Gujarat High Court
Taluka Development Officer vs Ajitsinh Narsangbhai Parmar on 19 June, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5698 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
yes
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TALUKA DEVELOPMENT OFFICER
Versus
AJITSINH NARSANGBHAI PARMAR & ANR.
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Appearance:
MS HARSHAL N PANDYA(3141) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
DELETED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
Date : 19/06/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India by the employer, challenging
the award dated 21.12.2024 passed by the learned
Labour Court, Surendranagar, in Recovery Application (C-
2) No.241 of 2023, whereby the petitioner has been
directed to pay an amount of Rs.39,000/- to the
respondent-workman towards unpaid wages.
2. The gist of the case is that the respondent was serving
as a Computer Operator with the petitioner
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establishment and was drawing monthly wages of
Rs.4,500/-. It is the case of the respondent that wages for
the period from August 2015 to March 2016, i.e., for the
months of August, September, October, November,
December 2015 and January, February, March 2016,
were not paid by the petitioner. Upon demanding the
wages, the Taluka Development Officer instructed the
respondent to continue with the work. However, despite
rendering services for nine months, no wages were paid.
Consequently, the respondent filed a Recovery
Application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 ('the I.D. Act' hereinafter), relying on
documentary evidence in the form of a certificate issued
by the Taluka Development Officer, which certified the
respondent's nine months of service. After considering
the certificate and the submissions made by the
petitioner, the learned Labour Court directed the
petitioner to pay the unpaid wages, which is the subject
matter of challenge before this Court.
3. Heard the learned advocate Ms.Harshal Pandya for the
petitioner.
4. Learned advocate Ms. Pandya submits that the claim for
payment of wages cannot be entertained under Section
33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act, as no prior adjudication has been
made by any Court of law before filing the said
application. Learned advocate Ms.Pandya submits further
submits that the application is barred by limitation, as
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the claim pertains to the period from August 2015 to
April 2016, whereas the proceedings were initiated only
in the year 2023, and that too under the provisions of
Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act. Learned advocate Ms.
Pandya also submits that the appropriate remedy for
such a claim lies under the Minimum Wages Act, and
therefore, the learned Labour Court has committed an
error in entertaining and allowing the application filed by
the respondent.
4.1. Learned advocate Ms. Pandya submits that for the
period in respect of which the demand has been
made, the respondent did not perform any work, and
therefore, is not entitled to claim wages under Section
33(C)(2) of the I.D.Act. Learned advocate Ms. Pandya
further submits that as the claim raised by the
respondent is seriously disputed by the present
petitioner, the learned Labour Court has committed an
error in allowing the application and in directing the
petitioner to pay wages for the period from August
2015 to April 2016.
4.2. In view of above submissions, learned advocate
Ms.Pandya has requested to set aside the impugned
order and allow the present petition.
5. Having considered the submissions advanced by the
learned advocate for the petitioner and the reasons
assigned by the learned Labour Court, it emerges as an
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undisputed fact that the present respondent was serving
as a computer operator since 2001, having completed 22
years of service, and was drawing monthly wages of
Rs.4,500/-. It is also not disputed that no wages were
paid to the respondent for the period from August 2015
to April 2016. To justify the non-payment of wages, the
petitioner contended that the respondent had not
rendered any work during the said period, and therefore,
under the principle of 'no work, no pay', wages were not
liable to be paid. In support of this contention, reliance
was placed on a communication dated 10.05.2016,
stating that the respondent was absent from duty at
14:00 hours on that day, and another communication
dated 23.06.2010, highlighting the respondent's irregular
attendance and work performance. However, it is
pertinent to note that the said communications pertain
to the period of June 2010 and May 2016, whereas the
respondent's claim is specifically for the period from
August 2015 to April 2016.
