Gujarat High Court
Pravinkumar Shankarlal Patel vs Jadiben Somabhai Senma on 1 September, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 311 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025
In R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 311 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJEEV J.THAKER Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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PRAVINKUMAR SHANKARLAL PATEL
Versus
JADIBEN SOMABHAI SENMA & ORS.
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Appearance:
JAYDEEPSINH H RAJPUT(8185) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR ABHISHEK R SHARMA(10751) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJEEV J.THAKER
Date : 01/09/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present Second Appeal has been filed under section 100 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code")
challenging the judgement and decree passed by the 3 rd
Additional District Judge, Mahesana, in Regular Civil Appeal
no.73 of 2025, whereby the judgement and decree passed by
Additional Civil Judge, Vijapur, in Regular Civil Suit no.14 of
2025 rejecting the plaint has been confirmed.
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2. For the sake of brevity and convenience the parties are referred
to as per their original status as that in the suit.
3. The brief facts arising in the present Second Appeal are that
the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit no.14 of 2025,
challenging the sale deed executed by defendant nos.1 to 4 in
favour of the defendant nos.5 and 6, dated 13.01.2025, to be
illegal, ultra vires, null and void and void-ab-initio. It is the
case of the plaintiff that the father of the defendant nos.1 to 4
had agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff in the year
2005 and in view of the fact that the suit property was a new
tenure land i.e. restricted land and as sale deed could not be
executed, the father of the defendant nos.1 to 4 did not execute
the sale deed and it is the case of the plaintiff that father of the
defendant nos.1 to 4 had taken entire sale consideration by
cash and therefter, the possession of the suit property was
handed over to the plaintiffs on 23.05.2005, and since then, the
plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and since last
more than 20 years, the plaintiff is in possession without any
objection from the father of the defendant or defendant nos.1
to 4 and in view of the fact that the suit property was a new
tenure land, the name of the defendants were stated to be
owner of the property and in view of the fact that the plaintiff
could not seek specific performance of the contract the
defendant nos.1 to 4 in collusion with each other, executed
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sale deed in favour of the defendant nos.5 and 6 on 13.01.2025
and as defendant nos.5 and 6 tried to object the plaintiff's
possession of the suit property, the plaintiff filed a suit on the
ground that, as the plaintiff has purchased the property from
defendant nos.1 to 4 since 23.05.2005, by taking the entire sale
consideration, the plaintiff has become owner of the property
and the fact that the plaintiff is in possession of the property
since 23.05.2005 by virtue of agreement between the plaintiff
and father of the defendant nos.1 to 4, the plaintiff has sought
title by way of adverse possession. The Trial Court suo motu
held that the plaintiff's claim of occupying the premises based
on the fact that the possession was handed over was with
respect to a property which is a new tenure land.
4. Moreover, the plaintiff's entire case is based on the fact that
the plaintiff is in possession of the property by virtue of the
understanding that the father of the defendant nos.1 to 4 have
sold the suit property to the plaintiff and therefore, the plaintiff
claimed adverse possession of the suit property. Moreover, it
has also been observed in the order passed by the Trial Court
while rejecting the plaint that the plaint is barred by law on the
ground that, the plaint is hit by Section 43 of the Gujarat
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and that there are
no averments in the plaint to justify the case of the plaintiff on
adverse possession and therefore by an order dated
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03.04.2025, the plaint was rejected. Aggrieved by the said
order, the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Appeal no.73 of 2025
and after reappreciating the facts the said Appeal was
dismissed, hence the present second appeal.
5. Learned advocate for the plaintiff has mainly argued that the
fact that as the plaintiff was claiming title by way of adverse
possession the same could not be a ground for the Court to
reject the plaint. It has been argued by the learned advocate for
the plaintiff that the plaintiff has not sought for specific
performance of the understanding and therefore also the Trial
Court could not have held that the plaint is barred under the
provisions of Section 43 of the Gujarat Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
6. Learned advocate for the plaintiff has also argued that the Trial
Court also could not have come to the conclusion that there are
no averments made in the plaint that since, which date and
how the possession of the suit property, has become hostile to
the owner of the property and as to on which date, the plaintiff
has claimed right by way of title by adverse possession.
