DAUGHTER OF SOM DEV, AGE 49
YEARS, VILLAGE THORANG, POST OFFICE
GONDHLA, TEHSIL LAHOUL, DISTRICT LAHAUL
SPITI, HIMACHAL PRADESH.
30. PHUNCHOG DOLMA DAUGHTER OF TASHI
TANDUP, AGE 48 YEARS, VILLAGE AND POST
OFFICE LOSSAR, TEHSIL SPITI, DISTRICT LAHOUL
SPITI, H.P.
31. NAWANG ZANGMO DAUGHTER OF SOM DEV, AGED
49 YEARS, VILLAGE THORANG, POST OFFICE
GONDHLA, TEHSIL LAHOUL, DISTICT LAHOUL
SPITI, H.P.
32. PREM CHAND SON OF DHANI RAM, AGE 52 YEARS,
VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE JOBRANG, TEHSIL
LAHOUL, DISTRICT LAHOUL SPITI H.P.
33. LABZANG PALDAN SON OF SONAM TOBGE, AGE 49
YEARS, VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE LALUNG,
TEHSIL SPITI, DISTRICT LAHOUL SPITI, H.P.
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34. ASHWANI KUMAR SON OF TILAK RAJ, AGE 51
YEARS, VILLAGE JABAL JHAMROT, POST OFFICE
KOTI, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
.....Petitioners
(BY MR. VIJAY CHAUDHARY, ADVOCATE)
.
AND
1. STATE OF H.P. THROUGH ITS CHIEF
SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF H.P.
SHIMLA-2.
2. ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECETARY (EDUCATION) TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF H.P., SHIMLA-2.
3. DIRECTOR HIGHER EDUCATION, HIMACHAL
PRADESH, SHIMLA-1.
4. HIMACHAL PRADESH SCHOOL EDUCATION
SOCIETY THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN-CUM-
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY (EDUCATION) TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF H.P.SHIMLA-2.
5. STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR, SARVA SHIKSHA
ABHIYAN, HIMACHAL PRADESH SCHOOL
EDUCATION SOCIETY, SHIMLA-1.
.........RESPONDENTS
(MR. RAJINDER DOGRA, SENIOR ADDITIONAL
ADVOCATE GENERAL, FOR THE RESPONDENTS.).
CWP NO. 1756 OF 2021.
BETWEEN:
1. NISHANT SHARMA SON OF SH. SEWAK RAM
SHARMA, AGED 34 YEARS, RESIDETN OF VILLAGE
AND POST OFFICE KANAID, TEHSIL SUNDERNAGAR,
DISTRICT MANDI, H.P.
2. NAVEEN KUMAR SON OF LATE INDER SINGH, AGED
51 YEARS, RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO. 218/4, SUHARA
MOHALLA, TEHSI SADAR, DISTRICT MANDI, H.P.
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3. KAMLESH KUMAR VERMA SON OF SHRI KRISHAN
CHAND, AGED 49 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE
BANDAL, POST OFFICE KHUDA, TEHSIL
SARKAGHAT, DISTRICT MANDI, H.P.
4. HEM LATA WIFE FO SHRI PRADEEP SEN, AGED 43
.
YEARS, VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE TALYAHAR,
TEHSIL AND DISTRICT MANDI, H.P.
5. HARJIT SINGH SON OF SH. GURNAM SINGH, AGED
42 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE ABHIPUR, POST
OFFICE KALI BARI, TEHSIL NALAGARH, DISTRICT
SOLAN, H.P.
6. RAJEEV KUMAR SON OF SHRI SIKANDER LAL, AGED
33 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE GARA, POST
OFFICE SWAHAN, TEHSIL SRI NAINA DEVI JI,
DISTRICT BILASPUR, H.P.
7. BAHGAT RAM SON OF SH. SHOBHU RAM, AGED 40
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE KHILAHAR, POST
OFFICE BHARANOO, TEHSIL NERWA, DISTRICT
SHIMLA, H.P.
8. HEM RAJ SON OF SH. VINU RAM, AGED 48 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE BHUTTI,
TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
9. JAGDISH SINGH SON OF SH. PUNE RAM, AGED 48
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
BHALYANI, TEHSIL, AND DISTRICT, KULLU, H.P.
10. SAHA DEV SON OF SH. KALU RAM, AGED 49 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF NEAR ACADEMIC HILL PUBLIC
SCHOOL, GADAURI, POST OFFICE SHAMSHI, TEHSIL
BHUNTER, DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
11. KAMLESH SON OF SH. HIRA SINGH, AGED 50 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF VILLAAGE LANJ, POST OFFICE URTU,
TEHSIL NIRMAND, DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
12. KHEM RAJ SON OF SH. TULSI RAM, AGED 52 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF VILLAG RENH, POST OFFICE BANOGI,
SUB TEHSIL SAINJ, DISTRICT KULLU, H.P.