6. In the opinion of this Court, the above communications
cannot conclusively establish that the respondent did not
work during the period for which the wage demand has
been raised. On the contrary, the respondent has
produced evidence in the form of certificates issued by
Mr. Pradhyumansinh A. Borana, Talati-cum-Mantri,
Gundiyana, for each relevant month, certifying that the
respondent had in fact worked during the period in
question. These certificates, produced below Exhibits 17
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to 30, were not rebutted by the petitioner during cross-
examination. Therefore, this Court is of the considered
view that, since the entitlement to wages has not been
effectively disputed and the work performed during the
said period is supported by unrebutted documentary
evidence, the petitioner cannot escape liability by merely
invoking the principle of 'no work, no pay'.
7. Another contention raised by the present petitioner is
that a demand under the Payment of Wages Act or the
Minimum Wages Act cannot be raised under the
provisions of Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. To examine this argument, this Court has
referred to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Town Municipal Council,
Athani vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli,
reported in (1969) 1 SCC 873, wherein an identical
question was raised. The Apex Court, while dealing with
the scope of Section 33(C)(2), has observed as under:
"2.Four different applications under section 33C,(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act") were filed in the Labour Court,
Hubli, by various workmen of the appellant. Application
(LCH) No. 139 of 1965 was filed by eleven workmen on 28th
July, 1965, seeking computation of their claim for overtime
work for the period between 1st April, 1955 and 31st
December, 1957, and for work done on weekly off-days for
the period between 1st April, 1955 and 31st December, 1960.
The amount claimed by each workman was separately
indicated in the application under each head. The total claim
of all the workmen was computed at Rs. 62,420/82P
according to the workmen themselves. The second application
(LCH) No. 138 of 1965 was presented by 50 workmen on
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23rd July, 1965, putting forward a claim for washing
allowance at Rs. 36 each from 1st January, 1964 to 30th June,
1965, and cost of uniform at Rs. 40 each from 1st January
1964 to 30th June, 1965 in respect of 18 of those 50
workmen. The third application (LCH) No. 101 of 1965 was
filed by one workman alone on 19th April, 1965, claiming a
sum of Rs. 8,910/72P in respect of his over-time work and
compensation for work done on weekly off days. The fourth
application (LCH ) No. 140 of 1965 was filed on 26th July
1965 by 14 workmen making a total claim of Rs. 17,302/60P,
for work done on weekly off-days during the period from 1st
December, 1960 to 30th June, 1965. 13 of the workmen
claimed that they were entitled to payment at Rs, 1190 each,
while one workman's claim was to the extent of Rs. 1832/60P.
The Labour Court at Hubli entertained all these applications
under s. 33C(2) of the Act, computed the amounts due to the
various workmen who had filed the applications, and directed
the appellant to make payment of the amounts found due.
Thereupon, the appellant challenged the decision of the
Labour Court before the High Court of Mysore by four
different writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The
order in Application (LCH) No. 139/1965 was challenged
in, Writ Petition No. 741 of 1966, that in Application (LCH)
No. 138/1965 in Writ Petition No. 973 of 1966; that in
Applica- tion (LCH) No. 101 of 1965 in Writ Petition No. 974
of 1966; and that in Application (LCH) No. 140/1965 in Writ
Petition No. 975/1966. The principal ground for challenging
the decision of the Labour Court was that all these amounts
could have been claimed by the workmen by filing
applications under section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act
No. 11 of 1948; and, since that Act was a self-contained Act
making provision for relief in such cases, the jurisdiction of
the Labour Court under the general Act, viz., the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 was taken away and excluded. It was
further pleaded that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to
deal with the claims under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages
Act had become time-barred and such claims, which had
become time-barred, could not be entertained by the Labour
Court under S. 33C(2) of the Act. Some other pleas were also
taken in the writ petitions which we need not mention as they
have not been raised before us. The High Court did not accept
the plea put forward on behalf of the appellant and dismissed
the writ petitions by a common order dated 25th August,
1967. These four appeals are directed against that common
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order dismissing the four writ petitions. Civil Appeals Nos.
170, 171, 172 and 173 of 1968 are directed against the order
governing Writ Petitions Nos. 741/ 1966, 973/11966,
974/1966 and 975/1966 respectively.
