Gujarat High Court
Brijeshkumar Premshankar Bhatt vs Elecon Engineering Company Ltd on 26 June, 2025
Author: A. S. Supehia
Bench: A.S. Supehia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 760 of 2025
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4664 of 2023
With
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 761 of 2025
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7539 of 2023
With
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 762 of 2025
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4780 of 2023
With
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 763 of 2025
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4697 of 2023
With
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 764 of 2025
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4716 of 2023
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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BRIJESHKUMAR PREMSHANKAR BHATT
Versus
ELECON ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD
=============================================
Appearance:
MR PARESH J BRAHMBHATT(9788) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR DIPAK DAVE, ADVOCATE FOR MR JEET Y RAJYAGURU, ADVOCATE
for MR. KIRTAN H MISTRY(10012) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 26/06/2025
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)
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1. ADMIT. Learned advocate Mr.Dipak Dave, waives service
of notice of admission on behalf of the respondent - Elecon
Engineering Company Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as "the
respondent - Company").
2. With consent of the learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties, the matters are taken up for final hearing
and are disposed of by this common judgment and order.
3. The captioned Letters Patent Appeals, filed under Clause
15 of the Letters Patent, 1865, are directed against the
common judgment and order dated 24.12.2024 passed in the
captioned writ petitions, wherein and whereby, the learned
Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions filed by the
respondent - Company, challenging the award dated
27.09.2022 passed by the Labour Court, Anand in Reference
(T) No.66 of 2014 and allied references. The employees of the
respondent - Company had raised a demand for reinstating
them with continuity of service. Accordingly, the dispute was
referred, which has culminated into the reference proceedings.
4. The Labour Court allowed the reference proceedings in
favour of the appellant - employees and directed the
respondent - Company to reinstate its employees i.e. the
appellants with continuity of service on their original posts.
BRIEF FACTS :
5. The short issue, which fell for deliberation before the
learned Single Judge and also before us, is as to whether the
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employees (appellants) were compelled to offer their
resignation or in the alternative, they had tendered the
resignation on a false promise given to them by the
respondent - Company. It is alleged that since the Company
was facing huge financial loss, the employees were coerced by
the Company to tender their resignation, and after two or three
months, they would be again taken back in the service. It is not
in dispute that requisite amount, which was paid to the
appellants, at the relevant time, after they offered their
resignation, is accepted by them.
6. The facts reveal that there were around 676 employees,
out of 1300 employees, who tendered their resignation and an
amount of Rs.8,24,68,297/- was paid to such employees. As
recorded by the learned Single Judge, out of 676 employees,
18 employees have raised an industrial dispute challenging to
such resignation. However, today when the matters are taken
up for hearing, it is reported by the learned advocates that
there are 30 employees out of 676 employees, who have
raised an industrial dispute challenging the action of accepting
their resignation. The Labour Court has held that the action of
the respondent-Company in relieving these employees
amounts to a termination, which is in contravention of Section
23(1) of the Model Standing Orders. It is also in violation of the
provisions of Sections 25N, 25F, 25G, and 25H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 ("the I.D. Act").
7. In the course of the reference proceedings before the
Labour Court, two primary issues emerged for determination:
(i) whether the appellants-employees fall within the definition
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of "workman" under the I.D. Act; and (ii) whether their
separation from service, purportedly by way of acceptance of
resignation, amounts to "retrenchment" as defined under
Section 25N of the I.D. Act. Upon consideration of the material
on record, the Labour Court answered both the issues in
favour of the employees and held that the action of the
respondent-Company constituted illegal retrenchment.