13. PARTAP SINGH SON OF SHRI KALTOO RAM, AGED
50 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE KAMAND, POST
OFFICE BHUTTI, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT, KULLU H.P.
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14. VIJAY SHUSHAN, SON OF SH. BUDH RAM, AGED 54
YEARS, RESIDNT OF VILLAGE PRIRDI, POST
OFFICEN MOHAL, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT, KULLU
H.P.
15. DEEPAK SHARMA SON OF SHRI PREM NATH
.
SHARMA, AGED 50 YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAG
AND POST OFFICE BATHRI, TEHSIL DALHOUSIE,
DISTRICT CHAMBA, H.P.
16. MOHAN SINGH SON OF SH. MELTHU RAM, AGED 48
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
KOTI BOUNCH, TEHSIL SHILLAI, DISTRICT
SIRMAUR, H.P.
17. JASWANT KUMAR SON OF SH. SANT RAM, AGED 49
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE POPLI WALA, POST
OFFICE PURUWALA, TEHSIL PAONTA SAHIB,
DISTRICT SIRMAUR, H.P
18. MEHMA NAND SON OF SH. ROOP SINGH, AGED 50
YEARS, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE AND POST OFFICE
RAJANA, TEHSIL SANGRAH, DISTRICT SIRMAUR,
H.P.
19. TAPENDER SINGH SON OF SH. BALWANT SINGH,
AGED 53 YEARS, RESIDENT FO VILLAGE AND POST
OFFICE KOLAR, TEHSIL NAHAN DISTRICT SIRMAUR,
H.P.
20. PREM JEET LAL, SHRI CHHIME DAWA, AGED 56
YEARS, VILLAGE GOHARMAN, POST OFFICE
JAHALMAN, TEHSIL LAHOUL, DISTRICT LAHOUL
AND SPITI, H.P.
........PETITIONERS
(BY MR. VIJAY CHAUDHARY, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF H.P. THROUGH ITS CHIEF SECRETARY TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF H.P., SHIMLA-2.
2. ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECETARY (EDUCATION) TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF H.P., SHIMLA-2.
::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:27:12 :::CIS
14
3. HIMACHAL PRADESH SCHOOL EDUCATION SOCIETY
THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN-CUM-PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
(EDUCATION) TO THE GOVERNMENT OF H.P.SHIMLA-2.
4. STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR, SARVA SHIKSHA
.
ABHIYAN, HIMACHAL PRADESH SCHOOL EDUCATION
SOCIETY, SHIMLA-1.
..............RESPONDENTS
(MR. RAJINDER DOGRA, SENIOR ADDITIONAL
ADVOCATE GENERAL, FOR THE RESPONDENTS.).
RESERVED ON: 10.12.2021.
DECIDED ON: 17.12.2021.
_____________________________________________________________
All these petitions coming on for hearing this day, the
Court, passed the following:
ORDER
Since all these petitions involve common question of
law and facts, therefore, these have been heard and are
being decided together by a common judgment.
2. The substantive reliefs as prayed in these petitions
commonly are as under:
"(I) A Writ in the nature of Certiorari may kindly be issued
for quashing the condition incorporated in order, dated
16.12.2020, Annexure P-8 to the effect that "The services
of the employees of the Society would stand
automatically dispensed with and they will not be
considered for taking over in Government Departments."
(II) That the order dated 16.12.2020 (Annexure P-12) may
kindly be modified and the respondents may kindly be
.
directed to regularize the services of the petitioners after
completion of the requisite years of services as per their
date of joining on contract basis, as per the Government
Policy prevailing at the relevant time along with all
consequential benefits of seniority, increments,
allowances and arrears of pay."
3.
Petitioners in CWP Nos. 1756 and 3743 of 2021 are
the technical staff (Junior Engineers, Assistant Engineers
and Draftsman), whereas, petitioners in CWP Nos. 1339 and
1755 of 2021 were non-technical staff (Lecturers,
Accountants, Data Entry Operators, Clerks and Peons)
employed with Himachal Pradesh School Education Society
(HPSES). The HPSES was formed in 1995 initially to
implement District Primary Education Programme (DPEP)
and later programmes/projects such as Sarva Shiksha
Abhiyan (SSA), Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan
(RMSA) and currently "Samgra Shiksha". The above noted
holistic programmes/ projects have been launched from time
to time to focus on provision of basic quality School
education to all in mission mode.
4. Initial recruitment of all the petitioners was on
.
contract basis in HPSES under DPEP or SSA as the case
may be. Petitioners continued to be contract employees of
HPSES till their regularization on 16.12.2020. Before their
regularization, as noticed above, majority of the petitioners
have continuously served on contract basis for more than 20
years. Petitioners are now aged in the range of 40 to 56
years.
