[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Ashish Khurana vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax ... on 8 April, 2026
Author: A.S. Supehia
Bench: A.S. Supehia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3994 of 2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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ASHISH KHURANA
Versus
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE - 2(3)
AHMEDABAD
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Appearance:
MR. TUSHAR HEMANI, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MS VAIBHAVI K
PARIKH(3238) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR.VARUN K.PATEL(3802) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI
Date : 08/04/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)
1. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. Tushar Hemani appearing with
Learned Advocate Ms. Vaibhavi K. Parikh for the petitioner and
learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Varun K. Patel for the
respondent.
2. Having regard to the controversy involved, with the consent of the
learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is taken up
for final hearing.
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3. RULE. Learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Varun K Patel waives
service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondent.
4. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner challenges the notice dated 22.03.2025 issued under
Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short "the Act")
seeking to re-open income tax assessment of the petitioner for the
Assessment Year 2015-16 (for short "the assessment year under
consideration") by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,
Central Circle 2(3), Ahmedabad (for short "the respondent").
4.1 The petitioner is an individual who filed his return of income for the
assessment year 2015-16 on 29.02.2016 declaring total income at
Rs.91,03,120/-. The petitioner is part of MSK Group which is
engaged in the business of infrastructure development. The said
MSK and Madhav Group of Gujarat including the petitioner were
subjected to search action under Section 132 of the Act on
18.05.2024. The Respondent issued a notice dated 22.03.2025 under
Section 148 of the Act for the year under consideration. It is stated
therein that a search was initiated under Section 132 of the Act on
18.05.2024 in the case of the Petitioner or in the case of the person
in respect of which the Petitioner is assessable under the Act. It was
further stated that the Respondent is satisfied, with the approval of
Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, that the books of
accounts or documents, seized or requisitioned under section 132 or
section 132A of the Act in the case of MSK and Madhav Group
pertains or pertain to, or any information contained therein, relate to
the Petitioner or the person in respect of which, the Petitioner is
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assessable under the Act and hence, the notice dated 22.03.2025 is
issued under Section 148 of the Act after obtaining prior approval of
Directorate General of Income Tax (Investigation), Ahmedabad. The
Petitioner has challenged the said notice under Section 148 of the
Act principally on the ground of limitation.
5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Tushar P. Hemani for the petitioner
submitted that the respondent has acted illegally and without
jurisdiction while issuing Notice under Section 148 of the Act as the
same is barred by limitation. It was further contended that the
impugned notice is time-barred under the statutory scheme
governing search assessment. It was submitted that in the present
case, search action in question was carried out on 18.05.2024 i.e.
during the Financial Year 2024-25. Since the search under Section
132 of the Act was initiated on or after 1 st April, 2021 but before 1st
September, 2024, the provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the Act as
they stood immediately before the commencement of Finance (No.
2) Act, 2024 shall apply as contemplated under Section 152(3) of the
Act. Hence, relying upon Section 149 of the Act, it is contended that
the Notice under Section 148 of the Act can be issued up to six years
from the end of the relevant assessment year. Further, relying upon
the Section 153A of the Act, it is submitted that Notice under
Section 153A of the Act can be issued for a period of "ten
assessment years" immediately preceding the assessment year
relevant to the previous year in which search is carried out and for
the "relevant assessment years", subject to fulfillment of certain
conditions.
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5.1 It is further submitted that the "relevant assessment year" means
assessment year preceding the assessment year relevant to the
previous year in which search is carried out or requisition is made,
which falls beyond six assessment years but not later than ten
assessment years from the "end of the assessment year relevant to
the previous year in which search is conducted".
5.2 Reference is also made to the provisions of Section 149 of the Act,
more particularly the proviso to Section 149 read with explanation -
1 to Section 153A of the Act, and it is submitted that so far as the
limitation is concerned, for reopening of the assessment, the same is
pari materia to Section 153C of the Act.
