[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. Thro ... vs Harijan Somabhai Badhabhai on 6 May, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20898 of 2023
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
Yes
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PASCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LTD. THRO DEPUTY ENGINEER
Versus
HARIJAN SOMABHAI BADHABHAI
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Appearance:
MR PREMAL R JOSHI(1327) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR IMTIYAZ I MANSURI(9159) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 06/05/2026
JUDGMENT
1. By way of this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioner - Paschim Gujarat
Vij Company Ltd. ('PGVCL', for short), has sought following
prayers.
"(A) Be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in
the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction quashing and setting aside the order
dated 7/8/2023 passed below Exhibit 14 in Civil
Miscellaneous Application number 60 of 2022 by the
Court of learned Principal District Judge, Porbandar;
Annexure-A;
(B) Pending admission and final disposal of this
petition, Your Lordships will be pleased to stay further
execution, operation and implementation of the impugned
order dated 7/8/2023 passed below Exhibit 14 in Civil
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Miscellaneous Application number 60 of 2022 by the
Court of learned Principal District Judge, Porbandar;
Annexure-A.
(C) Be pleased to award the cost of this petition;
(D) Such other and further relief that is just, fit and
expedient in the facts and circumstances of the case may
be granted."
2. The brief facts of the case are that, the PGVCL filed the
Special Civil Suit No.660 of 2001 before the Court of learned
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Porbandar for recovery of
Rs.6,46,065.29 paisa as an outstanding and due amount of
electricity use. In the suit, respondent appeared through
learned advocate but did not file reply inspite of giving ample
opportunity. Ultimately suit was decreed on 29.02.2008
whereby the petitioner has led his evidence. In the suit
proceedings, the petitioner filed an application to serve the
copy of the judgment and decree upon the respondent. The
application was allowed and notice was also served upon the
respondent. Subsequently, the petitioner filed Regular
Execution No.05 of 2019 to execute the decree passed in
Special Civil Suit and the notice was issued and consequently
recovery warrant was also issued.
3. Upon receipt of the notice as well as recovery warrant,
the respondent approached the Court of Principal District
Judge by filing an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ('the Code', for short). However, the said
appeal was in delay of 14 years and 09 months. Thus, he has
filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to
condone the delay of 14 years and 09 months, which was
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numbered as Civil Miscellaneous Application No.60 of 2022.
Learned Principal District Judge, after issuing a notice to the
petitioner, decided the said application for condonation of
delay in favour of respondent herein and by order dated
07.08.2023 allowed the said application and condoned the
delay of 14 years 09 months with a condition to pay Rs.5,000/-
to the present petitioner and to deposit cost of Rs.2500/- in
District Legal Service Authority, Porbandar. Being aggrieved,
the petitioner preferred the present petition.
4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi for the
petitioner - PGVCL and Mr.Imtiyaz Mansuri, for the
respondent.
5.1 Learned advocate Mr.Premal Joshi appearing for the
PGVCL taken this Court to the averments made in Civil
Miscellaneous Application No.60 of 2022 more particularly
opening para thereof and would submit that perusal of this
para demonstrates that applicant has not assigned any reason
much less any sufficient reason for condonation of huge and
colossal delay of 14 years and 09 months. He would further
submit that solitary contention raised by respondent herein
before the learned Principal District Judge that he had been
acquitted by the Criminal Court in a criminal case that had
arisen from the same set of facts on 31.12.2010. Therefore,
the respondent herein was under impression that the suit
which based upon same set of facts would also be dismissed
by the Court. Therefore, he has not filed any reply in the suit
and ultimately when he received notice and recovery warrant
in execution proceedings, he came to know that suit run ex
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parte against him and decree was passed. Learned advocate
Mr.Joshi would submit that as such the reason assigned by
respondent herein to condone huge and colossal delay of 14
years and 09 months was insufficient, it was lacking bona
fides and even equity was not in favour of respondent herein.
Yet, learned Principal District Judge, without cogent and
compulsive reason, casually condoned the delay of 14 years
and 09 months and thereby has committed serious error.
Therefore, learned advocate Mr.Joshi would submit to allow
this petition and to quash and set aside the impugned order.
5.2 Learned advocate Mr.Joshi has relied upon the following
judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in support of his
submissions.
(i) P. K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and another
reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556;
(ii) Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in
(2013) 12 SCC 649;
(iii) Baaswaraj and other vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81; and
(iv) Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi
and others reported in (2021) 18 SCC 384.
6.1 Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Mansuri appearing for
the respondent, in support of the impugned judgment and
order, would submit that respondent has deposited the
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principle amount decreed by the learned trial Court. He
further submitted that besides if we consider the judgment,
which is sought to be appealed before the Appellate Court, it
was a judgment passed in the suit practically passed ex parte.
The respondent herein was not aware about suit proceedings
and came to know only when process of execution served
upon him. He would further submit that because of the
technical consideration, the decree was passed against the
respondent. He did not contest the suit proceedings as he was
under impression that once the criminal case against him is
over, resulting in his acquittal, the civil suit based upon the
very same facts, would not survive. Therefore, he submitted
that the respondent was unaware about such proceedings and
having came to know about passing of decree, he immediately
approached the Appellate Court to question the legality and
propriety of the decree thereof, however, as there was delay
of 14 years 09 months, he preferred the application for
condonation of delay under the Limitation Act.
6.2 Learned advocate Mr.Mansuri would further submit that
court should take liberal and pragmatic view to condone the
delay for advancement of justice. The person who did not get
opportunity to contest the suit proceedings, must be given a
chance to appeal the judgment which practically passed ex
parte against him. He, therefore, would submit that learned
trial Court has not committed any error in condoning the
delay. Upon above submissions, he would submit that this
Court may not entertain the present petition under the limited
supervisory jurisdiction and request the court to dismiss the
petition.