5. The State Government for the last many years has
adopted mode of recruiting the personnel to be employed in
its various departments either on temporary/ad-hoc basis or
on contract basis, notwithstanding the fact that their
requirement was predictably permanent. Therefore, the State
Government, from time to time, has come up with various
Schemes/Policies whereunder services of such
temporary/ad-hoc/contract employees have been
regularised after a specific period of time ranging from 3
years to 10 years.
6. Petitioners also raised the demand for their
regularization on completion of continuous and
uninterrupted services of more than 8 years. They claimed
.
that ever-since their employment on contract basis, they had
been discharging the duties assigned to them to the
satisfaction of their superiors and nothing adverse had been
conveyed against them regarding performance of the duties.
Seeking parity, with contract employees in other
departments of the State Government, whose services were
regularised, from time to time, petitioners raised their claim.
Petitioners had also sought parity with EGS Instructors
(Teachers), who were appointed under the Education
Guarantee Scheme in SSA and had been permanently
absorbed in the Education Department as "Gramin Vidya
Upasaks" i.e. teachers in the Government Primary Schools
after having worked there for only four years.
7. The Executive Committee of HPSES on 23.02.2012
resolved to grant regular pay scale to its contractual
employees including petitioner. Vide office order dated April,
2012, the employees who had completed 8 years of service
as on 31.3.2010 and 31.3.2011, respectively, were granted
revised contractual remuneration at par with the
Government employees in other departments, thus the
.
petitioners also availed the said benefit.
8. Vide letter dated 24.10.2011, the State Project
Director had apprised the Chairman of the Governing Body
of HPSES i.e. the Hon'ble Chief Minister that the services of
the contractual employees could be considered for
regularization since the HPSES was a sister wing of the
Education Department. The matter pertaining to
regularisation of the services of petitioners, however,
attracted least priority.
9. Aggrieved against non-fulfilment of their demands,
some of the petitioners approached this Court by way of
CWP No. 6275 of 2012 titled Sanjay Gharu and others vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh and others and CWP No. 1497 of
2012 titled Tilak Chand Sharma vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh and others. These petitions came to be decided by
learned Single Judge of this Court vide common judgment
dated 16.10.2014 in the following terms:
"10. Accordingly, in view of the observations and
analysis made hereinabove, both the writ petitions are
allowed and the respondents are directed to regularize
the services of the petitioners from the date when they
have completed eight years of service with all
.
consequential benefits within a period of three months
from today. Pending application(s), if any, also stand
disposed of. No orders as to costs."
10. Respondents-State assailed the aforesaid judgment
in LPA No. 66 of 2015. However, in the meantime, the State
Government took a conscious decision to merge the
technical staff of HPSES in HP PWD and I&PH Department.
The relevant communication dated 26.9.2017 in that regard
from Mission Director (SSA)-cum Director Elementary
Education, Himachal Pradesh to the Engineer-in-Chief
(PWD), which reads as under:
"No. HPSES(SSA/RMSA) HO-Vl.II-7395
OFFICE OF THE STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR
SSA/PMSA H.P. SCHOOL EDUCATION SOCIETY,
DPEP BHAWAN LAL PANI, SHIMLA-171001.
Dated: 26/09/17
To
The Engineer-in-Chief (PWD)
Nirman Bhawan, Nigam Vihar,
Shimla - 171 002.
Subject: Regarding merger of technical staff (Civil Engineers
and Draftsmen) of HPSES Employees in HPPWD and
IPH Department in view of the Hon'ble High Court
order.
Sir,
With reference to letter dated 22.09.2017, on the
subject noted above, matter regarding merger of technical
staff of Himachal Pradesh School Education Society (HPSES)
in HPPWD and I&PH has been approved by the Council of
Ministers in its meeting held on 18.09.2017. Accordingly, as
.
per the ratio approved by the Council of Ministers, 60% of
total employees are to be merged in PWD Department.
You are, therefore, requested to do the needful as
per the list enclosed. It is further apprised that these
employees are being paid pay scales equivalent to regular
employees of Government Department as per Annexure-A, B
and C.
It is also brought to your kind notice that the
Council of Ministers has further approved that one
Assistant Engineer and 18 Junior Engineers after merging
in PWD Department as per list enclosed as Annexure 'D' be
deputed in HPSES (SSA) on secondment basis to supervise
ongoing works of the department of Education. Therefore,
necessary action may please be taken at your end at the
earliest please.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
Encls: As above. Mission Director (SSA)-cum-Director
Elementary Education,
Letter dated 22.9.17. Himachal Pradesh."
11. Vide letter dated 13.11.2017, the Special Secretary
(PW) to the Govt. of H.P. requested the Mission Director
(SSA) to provide the requisite information regarding the
technical staff of HPSES for further transmission to the H.P.
Public Service Commission, in sequel to the proposed merger
of the technical staff of HPSES in HPPWD and I&PH
Department.
12. While the above noticed process was going-on, LPA
No.66 of 2015 was disposed of on 10.10.2017 in the
following terms:
.
