Gujarat High Court
Anis Khalidhussain Hakim vs State Of Gujarat on 19 June, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 18392 of 2013
With
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 20450 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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ANIS KHALIDHUSSAIN HAKIM
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR PRAVIN GONDALIYA(1974) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
ADVOCATE NOTICE UNSERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 19/06/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Since both petitions arise from the same FIR and involve
similar facts, this common order is being passed to decide the issues
raised in both petitions together.
2. With the consent of the learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties, Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 18392 of
2013 is treated as the lead matter.
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3. Prosecution case is as under:-
3.1. The complainant, Smt. Ramaben W/o Balubhai Parasotambhai
Jat Patel, residing at Plot No. 29/295, Udhna, Surat, originally from
Village Ditala, Post Dhari, District Amreli, is a homemaker, while
her husband is engaged in land brokerage. In 2006, her husband,
acting on the suggestion of his son Majidbhai, executed a
Memorandum of Understanding to donate approximately 100 Bigha
of land situated at Lajpore to a Muslim Orphanage located at Eighth
Lines, Surat, headed by its President, Umarbhai @ Umar General.
While documentation for 14 Vidha and sale deeds for 28 Bigha
were executed, the remaining land transactions were not completed
by the orphanage trustees, resulting in a dispute. Subsequently, a
settlement was reached to provide an additional 8 Bigha of land.
However, due to non-completion of the documentation, the
orphanage representatives allegedly began demanding cash
compensation in lieu thereof. Around this time, a police case was
also registered against the complainant's husband in relation to
another land matter at Vesu on 05.09.2013, after which he ceased
returning home.
3.2. Thereafter, from around 10.09.2013, the complainant's
unmarried son, Ravin, was repeatedly summoned by Umar General
and Anisbhai to attend meetings at the orphanage, where he was
allegedly coerced to arrange immediate payment for the Lajpore
land and was further pressured to execute a voucher for ₹68 lakhs68 lakhs
--an amount allegedly exceeding what was initially received by his
father. Ravin, who was not a party to the original transaction,
reportedly faced continuous threats and mental harassment,
including references to underworld connections from Mumbai. Four
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to five days before his death, Ravin returned home visibly distressed
and shared his ordeal with the complainant. Despite her attempts to
resolve the issue through relatives, Ravin died by suicide on
19.09.2013. The complainant attributes his death to the sustained
threats and coercion by Umar General and Anisbhai and seeks
initiation of criminal proceedings against them for abetment of
suicide and criminal intimidation under the Indian Penal Code.
4. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Pravin Gondaliya assisted by
learned advocate Mr. Rahul Dholakiya appearing for the petitioner,
learned APP Mr. Chintan Dave for the respondent-State. Though
served none appeared for the private respondent.
5. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned Advocate Mr. Pravin
Gondaliya, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the primary
offences alleged against the petitioner are under Sections 306 and
385 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC"), which, even if the
contents of the FIR are presumed to be true and correct, do not
prima facie constitute the said offences. It is further submitted that,
as per the case of the prosecution, the father of the deceased had
entered into an agreement to sell more than 100 acres of land to the
Yatimkhana (Muslim Orphanage). However, after execution of sale
deeds for a portion of the land, he failed to fulfill the entire promise
and did not execute sale deeds for the remaining land.
Consequently, the President and members of the administrative
body of the Yatimkhana began demanding the return of the money
paid. In the interim, as the father of the deceased became involved
in another FIR and went absconding, the demand was shifted to the
deceased, who was allegedly asked by the petitioners--being part
of the Yatimkhana's administrative team--to repay an amount of
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₹68 lakhs68 lakhs, purportedly advanced to his father.
5.1. It is alleged that the deceased, unable to bear the pressure of
repeated demands and coercion, was forced to attend multiple
meetings and was also allegedly compelled to sign certain financial
vouchers. As a result of such sustained mental pressure, he
ultimately committed suicide. The learned advocate for the
petitioner submitted that, even if the entire prosecution story is
accepted at face value, the ingredients necessary to constitute an
offence under Sections 107 and 306 of the IPC--particularly the
element of instigation or intentional aiding constituting abetment--
are conspicuously absent in the present case. Therefore, it is
contended that the petitioner ought not to be compelled to face the
ordeal of a criminal trial.