5.3 It is submitted that in the instant case, the search action was carried
out in the case of third party on 18.05.2024 i.e. during the Financial
Year 2024-25, and hence relevant assessment year to the previous
year in which the search was undertaken under Section 132 of the
Act is Assessment Year 2025-26. It is further submitted that the
notice under Section 148 of the Act for the Assessment Year 2015-
16 would be time-barred, as the period of ten years would end at the
Assessment Year 2016-17, since the Assessment Year 2025-26 will
become the first assessment year as per the provisions of Section
153A of the Act. The table showing the calculation was placed
before this Court and the same is reproduced as under:
Number Assessment Year
1st year Assessment Year 2025-26
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2nd year Assessment Year 2024-25
3rd year Assessment Year 2023-24
4th year Assessment Year 2022-23
5th year Assessment Year 2021-22
6th year Assessment Year 2020-21
7th year Assessment Year 2019-20
8th year Assessment Year 2018-19
9th year Assessment Year 2017-18
10th year Assessment Year 2016-17
5.4 In support of his submissions, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Hemani
has placed reliance on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the
case of Dinesh Jindal vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
[2024] 164 taxmann.com 746 / 469 ITR 32 (Delhi) / Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 12091 of 2023 decided on 27.05.2024. Reliance is also
placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of
Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Central-1) vs. Ojjus
Medicare (P.) Ltd. [2024] 161 taxmann.com 160 / 465 ITR 101
(Delhi). Finally, he has also placed reliance on the judgment of
Madras High Court, Bench at Madurai, passed in A.R. Safiullah vs.
ACIT [Writ Petition (MD) No. 4327 of 2021, dated 24-3-2021].
5.5 Thus, it is urged that the impugned notice issued under Section 148
of the Act for the assessment year 2015-16 may be quashed and set
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aside.
6. Per contra, learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Varun Patel for the
respondent Department opposed the petition and contended that the
impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act is valid and within the
limitation. It is further contended that since the search was initiated
after 01.04.2021, the old Section 153A/153C assessment regime
does not apply to the present case. Instead, the case falls under the
new Section 148/149 reassessment regime introduced by the Finance
Act, 2021. Under the new Section 149(1)(b), the limitation period is
not calculated backward from the search year. Instead, a notice can
be issued if not more than 10 years have elapsed from the end of the
relevant assessment year, provided the escaped income is Rs. 50
lakhs or more. Accordingly, the notice for AY 2015-16 is perfectly
valid and within the limitation period.
7. It is further submitted that the petitioner assessee in support of the
contention regarding inclusion of search year has wrongly construed
the word 'end' used in the explanation 1 to Section 153A, which is
otherwise missing in the notes on clauses and the memorandum
explaining the provisions. It is further submitted that the assessment
year has two ends, one 1st April, and 2nd 31st March. For the purpose
of going forward, the end would be considered as 31 st March.
Whereas for the purpose of going backward, the end would be
considered as 1st April. Thus, since it is required to go backward for
purpose of calculating 10 assessment years, 'end' is to be construed
as 1st April. It is therefore submitted that considering the aforesaid
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contentions and the legislative intent as borne out from the notes on
clauses and memorandum explaining the provisions relating to
Finance Act, 2017, for purpose of calculating 10 assessment years,
search year is to be excluded and it is always to be considered as six
plus four assessment years and therefore, 'end' is to be construed as
1st April for going backward for making the said provision
effectively workable as per the legislative intent. It is submitted that
the purpose of introducing the amendment was to extend the reach
of assessing officer and therefore while interpreting the provisions of
Section 153A of I.T., apart from the six previous assessment years,
the authority of assessing officer must include for another four years,
otherwise the intention of the legislature and purpose of the proviso
would be defeated.