Consequently, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the
concerned employees. The same has been assailed by the
respondent - Company in the captioned writ petitions. The
learned Single Judge has allowed the same, which has given
rise to the present Letters Patent Appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS-EMPLOYEES :
8. Learned advocate Mr. Paresh Brahmbhatt, appearing on
behalf of the appellant-employees, has submitted that the
learned Single Judge has committed an error in setting aside
the order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court. By
referring to the findings and evidence recorded in the Labour
Court's award, it was contended that the respondent-Company
failed to produce any documentary evidence to establish that
the appellants, who were serving as Junior Engineers, Senior
Engineers, and Assistant Managers, were performing
supervisory duties. In the absence of such evidence, it is
argued that the appellants cannot be excluded from the
definition of "workman" as provided under Section 2(s) of the
of the I.D. Act.
9. Learned advocate Mr.Brahmbhatt, has further submitted
that in fact, though they were designated as Junior Engineers
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or Senior Engineers or Assistant Managers, they were actually
operating the CNC machines of the respondent - Company. He
has submitted that the appellants were in fact CNC Operators
and accordingly, the Company was paying monthly salary of
Rs.26,353/- (in cases of Junior Engineers).
10. Learned advocate Mr. Paresh Brahmbhatt, has further
submitted that the cross-examination of the witness of the
respondent-Company establishes that, although the witness
stated before the Labour Court that he would produce the
documentary evidence to demonstrate the actual nature of
work performed by the appellants, no such documentary
evidence was ever placed on record, which significantly
weakens the Company's claim that the appellants were
discharging supervisory duties and not covered under the
definition of "workman.".
11. It is submitted that, in light of the aforesaid facts and the
categorical statement made before the Labour Court regarding
the proposed production of the documentary evidence to
establish the actual nature of duties performed by the
appellants, the Labour Court rightly drew an adverse inference
against the respondent-Company. Consequently, the Labour
Court held in favour of the appellants and concluded that they
fall within the definition of "workman" as contemplated under
Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act.
12. With regard to the issue of resignation and its
acceptance, learned advocate Mr. Paresh Brahmbhatt has
submitted that the appellants had tendered their resignation
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under compulsion, based on a clear assurance from the
respondent-Company that they would be re-engaged within
two to three months. It is contended that the resignation was
not voluntary but was obtained under a promise that was
never fulfilled. In support of this contention, it was pointed out
that a criminal complaint was also lodged with the concerned
police station against the conduct of the respondent- Company.
Furthermore, it is submitted that although the appellants had
received certain amounts following the acceptance of their
resignation, they had attempted to return the said amounts by
issuing cheques to the Company. Despite their repeated efforts
to tender back the amount and resume their duties, the
respondent-Company did not respond. It is contended that the
resignation was obtained under compulsion at the instance of
a single officer of the respondent-Company, namely Mr. Paneri.
However, it is pointed out that Mr. Paneri was not examined as
a witness before the Labour Court, and therefore, the core
allegation of coercion remains unsubstantiated in the absence
of his testimony. Left with no alternative, the appellants were
ultimately compelled to raise an industrial dispute.
13. Thus, it is urged that the Labour Court has precisely held
that the action of the respondent in compelling or misleading
the employees in tendering the resignation being violation of
statutory provisions of the I.D. Act as well as against the Model
Standing Orders. The appellants were ordered to be reinstated
in service with continuity of service.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-COMPANY :
14. Opposing the aforesaid submissions of the learned
advocate Mr.Brahmbhatt, learned advocate Mr.Dave, appearing
for the respondent - Company has submitted that the
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge may
not be interfered with, as the same is precisely passed after
threadbare examination of the evidence, which has been
surfaced on record.
15. Learned advocate Mr. Dave, appearing on behalf of the
respondent-Company, has invited our attention to the decision
dated 24.08.1999 passed in Special Civil Application No. 1869
of 1999, involving a Junior Engineer employed by the present
respondent-Company, who had assailed his termination. In the
said judgment, the learned Single Judge held that the
concerned Junior Engineer did not fall within the definition of
"workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. It is submitted that, in the aforesaid case, this Court had
examined the actual duties discharged by the Junior Engineer,
who was also in charge of machine operations, and had
categorically held that such an employee would not fall within
the statutory definition of a "workman". In view of this
precedent, Mr. Dave submitted that the Labour Court erred in
holding the contrary and classifying the present appellants as
"workmen". It is further submitted that the said judgment was
duly brought to the attention of the Labour Court. However,
the Labour Court proceeded to declare the appellants as
workmen merely on the ground that the respondent-Company
had failed to produce documents evidencing that the
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appellants were engaged in supervisory duties. Learned
advocate Mr.Dave, has further submitted that this reasoning is
legally untenable, as the initial burden of proving that the
employees fall within the ambit of Section 2(s) lies squarely
upon the employees themselves.