7. Learned advocate for the plaintiff has relied upon judgement
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reported in 2007 14 SCC 792 in case of Utha Moidu Haji vs
Kuningarath Kunhabdulla And Ors and has argued that the
transaction by which the plaintiff entered into possession of
the land was a void transaction, the possession of the plaintiff
had become adverse from the date he is in possession and
therefore, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court could
not have rejected the plaint under the provisions of Order VII
Rule 11 of the Code and in view of the same, it has been
argued that the present Second Appeal is required to be
admitted on the following substantial questions of law:
"A.Whether the plaint seeking declaration of
ownership by way of adverse possession can
be rejected at the threshold under Order VII
Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 merely on teh ground that the initial
possession was based on an alleged void
agreement to sell, without affording the
plaintiff an opportunity to lead evidence in
support of the plea of advserse possession?
B. Whether the plaintiff's claim of adverse
possession is liable to be rejected in law
solely on the ground that the plaint does not
specify the exact date on which possession
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became hostile, despite clear averments of
continuous, open, and exclusive possession
for over twelve years in denial of the true
owner's title?
C. Whether the possession obtained under a
void or unenforceable agreement can, in law,
be treated as permissive, when such
agreement is non est and incapable of
conferring legal rights, thereby necessitating
a fact-based inquiy into the nature of
possession rather than a presumption of
permissiveness?"
8. Having heard learned advocate for the plaintiff and having
considered the plaint and judgement and decree passed by the
Trial Court and confirmed by the First Appellate Court, the
following are the undisputed facts:
(i) The plaintiff has filed a suit on the ground that on
23.05.2005, there was an understanding between plaintiff and
father of defendant nos.1 to 4, whereby the suit property was
to be sold to the plaintiff.
(ii) At the time of the said understanding of selling the suit
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property to the plaintiff, the suit property was a new tenure
land (restricted land) and pursuant to the payment of entire
sale consideration, the possession of the property was handed
over to the plaintiff on 23.05.2005.
(iii) A power of attorney was also executed by father of the
defendent nos.1 to 4, whereby all powers including the power
to convert the suit property from new tenure land to old tenure
land was also given.
(iv) In the plaint the plaintiff has pleaded that as the suit
property was a new tenure land, a registered sale deed could
not be executed but on 23.05.2005, the plaintiff has become
owner of the property and defendant nos.1 to 4 did not have
any right, title, interest in the property.
(v) In the plaint, the plaintiff has also stated that, time and
again the plaintiff has tried to approach defendent nos.1 to 4 to
request them to execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and
that defendant nos.1 to 4 have given false and evasive replies.
(vi) On 10.01.2025, by way of Revenue Entry No.6617, the
names of defendant nos.1 to 4 were entered in the revenue
record, in view of the death of the father of defendant nos.1 to
4 i.e. Somabhai Manibhai.
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(vii) On 13.01.2025, the defendant nos.1 to 4 executed sale
deed in favour of defendent nos.5 to 6.
(viii) Even at para no.10 of the plaint, the plaintiff has stated
that the cause of action has arisen in view of the fact that the
defendant nos.1 to 4 had given assurances and promises to
execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and have failed to
execute a sale deed.
9. In view of the same, the fact remains that the plaintiff has not
filed a suit for specific performance, though it is a specific
case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is occupying the premises
by virtue of an agreement between the plaintiff and father of
the defendant nos.1 to 4 in 2005.
10. If the entire plaint is carefuly considered, the plantiff has
nowhere stated that, as to on which and how his possession has
become hostile as to that of the original owners i.e. defendant
nos.1 to 4.