7.1 While referring to Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act, it is
contended that the "relevant assessment year" which finds place in
the provisions of Section 153A(b) of the Act cannot be construed by
adopting two different methodologies - one wherein, for calculating
the six assessment years, the period would start from the previous
year in which such search is conducted or requisition is made, and
for the very same assessee, if it is found that the income of Rs.50
lakhs has escaped, for calculating ten years, the first assessment year
has to be ignored. In other words, if search year is included for
calculating period of 10 A.Ys. as contended by the petitioner, there
will be two different calculations, first, for six AYs excluding the
search year and second, for 10 A.Ys. including the search year,
which cannot be legislative intent. It is also submitted that the
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assessment year in which search was conducted, cannot be included
while calculating ten assessment years, otherwise, A.Y. 2019-20 will
come under both i.e. original six assessment years preceding the
relevant assessment year in which search was carried (as 6th AY) and
under extended category of ten assessment years also (as 7th AY) and
the same could not be the intention of the legislature. The following
statement containing the calculation of ten assessment year as per
Assessee's case and Revenue's case corroborates the aforesaid
contentions:
No of Assessee's Revenue's calculation
Year. calculation of of 10A.Ys.
10A.Ys. (Excluding search
(including year)
search year)
1. 2025-26 2024-25
2. 2024-25 2023-24
3. 2023-24 2022-23
4. 2022-23 2021-22
5. 2021-22 2020-21
6. 2020-21 2019-20
7. 2019-20 2018-19
8. 2018-19 2017-18
9. 2017-18 2016-17
10. 2016-17 2015-16
7.2 It is further submitted that in case of Bhavin Kishorbhai Zinzuwadia
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Vs. ACIT [2024] 169 Taxmann.com 505 (Guj.) this Hon'ble Court
has already decided this issue accepting the calculations of 10
assessment years for the purpose of Section 153C excluding the
search year/the year in which the incriminating material is received
by AO of other person.
7.3 An attempt is also made to distinguish the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare (supra), by submitting that
two methods cannot be adopted for computation of the six-year
block period as mentioned in Sections 153A and 153C of the Act
and for calculation of the ten-year block period by excluding the
previous year from computation of ten years. Thus, it is urged that
this Court may take a different view, disagreeing with the judgments
of the Delhi High Court as well as the Kerala High Court, and it is
urged that the action of the respondent may be upheld for reopening
the Assessment Year 2015-16.
7.4 Thus, it is urged that the action of the respondent in issuing the
impugned notice for the A.Y. 2015-16 under Section 148 of the Act
may be upheld and the present petition may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND OPINION:
8. We have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties at
length. We have also perused the case laws cited, considered the
provisions threadbare and have also perused the material on record.
9. The sole issue that arises for consideration in the present petition is
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that -
(i) Whether the notice issued by the respondent for the Assessment
Year 2015-16 is barred by limitation;
(ii) Dealing with this issue, uncontroverted facts are that the search took
place in the case of the petitioner on 18.05.2024 which indisputably
falls in the Financial Year 2024-25 and Assessment Year 2025-26.
Therefore, the date of search would be taken into consideration for
the purpose of initiation of proceedings under Section 153A of the
Act. Keeping that legal principle in mind, ten years that could be
covered subject to fulfilling other conditions emanating from the
statute, would be as under:
Number Assessment Year
1st year Assessment Year 2025-26
2nd year Assessment Year 2024-25
3rd year Assessment Year 2023-24
4th year Assessment Year 2022-23
5th year Assessment Year 2021-22
6th year Assessment Year 2020-21
7th year Assessment Year 2019-20
8th year Assessment Year 2018-19
9th year Assessment Year 2017-18
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10th year Assessment Year 2016-17
The only difference between the calculation as per the revenue
and the petitioner is the inclusion or exclusion of the search year.
Revenue contends that while calculating the period of ten years,
search year is to be excluded and the calculation starts from
assessment year immediately preceding the previous year relevant
to the assessment year in which search is conducted whereas the
petitioner's contention is that the calculation of the period of ten
years would include the search year.
10. The short controversy turns upon whether, while computing the ten-
year block, the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which search is conducted (hereinafter "the search assessment year")
is to be included in the reckoning, unlike the computation of six
assessment years which expressly excludes it.