"Learned Deputy Advocate General has placed on record
instructions, dated 29th September, 2017, which read as
under:-
"To
The Ld. Advocate General,
H.P. High Court, Shimla-1.
Sub: Regarding withdrawal of L.P.A. No. 66 of 2015
filed by the State of H.P.
Sir, r I am the honour to enclose herewith the copy of
letters received from the Principal Secretary (Education) vide
which approval of CMM and the Council of Ministers
held on 18.09.2017 has been conveyed to this office.
In this context it is submitted that vide
above mentioned letters following has been conveyed:
"LPA No. 66/2015 filed by the Government
against the order passed by the Hon'ble High
Court in CWP No. 6275 of 2012 and CWP No.
1497/2012 and other litigation/CWPs filed by the
Society and individual be withdrawn."
It is, therefore, requested to kindly withdraw the
L.P.A. No. 66/2015 filed by the State of H.P., as
desired by the Government.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
State Project Director(SSA &
RMSA) H.P., Shimla-1"
2. At this stage, learned counsel for the writ
petitioners, under instructions, states that in view of
intervening developments, writ petitioners seek
permission to withdraw the original writ petitions being
CWP Nos. 1497 of 2012 and 6275 of 2012.
3. Learned Deputy Advocate General also seeks
permission to withdraw the present Letters Patent
Appeal. Permission, as prayed for, is granted.
.
4. Consequently, judgment, dated 16th October, 2014,
passed in CWP No. 6275 of 2012, titled Sanjay Gharu
and others Vs. State of H.P. and others (supra) is
rendered infructuous. It stands clarified that all issues
are left open, reserving liberty to the petitioners to
agitate the same, if so desired at a later stage. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of."
13. That after disposal of LPA No. 66 of 2015, the
matter with respect to regularization of petitioners was
placed before the Cabinet on 25.10.2017 and the Cabinet
approved the proposal to merge the technical staff of HPSES
with HPPWD and I&PH Department.
14. Despite the decision having been taken by the State
Government to merge the technical staff of HPSES with
HPPWD and I&PH Department, no action was taken which
forced the petitioners to approach the Court again by way of
CWPOA No. 5637 of 2020 titled Manoj Kumar and others vs.
State of H.P. and others and CWPOA No. 5567 of 2020 titled
Bimla Devi and others vs. State of H.P. and others. During
the pendency of these petitions, the respondents regularised
the services of technical staff as well as non-technical staff
vide orders dated 16.12.2020, respectively. The respondents-
State while regularizing the services of the petitioners on
their existing posts with existing pay scales in HPSES under
.
"Samagra Shiksha" imposed a condition that their
employment would be co-terminus with the existence of
HPSES and on dissolution of such Society their services will
stand automatically dispensed with and they shall not be
considered for taking over by any other Government
Departments. In view of the intervening development,
CWPOA No. 5637 of 2020 and CWPOA No. 5567 of 2020
were disposed of by this Court on 22.12.2020 in the
following terms:
"Since the services of the petitioners have already been
regularized as is evident from order dated 16th December,
2020 we deem it proper to dispose of all these petitions,
making it clear that in case any of the petitioner is still
aggrieved by non-grant of any of the relief including the one
claimed in these petitions and has subsisting cause of
action, he/she is always at liberty of approach this court for
redressal of the same. Pending miscelleaneous
application(s), if any also stand disposed."
15. By way of instant petitions, the petitioners have
assailed the action of the State Government primarily on two
grounds, firstly, that instead of regularizing the services of
.
the petitioners on completion of 8 years at par with the other
similarly situated Government employees, they were
regularized after serving for more than 20 years and,
secondly, the stipulation to the effect that their employment
would be co-terminus with HPSES is arbitrary. The
petitioners have assailed the action of the State Government
being illegal, unjust and arbitrary as according to the
petitioners a promise was held out to them by the express as
well as implied conduct of respondents and hence the
respondents were estopped from resiling from the promise to
regularize the services of the petitioners. In support of such
contention, it has been submitted that the respondents have
regularized the contract employees in various departments
after 8 years of continuous service and the conduct of
respondents in allowing the petitioners to work for a period
of more than 20 years on contract basis and also allowing
them financial benefits at par with other Government
servants except to regularize their services was itself a
promise to the petitioners that their services would be
regularised in due course. On such promise, the petitioners
.
had stuck to their jobs with HPSES and have now reached
such a stage of life where they will not be able to generate
any other employment for them. As per petitioners, the
imposition of stipulation in their regularization order
amounts to resiling from the promise. In addition, such
conduct of the State Government is clearly violative of
Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution as in all other cases,
the respondents have allowed the employees on closure or
dissolution of various public sectors/organizations to be
absorbed in other departments.