11. The entire suit is based on the fact that the plaintiff is in
possession of the property by virtue of an understanding in the
year 2005, and that the father of defendant nos.1 to 4 shall
execute sale deed in favour of the paintiff. The Fact remains
that Agreement on which the Plaintiff is seeking specific
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performance also states that the suit property is a new tenure
land and in the Plaint also, there is a clear averment that the
suit property is a new tenure land. At the time when the
Agreement, dated 17.03.1995, was entered into between the
parties, the suit property was new tenure land and the same
was to be converted into an old tenure land and thereafter the
sale-deed was to be executed between the parties. Therefore,
the admitted position before the Court is that, an Agreement
that was entered into between the parties was with respect to
new tenure land and hence, its sale or agreement to sell was
barred by law under Section 43 of the Tenancy Actwhich reads
as under:
"43. (1) No land or any interest therein purchased
by a tenant under section 17B, 32, 32F, 32-I. 6[*],
7[32U, 43-1D or 88E] or sold to any person under
section 32P or 64 shall be transferred or shall be
agreed by an instrument in writing to be
transferred, by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease
or assignment, without the previous sanction of the
Collector and except in consideration of payment of
such amount as the State Government may by
general or special order determine; and no such
land or any interest, therein shall be partitioned
without the previous sanction of the Collector.
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[Provided that no previous sanction of the Collector
shall be required, if the partition of the land is among
the members of the family who have direct blood
relation or among the legal heirs of the tenant:
Provided further that the partition of the land as
aforesaid shall not be valid if it is made in
contravention of the provisions of any other law for
the time being in force: Provided also that such
members of the family or the legal heirs shall hold the
land, after the partition, on the same terms, conditions
and restrictions as were applicable to such land or
interest therein purchased by the tenant or the person.
12. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Bharatbhai Devashibhai Ukani vs. Vinaben Babaji and
ors. in First Appeal No. 4023 of 2023 in Para 11, has referred
to the issue in question that has been decided by the Full
Bench in the case of deceased Shaikh Ismailbhai Husenbhai
thro' Legal Heirs (supra), which reads as under:
"11. Issue, in question is no longer res-integra in
view of the recent judgment of the Full Bench, in
the case of deceased Shaikh Ismailbhai
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Hushainbhai through legal heirs (supra). The Full
Bench, has confined its examination to the
provision of Section 43 of the Act of 1948.
Paragraph 21 in this behalf reads thus;
"21. Furthermore, in light of the controversy
before us, as can be seen from the previous
decisions of this Court noted hereinbefore, we do
not find any reason to enlarge the scope of the
reference and confine ourselves to the question of
reference to examine "whether a plaint is liable to
be rejected on the ground that the suit for specific
performance of contract based on an illegal or
invalid agreement to sell, hit by Section 43 of the
Tenancy Act,1948, is not maintainable?"
13. In view of the said judgment it has been held and observed that
it is only the Civil Court that can look into the fact as to whether the
agreement on the basis of which the suit for specific performance is
instituted is a valid agreement and not hit by any statutory provisions
or forbidden by law or opposed to public policy.
14. If the agreement itself is invalid being hit by section 43 of the
Tenancy Act, no cause of action can be said to have arisen asking
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Defendant to perform his part of the contract and there is no sanction
and the agreement itself is illegal and invalid. Para 12 of the
decision rendered in First Appeal No. 4023 of 2023 reads as under:
"12. It has been held and observed that the Civil
Court, alone can look into the fact that as to
whether the agreement on the basis of which, the
suit for specific performance is instituted is a valid
agreement, not hit by any statutory provision, or
forbidden by law or oppose to public policy. The
Full Bench, has also considered the object and
scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, and
referred to the judgment in the case of Dahiben vs.
Arvindbhai Bhanusali (Gajara) dead through LHS.,
reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366, wherein, it has been
held and observed that the cause of action for a suit
for specific performance of an agreement of refusal
by the Vendor inspite of readiness and willingness
of the vendee to execute the sale deed, will not be
existing in a case where the agreement itself is
invalid being hit by Section 43 of the Act of 1948,
inasmuch as, no cause of action can be said to have
arisen, asking the Defendant to perform his part of
the contract when there is no sanction and the
agreement itself is illegal or invalid. Paragraphs
138, 139, 151 and 153 of the judgment of Full
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Bench, read thus:
"138. We may clarify that we are not concerned
with the dispute pertaining to the validity of an
agreement, i.e. the dispute whether an agreement is hit
by Section 43 or not, i.e. whether it is valid or not?