3. In these appeals in this Court also, the principal point
urged by learned counsel for the appellant was the same
which was raised before the High Court in the Writ Petitions,
viz., that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to deal with the
claims of the workmen under S. 33C(2) of the Act, was
barred by the fact that the same relief could have been
claimed by the workmen under s. 20(1) of the Minimum
Wages Act. In the course of the arguments, however, learned
counsel conceded that he could not press this point in Civil
Appeal No. 171 of 1968 arising out of Writ Petition No. 973
of 1966 which was directed against the order of the Labour
Court in Application (LCH) No. 138 of 1965, because the
claim in that application before the Labour Court was
confined to washing allowance and cost of uniform which are
items not governed by the Minimum Wages Act at all. His
submissions have, therefore, been confined before us to the
other three appeals in which the claim of the workmen was for
computation of their benefit in respect of overtime work and
work done on weekly off-days.
4.It may be mentioned that the objection to the jurisdiction of
the Labour Court was raised on behalf of the appellant
not only in the writ petitions before the High Court, but even
before the Labour Court itself when that Court took up the
hearing of the applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act.
However, the ground for challenging the jurisdiction of the
Labour Court was confined to the point mentioned by us
above. It was not contended either before the Labour Court or
in the writ petitions before the High Court that the
applications were not covered by the provisions of s.
33C(2) of the Act. The plea taken was that, even though the
applications could be made under s. 33C(2) of the Act, the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court to proceed under that
provision of law was barred by the provisions of
the Minimum Wages Act.
5.Mr. B. Sen, appearing on behalf of the appellant, wanted
permission to raise the question whether these applications
before the Labour Court were at all included within the scope
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of s. 33C(2) of the Act; but, on the objection of learned
counsel for the respondents, the permission sought was
refused. As we have mentioned earlier, the jurisdiction of the
Labour Court on this ground was not challenged either before
the Labour Court itself or before the High Court. No such
ground was raised even in the special leave petition, nor was
it raised at any earlier stage by any application. It was sought
to be raised by Mr. Sen for the, first time in the course of the
arguments in the appeals at the time of final hearing. We did
not consider it correct to allow such a new point to be raised
at this late stage. However, another new point, which had not
been raised before the Labour Court and in the writ petitions
before the High Court, was permitted to be argued, because it
was raised by a separate application, presented before the
hearing, seeking permission to raise it. The new question
sought to be raised is that, even if the applications under s.
33C(2) of the Act were competent and not barred by the
provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, they were time-barred
when presented under article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963. The question of limitation was
incidentally mentioned before the, Labour Court as well as the
High Court, relying on the circumstance that applications
under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act could only have
been presented within a period of six months from the date
when the claims arose. At that stage, reliance was not placed
on article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act; but, well
before the final hearing, a written application was presented
on behalf of the appellant seeking permission to raise this plea
of limitation in these appeals. Notice of that application was
served on the res- pondents well in time, so that, by the time
the appeals came up for hearing, they knew that this point was
sought to be raised by the appellant. A question of limitation
raises a plea of want of jurisdiction and, in these cases, this
question could be decided on the basis of the facts on the
record, being a pure question of law. It is in this background
that we have permitted this question also to be raised in these
appeals, though it was not put forward either in the High
Court or before the Labour Court. Thus, we are concerned in
these appeals with the two aspects relating to the exclusion of
the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to, entertain applications
under s. 33C(2) of the Act because of the provisions of
the Minimum Wages Act, and the plea that the applications
under s. 33C(2) of the Act were time-barred Dr at least part of
the claims under the applications were ame- barred in view
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of article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.
6.On the first question, both the Labour Court and the High
Court held that the contention raised on behalf of the
appellant that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was
excluded because of s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act has
no force, on the assumption that the claims made in these
applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act could have been
presented before the Labour Court under s. 20(1) of the
Minimum Wages Act. In our view, this assumption was not
justified. As we shall indicate hereafter, the claims made by
the workmen in the applications under S. 33C(2) of the Act
could not have been made before the Labour Court under s.
20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, so that it is not necessary
for us to decide the general question of law whether an
application under s. 33C(2) of the Act can or cannot be
competently entertained by a Labour Court if an application
for the same relief is entertainable by the Labour Court
under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act.