11. With reference to the relevant assessment year, it is necessary to
refer to the provisions of Section 153A(1)(b) of the Act which reads
as under :
"Section 153A(1)(b) : (The Assessing Officer shall) assess or
reassess the total income of six assessment years immediately
preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which such search is conducted or requisition is made and for
the relevant assessment year or years."
11.1 The key expression that flows from reading of the section is "six
assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year
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relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted" and
"for the relevant assessment year or years." is phrased
independently, disjointed from earlier phrase.
12. In juxtaposition, the Fourth Proviso permits assessment beyond six
years subject to specified conditions and refers to "relevant
assessment year" as stated in Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the
Act defines "relevant assessment year" as:
"For the purpose of this sub-section, the expression "relevant
assessment year" shall mean an assessment year preceding
the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
search is conducted or requisition is made which falls beyond
six assessment years but not later than ten assessment years
from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous
year in which search is conducted or requisition is made."
12.1 The key expression that flows from reading of the section is "not
later than ten assessment years from the end of the assessment year
relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted".
13. Thus, the computational framework of Section 153A of the Act,
including Explanation 1, applies pari materia to the proceedings
under Section 153C of the Act. A plain reading of Section 153A of
the Act reveals that the Parliament has consciously adopted two
different phraseologies:
Six-Year Block Ten-Year Block
"six assessment years "not later than ten assessment years
immediately preceding" from the end of the assessment year"
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13.1 This linguistic distinction is deliberate and must be given full effect.
Under Section 153A(1)(b) of the Act, the anchor point is "the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted". Therefore, six years must be "immediately preceding"
that assessment year. The phrase "immediately preceding"
necessarily excludes the search assessment year itself. In contrast
thereto, Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the Act introduces a
materially different formulation: "not later than ten assessment years
from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which search is conducted". This computation mechanism does not
use the phrase "immediately preceding" but instead, requires
reckoning from the end of the assessment year relevant to the
previous year of search. Thus, the assessment year relevant to the
previous year of search becomes the reference year and the ten-year
period is counted from the end of that assessment year. This
necessarily includes the search assessment year within the ten-year
framework and resultantly, the search year becomes the first year in
the reckoning of the ten-year block.
13.2 If Parliament intended identical computation for both six and ten
years, it would have used identical language. Instead, it has
consciously used different phraseology, for six years "immediately
preceding" and for ten years "from the end of the assessment year".
Legally, it is well settled that while interpreting plain language of a
Statute, the Court must give meaning to every word used by the
Legislature. To compute ten years by excluding the search year (as
is done for six years) would render the phrase "from the end of the
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assessment year" otiose and merge two distinct statutory schemes
into one that would violate settled principles of statutory
interpretation. The scheme of Section 153A reflects calibrated
expansion in as much as ordinary search assessment would be
computed as six years immediately preceding the search year
whereas exceptional extended jurisdiction up to ten years is not a
mere arithmetic extension of the six-year model; it is governed by a
separately structured computational rule. The Legislature, in its
wisdom, has consciously created:
A backward-looking "preceding" model (six years), and
A reckoning "from the end of the assessment year" model (ten
years).
13.3 Thus, it can be concluded that Section 153A of the Act prescribes
two distinct and independent computational regimes. The six
assessment years are those "immediately preceding" the assessment
year relevant to the previous year of search, thereby excluding the
search year whereas the ten assessment years under Explanation 1 of
Section 153A of the Act are to be computed "from the end of the
assessment year" relevant to the previous year of search. The
statutory language necessarily results in inclusion of the search
assessment year within the ten-year reckoning. Any interpretation
that applies the six-year exclusion model, if made applicable to the
ten-year block, would defeat the legislative scheme and render
material words redundant. Accordingly, while computing the
extended ten-year period under Explanation 1 to Section 153A read
with Section 153C of the Act, the assessment year relevant to the
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previous year of search is to be included in the reckoning.
