[Cites 20, Cited by 0]

Gujarat High Court

Dipika Vinodrai Maru vs State Of Gujarat on 29 April, 2026

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                           R/CR.MA/10670/2021                                         JUDGMENT DATED: 29/04/2026

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                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                             R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
                                           FIR/ORDER) NO. 10670 of 2021


                      FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


                      HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
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                                    Approved for Reporting                          Yes           No
                                                                                ✔
                      ==========================================================
                                                 DIPIKA VINODRAI MARU & ANR.
                                                            Versus
                                                   STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
                      ==========================================================
                      Appearance:
                      MR ROHIT S VERMA(3887) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
                      AVANI V PATEL(8016) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
                      HCLS COMMITTEE(4998) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
                      MR.RONAK RAVAL, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
                      ==========================================================

                         CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER

                                                           Date : 29/04/2026

                                                              JUDGMENT

1. The present application is filed under section 482 of

Cr.PC for quashment of the FIR being 11203008210032/

2021 registered with Bilkha Police Station, Junagadh for

the offence punishable under section 504, 506(2) 507,

114 of IPC stating the offence, which is alleged to have

been committed from the period 25.11.2020 to

18.11.2020 as per the case of the complainant, in the

impugned FIR is that the marriage of the first informant

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was solemnized with accused no.1 and prior to 5 years

from the date of marriage, the accused no.1 was

engaged to accused no.2 i.e the present applicant.

Somehow, the marriage was not solemnized and accused

no.1 got married to the complainant. As per the

allegations, the dispute arose between the husband and

wife and she was thrown out from the matrimonial house

and therefore, complainant filed application under

section 125 of CrPC. It is contended in the FIR that

despite the order of maintenance was passed, the

husband never paid the amount which is ordered by the

learned Family Court and has started living with the

present applicant in live in relationship agreement. On

30.11.2020, the complainant received a call from the

mobile of the present applicant informing that she may

give divorce to the accused no.1 or could face dire

consequences. Again, on 7.24 hours, the brother of the

applicant no.1 i.e applicant no.2 has called and similar

threats were issued to her. Thereafter, she received calls

from different four numbers and in all four calls she

received abusive language and inquiring regarding the

family of the complainant. With the above allegations,

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the complaint came to be lodged on 02.04.2021, which is

the subject matter of challenge before this Court.

2. Heard learned advocate Mr.Rohit Verma for the

applicant and learned advocate Ms.Avani Patel for the

complainant and Learned APP Mr.Ronak Raval for the

respondent-State.

2.1. It is submitted by learned advocate Mr.Rohit Verma,

appearing for the applicant, that there is a dispute

between the husband and wife and though the present

applicant no.1 was the ex-fiancee of the accused no.1

was falsely dragged into the matrimonial dispute. It is

submitted that there was altercation between the

complainant and the applicant as complainant has

created the group on 26.11.2022, where the relatives of

the present applicants were joined in the said group and

abusive messages were posted on the said group. It is

submitted by learned advocate Mr.Rohit Verma that one

FIR came to be lodged by the present applicant no.1 on

10.05.2022 for the offence punishable under section 469,

500, 507 of IPC and 66c and 67 of the I.T.Act. The said

FIR culminated into charge-sheet which is filed on

10.05.2022 and said FIR was filed after a delay of 5

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months of so called incident. It is submitted that false

allegations are made against the present applicant that

she is staying with the accused no. one in live-in

relationship. It is submitted by learned advocate

Mr.Rohit Verma that only to malign the image of the

present applicant false accusations are made and the

continuation of the impugned FIR would be abuse of

process of law.

2.2. Learned advocate Mr.Rohit Verma has relied on the

decision of this Court in the case of Diyalbhai

Lavjibhai Mathodiya Vs State of Gujarat reported in

2026 (0) AIJEL-HC 253092 and submitted that the FIR

was delayed by 5 months and therefore, it cannot be said

that to causing alarm which is prior required to attract

the provisions of section 500 the calls were made. It is

submitted by learned advocate Mr.Rohit Verma that

even on bare reading of the FIR also does not disclose

any cognizable offence against of present applicant and

in that background, the impugned FIR is deserves to be

quashed by allowing the present application.

2.3. Per Contra, learned advocate Ms.Avani Patel,

appearing for the respondent no.2, has submitted that

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there are number of proceedings initiated by the

complainant against the accused no.1 and as the

applicant no.1 was having illicit relation with the

accused no.1 which was the cause for matrimonial

dispute, no interference is required, at this stage, and

the investigation is required to be concluded. In that

background, it is prayed not to interfere the

investigation and present application is required to be

dismissed.

2.4. Learned APP Mr.Ronak Raval, appearing for the

State, has submitted that during the investigation it is

found that five numbers which are stated in the FIR, out

of those 5 numbers, first number belongs to the present

applicant no.1, the second, third and fifth number where

the complainant made a miscall and in in response to the

said miscall, incoming call is received in the mobile of

the complainant which was subsequently found to be a

wrong number and therefore, it was immediately

disconnected. It is submitted by learned APP Mr.Ronak

Ravalthat with regard to the fourth number, it belongs to

Chennai, however the Investigating Officer could not get

any whereabouts of the person to whom it belongs. It is

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also submitted by learned APP Mr.Ronak Raval that the

investigation is at large and in that background no

interference is required at this stage.