7.The long title and the preamble to the Minimum Wages
Act show that this Act was passed with the object of making
provision for fixing minimum rates of wageaein certain
employments The word "wages" has been given a wide
meaning in its definition in S. 2(h) of that Act and, quite
clearly, includes payment in respect of overtime and -for work
done on weekly off-days which are required to be given by
any employer to the workmen under the provisions of that Act
itself. Section 13(1), which deals with weekly off-days,
and section 14(1), which deals with overtime, are as follows :-
"13. (1) In regard to any scheduled employment minimum
rates of wages in respect of which have been fixed under
this Act, the appropriate Government may-
(a) fix the number of hours of work which shall constitute
a normal working day, inclusive of one or more specified
intervals;
(b) provide for a day of rest in every period of seven days
which shall be allowed to all employees or to any
specified class of employees and for the payment of
remuneration in respect of such days of rest;
(c) provide for payment for work on a day of rest at a rate
not less than the overtime rate."
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"14. (1) Where an employee, whose minimum rate of
wages is fixed under this Act by the hour, by the day or by
such a longer wage- period as may be prescribed, works
on any day in excess of the number of hours constituting a
normal working day, the employer shall pay him for every
hour or for part of an hour so worked in excess at the
overtime rate fixed under this Act or under any law of the
appropriate Government for the time being in force,
whichever is higher."
In order to provide a remedy against breach of orders
made under ss. 13(1) and 14(1), that Act provides a forum
and the manner of seeking the remedy in section 20 which
is as follows:
"20. (1) The 'appropriate Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for
Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central
Government exercising functions; as a Labour
Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State
Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner
or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil
Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the Authority to
hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising
out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or
in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest
or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause
(c) of subsection (1) of section 13 or of wages at the
overtime rate under section 14, to employees employed or
paid in that area.
(2) Where an employee has any claim of the, nature
referred to in sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any
legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union
authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector,
or any person acting with the permission of the Authority
appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such
Authority for a direction under sub-section (3) :
Provided that every such application shall be presented
within six months from the date on which the minimum
wages or other amount became payable:
Provided further that any application may be admitted
after the said period of six months when the applicant
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satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not
making the application within such period. (3) When any
application under sub-section (2) is entertained, the
Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or
give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such
further inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, may,
without prejudice to any other penalty to which the
employer may be liable under this Act, direct-
(i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less
than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the
employee of the amount by which the minimum wages
payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together
with the payment of such compensation as the Authority
may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such
excess;
(ii) in any other case, the payment+ of the
amount due to the employee together with the
payment of such compensation as the Authority
may think fit, not exceeding ten rupees, and the
Authority may direct payment of such
compensation in cases where the excess or the
amount due is paid by the employer to the
employee before the disposal of the application.
(4) If the Authority hearing any application
under this section is satisfied that it was either
malicious, or vexatious, it may direct that a
penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the
employer by the person presenting the
application.
(5) Any amount directed to be paid under this
section may be recovered-
(a) if the Authority is a Magistrate, by the
Authority as if it were a fine imposed by the
Authority as a Magistrate, or
(b) if the Authority is not a Magistrate, by any
Magistrate to whom the Authority makes
application in this behalf, as if it were a fine
imposed by such Magistrate. (6) Every
direction of the Authority under this section
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shall be final.
(7) Every Authority appointed under sub-
section ( 1 ) shall have all the powers of a Civil
Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
for the purpose of taking evidence and of
enforcing the attendance of witnesses and
compelling the production of documents, and
every such Authority shall be deemed to be a
Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195
and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898."
We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum Wages
Act, because the language used at all stages in that Act leads
to the clear inference that that Act is primarily concerned with
fixing of rates-rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate
for payment for work on a day of rest-and is not really
intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages
for which provision is made in other laws, such as
the Payment of Wages Act No. 4 of 1936, and the Industrial
Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. In s. 20(1) of the Minimum
Wages Act also, provision is made for seeking remedy in
respect of claims arising out of payment of less than the
minimum rates, of wages or in respect of payment of
remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days
under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section
13 or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14. This
language used in s. 20(1) shows that the Authority appointed
under that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction for
deciding claims which relate to rates of wages, rates for
payment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates. If
there be no dispute as to rates between the employer and the
employees, section 20(1) would not be attracted. The purpose
of s. 20(1) seems to be to ensure that the 'rates prescribed
under the Minimum Wages Act are complied with by the
employer in making payments and, if any attempt is made to
make payments at lower rates, the workmen are given the
right to invoke the aid of the Authority appointed under s.
