[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Shardaben Rameshbhai Zapadia vs Ikbalbhai Jummabhai Kataria on 23 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/4660/2025 ORDER DATED: 23/02/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 4660 of
2025
In F/FIRST APPEAL/26548/2025
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SHARDABEN RAMESHBHAI ZAPADIA & ORS.
Versus
IKBALBHAI JUMMABHAI KATARIA & ORS.
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Appearance:
NISHIT A BHALODI(9597) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5
MR RITURAJ M MEENA(3224) for the Respondent(s) No. 3
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HASMUKH D. SUTHAR
Date : 23/02/2026
ORAL ORDER
1. The present application is filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 2127 days caused
in filing the appeal against the judgment and award dated
30.05.2019 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Ahmedabad in MACP No. 430 of 2012.
2. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties.
Though served, none appears for respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
3. The learned advocate for the respondent-Insurance
Company has opposed the application on the ground that an
inordinate delay has been caused in filing the appeal and that
the settled principles of the law of limitation are required to be
strictly considered, as the same adversely affect the rights and
interests of the Insurance Company. It is submitted that the law
of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to
be applied with all its rigour considering the provisions of the
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C/CA/4660/2025 ORDER DATED: 23/02/2026
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prescribed statute. In this regard, reliance is placed upon P.K.
Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556.
3.1 It is further argued that the award was passed on
30.05.2019 and the learned advocate for the claimant had
knowledge of the same on 24.07.2019. Despite such knowledge,
no steps were taken for filing the appeal within the period of
limitation. Not only that, after being satisfied with the award,
MACEX No. 03 of 2023 came to be preferred and execution
proceedings were initiated. Subsequently, the present appeal has
been filed. There is lack of bona fide coupled with absence of due
diligence. It is further contended that merely financial hardship
or lack of awareness of limitation cannot justify condonation
when a delay of 2127 days has occurred and the claimant
remained silent during the entire period. In this regard, reliance
is placed upon Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 363 and Surendra Kumar Jain v.
Santobai, 2025 INSC 230.
4. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties
and having gone through the documents on record, it is an
undisputed and admitted fact that the judgment and award was
rendered on 30.05.2019. After pronouncement of the said
judgment, the claimant came to know about it through his
advocate on 24.07.2019. Therefore, 24.07.2019 is the crucial
date of knowledge.
5. Thereafter, execution proceedings being MACEX No. 03 of
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2023 came to be filed against the owner of the vehicle and
continued for a considerable period. The applicant could not
recover the amount of compensation due to ineffective
pursuance of the execution proceedings. Resultantly, the
execution petition came to be withdrawn.
6. If the applicant intended to prefer an appeal and was
dissatisfied with the judgment and award, he ought to have
preferred the appeal from the date of knowledge i.e. 24.07.2019.
This is not a case where the applicant pursued a remedy before a
wrong forum. Execution proceedings are initiated after passing
of the award to realise the amount. The applicant initiated such
proceedings, which could not reach their logical end, and
thereafter withdrew the same and has now chosen to file the
present appeal. Pursuing execution proceedings cannot be
treated as time spent in prosecuting another legal proceeding
before a wrong forum. Therefore, the applicant is not entitled to
claim any benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
7. Once the applicant accepted the judgment and award and
after a delay of almost five years and eight months i.e. 2127
days, without assigning any sufficient reason, merely stating
that he is ready and willing to waive interest for the entire period
of delay is not a ground to condone the delay in absence of
sufficient cause. This Court cannot strive to do justice in the
name of sufficient cause when no sufficient cause is made out.
8. It is well-settled law that while considering a plea for
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condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the Court is
to ascertain the bona fides and genuineness of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation, rather than to examine
the merits of the main matter at the threshold. Only when
sufficient cause is shown should the delay be condoned, and not
as a matter of course or by way of generosity. The pursuit of
substantial justice cannot come at the cost of prejudicing the
rights accrued in favour of the opposite party.
9. It is true that refusal to condone delay may, at times, result
in denial of adjudication on merits. However, the law of
limitation has been enacted with a definite purpose. Different
time limits are prescribed for different kinds of litigations for
valid and sound reasons. Litigants are expected to remain
vigilant about their rights and liabilities. If a citizen is permitted
to exercise his rights at his whims and fancies without reference
to the law of limitation, it may result in serious prejudice to the
rights of other citizens.
10. In such circumstances, the "concept of liberal approach",
"justice-oriented approach" or "substantial justice" should not be
employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of
limitation. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of parties, but parties are expected not to resort to dilatory
tactics and to seek their remedy promptly. The length of delay is
definitely a relevant factor which the Court must take into
consideration while deciding whether the delay should be
condoned or not.
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11. A litigant who has slept over his rights cannot be permitted
to wake up after an inordinate lapse of time and seek redressal
as a matter of right. Institution of proceedings after a prolonged
delay not only affects the right of defence of the opposite party
but also results in prolonged uncertainty and harassment. These
factors are required to be borne in mind while considering an
application for condonation of huge delay.
12. Herein, no sufficient cause is mentioned. In view of the
decisions in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 INSC 53;
State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls
High School, 2026 INSC 148; Surendra Kumar Jain v.
Santobai, 2025 INSC 230; and Thirunagalingam v.
Lingeswaran, 2025 INSC 672, it is clear that in the absence of
sufficient cause, the Court ought not to exercise discretion in
favour of the applicant.
13. It is needless to state that unless and until office objections
are removed, no litigation can be treated as borne on the record
of the Registry of the High Court.
14. Accordingly, the question of condoning the delay does not
arise. The present application stands dismissed.
(HASMUKH D. SUTHAR,J)
ALI