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7. Having considered the above submissions of learned
counsel appearing for the respective parties and having
further considered the facts coming out of the impugned
order as well as the records and proceedings, it appears that
application before the learned trial Court seeking condonation
of huge and colossal delay of 14 years and 09 months is based
upon false facts. In paragraph:1 being an opening para of the
application, respondent herein stated that in criminal case he
was acquitted on 31.12.2010. Therefore, he was under
impression that the Court will also dismiss the suit as criminal
case and civil suit both arise from the same set of facts. He
has further pleaded that in existence of such circumstance, he
has not filed reply and his right to file written statement was
closed the suit thereby runs ex parte and decreed against him.
However, it is quite noticeable from impugned judgment
(para:2) that the Special Civil Suit No.660 of 2001 decreed
against the respondent on 29.02.2008 much prior and earlier
to judgment in criminal case and, therefore, foundation of the
application before the learned trial Court itself was based
upon false facts. The respondent herein, beside making such
false facts in para:1, did not assign any other and further
reason to explain huge and colossal delay of 14 years and 09
months. In the case of P. K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala
and another (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
equity cannot be basis for extending the period of limitation.
The observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para:6, would
be profitable to read as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the
statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to
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extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The
discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither
proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay
cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and
the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the
application for condonation of delay filed in the High
Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first
appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."
8. In case of Baaswaraj and other vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
para:15, summerised the case as under:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to
what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts
and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
9. This Court would be at advantage to refer principles
summarized in decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others
(supra), which reads thus:
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" The principles applicable to an application for
condonation of delay are as follows:
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application
for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed
to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being
had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and
are to be applied in proper perspective to the f obtaining
fact-situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in
the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and
a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it
may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants
strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors
to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
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principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of
liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be
vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face
such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking
recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing
a collective cause should be given some acceptable
latitude.
(xiv) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard
manner harbouring the notion that the courts are
required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle
that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice
dispensation system.
(xv) An application for condonation of delay should not be
dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.
(xvi) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a
conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality
of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the
ultimate institutional motto.
(xvii) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can
be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be
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curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
10. The observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras:259
and 260 of its judgment rendered in the case of Shivamma
(Dead) by Lrs. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, also
worth to refer, which read as under:
"259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is
not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly
clear that the High Court has erroneously condoned a
massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at
the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups
in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in
the case of the respondent no. 1 against the
maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the
relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no
hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near
to being "sufficient cause" as per Section 5 of the 1963
Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the
precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays
of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more
particularly the delay in those cases was supported by
sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a
very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay.
Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of
the delay by the High Court."
11. In the decision rendered in the case of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) by Legal Representatives and Others vs. Special
Deputy Collector (LA) reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336 the
Hon'ble Supreme Court again summarized the principle in
regard to condonation of delay. Para:28 thereof reads as
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under :
"28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
28.1. Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right
to remedy rather than the right itself;
28.2. A right or the remedy that has not been exercised
or availed of for a long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
28.3. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
28.4. In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
28.5. Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained,
but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and
may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
28.6. Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
28.7. Merits of the case are not required to be considered
in condoning the delay; and
28.8. Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
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have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the
statutory provision."
12. In the aforesaid circumstances, what appears is that the
respondent herein failed to establish bona fide at the same
time did not aver any sufficient but convincing reason. Even
not a good cause. The learned Principal District Judge was
required to notice that result flowing from statutory provision
is never an evil. The Court has no power to ignore the
provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from
its operation. The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party, but Court has no choice
but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex, which means that the Law is hard but
it is the Law, stands attracted in such a situation. It has been
consistently laid down by the Supreme Court that
'inconvenience is not' a test or decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting the Statute. The limitation Act
is founded on the public policy and it is aimed at secure peace
in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken
diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts
of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and
have from lapse of time become stale. In Halsbury's Law of
England, Volume 28, Page:266, at para:605, the policy of the
Limitation Act has been explained as under:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts. The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
(2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
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diligence."
13. Needless to state that unlimited limitation would lead to
sense of insecurity and uncertainty. The limitation prevents
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in
equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been
lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches [ See
Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. SBI Staff Association [(2005)
7 SCC 510, Rajender Singh Vs. Santa Singh [AIR 1973 SC
2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Jalgaon Medium Project
(2008) 17 SCC 448] ].
14. In view of above, the respondent herein was unable to
explain the delay of 14 years and 09 months, by all means
such delay is huge and colossal. Perusal of the judgment and
order passed by Principal District Judge, it appears that
impugned judgment lacks of any reason for condoning the
huge and colossal delay of 14 years and 09 months. A strange
finding has been recorded by the learned trial Court that the
respondent of the petition before the learned trial Court i.e.
PGVCL has not produced any evidence. I am at loss to
understand that what kind of the evidence was required to be
produced by PGVCL to challenge the delay condonation
application filed by the respondent herein. The learned
Principal District Judge also recorded that the appellant has
sufficiently explained the delay for the reasons stated by the
respondent herein is enough to allow the application,
however, I am still at loss that which was the reason given by
the respondent convinced the learned Principal District Judge
and how it was sufficient to condone the colossal delay.
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15. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is unable to
subscribe the view taken by the learned Principal District
Judge to condone the delay.
16. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the present petition
deserves to be allowed and it is allowed. The impugned order
passed in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.60 2022 is
hereby quashed and set aside and consequently civil
miscellaneous application also stands dismissed. Pursuant to
the impugned order, if the respondent herein has deposited
any amount towards the costs before the learned trial Court
or paid to PGVCL, the same shall be refunded.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
MISHRA AMIT V.