16. In support of this proposition, reliance is placed on the
recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lenin
Kumar Ray; Management, M/s. Express Publications (Mdaurai)
Ltd., Vs. M/s. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd., (2024) AIR
SC 5409. Referring to the deposition of the respondent-
Company's witness, learned advocate Mr.Dave, has pointed
out that the witness had categorically denied that the
appellants were ever engaged as CNC Operators. It is
submitted that the appellants were functioning in their
designated roles as Junior Engineers, Senior Engineers, and
Assistant Managers. While it may be the case that some of the
employees were previously serving as CNC Operators, it is
submitted that they were later promoted to the said positions
and were no longer engaged in manual or technical operations
that could bring them within the scope of a "workman."
17. Learned advocate Mr.Dave, has further submitted that
the Company cannot be compelled to produce documents,
which do not exist and that the absence of such documents
cannot lead to an adverse inference. As regards the issue of
resignation, it is contended that the employees have utterly
failed to establish, by any cogent evidence, that their
resignation was obtained under coercion or on the false pretext
of being re-engaged after two or three months. It is further
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submitted that no documentary proof or consistent testimony
was led to support this claim. Furthermore, considering that
only a small number of employees out of total 676 have raised
such a contention, it is implausible to accept that the entire
group of employees was misled or coerced into resigning.
Finally, learned advocate Mr.Dave, has referred to the
provisions of the Model Standing Orders, more particularly
Clauses 4.3 and 23(1)(iv), and submitted that the Labour Court
has misapplied these provisions in the present case.
Accordingly, the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the
award passed by the Labour Court, and no interference is
warranted.
ANALYSIS AND OPINION :-
18. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties, at length.
19. As noted hereinabove, the entire dispute raised in the
present case, revolves around two principal issues; (i) whether
the appellants can be classified as "workmen" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D.Act, and (ii) whether the
action of relieving them from service, either through
acceptance of resignation or through alleged coercion and
inducement to resign, would amount to "retrenchment" as
defined under Section 25N of the I.D. Act, thereby attracting
the provisions of Sections 25G and 25H of the I.D. Act., as well.
A) ISSUE OF RESIGNATION :-
20. It is the case of the appellant-employees that the
respondent-Company misled and compelled them to tender
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their resignation on the false assurance that they would be re-
engaged shortly thereafter. It is not in dispute that, owing to its
weak financial position, the respondent-Company had called
upon its workforce of approximately 1,300 employees to resign
voluntarily, offering to pay them their dues upon such
resignation. Pursuant to this call, 676 employees submitted
their resignations, which were accepted by the Company, and
a total sum of Rs.8,24,68,297/- was disbursed to them as part
of the settlement.
21. Out of the total 1,300 employees, it is reported that only
30 employees have raised an industrial dispute, alleging that
their resignation was obtained illegally and under compulsion.
It is not in dispute that all these employees, who have raised
the industrial dispute, had accepted the monetary amounts
offered to them at the time of resignation.
22. Before addressing the issue as to whether the appellants
fall within the ambit of "workman" as defined under Section
2(s) of the I.D. Act, it is imperative to first examine the core
contention regarding the alleged forced resignation.
Alternatively, the appellants contend that the respondent-
Company misled them into tendering their resignation on the
promise that they would be re-employed or reinstated in
service within a period of two to three months. This
foundational allegation goes to the root of the dispute and is
required to be examined prior to considering the statutory
classification of the appellants' employment status under
Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act.