13.4 Even otherwise, this issue is no more res integra as the same is
covered by the judgement of this Court in the case of Jayantibhai
Karamshibhai Maniya vs. Income-tax Officer, [2026] 182
taxmann.com 493 (Guj.). This Court has taken a view, after
considering the earlier judgement in the case of Bhavin Zinzuwadia
(supra), that while calculating the period of ten years under Section
153C of the Act, keeping in mind the language of Explanation 1 to
Section 153A of the Act, the search year or the year in which seized
material is received by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the
petitioner is required to be taken into consideration. Relevant extract
of the said judgement can be usefully referred to as under:
" 9.2 The provisions of Sections 153A / 153C of the Act find place in the
proviso to Section 149 of the Act and, hence, the limitation as provided
in Sections 153A / 153C of the Act gets triggered upon the initiation of
assessment proceedings emanating from a search under Sections 132 /
132A of the Act. We may, at this stage, mention that the Delhi High
Court as well as the Madras High Court has already considered the
implications of Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act to the
limitation and the expression "relevant assessment year" used therein
in Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act. The Delhi High Court, in
the case of Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd. (supra), after considering an array
of judgments of other High Courts as well as of the Supreme Court and
upon a threadbare consideration and analysis of the statutory
provisions of Sections 153A, 148 and 149 of the Act, has held thus:
" 88 Section 153A replicates the basis on which the six AYs' are to
be identified and computed with the solitary distinction being that in
the case of the searched person, the six AYs' are liable to be
computed from the AY pertaining to the FY in which the search was
conducted. The starting point for the purpose of identifying the six
AYs' in the case of section 153A would thus turn upon the year of
search as opposed to the handover of material which is spoken of in
the First Proviso to section 153C. If one were to therefore assume
that a search took place on a person between 01 April 2021 to 31
March 2022, the pertinent AY would become AY 2022-23 and the
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corresponding six AYs' would by as follows:
Computation of the six-year block period as provided No of years
under section 153C of the Act
89. That takes us then to the issue of identifying the "relevant
assessment year" for the purposes of computing the ten year block.
Explanation 1 to section 153A specifies the manner in which the
entire ten AY period is to be computed. While the computation of six
AYs follows the position as enunciated and identified above,
Explanation I prescribes that the ten AYs' would have to be
computed from the end of the AY relevant to the FY in which the
search was conducted or requisition made The ten AY period
consequently is to be reckoned from the end of the AY pertaining to
the previous year in which the search was conducted as distinct
from the preceding year which is spoken of in the case of the six
relevant AYs.
90. Viewed in that light, and while keeping the period of 01 April
2021 to 31 March 2022 as the constant, the relevant AY would be
AY 2022-23. The ten AYs would have to be computed from 31
March 2023with the said date indubitably constituting the end of the
AY relevant to the previous year of search. Viewed in light of the
above, the block period of 10 AYs would be as follows.-
Computation of the six-year block period as provided No of years
under section 153C read with Section 153Aof the Act
91 Tested on the aforesaid precepts, it would be manifest that AY
2022-23 would form the first year of the block of ten AYs'
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terminating in AY 2013-14. We, in this regard also bear in
consideration the following instructive passages as appearing in the
decision handed down by a learned Judge of the Madras High
Court in A. R. Safiullah. We deem it appropriate to extract the
following paragraphs from that decision:-
"9 Explanation-I is clear as to the manner of computation of the
ten assessment years. It clearly and firmly fixes the starting point.
It is the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year
in which search is conducted or requisition is made. There
cannot be any doubt that since search was made in this case on
10.04.2018, the assessment year is 2019-20. The end of the
assessment year 2019-20 is 31.03.2020. The computation of ten
years has to run backwards from the said date i.e. 31.03.2020.
The first year will of course be the search assessment year itself.