16. Further contention of petitioners is that they had
earned a judgment in their favour which was passed by this
Court on 16.10.2014 after considering the merits of the
case. The respondents were under direction to regularize the
services of the petitioners from the date when they had
completed 8 years of continuous service on contract basis.
The petitioners were made to withdraw the petitions on the
promise that their services would be regularised and as a
pre-condition thereof, they were required to withdraw the
.
petitions.
17. In reply, the respondents have submitted that the
petitioners were engaged under 'Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan' on
contract basis and as per para 37.1 of the Manual of
Financial Management procurement, no permanent liability
could be accrued on the Society or the State Government by
filling up of the posts. As per the respondents, some of the
petitioners were engaged under DPEP project which was
wound up in 2003 resulted their contract had come to an
end whereafter they were engaged afresh under 'Sarv
Shiksha Abhiyan'. It has been alleged that petitioners cannot
be equated with the Government employees as they are
selected after due process and through competitive exam,
interview etc. in accordance with the relevant R &P Rules,
whereas in case of petitioners, no R & P Rules were there
and the petitioners were recruited without adoption of
procedure in accordance with law. The reason of financial
implication has also been mentioned as one of the grounds
for not regularizing the petitioners retrospectively. The
.
contractual remuneration of the petitioners were enhanced
at par with regular Government employees only by taking a
lenient view. The petitions are stated to be bad for non-
joinder of necessary parties. According to respondents, the
Union of India is necessary party in view of fact that
Samagra Shiksha is aided by the Government of India to the
extent of 90%. The respondents have also submitted that the
decision of Cabinet dated 22.9.2017 was reviewed in the
meeting dated 23.11.2020 and approval was accorded for
regularization of petitioners in the HPSES itself under
'Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan'.
18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
have gone through the records.
19. The tone and tenor of the averments in instant
petitions reveal that petitioners have based their claim on
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In order to succeed on
the strength of said doctrine, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to prove existence of pre-existing right in their
favour the extension of which may have led to certain
.
promises being made by the public authorities. In the given
facts of the case, the petitioners may not qualify the
requisite condition. However, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is akin to principle of legitimate expectation and
both have overlapping traits. The only marked difference
being that principle of legitimate expectation can be applied
even in absence of any existing right. The claims based on
"legitimate expectation" have been held to require reliance
on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant
in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand
and others Vs Brahmputra Mettalics Ltd. 2020 (13)
SCALE 500 has expounded in detail the concept of
legitimate expectation in the context of India law as under:
"40. Under Indian Law, there is often a conflation between the
doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation.
This has been described in Jain and Jain's well known
treatise, Principles of Administrative Law::
"At times, the expressions 'legitimate expectation'
and 'promissory estoppel' are used interchangeably,
but that is not a correct usage because 'legitimate
expectation' is a concept much broader in scope than
'promissory estoppel'.
.
...
A reading of the relevant Indian cases, however,
exhibit some confusion of ideas. It seems that the
judicial thinking has not as yet crystallised as regards
the nature and scope of the doctrine. At times, it has
been referred to as merely a procedural doctrine; at
times, it has been treated interchangeably as
promissory estoppel. However both these ideas are
incorrect. As stated above, legitimate expectation is a
substantive doctrine as well and has much broader
scope than promissory estoppel.
...
In Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, the
Supreme Court has observed in relation to the
doctrine of legitimate expectation:
"the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the
substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law
and that the decision maker can normally be
compelled to give effect to his representation in regard
to the expectation based on previous practice or past
conduct unless some overriding public interest comes
in the way Reliance must have been placed on the said
representation and the representee must have thereby
suffered detriment."
It is suggested that this formulation of the doctrine
of legitimate expectation is not correct as it makes
"legitimate expectation" practically synonymous with
promissory estoppel. Legitimate expectation may arise
from conduct of the authority; a promise is not always
necessary for the purpose."
41. While this doctrinal confusion has the unfortunate
consequence of making the law unclear, citizens have been the
.
victims. Representations by public authorities need to be held to
scrupulous standards, since citizens continue to live their lives
based on the trust they repose in the State. In the commercial
world also, certainty and consistency are essential to planning the
affairs of business. When public authorities fail to adhere to their
representations without providing an adequate reason to the
citizens for this failure, it violates the trust reposed by citizens in
the State. The generation of a business friendly climate for
investment and trade is conditioned by the faith which can be
reposed in government to fulfil the expectations which it generates.
Professors Jain and Deshpande characterize the consequences of
this doctrinal confusion in the following terms:
"Thus, in India, the characterization of legitimate
expectations is on a weaker footing, than in jurisdictions like
UK where the courts are now willing to recognize the
capacity of public law to absorb the moral values underlying
the notion of estoppel in the light of the evolution of
doctrines like LE [Legitimate Expectations] and abuse of
power. If the Supreme Court of India has shown its creativity
in transforming the notion of promissory estoppel from the
limitations of private law, then it does not stand to reason as
to why it should also not articulate and evolve the doctrine of
LE for judicial review of resilement of administrative
authorities from policies and longstanding practices. If such
a notion of LE is adopted, then not only would the Court be
able to do away with the artificial hierarchy between
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, but, it would
also be able to hold the administrative authorities to account
on the footing of public law outside the zone of promises on a
stronger and principled anvil. Presently, in the absence of a
like doctrine to that of promissory estoppel outside the
promissory zone, the administrative law adjudication of
resilement of policies stands on a shaky public law
foundation."