The issue before us is plain and simple; as to whether
the agreement which has been executed with a view to
transfer a restricted tenure land as prescribed in
Section 43(1), without the permission of the Collector,
can be specifically enforced by the Civil Court by
granting a decree of specific performance of such an
agreement." Our concern is about the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court to decide on the question of
enforceability of such an agreement of sale, which in
our considered opinion clearly resides in the Civil
Court as held by the Division Bench in Ganpatlal
(supra). The Civil Court alone will have jurisdiction to
adjudicate on the question of enforceability of the
agreement of sale, on the basis of which the suit for
specific performance has been executed. It is the Civil
Court which alone can look into the fact as to whether
the agreement on the basis of which the suit for
specific performance is instituted is a valid agreement,
not hit by any statutory provision, or forbidden by law
or opposed to public policy.
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139. The question as to enforceability of an
agreement hit by Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, 1948,
to grant a decree of specific performance, cannot be
by any stretch of imagination, a question within the
scope of the jurisdiction of the revenue authority
under the Tenancy Act, 1948. There is no gainsaying
that Civil Court will not be required to stay a suit for
specific performance based on an agreement hit by
Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act, 1948 and relegate
the parties to approach the Mamaltdar to decide on
the question of validity of such an agreement. (g)
Enforceability of the agreement hit by Section 43 of
the Tenancy Act:-
151. On a careful reading of the provision in Order VII,
Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the law laid
down by the Apex Court in Dahiben (supra), in light of
the dispute before us, we may note that in order to
maintain the suit for specific performance of agreement,
which is hit by Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act, 1948,
the Plaintiff would be required to disclose the cause of
action for seeking a decree of specific performance of
such an agreement. The cause of action for a suit for
specific performance of an agreement of refusal by the
Vendor inspite of readiness and willingness of the
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vendee to execute the sale deed, will not be existing in a
case where the agreement itself is invalid being hit by
Section 43(1), inasmuch as, no cause of action can be
said to have arisen asking the Defendant to perform his
part of the contract when there is no sanction and the
agreement itself is illegal or invalid. Further, on the
averments made in the plaint, in conjunction with the
documents relied upon by the Plaintiff, the Civil Court
will be in a position to ascertain the question of
enforceability of the agreement. It will be in a position
to ascertain that the agreement, which is the basis of the
suit, whether is hit by Section 43(1) or not, inasmuch as,
to seek a decree of specific performance of agreement,
the Plaintiff is required to disclose and establish two
circumstances: (I) firstly, that the documents, which is
the basis of the suit is a valid document in the eye of law
and (ii) secondly, that the cause of action has arisen
prior to the presentation of the plaint. If the documents,
i.e. the agreement is an illegal or invalid document in
the eye of law, the Civil Court from the statement in the
plaint itself will ascertain the suit being barred by law.
In any case, a suit basis of which is an invalid document
in the eye of law or where there exists no cause of
action to institute the suit on the date of the
presentation of the plaint, the Civil Court will have no
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option but to reject the plaint, at the threshold, under
Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
arguments that the Civil court will be required to frame
the issue as to the validity of the agreement, which is
the basis of the suit and must necessarily proceed with
the trial to arrive at the decision as to whether the
decree of specific performance of an agreement hit by
law, is to be granted or not, does not appeal to us.
153. We are in respectful agreement with the
decision of the Division Bench in Naranbhai
Kanjibhai Gajera (supra), holding that the
Division Bench decision in Amarben (supra)
can be said to be 'per incuriam' ignoring
statutory provisions and in view of the decision
of another Division Bench dated 21.06.2021 in
Vijaybhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra), which
was challenged in Special Leave to Appeal
(Civil) No.5124 of 2022, and which has been
dismissed vide judgement and order dated
10.11.20222 affirming the Division Bench
judgement in Vijaybhai Shambhubhai Patel
(supra)."