20(1). In cases where there is no dispute as to rates of wages,
and the only question is whether a particular payment at the
agreed rate in respect of minimum wages, overtime or work
on off-days is due to a workman or not, the appropriate
remedy is provided in the Payment of Wages Act. If the
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payment is withheld beyond the time permitted by
the Payment of Wages Act even on the ground that the
amount claimed by the workman is not due, or if the amount
claimed by the workman is not paid on the ground that
deductions are to be made by the employer, the employee can
seek his remedy by an application under section 15(1) of the
Payment of Wages Act. In cases where section 15 of the
Payment of Wages Act may not provide adequate remedy, the
remedy can be sought either under section 33C of the Act or
by raising an industrial dispute under the Act and having it
decided under the various provisions of that Act. In these
circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission made
by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant that s. 20(1) of the
Minimum Wages Act should be interpreted as intended to
cover all claims in respect of minimum wages or overtime
payment or payment for days of rest even though there may
be no dispute as to the rates at which those payments are to be
claimed. It is true that, under s. 20(3), power is given to the
Authority dealing with an application under s. 20(1) to direct
payment of the actual amount found due; but this, it. appears
to us, is only an incidental power granted to that Authority, so
that the directions made by the Authority under s. 20(1) may
be effectively carried out and there may not be unnecessary
multiplicity of proceedings. The power to make orders for
payment of actual amount due to an employee under s.
20(3) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as indicating that the
jurisdiction to the Authority under s. 20(1) has been given for
the purpose of enforcement of payment of amounts and not
for the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with
the various rates fixed under that Act. This interpretation, in
our opinion, also harmonises the provisions of the Minimum
Wages Act with the provisions of the Payment of Wages
Act which was already in existence when the Minimum
Wages Act was passed. In the present appeals, therefore, we
have to see whether the claims which were made by the
workmen in the various applications under s. 33C(2) of the
Act were of such a nature that they could have been brought
before the Authority under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages
Act inasmuch as they raised disputes relating to the rates for
payment of overtime and for work done on weekly off days.
8. This Court has also referred to the decision rendered
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by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of
R.L. Kalathia & Co., Bhavnagar vs. State of
Gujarat and Others, reported in (1990) 1 GLH
233, wherein it has been held that an application
under Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D.Act, claiming the
difference between the actual wages paid and the
wages fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, is
maintainable. It has further been held that the
Minimum Wages Act does not prohibit the
respondent employees from approaching the Labour
Court for computation of their claim under Section
33(C)(2) of the I.D.Act, even though the Minimum
Wages Act provides for a separate enforcement
machinery. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
"6. So far as second contention is concerned, even
though the respondents may have remedy under
the Minimum Wages Act, there is no law which prohibits
them from going to the Labour Court for computation for
their claims under Section 33-(C)(2) of the I.D. Act.
Nothing could be pointed out by the learned Advocate for
the petitioner to us to indicate that Minimum Wages
Act provisions exclude the jurisdiction of the Labour
Court under Section 33-(C)(2) of the Act. The Labour
Court rightly came to the conclusion that looking to the
provisions of Section 33-(C)(2) of the Act, it was clear
that if there is a right arising in favour of the workmen, the
same must be granted by the Court, even though Minimum
Wages Act may have separate enforcement machinery. In
absence of any express or even implied exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-(C)
(2) of the I.D. Act, we cannot accept the contention of the
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learned Advocate for the petitioner that recovery
applications are not maintainable. It is also not possible to
agree that Minimum Wages Act is such complete Code
that it excludes jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section
33-(C)(2) of the I.D. Act. The second contention also, is
therefore, rejected.