In that event, the ten assessment years will be as follows:
1st Year 2019-20
2nd Year 2018-19
3rd Year 2017-18
4th Year 2016-17
5th Year 2015-16
6th Year 2014-15
7th Year 2013-14
8th Year 2012-13
9th Year 2011-2012
10th Year 2010-2011
The case on hand pertains to AY 2009-10. It is obviously beyond the
ten year outer ceiling limit prescribed by the statute. The terminal
point is the tenth year calculated from the end of the assessment
year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted. The
long arm of the law can go up to this terminal point and not one day
beyond. When the statute is clear and admits of no ambiguity, it has
to be strictly construed and there is no scope for looking to the
explanatory notes appended to statute or circular issued by the
department.
10. In the case on hand, the statute has prescribed one mode of
computing the six years and another mode for computing the ten
years. Section 153A(1)(b) states that the assessing officer shall
assess or reassess the total income of six years immediately
preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which search is conducted. Applying this yardstick, the six years
would go up to 2013-14. The search assessment year, namely, 2019-
20 has to be excluded. This is because, the statute talks of the six
years preceding the search assessment year. But, while computing
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the ten assessment years, the starting point has to be the end of the
search assessment year. In other words, search assessment year has
to be including in the latter case. It is not for me to fathom the
wisdom of the parliament. I cannot assume that the amendment
introduced by the Finance Act, 2017 intended to bring in four more
years over and above the six years already provided within the
scope of the provision. When the law has prescribed a particular
length, it is not for the court to stretch it. Plasticity is the new
mantra in neuroscience, thanks to the teachings of Norman Doidge.
It implies that contrary to settled wisdom, even brain structure can
be changed. But not so when it comes to a provision in a taxing
statute that is free of ambiguity Such a provision cannot be
elastically construed.
11. One other contention urged by the standing counsel has to be
dealt with. It is pointed out that the petitioner has invoked the writ
jurisdiction at the notice stage. Since the petitioner has
demonstrated that the subject assessment year lies beyond the ambit
of the provision, the respondent has no jurisdiction to issue the
impugned notice Once lack of jurisdiction has been established, the
maintainability of the writ petition cannot be in doubt."
In our considered opinion, the decision in A.R Safiullah correctly
expounds the legal position and the interpretation liable to be
accorded to the identification of the ten AYs which are spoken of in
sections153A and 153C."
9.3 Thus, it is precisely held hereinabove that the statute prescribes
different modes of computation for six years and ten years. We
reiterate that the provisions of Section 153A(1)(b) of the Act stipulate
that the Assessing Officer shall assess or reassess the total income of
six years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the
previous year in which the search is conducted. However, the ten
assessment year period, consequently, is to be reckoned from the end of
the assessment year pertaining to the previous year in which the search
was conducted, as distinct from the preceding year which is spoken of
in the case of the six relevant assessment years. Thus, the contention
with regard to the computation of six years as well as ten years under
the provisions of Section 153A of the Act has already been gone into by
the Delhi High Court as well as the Madras High Court, and we have
no convincing reason to take a divergent view from the view expressed
hereinabove. Applying the aforesaid computation to the facts of the
present case, taking the date of the search as 09.05.2024 during the
Financial Year 2024-25, the Assessment Year 2025-26 will become the
first assessment year and, in the same manner, the Assessment Year
2016-17 will become the tenth assessment year. Thus, the year under
consideration, namely, Assessment Year 201516, for which the
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impugned notice has been issued under Section 148 of the Act, would
fall beyond the period of ten years prescribed under the statute as it
stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021,
and hence, on this count, the impugned notice can be said to be barred
by limitation. "
14. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned Notice issued under
Section 148 of the Act dated 22.03.2025 for A.Y. 2015-16 is barred
by limitation as the same falls beyond the permissible period of ten
years. We, therefore, quash and set aside the Notice dated
22.03.2025 issued under Section 148 of the Act for Assessment Year
2015-16 on the ground of limitation. Accordingly, the present writ
petition is allowed. RULE is made absolute. No order as to cost.
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)
(PRANAV TRIVEDI,J)
SAJ GEORGE/DB/42