5.2. It is further argued that the FIR does not disclose any act of
putting a person in fear of injury or wrongful restraint, and hence
does not attract the ingredients of the offence punishable under
Section 385 of the IPC. In support of these submissions, the learned
advocate has placed reliance on the following judgments:-
Kiranbhai Himmatlal Gadhavi v. State of Gujarat, Cr.MA No.13760 of
2020; Nileshbhai Babubhai Vaghasiya v. State of Gujarat, 2025 (0)
AIJEL-HC 250665; Vikrambhai @ Vikramsinh Dajibhai Solanki v.
State of Gujarat, 2024 (0) AIJEL-HC 249057; Patel Babubhai
Manohardas & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 322.
5.3. Based on the above submissions, the learned advocate for the
petitioner prayed that the present petition be allowed.
6. It is noted that Respondent No. 2, though duly served, has
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chosen not to appear before this Court.
7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand,
placed reliance on the investigation papers and argued that the
deceased, Ravin, was under no legal obligation to repay any
amount to the accused persons. Nevertheless, he was repeatedly
summoned by the accused and subjected to persistent pressure to
pay a substantial and unjustified sum. It was further submitted that
the deceased was continuously harassed, and such conduct was
sustained and deliberate. Referring to the FIR and materials forming
part of the chargesheet, the learned APP contended that four to five
days prior to his death, the deceased was coerced into signing
vouchers for an amount of ₹68 lakhs66 lakhs and was threatened that his
father would be abducted if he failed to comply.
7.1. Learned APP relied upon the judgment of Ranjeet Mittal v.
State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2024 (0) AIJEL SC 74113 to
submit that for questioning of criminal charges it is must be shown
that there is no sufficient evidence to prove prima facie case against
the accused person. if a case is prime facie established against the
accused the FIR should not be quashed.
7.2. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the learned APP urged
this Court to reject the present petition.
8. I have heard the learned advocates for both sides and have
also perused the documents annexed to the petition. In order to
appreciate the factual matrix and the nature of allegations between
the parties, it is essential to refer to the contents of the First
Information Report and the statement made by the first informant
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therein regarding the commission of the alleged offence.
"In the year 2006, at Lajpore, my husband, upon the advice of
his son Majidbhai, intended to donate 100 Vidha of land to the
Muslim Orphanage located at Eighth Lines, Surat, under the
leadership of its President, Umarbhai (popularly known as
Umar General). Out of this, documentation for 14 Vidha was
executed, and sale deeds for 28 Vidha were prepared.
However, despite repeated requests by my husband, the
trustees of the orphanage failed to execute the necessary
documents for the remaining land, leading to a dispute. Two
days prior to the holy month of Ramadan, Umar General, along
with Anisbhai and other trust members, convened a meeting at
Hasot, where it was mutually decided that my husband would
be compensated with an additional eight sections of land
equivalent to the amount he had received. Subsequently,
however, due to the inability of the orphanage to secure
documents in their own name, they demanded cash in lieu of
the land, and a one-year period was stipulated for the same.
Meanwhile, my husband became embroiled in another land-
related police case at Vesu on 05.09.2013 and stopped coming
home. From approximately 10.09.2013 onwards, Umar General
persistently summoned my son, Ravin, to the orphanage for
repeated meetings, coercing him to arrange payment for the
Lajpore land transaction, despite Ravin's lack of knowledge or
involvement. The demands escalated to ₹68 lakhs68 lakhs, over and
above the amount initially received by my husband, and
threats were issued--implying influence from Mumbai and
consequences to both my husband and son. Ravin, distressed
and under pressure, confided in me just days before his death
that he was being harassed and forced to sign a voucher for
₹68 lakhs68 lakhs. He also stated that the orphanage had now refused
to transfer the land and instead sought only monetary
compensation. I advised him to seek assistance from Majidbhai
and our relative Afrojbhai. Ravin informed me that Afrojbhai
acknowledged his limited connection with the orphanage
trustees but assured him that his friend, Kashambhai Bham,
who is associated with the orphanage, would help mediate the
issue. Ravin had arranged to meet them again the following
day, and on 19.09.2013, he told my son-in-law Amit that he
was heading for another meeting regarding the orphanage.