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23. We have perused the evidence in this regard, which have
been recorded by the Labour Court. A threadbare examination
of the award, would reveal that in fact, no evidence is led by
the employees, which would even suggest that the employees
were compelled to tender their resignation.
24. There exists a clear case of 'word' against 'word'. The
witness examined on behalf of the respondent-Company
categorically deposed before the Labour Court that there was
no element of coercion involved and that the appellants-
employees had voluntarily tendered their resignation in
response to an offer made by the Company, which was
necessitated by its financial constraints. In light of this, the
serious allegation of forced resignation or, in the alternative,
the assertion that the employees were misled into resigning
based on a promise of future reinstatement, was required to be
substantiated by cogent, clear, and reliable evidence. The
burden lay on the appellants to conclusively establish that the
resignation was not voluntary, but as a result of illegal or
coercive action on the part of the respondent-Company. It is
difficult to accept the serious allegations, in the absence of
supporting evidence, that the respondent-Company coerced or
misled as many as 676 employees into resigning. The fact that
only a small fraction of these employees, 30 out of 676, have
chosen to challenge their resignation by raising an industrial
dispute undermines the credibility of the allegation of
widespread coercion or deception. Thus, in view of the
aforesaid facts, the contention that the respondent-Company
compelled or misled a large number of its employees to tender
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their resignation does not appear plausible or supported by the
evidentiary record.
25. At this stage, we may incorporate the observations
recorded by the learned Single Judge in paragraph Nos.13,
13.1, 14 and 14.1 of the judgment and order, which reads as
under : -
"13. Learned labour Court instead of framing the issue for the
purpose of determining whether employees are falling under the
ambit of 'workmen', have cursoraliy held that as no evidence was led
with regard to the powers of appointment, dismissal or holding
disciplinary enquiry against other employees the employee can be
termed as workmen. In the decision rendered by the Apex Court in
the above case where it is held that this would not be a sole criteria
to conclude the employee under the umbrella of workman. The
employees in high ranking position in asbence of powers to appoint,
dismiss or hold disciplinary enquiry would not be straight away falling
under the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D.Act. In absence of any
detailed findings given by the learned labour Court this Court is of
the view that learned labour Court has committed jurisdictional error
in awarding the reference in favour of the workman. In view of the
above discussions, the claimants cannot be said to be workmen
within the ambit of section 2(s) of the I.D.Act and therefore, finding
recorded by the learned labour Court is required to be reversed and
is accordingly reversed.
13.1. Even on the issue of resignation was forced or given voluntarily
in none of the statement of claim the averment were made or any
dispute was raised with regard to the resignation. The factum of the
resignation was not under challenge and in absence of the same
learned labour Court has arrived at the conclusion that resignation
was tendered non voluntarily. It is contended that in absence of the
evidence of Mr.Paneri the employer has failed to establish that the
resignation was voluntarily given. This Court is of the view that if the
workman has asserted that it was forceful resignation then it is duty
of the workman to establish the same. When the employees have
tendered resignation, dues were paid to the employees, at no point
of time the resignation has been withdrawn, the complain with
regard to the resignation was after more than one year and in that
background learned labour Court has committed error in holding that
there was forceful resignation. Some of the employees have
contended that they were forced to sign however, some of the
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employees content that their signature was forged. But in the event
of sending the application of resignation to the FSL the endorsement
was made giving no objection with regard to admission of evidence
of resignation.
14. The judgement relied by the workman in the case of Shankar
(supra) would not come for the rescue of the workman as in the
instant case after crediting the payment of amount in the bank
account, it is not open for the employees to contend that this was
forceful resignation, more particularly, when resignation was not
withdrawn. On that count also impugned order deserves to be set
aside.