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15. In any case, this Court is bound by the judgment of the
Hon'ble Full Bench in Shaikh Ismailbhai Hushainbhai
through legal heirs (supra) and Hon'ble Division Bench in
Bharatbhai Devashibhai Ukani vs. Vinaben Babaji and ors.
(supra). These judgments squarely cover the position of law on
the application of Order VII Rule 11 to Agreements hit by
Section 43 of the Tenancy Act and hence, they squarely apply
to the facts of the present case.
16. Therefore, in view of provisions of Section 43 of the Tenancy
Act and the admitted position that the suit property was a new
tenure land, the plaint was liable to be rejected under provisions
of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on the ground that the suit was
based on illegal and invalid agreement which is hit by section
43 of the Tenancy Act and hence, is not maintainable.
17. Therefore, the fact remains that neither the plaintiff has
sought for relief for specific performance and the plaintiff has
come forward with the case that time and again defendant
nos.1 to 4 have assured and acknowledged that the sale deed
will be executed in view of the agreement of 2005.
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18. In this background, it will be important to consider the
fact that plaintiff has not produced any document to prove his
case of claiming ownership. It is required that there has to be
some pleadings on the said fact of plaintiff having acquired
title by way of adverse possession. The pleadings must set-
forth sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the
ability to put-forth a false or exaggerated claim and pleadings
must inspire confidence and credibility and as held in the
judgment reported in Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes
vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (Dead) Through Lrs. (supra) on
vague pleadings, no issue arises. Only when the plaintiff
establishes the fact by giving details and prays in his
pleadings, the question of framing issue arises. It is mandatory
for the plaintiff to give details and produce documents
sufficient and give material particulars of his title by adverse
possession failing which, the plaintiff could not succeed. In the
present case, except for the fact in the relief claimed by
plaintiff to be owner by way of adverse possession, there are
no pleadings as to how the plaintiff is having title by way of
adverse possession.
19. Moreover the fact remains that, the plaintiffs who are
claiming adverse possession, have miserably failed to show
that, on what date he came into possession and that what was
the nature of his possession and whether the factum of
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possession, was known to the defendant and since how long
his possession has continued and the plaintiffs have also
miserably failed to prove that his possession was open and
undisturbed. All the above referred ingredients are not
mentioned in the pleadings and are also not proved in evidence
and therefore, when there are no proof in the pleadings and
there is no oral or documentary evidence, the case of the
plaintiffs without evidence will not establish a case in law.
Moreover, mere possession of the land by the plaintiffs would
not ripen into possessory title. The plaintiffs to claim right by
adverse possession must have intention and hold the suit
property adverse to the title of the defendant.
20. With respect to the claim of the plaintiffs to be in
adverse possession, the possession of the suit property by the
plaintiffs contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession
which is impliedly or expressly in denial of the title of the true
owner and for claiming possession to be adverse, the same
must be a possession by the plaintiffs, who does not
acknowledge either the defendant's right or anybody else's
right, but also denies the said right. The plaintiffs possession
for claiming adverse possession had to imply a control and
consciousness in the mind of the plaintiffs having dominion
over an object that plaintiffs have adverse possession and only
then can plaintiffs exercise it, and therefore by only holding
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possession of the suit property would not entitle the plaintiffs
into possessory title as there has to be an element to hold the
suit property adverse to the title of the true owner.
21. The possession of the premises of the plaintiffs only
implies the bare use of the suit premises land without any right
to retain it and therefore, in order to constitute adverse
possession, the plaintiffs must prove that the actual possession
of the plaintiffs was claimed by the plaintiffs as of right by
himself or by persons deriving title from him and therefore, it
was not sufficient for the plaintiffs to prove adverse possession
to show just the possession of property and for the claim of
adverse possession, the said possession along with being
actual, visible, exclusive has to be hostile and continued
during the time necessary to create a bar under the statute of
limitation. It is not enough for the plaintiffs to prove that he
was in actual possession of the property within period of
limitation, but the plaintiffs must establish his title to the
property and if the plaintiffs fail to prove his title, the suit fails
and the question of adverse possession does not arise in such a
case.