Around 9:00 p.m., he called and told me he had met Majidbhai
and was about to meet Afrojbhai. Tragically, at around 10:00
p.m., we received a call from the police informing us of Ravin's
death. In light of these events, I have reason to believe that the
persistent threats, coercion, and undue pressure exerted by
Umar General and Anisbhai--demanding exorbitant sums and
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forcing my son to execute documents unrelated to him--drove
my son Ravin to take the extreme step of ending his life. I,
therefore, hold them responsible for abetting his suicide and
urge the authorities to initiate appropriate legal action against
them for their role in this tragic incident."
8.1. It is appropriate at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions
of Sections 107 and 306 of the IPC, which are reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference:-
107. Abetment of a thing.--
"A person abets the doing of a thing, who--
(First)-- Instigates any person to do that thing; or
(Secondly) -- Engages with one or more other person or persons in
any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order
to the doing of that thing; or
(Thirdly) -- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the
doing of that thing."
306. Abetment of suicide.--
"If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of
such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine."
8.2. A plain reading of the aforesaid statutory provision reveals
that the following essential ingredients must be satisfied to
constitute the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of
the Indian Penal Code:
a) The deceased must have committed suicide;
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b) The accused must have instigated or abetted the commission
of suicide;
c) There must be direct involvement of the accused in such
abetment or instigation, including any intentional act of pressurizing
the deceased or aiding the commission of suicide by any act or
illegal omission.
8.3. The legal position governing the offence under Section 306
IPC is well settled and has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC
129, wherein it was held that mere allegations of harassment or
demand, in the absence of proximate and direct nexus with the act
of suicide, would not be sufficient to attract the ingredients of
abetment under Section 306 IPC.
"(1) Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person orintention. ally aiding that person in doing of a thing.
In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental
process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing.
More active role which can be described as instigating or
aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be
said to be abetting the commission of offence under sec. 306
IPC."
(2) In State of West Bengal. v Orilal Jaiswal (1994)1 SCC
73, the court has observed that the courts should be
extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of
each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the
purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim
had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide.
If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences
in domestic life quite common to the society to which the
victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences
were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced
individual in a given society to commit sui-cide, the
conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a
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finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of
suicide should be found guilty."
8.4. Furthermore, in the case of Kishori Lal v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2007) SCC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborated on the
scope and application of Section 107 of the IPC and laid down the
legal position in clear terms, observing as under:-
"Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of
abetmentis a separate and distinct offence provided in IPC. A
person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any
person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3)
intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that
thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a
crime. The word 'instigate' literally means to provoke, incite,
urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The
abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid,
as provided in the three clauses of sec. 107. Section 109
provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of
abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such
abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the
punishment provided for the original offence. 'Abetted' in sec.
109 means the specific of-fence abetted. Therefore, the offence
for the abetment of which a person is charged with the
abetment is normally linked with the proved offence."
8.5. Thus, the Courts have consistently taken the view that, before
holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 of the
IPC, it is imperative for the Court to scrupulously examine the facts
and circumstances of the case and assess the evidence adduced to
ascertain whether the alleged cruelty or harassment meted out to
the victim was of such a nature that it left the victim with no
alternative but to end his or her life. It must further be borne in
mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be
cogent and credible evidence indicating a direct or indirect act of
instigation, provocation, or active participation by the accused
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which led to the commission of suicide. Mere allegations of
harassment, unaccompanied by any specific or proximate act by the
accused at or near the time of the incident, would not be sufficient
to sustain a charge under Section 306 IPC.
8.6. In Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1995) 3
SCC 438, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the element of mens
rea is a necessary component to constitute the offence under
Section 306 of the IPC. A mere utterance of a word or phrase in a
moment of anger or emotional outburst, without any intention that
such an act would lead to suicide, cannot be construed as
instigation. The term instigate, in its literal sense, means to provoke,
incite, urge, or induce someone by persuasion or pressure to do a
particular act.