3. Having considered the submissions made by the learned

advocates for the respective parties, this Court has

referred to the decision of the Apex Court in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1)

SCC 335, wherein the Apex Court has laid down the

guidelines governing the exercise of inherent powers

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

which are reproduced hereinbelow:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(i) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

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accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(iv) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

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4. The question arising for consideration before this Court

is whether the case of the present applicant falls under

any of the criteria mentioned in the case of State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (Supra)?

4.1. To determine the above question, if one would refer

the allegations made in the FIR then it emerges that the

complainant married to the accused no.1 and prior to

marriage of the complainant, the accused no.1 was

engaged to accused no.2. subsequently, the marriage

was not solemnized and the accused no.1 married the

complainant. As per the allegations, relations with the

present applicant continued with accused no.1 and that

was cause for matrimonial dispute. As per the

allegations which is made against present applicant, on

30.11.2020 the call was received issuing the threats to

the complainant and informing to give divorce to the

husband or to face dire consequences.

4.2. At this stage the reference of the decision of this

Court in the case Diyalbhai Lavjibhai Mathodiya Vs

State of Gujarat (supra) is required to be made. The

relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow:

8.For attracting the provisions of Sections 504 and 506(2) of the

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Indian Penal Code, it is imperative that there is a specific reference to the abusive language alleged to have been used. Ordinarily, the nature and tenor of the abusive language constitute the determinative factor in assessing whether such language amounts to an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of peace, and not the particular temperament or conduct of the complainant. Mere use of abusive or discourteous language, rudeness, or insolence would not, by itself, amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504 of the IPC, unless such conduct contains the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of peace or any other offence.

Furthermore, it must also be established that the accused intended, or knew it to be likely, that such provocation would cause the person insulted to breach the peace. To constitute an offence under Section 504 of the IPC, the insult must be of such a nature as is calculated to cause the aggrieved party to lose self-control and to act in a manner that would disturb public peace. Only upon satisfaction of these essential ingredients can the provisions of Sections 504 and 506(2) of the IPC be said to be attracted.

9. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2026) 2 SCC 622, wherein the relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:-

15. Insofar as Section 294IPC is concerned, this Court in N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha [N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818) has explained the true purport and scope of Section 294. We quote the relevant observations as under: (SCC pp.

821-22, paras 6-9) "6. Section 294(b)IPC talks about the obscene acts and songs. Section 2941PC as a whole reads thus:

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294. Obscene acts and songs.-Whoever, to the annoyance of others-

(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or

(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.'

7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity under Section 294(b)IPC is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. The following passage from the judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his Lordship then was) reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko [P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko, 1967 SCC OnLine Ker 125: 1967 KLT 799 explains as follows: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 5-6)

5. The only point argued was that the 1st accused has not committed an offence punishable under Section 294(b)IPC, by uttering the words abovementioned. The courts below have held that the words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360], QB at p. 371 Cockburn, C.J. laid down the test of "obscenity" in these words: (QB p. 371) *... the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences..."

6. This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 52: AIR 1965 SC 881]. In

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Roth v. United States [Roth v. United States, 1957 SCC OnLine US SC 106: 1 L Ed 2d 1498 : 354 US 476 (1957)], Warren, C.J. said that the test of "obscenity" is the 'substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires'. Harian, J. observed that in order to be "obscene" the matter must "tend to sexually impure thoughts". I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are "obscene" and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable under Section 294(b)IPC

8. It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words used by the accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive, humiliating or defarmative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b)IPC

9. To prove the offence under Section 294IPC mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellant-accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294(b)IPC is made out."

16. We fail to understand how the act of a police officer assaulting the complainant within public view or public as alleged would amount to an obscene act. Obscene act for the purpose of Section

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294 has a particular meaning. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by themselves are not sufficient to attract the offence under Section 294IPC

17. Thus, insofar as Section 294IPC is concerned, we are of the view that no case is made out to put the appellant-accused to trial.

18. We shall now deal with Sections 504 and 5061PC, respectively.

19. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through one of us, J.B. Pardiwala, J., in its decision in Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. [Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219] explained what constitutes an offence of criminal intimidation. We quote the relevant paragraphs from the said decision as under: (SCC pp. 241-44, paras 25-34) "25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:

'503. Criminal intimidation.- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal Intimidation. Explanation. A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.

26. Section 504 reads thus:

504. Intentional Insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.

Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation

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will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both:

27. Section 506 reads thus:

'506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. Whoever commits, the offence of criminal Intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;

If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with Imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both

28. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials.

(1) Threatening a person with any injury:

(i) to his person, reputation or property; or

(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.

(2) The threat must be with intent;

(i) to cause alarm to that person; or

(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or

(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

29. Section 504IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person

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insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section, But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender.

30. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.

31. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 5041PC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general

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proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In R. v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai [R. v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78], a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:

'To constitute an offence under Section 504IPC it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.

32. A bare perusal of Section 5061PC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.

33. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 5061PC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR

34. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present."(emphasis in original)

20. Applying the principles as explained aforesaid, we are of the view

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that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Sections 504 and 506IPC, respectively, are borne out. xxx

5. Applying the above ratio, in the instant case,

undisputedly, the FIR was lodged after a delay of 5 years

from the date of occurrence, without offering any

plausible explanation. The allegations in the impugned

FIR is that abusive language was used however, what

exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in

the FIR. Additionally, the investigation material reflects