14.1. The learned Labour Court has also overlooked the award
passed in Reference No.483 of 1992 filed by the employees of the
same company posted on the designation of Junior Engineer wherein,
it is held that person engaged as Junior Engineer cannot be
considered as a workman within meaning of section 2(s) of the Act.
The aforesaid decision was upheld by this Court in SCA No.1869 of
1999 and therefore also, learned labour Court has committed error in
concluding reference in favour of the workman. Considering overall
circumstances these petitions, filed by Management, deserves to be
allowed. The judgment which was relied by the learned advocate for
the workmen being S.K.Narayanan (supra) regarding that decision if
not rendered on merits then same can be determined in the
subsequent challenge is concerned, this Court is of the view that
when the detailed judgment was given by the learned labour court in
the identical nature of dispute which was upheld by this Court, it
cannot be said that decision was not rendered on merits. Therefore,
that judgment would not come for the rescue of the workmen."
26. We are in complete agreement with the findings recorded
by the learned Single Judge. If, as alleged, the entire exercise
of compelling the appellants to tender their resignation was
orchestrated at the instance of one officer, namely Mr. Paneri,
then nothing prevented the appellants from summoning him as
a witness. However, neither the appellants nor the Labour
Court took any steps to secure his examination. In the absence
of such crucial testimony, the claim that the resignation was
forced at the behest of Mr. Paneri cannot be accepted.
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Accordingly, the findings recorded by the Labour Court in
favour of the appellants on the issue of forced resignation
appear to be based on an incorrect appreciation of evidence
and facts. We find no reason to interfere with the well-
reasoned judgment of the learned Single Judge on this point.
B) WHETHER THE APPELLANTS FALL UNDER THE DEFINATION
OF "WORKMAN" :-
27. As regards the second issue, whether the appellants fall
within the definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the
I.D. Act., we are of the considered view that the same is
rendered academic in light of our conclusion on the first issue.
Nevertheless, we concur with the findings of the learned Single
Judge, who, after a detailed and case-specific analysis, held
that the appellants do not fall within the definition of
"workman" as defined under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. The
learned Single Judge has examined the circumstances
surrounding the resignation of each of these employees,
including the salary they were drawing at the relevant time.
The appellants, in the present appeals, are designated as
Junior Engineers, Senior Engineers, and Assistant Managers,
and were drawing salaries ranging from Rs.21,000/- to
Rs.53,000/- per month. In this context, we may mention that
the salary drawn by the appellants exceeds the statutory limit
of Rs.10,000/- per month, as prescribed under Section 2N of
the I.D. Act.
28. The witness examined on behalf of the respondent-
Company clearly denied that the appellants were performing
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duties as CNC Operators. It was stated that the appellants,
designated as Junior Engineers, Senior Engineers, and
Assistant Managers, were performing supervisory functions
consistent with their roles. The appellants, before the Labour
Court have not produced any evidence that though they were
working in the capacity of Junior Engineers, Senior Engineers,
and Assistant Managers, they were compelled to do the work
of operating the machines. The appellants are treated to be
encompassed within the definition of "workman" as defined
under section 2(s) of the I.D.Act, by recording that the
Company had failed to produce any documentary evidence
showing that they were doing supervisory work. It is settled
legal precedent that the onus of proving the nature of
employment rests on the person claiming to be a "workman"
within the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D.Act (vide Lenin
Kumar Ray (Supra). The learned Single Judge has
meticulously examined the nature of duties, the evidence on
record, and the designation of each individual appellant, and
has precisely concluded that none of them qualifies as a
"workman" under the I.D. Act.
C) ASPECT OF VIOLATION OF MODEL STANDING ORDER AND
PROVISIONS OF I.D.Act. :-
29. We have also examined the relevant provisions of Section
23 of the Model Standing Orders, which reads as under : -
"23. (1) Subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, the employment of a permanent workman employed on rates
other than the monthly rates of wages be terminated by giving him
fourteen days' notice or by payment of thirteen days' wages
(including all admissible allowances) in lieu of notice,
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(2) Save as otherwise provided in these Standing Orders a
permanent work-men employed on rates other than the monthly
rates of wages desirous of leaving the service may do so by giving
the Manager fourteen days notice in writing.