8.7. In Ramesh Kumar v. state of Chattisgarh, 2001 9 SCC 9618 the
Apex Court observed as under:-
"that where the accused by his acts or by a continued course
of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was
left with no other in order to prove that the accused abetted
commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established
that: option except to commit suicide, an "instigation" may be
inferred. In other words,"
(1) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by
words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even
be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or
forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful forward
direction; and
omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more
quickly in a (il) that the accused had the intention to provoke,
urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting
in the manner noted above. Undoubt-edly, presence of mens
rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation."
8.8. In the present case, it appears that the father of the deceased
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had executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in favour of
the Yatimkhana, agreeing to transfer 100 bigha of land. Pursuant to
the said MoU, he executed a sale deed for 14 bigha of land and an
agreement to sell for an additional 28 bigha. However, despite
having received the full consideration from the Yatimkhana, the
father of the deceased failed to fulfill his promise to execute sale
deeds for the remaining land. Consequently, the petitioners, who
are in charge of the administration of the Yatimkhana, demanded a
sum of ₹68 lakhs68 lakhs from the deceased, and multiple meetings were
held in this regard. Thereafter, the deceased ultimately committed
suicide.
8.9. The prosecution alleges that the deceased was subjected to
persistent and continuous harassment by the petitioners, which
drove him to take the extreme step of ending his life. The learned
Additional Public Prosecutor has argued that there are multiple
witnesses who have supported the prosecution's version, and
therefore, there is prima facie material on record to warrant a trial
against the petitioner. However, a plain reading of the FIR does not
disclose any specific act of instigation or abetment as defined under
Section 107 of the IPC. Nor does it reveal any proximate or overt act
that directly compelled the deceased to commit suicide. Although
reference is made to several meetings held prior to the incident, the
prosecution has failed to disclose what transpired in those meetings,
or how they amounted to abetment. More importantly, the
prosecution has not established the essential ingredients required
under Section 306 of the IPC, namely that the deceased was left
with no other reasonable alternative but to commit suicide due to
the conduct of the accused.
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8.10. Indeed, every individual aspires to live, and an untimely death
is a profound tragedy for all concerned. The unfortunate and
premature demise of a young boy like Ravin is undeniably painful
and deeply distressing. However, the core issue before this Court is
whether sentiments can override the mandate of law and whether,
in the present case, the legal ingredients constituting abetment of
suicide are satisfied. The Court is required to ascertain whether
there was any act of instigation, intentional aiding, or active
provocation on the part of the petitioners that directly led to the
commission of suicide by the deceased.
8.11. A bare perusal of the FIR and the materials on record reveals
that the petitioners, who were in charge of the Yatimkhana, had
allegedly demanded ₹68 lakhs68 lakhs from the deceased, an amount that
had already been paid to the father of the deceased in connection
with a parcel of land. However, mere demand of money, even if
persistent, by itself, does not constitute instigation or abetment
within the meaning of Section 306 of the IPC. The act of demanding
repayment--without any accompanying threat, coercive conduct, or
illegal compulsion--cannot, by itself, be construed as leaving the
deceased with no reasonable alternative except to take the extreme
step of ending his life.
8.12. The concept of abetment as envisaged under Section 306 of
the IPC has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of M. Mohan v. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626, wherein it
was observed that there must be a clear mens rea to commit the
offence. The act of instigation must be of such a nature that it
leaves no other option for the victim except to commit suicide. The
Court emphasized that mere harassment, unaccompanied by any
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overt act or incitement proximate to the time of suicide, would not
be sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 306 of the IPC.
Relevant paras are as under:-
"36. We would like to deal with the concept of "abetment".
Section 306 of the Code deals with "abetment of suicide" which
reads as under:
"306. Abetment of suicide. --If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
37. The word "suicide" in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal
Code, however, its meaning and import is well known and
requires no explanation. "Sui" means "self" and "cide" means
"killing", thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a person
committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of
the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing
himself.