42. We shall therefore attempt to provide a cogent basis for the
.
doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is not merely grounded on
analogy with the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The need for this
doctrine to have an independent existence was articulated by
Justice Frankfurter of the United State Supreme Court
in Vitarelli v. Seton:
"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the
standards by which it professes its action to be judged.
Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a
defined procedure, even though generous beyond the
requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be
scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of
administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may
add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall
perish with the sword."
43. However, before we do this, it is important to clarify the
understanding of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in previous
judgments of this Court. In National Buildings Construction
Corporation v. S. Raghunathan ("National Buildings Construction
Corpn."), a three Judge bench of this Court, speaking through
Justice S. Saghir Ahmad, held that:
"18. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has its
genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government
and its departments, in administering the affairs of the
country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or
intention and treat the citizens with full personal
consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The
policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied
selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is
akin to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that
the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" was evolved which
has today become a source of substantive as well as
procedural rights. But claims based on "legitimate
expectation" have been held to require reliance on
representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in
the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel."
.
(emphasis supplied)
44. However, it is important to note that this observation was
made by this Court while discussing the ambit of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation under English Law, as it stood then. As we
have discussed earlier, there was a substantial conflation or
overlap between the doctrines of legitimate expectation
and promissory estoppel even under English Law since the former
was often invoked as being analogous to the latter. However, since
then and since the judgment of this Court in National Buildings
Construction Corporation (supra), the English Law in relation to the
doctrine of legitimate expectation has evolved. More specifically, it
has actively tried to separate the two doctrines and to situate the
doctrine of legitimate expectations on a broader footing. In Regina
(Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v. East Sussex County Council30, the
House of Lords has held thus:
"33 In any case, I think that it is unhelpful to introduce
private law concepts of estoppel into planning law. As Lord
Scarman pointed out in Newbury District Council v. Secretary
of State for the Environment [1981] A.C. 578, 616, estoppels
bind individuals on the ground that it would be
unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented
or agreed. But these concepts of private law should not be
extended into "the public law of planning control, which
binds everyone". (See also Dyson J in R v. Leicester City
Council, Ex p Powergen UK Ltd. [2000] JPL 629, 637.)
34 There is of course an analogy between a private law
estoppel and the public law concept of a legitimate
expectation created by a public authority, the denial of
which may amount to an abuse of power... But it is no more
than an analogy because remedies against public authorities
also have to take into account the interests of the general
public which the authority exists to promote. Public law can
also take into account the hierarchy of individual rights
which exist under the Human Rights Act 1998, so that, for
.
example, the individual's right to a home is accorded a high
degree of protection (see Coughlan's case, at pp 254-255)
while ordinary property rights are in general far more limited
by considerations of public interest : see R ( Alconbury
Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389.
35 It is true that in early cases such as the Wells
case [1967] 1 WLR 1000 and Lever Finance
Ltd. v. Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1
Q.B. 222, Lord Denning MR used the language of estoppel in
relation to planning law. At that time the public law concepts
of abuse of power and legitimate expectation were very
undeveloped and no doubt the analogy of estoppel seemed
useful.....It seems to me that in this area, public law has
already absorbed whatever is useful from the moral values
which underlie the private law concept of estoppel and the
time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet."
(emphasis supplied)
45. In a concurring opinion in Monnet Ispat and Energy
Ltd. v. Union of India ("Monnet Ispat"), Justice H.L. Gokhale
highlighted the different considerations that underlie the doctrines
of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. The learned
judge held that for the application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, there has to be a promise, based on which the promisee
has acted to its prejudice. In contrast, while applying the doctrine
of legitimate expectation, the primary considerations are
reasonableness and fairness of the State action. He observed thus:
"Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations
289. As we have seen earlier, for invoking the principle of
promissory estoppel there has to be a promise, and on that
basis the party concerned must have acted to its
prejudice. In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it
was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the
.
Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed
as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot be used
against a statutory provision or notification.
290.....In any case, in the absence of any promise, the
Appellants including Aadhunik cannot claim promissory
estoppel in the teeth of the notifications issued under the
relevant statutory powers. Alternatively, the Appellants are
trying to make a case under the doctrine of legitimate
expectations. The basis of this doctrine is in reasonableness
and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the
decision of the public authority is founded in a provision of
law, and is in consonance with public interest."