(3) Where the employment of a workman is terminated under sub-
rule (1) or where a workman leaves the service under sub-rule (2)
and such workman draws wages on piece rate basis, wages shall be
computed on the average daily earnings, of such workman for the
days he actually worked during the previous wage period.
(4) The employment of a permanent workman employed on the
monthly rates of wages be terminated by giving him one month's
notice or on payment of month's wages (including all admissible
allowances) in lieu of notice.
10[(4-A) The reasons for the termination of service of a permanent
workman shall be recorded in writing and communicated to him, if he
so desires, at the time of discharge, unless such communication, in
the opinion of the Manager, is likely directly or indirectly to lay any
person open to civil or criminal proceedings at the instance of the
workman.]
(5) Save as otherwise provided in these Standing Orders, a
permanent work-man employed on the monthly rates of wages,
desirous of leaving the service shall give in writing 10 [one months'
notice] to the Manager of his intension to do so.
(6) If a permanent workman leaves the service without giving notice
no deduction on that account shall be made from his wages, but he
shall be liable to be used for damages.
(7) All classes of workmen other than those appointed on a
permanent basis may leave their service or their service may be
terminated without notice or pay in lieu of notice; provided that the
services of temporary workman shall not be terminated as a
punishment unless he has been given an opportunity of explaining
the charges of misconduct alleged against him in the manner
prescribed in the Standing Order 25.
(8) When the employment of any workman is terminated, the wage
earned by him shall be paid to him before the expiry of the second
working day from the day on which his employment is terminated. In
the case of workman leaving the service, the payment of the wages
earned by him shall be made within seven days from the date on
which he leaves the service. All other sums due to a workman shall
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be paid before the expiry of one month from the date of termination
of his service or, as the case may be, from the date he left service.
(9) An order of termination of service shall be in writing and shall be
signed by the Manager and a copy thereof shall be supplied to the
workman concerned. In cases of general retrenchment, closing down
of departments or termination of services as a result of strike, no
such order shall be given."
30. A bare perusal of the relevant provisions of the Model
Standing Orders, as referred to hereinabove, makes it
abundantly clear that the case of the appellants does not, even
remotely, fall within the scope of Section 23(1) of the Model
Standing Orders. Accordingly, the Labour Court has erred in
holding that there was a violation of Section 23(1) of the Model
Standing Orders by the respondent-Company. The conclusion
drawn by the Labour Court that the appellants were governed
by these provisions and that the respondent-Company violated
the same is, in our view, unsustainable. We, therefore, do not
concur with the findings of the Labour Court on this issue.
31. We may also incorporate the provisions of Section 25(N)
of the I.D. Act, which reads as under : -
"25N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which
this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less
than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that
employer until,--
(a) the workman has been given three months' notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has
expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages
for the period of the notice; and
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32. "Retrenchment" is defined under section 2(oo) of ID Act,
which is as under:
2(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer
of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever,
otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of
disciplinary action, but does not include-
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman ; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
superannuation if the contract of employment between the
employer, and the workman concerned contains a stipulation
in that behalf; or
[(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of
the non-removal of the contract of employment between the
employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such
contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or]
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of
continued ill-health;]
33. The Labour Court also fell in error in invoking the
aforesaid statutory provisions against the Company by holding
that the relieving of the appellant - employees, is a
"retrenchment" under Section 25N of the I.D. Act, hence, as a
sequel, the provisions of Section 25F, 25G and 25H do not get
attracted.
34. On an overall appreciation of the facts and law, we do not
find any compelling reason to interfere with the judgment and
order of the learned Single Judge. Hence, the appeals fail. The
same are dismissed, accordingly.
Sd/-
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)
Sd/-
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
MAHESH/01-05