22. The judgment relied upon by learned advocate for the
defendant in the case of Rajendra Bajoria vs. Hemant Kumar
Jalan (supra) will also be of assistance to the defendant, in the
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facts of the present case in view of the fact in the said case
Apex Court has held that if the cause of action pleaded and the
relief claimed are not recognized by law of land such suit
cannot be kept alive to go to trial and the judgment Ram
Nagina Rai vs. Deo Kumar Rai (Deceased) (supra) will be
also of assistance to the defendant as in the present case also
there is nothing on record to show that the defendant's
possession over the property becomes adverse to the interest of
real owners at any point of time.
23. In view of the said facts and the fact that as per law laid
down in the case of Government of Kerala & Anr. vs. Joseph
and others reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2023 INSC
693, the proper and concrete proof as required would need for
the claimant to show some proof of possession and merely
long period of possession does not translate into the right of
adverse possession.
24. Similarly, in case of Gaya Prasad Dikshit vs. Dr. Nirmal
Chander and Another reported in 1984 (2) SCC 286 it is held
that mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a
period of more than 12 years is not enough. Wherein in the
case of Thakur Kishan Singh vs. Arvind Kumar reported in
(1994) 6 SCC 591 it is held that "A possession of a co-owner
or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to
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become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing
evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the
knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever
length of time does not result in converting the permissive
possession into adverse possession ..." (emphasis applied).
25. This Court would apt to refer also the judgment rendered
in the case of Annakili vs. A. Vedanayagam (2007) 14 SCC
308 (Two-Judges' Bench), more particularly para:24 which
reads as under:
"24. Claim by adverse possession has two elements :-
(1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse
to the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to
remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter.
Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite
ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well-settled
principle of law that mere possession of the land would not
ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor
must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to
the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only
animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same
must be shown to exist at the commencement of the
possession....."(emphasis supplied)
26. In case of Des Raj and others vs. Bhagat Ram reported
in (2007) 9 SCC 641 (Two Judges' Bench), in para:21, it is
observed thus:
"21. In a case of this nature, where long and continuous
possession of the plaintiff-respondent stands admitted, the
only question which arose for consideration by the courts
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below was as to whether the plaintiff had been in possession
of the properties in hostile declaration of his title vis-a-vis his
coowners and they were in know thereof."
27. In case of L. N. Aswathama vs. P. Prakash reported in
(2009) 13 SCC 229 (Two Judges' Bench) it has been observed
that permissive possession or possession in absence of Animus
possidendi would not constitute the claim of adverse
possession.
28. It is held in case of Chatti Konati Rao vs. Palle Venkata
Subba Rao (Two Judges' Bench) reported in (2010) 14 SCC
316, in para:15 as under:
"15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a
requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere
possession does not ripen into possessory title
until the possessor holds the property adverse to
the title of the true owner for the said purpose.
The person who claims adverse possession is
required to establish the date on which he came
in possession, nature of possession, the factum
of possession, knowledge to the true owner,
duration of possession and that possession was
open and undisturbed.......(emphasis supplied)"
29. In the present case, the plaintiff has miserably failed to
prove that he has become owner by way of adverse possession
and in view of the fact that the trial Court and the appellate
Court have rightly taken into consideration the plaint and
documentary evidence produced with the plaint. In view of the
same, no interference appears to have been called for in the
orders passed by both the Courts below.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SA/311/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2025
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30. Under the circumstances, this Second Appeal is devoid
of any substantial question of law. Both the learned Trial Court
and first appellate Court have rightly decided the dispute
between the parties in the right perspective and as stated above
no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal. The
appellants have failed to prove their case before the learned
Trial Court as well as before the First Appellate Court. This
Court does not find any substance in the present Second
Appeal as the same is devoid of any merit both on facts and
law and the same is dismissed at admission stage. The
connected application stands disposed of accordingly.
Sd/-
(SANJEEV J.THAKER,J)
URIL RANA