9. This Court has also referred the decision rendered in
the case of Somiben Mathurbhai Vasava vs.
M/s.Lalji Hakku Parmar Leather Works
company reported in 1984 1 GLR 388 wherein also
the Division Bench of this Court has held as under:
"10. In the case of Town Municipal Council, Athani v.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others, [1969-
II L.L.J. 651], the Supreme Court had an occasion to
consider directly the question of remedies under S. 33C of
the Industrial Disputes Act and S. 20 of the Minimum
Wages Act and the Supreme Court held that "the language
used at all stages of the Minimum Wages Act leads to the
clear inference that Act is primarily concerned with fixing
of rates-Rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for
payment for work on a day of rest and is not really
intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of
wages for which provision is made in other laws such as
the Payment of Wages Act and the Industrial Disputes
Act". The Supreme Court further observed that "the
language used in S. 10(1) shows that the Authority
appointed under that provision of law is to exercise
jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate to rates of
wages, rates for payment of work done on days of rest and
overtime rates, and the purpose of S. 20(1) seems to be to
ensure that the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages
Act are complied with by the employer in making
payments, and, if any attempt is made to make payments
at lower rates, the workmen are given the right to invoke
the aid of the authority appointed under S. 20(1)". It
further held that "in cases where there is no dispute as to
rates of wages, and the only question is whether a
particular payment at the agreed rate in respect of
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minimum wages, overtime work or work on off-days is
due to a workman or not, the appropriate remedy is
provided in S. 15 of the payment of Wages Act". The
Supreme Court further held the remedy can also be sought
either under S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act or by
raising an industrial dispute under the Act. Thus there
cannot be any doubt that the Labour Court has the
jurisdiction to entertain such recovery application and
there is no provision in the Minimum Wages Act which
bars the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S. 33C of
the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. This Court has held that the liability is statutorily
fixed, and the only question that arises pertains to its
implementation and recovery in pursuance thereof.
Therefore, Section 33(C) of the I.D.Act is the
appropriate remedy in cases where a dispute arises
under the Payment of Wages Act as well as the
Minimum Wages Act.
11. In that background, this Court is of the view that, as
there is no dispute regarding the rate of wages
between the employer and the employee, Section
20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act would not be
barred jurisdiction. The purpose of Section 20(1)
appears to be to ensure that the rates prescribed
under the Minimum Wages Act are duly complied
with by the employer while making payments. If
payment is made at rates lower than those
prescribed, the workman is entitled to invoke the
jurisdiction of the authority appointed under Section
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20(1). However, in cases where there is no dispute
regarding the rate of wages, and the only issue is
whether the payment at the agreed rate, including
minimum wages, overtime, or wages for work on off
days, is due to the workman, the appropriate remedy
lies under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act,
remedy can also be sought either under section
33(C) of the I.D.Act or by raising industrial dispute. In
the present case, as the petitioner has not disputed
the rate of wages, and the claim stands established
through the evidence adduced in the form of
certificates, the learned Labour Court rightly
exercised jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act. In the absence of any
provision either under the Industrial Disputes Act or
the Minimum Wages Act expressly prohibiting the
Labour Court from entertaining proceedings under
Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act for claims relating to
minimum wages, this Court is of the considered view
that the Labour Court did not lack jurisdiction to
adjudicate the said application.
12. The last contention raised by the learned advocate
for the petitioner pertains to the issue of limitation,
as the claim for non-payment of wages for the period
from August 2015 to April 2016 was raised in the
year 2023. In this regard, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in
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the case of Town Municipal Council, Athani
(supra), has also considered the question of
limitation and categorically held that the provisions
of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to
applications filed under Section 33(C)(2) of the
I.D.Act. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble
Apex Court are reproduced hereinbelow:
"10. This earlier decision was relied upon by the Court
in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v Gopal Bhiva and Others(1), where
the Court had to deal with the argument that applications
under s. 33C of the Act will be governed by three years'
limitation provided by article 181 of the Limitation Act. The
Court, in dealing with this argument held :-
"In our opinion, this argument is one of desperation. It is
well settled that Article 181 applies only to applications
which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure, and
so, its extension to applications made under Section 33-
C(2) of the Act would not be justified. As early as 1880,
the Bombay High Court had held in Rae
Manikbai v. Manekji Kavasji, [ ILR (1880) 7 Bom 213] that
Article 181 only relates to applications under the Code of
Civil Procedure in which case no period of limitations has
been prescribed for the application, and the consensus of
judicial opinion on this point had been noticed by the
Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators,
Dehradun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company
Ltd. [1932 SCC OnLine PC 71 : (1932-33) 60 IA 13, at p.