38. In our country, while suicide itself is not an offence
considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of
law, attempt to suicide is an offence under Section 309 IPC.
39. "Abetment of a thing" has been defined under Section 107
of the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 107,
which reads as under:
"107.Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing of a thing,
who--
First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons
in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in
order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.--Intentionally aides, by any act or illegal omission, the
doing of that thing."
Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with Section 107
reads as under:
Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the
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commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
8.13. This Court in Nileshbhai Babubhai Vaghasiya (supra) has held
as under:-
"15. Thus, abetement involves a mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing
of a thing. Without positive act on the part of the accused to
instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be
sustained. The intention of legislature and ratio of cases
decided by Hon'ble Apex Court is clear that in order to convict
a person under section 306 of IPC, there has to be clear mens
rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or
direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no
option and this act must have been intended to push the
deceased into such a position that he committed suicide
having no option."
8.14. In Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2024 (0)
AIJEL-SC 73335, while concluding the matter, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that there could be myriad reasons for a man or
woman to commit suicide. The relevant observation of the Apex
Court is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"47. Human mind is an enigma. It is well neigh impossible to
unravel the mystery of the human mind. There can be myriad
reasons for a man or a woman to commit or attempt to commit
suicide: it may be a case of failure to achieve academic
excellence, oppressive environment in college or hostel,
particularly for students belonging to the marginalized sections,
joblessness, financial difficulties, disappointment in love or
marriage, acute or chronic ailments, depression, so on and so
forth. Therefore, it may not always be the case that someone
has to abet commission of suicide. Circumstances surrounding
the deceased in which he finds himself are relevant."
8.15. Even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value,
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none of the averments made therein prima facie attract the essential
ingredients of the offence under Section 306 of the IPC. There is no
material to indicate any instigation, intentional aiding, or abetment
on the part of the accused so as to constitute an offence of
abetment of suicide.
8.16. As regards the alleged offence under Section 385 of the IPC, it
is pertinent to note that, in order to constitute such an offence, the
foundational requirement is the commission of extortion, which is
defined under Section 383 of the IPC as follows:-
"Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to
that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces
the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property,
or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be
converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion".
9. As per Section 385 of the IPC, if a person is put in fear of injury
in order to commit extortion, the punishment may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both. A cursory appraisal of the facts of
the present case suggests that the deceased was allegedly put in
fear that his father would be abducted if the amount of ₹68 lakhs68 lakhs
was not paid. However, the petitioners--who are the accused--
were merely demanding the amount of ₹68 lakhs68 lakhs that had already
been paid to the father of the deceased pursuant to a land
transaction. Such a demand, in itself, cannot be construed as an
intentional act of putting the deceased in fear of injury to compel
delivery of money. A demand for return of consideration paid under
a contractual obligation for sale of land cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be equated with extortion as defined under Section 383
of the IPC. Hence, the essential ingredients of the offence
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punishable under Section 385 of the IPC are not satisfied in the
present case.
10. With respect to the alleged offence under Section 506(2) of
the IPC, it is pertinent to note that there is no specific allegation
indicating any threat of grave or dire consequences, nor is there any
material suggesting the use of words or conduct likely to create
alarm in the mind of the deceased so as to attract the offence under
Section 506(2). In sum and substance, even assuming the entire
prosecution version to be true, the allegations do not prima facie
disclose the commission of the offences as alleged. The FIR,
therefore, appears to be nothing more than an abuse of the process
of law and is liable to be quashed in the interest of justice.
11. It would be apposite to refer the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein, in Paragraph 102, it is
held as under:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch. XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by this court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent
powers under sec. 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
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face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under sec. 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of sec. 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a
noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under sec. 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
13. In view of the above, the present petitions deserves to be
allowed, and it is accordingly ALLOWED. The FIR, being C.R. No.I-
134 of 2013 registered with Surat Railway Police Station, District:
Surat, along with all subsequent proceedings arising from it, is
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.MA/18392/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/06/2025
undefined
hereby quashed and set aside qua the petitioner herein. Rule is
made absolute. Direct service is permitted.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
MANISH MISHRA