(emphasis supplied)
46. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, speaking
through Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, the Court discussed the
decision in Monnet Ispat (supra) and noted its reliance on the
judgment in Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn. It then
observed:
"This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate
expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that
is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or
biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of
natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-
known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but
a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without
anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these
principles."
47. Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate
expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used
only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
48. As regards the relationship between Article 14 and the
doctrine of legitimate expectation, a three judge Bench in Food
.
Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, speaking
through Justice J.S. Verma, held thus:
"7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the
State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article
14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a
significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public
law : A public authority possesses powers only to use them
for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to
adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. Due
observance of this obligation as a part of good administration
raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen
to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its
instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary
component of the decision-making process in all State
actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a
State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give
due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the
persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that
unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an
abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides
of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would
be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule
of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the
exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control
of its exercise by judicial review.
8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a
citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct
enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight
to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the
requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation
forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary
concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation
is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair
decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the
claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a
question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises,
.
it is to be determined not according to the claimant's
perception but in larger public interest wherein other more
important considerations may outweigh what would
otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the
claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority
reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of
non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The
doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule
of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and
to this extent."
(emphasis supplied)
49. More recently, in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA, a
two-judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice B.S.
Chauhan, elaborated on this relationship in the following terms:
"39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary
and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality
must be in conformity with some principle which
meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of
a "democratic form of Government demands equality
and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination". The
rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands
the authority concerned to act in accordance with law.
Every action of the State or its instrumentalities
should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor
even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism
and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any
principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and
such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in
accordance with the rule of law.
...
41. Power vested by the State in a public authority
should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be
exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is
.
to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory
provisions and fact situation of a case. "Public
authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers
vested in them." A decision taken in an arbitrary
manner contradicts the principle of legitimate
expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to
exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to
effectuate the purpose for which power stood
conferred. In this context, "in good faith" means "for
legitimate reasons". It must be exercised bona fide for
the purpose and for none other...]"
r (emphasis supplied)
50. As such, we can see that the doctrine of substantive
legitimate expectation is one of the ways in which the guarantee
of non-arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 finds concrete
expression."
21. Adverting to the instant petitions, the factual
position is more or less admitted. The initial recruitment of
petitioners on contract basis, the longevity of their
continuous service, grant of financial benefits to the
petitioners at par with regular Government employees
holding equivalent posts, consideration and decision at the
end of the State Government to grant the petitioners benefit
of continuity of service either by merger or regularization are
the facts which admittedly have taken place. The
respondents have also not denied that the similarly situated
persons in other departments/organizations of State
.
Government were initially regularised after rendering 8 years
of continuous service on contract basis and subsequently in
certain cases the period of contract service for regularization
was reduced to 5 years or even 3 years.
22.
The only exception that has been sought to be
carved out by the respondents is that petitioners were not
initially appointed through procedure in accordance with
law. Their appointments were not in accordance with any
rules relating to their recruitment and promotion.
23. It is not the case of respondents that petitioners
were not holding minimum essential qualifications as
required for recruitment to the respective posts held by them
in other Government departments/organizations. This plea
otherwise could not have been available to the respondents
as the services of the petitioners have already been
regularized.
24. The question only remains whether the denial of
regularization to the petitioners retrospectively and also
imposition of the condition, as noticed above, in
.
regularization order of petitioners, is justified and legal?
25. Indisputably, the State Government has resorted to
the mode of recruitment through contract employment since
long. The contract employees have been regularized after
putting in certain years of continuous service, as noticed
above. The initial recruitment of the petitioners was though
under a specific project, nevertheless, the project was for a
laudable object to spread education in masses as an
initiative of the Government itself. Merely the funding of
project to larger extent was by the Central Government, it
cannot be said the project was alien to the State Government
as it was under the aegis of the State Government that the
projects have worked. Importantly, the project that
commenced about 25 years back is still in operation. The
HPSES has been created to run the project in question as
well as other related projects. It is not the case of
respondents that the project or consequent creation of
HPSES was for a limited period or purpose. Even the State
Government never had any illusion about the continuance of
.
projects being managed by HPSES. It will be gainful to
extract a passage from the Minutes of Meeting To Review the
Progress of Absorption of Engineering Staff Engaged Under
SSA under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary held on
27.8.2020."Chairman asked Secretary (Education) to
explore the possibility of Engineering wing and
regularizing the services of all employees of the Society
in the Society itself as Samagra Shiksha has to be
implemented and for implementation of new education
policy, services of these employees would be required.