20] An attempt was no doubt made in the case of Sha
Mulchand and Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. [(1952) 2 SCC
674 : 1953 SCR 351] , to suggest that the amendment of
Articles 158 and 178 ipso facto altered the meaning
which had been attached to the words in Article 181 by
judicial decisions, but this attempt failed, because this
Court held' that the long catena of decisions under Article
181 may well be said to have, as it were, added the
words "under the Code" in the first column of that article.
Therefore, it is not possible to accede to the argument
that the limitation prescribed by Article 181 can be
invoked in dealing with applications under Section 33-C
(2) of the Act."
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11. It appears to us that the view expressed by this Court in
those cases must be held to be applicable, even when
considering the scope and applicability of Article 137 in the new
Limitation Act of 1963. The language of Article 137 is only
slightly different from that of the earlier Article 181 inasmuch as,
when prescribing the three years period of limitation, first the
column giving the description of the application reads as "any
other application for which no period of limitation is provided
else-where in this division". In fact, the addition of the word
"other" between the words "any" and "application" would
indicate that the legislature wanted to make it clear that the
principle of interpretation of Article 181 on the basis of ejusdem
generis should be applied when interpreting the new Article 137.
This word "other" implies a reference to earlier articles and,
consequently, in interpreting this article, regard must be had to
the provisions contained in all the earlier articles. The other
articles in the third division to the schedule refer to applications
under the Code of Civil Procedure, with the exception of
applications under the Arbitration Act and also in two cases
applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The effect of
introduction in the third division of the schedule of reference to
applications under the Arbitration Act in the old Limitation Act
has already been considered by this Court in the case of Sha
Mulchand and Co. Ltd. [(1952) 2 SCC 674 : 1953 SCR 351] We
think that, on the same principle, it must be held that even the
further alteration made in the articles contained in the third
division of the Schedule to the new Limitation Act containing
references to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure
cannot be held to have materially altered the scope of the
residuary Article 137 which deals with other applications. It is
not possible to hold that the intention of the legislature was to
drastically alter the scope of this article so as to include within
them in all applications, irrespective of the fact whether they
had any reference to the Code of Civil Procedure.
12. This point, in our opinion, may be looked at from another
angle also. When this Court earlier held that all the articles in
the third division to the schedule, including Article 181 of the
Limitation Act of 1908, governed applications under the Code of
Civil Procedure only, it clearly implied that the applications must
be presented to a court governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure. Even the applications under the Arbitration Act that
were included within the third division by amendment of Articles
158 and 178 were to be presented to courts whose proceedings
were governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. At best, the
further amendment now made enlarges the scope of the third
division of the schedule so as also to include some applications
presented to courts governed by the Code of Criminal
Procedure. One factor at least remains constant and that is that
the applications must be to courts to be governed by the articles
in this division. The scope of the various articles in this division
cannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within
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them applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-
judicial tribunal, or even an executive authority. An Industrial
Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or
references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way
governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of
Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the
submission made that this article will apply even to applications
made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court. The alterations
made in the article and in the new Act cannot, in our opinion,
justify the interpretation that even applications presented to
bodies, other than courts, are now to be governed for purposes
of limitation by Article 137."
13. Considering the overall circumstances, this Court
does not find any infirmity in the impugned order
directing the present petitioner to pay the unpaid
wages for the period from August 2015 to April 2016.
Hence, the present petition, being devoid of any
merits, is required to be dismissed.
14. Resultantly, this petition is dismissed.
(M. K. THAKKER,J)
M.M.MIRZA
