[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Ashokbhai @ Ashokmama S/O Dattubhai ... vs State Of Gujarat on 15 April, 2026
Author: Ilesh J. Vora
Bench: Ilesh J. Vora
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/SCR.A/4420/2026 ORDER DATED: 15/04/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4420 of 2026
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ASHOKBHAI @ ASHOKMAMA S/O DATTUBHAI MHASKAR THRO
PRAMODINI ASHOK MHASKAR
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR. DHARMIK G KHADAWALA(17610) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR.SHATRUGHN S SONI(17589) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. DHAWAN JAYSWAL. APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 15/04/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)
1. The present petition is directed against the order of detention dated
23.03.2026 passed by the respondent - detaining authority in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short 'the Act'), whereby the respondent -
detaining authority has detained the petitioner - detenue as defined under
Section 2(g) of the Act.
2. Heard the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner - detenue
and learned APP appearing for the respondent - State.
3. Learned advocate for the petitioner - detenue submits that the
impugned order of detention is required to be quashed and set-aside since
the detaining authority has passed the order of detention solely on the
ground of registration of 2 criminal cases, as mentioned in the impugned
detention order, and that by itself cannot bring the case of the petitioner -
detenue within the purview of definition under Section 2(g) of the Act.
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R/SCR.A/4420/2026 ORDER DATED: 15/04/2026
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Learned advocate for the petitioner - detenue further submitted that the
illegal activities alleged to have been carried out or likely to be carried
out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of
public order and at the most it can be said to be a breach of law and order.
Further, except the statements of the witnesses and the registration of the
above FIRs, no other relevant and cogent material is on record which
would show that the alleged anti-social activities of the petitioner -
detenue fall under the category of breach of public order. Learned
advocate further submitted that it is not possible to hold, on the basis of
the facts of the present case, that the activities of the petitioner - detenue
with respect to the criminal cases had affected and disturbed the social
fabric of the society, eventually which would become threat to the very
existence of the normal and routine life of the people at large or that on
the basis of the registration of criminal cases, the petitioner - detenue had
put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for the
whole system to exist, as a system governed by rule of law, by disturbing
the public order. It is also submitted that the detaining authority has also
not applied its mind to the fact that the petitioner - detenue is released on
bail in all the offences.
4. Learned APP for the respondent-State has supported the detention
order passed by the detaining authority and has submitted that sufficient
materials and evidences were found during the course of investigation
and the same were even supplied to the petitioner - detenue, which
indicate that the detenue is in the habit of indulging into activities as
defined under Section 2(g) of the Act and considering the facts of the
case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and
the same deserves to be upheld by this Court.
5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective
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R/SCR.A/4420/2026 ORDER DATED: 15/04/2026
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parties and considering the documents and materials available on record,
prima facie, it is found that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the
detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance
with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIRs cannot have any
bearing on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant
penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the
allegations levelled against the petitioner - detenue cannot be said to be
germane for the purpose of bringing the petitioner - detenue within the
realm of the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. Unless and until there is
some material to make out a case that the person has become a threat and
menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and
that all social apparatus goes in peril disturbing the public order at the
instance of such person, in that circumstances, it cannot be said that the
detenue is a person which would fall within the meaning of Section 2(g)
of the Act. Except general statements, there is no other material on record
which shows that the petitioner - detenue has acted in such a manner
which has become dangerous to the public order.
6. After careful consideration of the material, we are of the
considered view that on the basis of aforesaid cases, the authority has
wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the
detenue could be termed to be acting in a manner 'prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order'. In our opinion, the said offences do not
have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. In this connection,
we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Piyush
Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1)
SCC 322, wherein, the detention order was made on the basis of the
registration of the two prohibition offences. The Apex Court after
referring the case of Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1)
SCC 10 held and observed that mere disturbance of law and order leading
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R/SCR.A/4420/2026 ORDER DATED: 15/04/2026
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to detention order is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under
preventive detention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer, which read
thus:
"17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in
Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, where the distinction between
`law and order' and `public order' has been clearly laid down.
Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:
10. "Does the expression `public order' take in every kind of
infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest
that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead
to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault
each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is
disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under
the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions
of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the
ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of
any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect
public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In
this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious
and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the
community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor
breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily
injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public
interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is
thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive
Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order
comes within the scope of the Act."
18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion, has
failed to substantiate that the alleged anti- social activities of the petitioner
adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public
order. It is true some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place,
as alleged by the witnesses. But, such incidents, in our view, do not have
any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be
punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts
constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of
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R/SCR.A/4420/2026 ORDER DATED: 15/04/2026
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the life of the community. It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger
within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a
bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the
Act unless, as laid down in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his
activities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely
the maintenance of public order We have carefully considered the offences
alleged against the petitioner in the order of detention and also the
allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion, these offences or the
allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic
or terror among the members of the public of the area in question giving
rise to the question of maintenance of public order. The order of detention
cannot, therefore, be upheld."
7. For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered opinion that, the
material on record are not sufficient for holding that the alleged activities
of the detenue have either affected adversely or likely to affect adversely
the maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective satisfaction
arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and
in accordance with law.
8. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order impugned
dated 23.03.2026 passed by the respondent authority is hereby quashed.
We direct the detenue to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in
any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service
permitted.
(ILESH J. VORA,J)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
MVP