There will not be any burden on the Society as these
employees are being paid the regular salary at par with
their counterparts in the departments. If these
employees are placed in some other department, they
would move to the department and other employees will
have to be inducted which will be a continuing cycle. He
has pointed out that at present salary is being claimed
under the project from the Government of India and
Government of H.P. in the ratio of 90:10, whereas these
employees are inducted in some other department,
.
complete burden will fall on the State Government. He
further suggested that if services of these employees are
regularised in the Society then Samagra Shiksha
Programme will run smoothly and will also help in
implementing New Education Policy in the State for
which these employees have attained expertise". It
becomes evident from above noticed facts that the project in
which the petitioners were employed were not temporary in
nature by any stretch of imagination. The continuity of the
project for more than 25 years as also the purpose sought to
be achieved through such project clearly implies that the
same is necessitated by inescapable obligations vis-à-vis
spread of education in the mass
26. The State Government has to act as a model
employer in a welfare State. It cannot have different
yardstick for different persons. Conceptually, the executive
authorities have the onerous duty to work for the benefit of
the public at large. As far as the mode and manner in which
the Government has to achieve its purpose is to be chosen
.
by the Government itself, however, with caveat that the
same cannot be irrational, unreasonable or arbitrary. In a
State where rule of law prevails, the Government is no
exception. Right of equality being one of the fundamental
traits of the Constitution, the same cannot be denied at the
whims and fencies of the authorities.
27. The benefit of regularization to the petitioners on
completion of 8 years of continuous contract service has
been delayed by the respondents and the petitioners cannot
be blamed for that. The financial implication as pleaded by
the respondents, therefore, cannot be a ground to deny the
right to the petitioners which had accrued to them especially
when the learned Single Judge of this Court had ruled in
their favour vide judgment dated 16.10.2014 passed in CWP
No. 6275 of 2012 and CWP No. 1497 of 2012 and held the
petitioners entitled for regularization from the date when
they completed 8 years of continuous contract services. The
right so earned by petitioners cannot be obliterated by
respondents at such a belated stage under the garb of
.
financial implication. The respondents have failed to justify
the reasons for delay in granting the benefit of regularization
to the petitioners. Thus, the petitioners had a right to be
regularised on completion of 8 years of continuous service
on contract basis.
28. The conduct of the respondents throughout belies
their assertions. It is not in dispute that the matter of
regularization of petitioners was not being considered by the
respondents. In fact, in 2017 itself, the State Cabinet had
approved the proposal to merge the technical staff working
with HPSES with HPPWD and I&PH Department of the State
Government and the State Cabinet had again reaffirmed the
said proposal in 2019. Various communications exchanged
inter se the concerned departments, from time to time, were
evident of the fact that the matter with respect to
regularization of petitioners was under active consideration.
Evidently, the petitioners had withdrawn their petitions
being CWPOA No. 5637 of 2020 and CWPOA No. 5567 of
2020 on the clear promise being held out to them by the
.
respondents that the matter of their regularization would be
taken ahead only after withdrawal of their petitions. The fact
that the petitioners withdrew their petitions after having
earned judgment in their favour clearly reflects the
unambiguous promise being held out to them by the State
Government. The admitted facts of the case clearly suggest
that the respondents had held out a clear promise to the
petitioners regarding grant of benefit of regularization of
their services. The fact that the petitioners have been
allowed to work on contract basis for more than 20 years
continuously itself was sufficient to instill a feeling of
security of job in the petitioners. At no point of time, the
respondents had represented to the petitioners that their
employment was not permanent. The petitioners had every
reason to believe that their services would be regularized as
the same treatment was being meted to contract employees
in other departments. Undoubtedly, the petitioners have
brought themselves into such stage of life, ostensibly under
the legitimate expectation, that any clog on continuity of
their respective jobs at this stage will be catastrophic for
.
them.
29. It can also be noticed from the admitted facts of the
case that the petitioners had fallen in circumstances which
had inculcated a legitimate expectation in them that their
services would be regularized at par with the other
Government employees and such expectation in the given
facts cannot be termed as unreasonable or excessive. In my
considered view the evident conduct of the respondents
amount of denial of a legitimate expectation of petitioners
and thus, leads to the violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
30. Accordingly, in view of the observations and
analysis made hereinabove, all the writ petitions are allowed
and the respondents are directed to regularize the services of
the petitioners from the date when they have completed
eight years of service with all consequential benefits within a
period of three months from today. However, in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case, the financial benefits, if
any, shall be permissible to the petitioners only for a period
.
of three years immediately preceding the filing of these
petitions. The regularization orders of the petitioners dated
16.12.2020 are held illegal and arbitrary and hence quashed
to the extent these contains the condition to the effect that
the regular employment of petitioners will be co-terminus
with the existence of HPSES. The State Government shall
remain under direction to provide continuous regular
employment to petitioners till their respective dates of
superannuation in accordance with law, unless petitioners
render themselves incapable for such benefit under relevant
conduct rules.
All the petitions are accordingly disposed of, in the
aforesaid terms, so also the pending miscellaneous
application(s) if any. The parties are left to bear their own
costs.
17th December, 2021 (Satyen Vaidya)
(GR) Judge
