Gujarat High Court
Ranjanben Pravinbhai Chauhan vs State Of Gujarat on 28 January, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.5598 of 2020
(QUASHING)
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DIVYESH A. JOSHI : Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√ x
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RANJANBEN PRAVINBHAI CHAUHAN
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR CHINTAN K GANDHI(8600) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR VAIBHAVI D RAVAL(8466) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR SOAHAM JOSHI APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
SAN ASSOCIATES LLP(8655) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DIVYESH A. JOSHI
Date : 28/01/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. By filing instant petition under Articles 21, 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India as wll as
under the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the petitioner has prayed for
following relief,
A) YOUR LORDSHIP may be pleased to issue writ
of certiorari, or any other writ or order
or directions and be pleased to quash and
set aside the impugned judgment passed on
dtd. 17.12.2019, below Exh.7, passed in
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Criminal Misc. Application No. 3662 of
2019, passed by the Ld. Principal District
& Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) and be
further pleased to Condone the delay in
preferring the said appeal and consequently
direct the Ld. Appellate court to decide
the said appeal or merits;
AND
B) xxx xxx xxx."
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the
present petition are as under,
2.1 The petitioner herein had filed Criminal
Misc. Application No.435/2014 before the
court of learned 8th Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Ahmedabad against the respondent -
husband under the provision of the Domestic
Violence Act alleging inter alia about the
harassment being meted out to her by the
respondent - husband.
2.2 The learned 8th Additional Civil Judge &
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ahmedabad
(Rural) by an order dated 31.03.2024, was
pleased to partly allow the said application
and the respondent - husband was directed to
pay Rs.50,000/- towards the compensation to
the petitioner.
2.3 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
aforesaid order, the petitioner filed
Criminal Appeal before the learned District &
Sessions Judge.
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2.4 However as there was delay in filing said
Criminal Appeal, separate application for
condonation of delay was also filed, which
was registered as Criminal Misc. Application
No.3662/2019, wherein the notice was issued
upon the respondent - husband.
2.5 On service of the notice, the respondent -
husband appeared through his advocate and
opposed the said application.
2.6 The learned Principal District & Sessions
Judge, by impugned order dated 10.12.2019,
rejected the said delay application. Hence,
this petition.
3. Heard learned advocate, Mr. Chintan Gandhi for the
petitioner and learned APP Mr. Soaham Joshi for
the respondent - State of Gujarat.
4. Learned advocate, Mr. Gandhi submitted that the
petitioner married with the respondent - husband
in the year 1991, however after the marriage, the
respondent - husband started harassing the
petitioner and also used to demand dowry but it
was continued, which led to filing of an
application under the Domestic Violence Act by the
petitioner against the respondent - husband for
maintenance and after considering the facts of the
case, the learned Magistrate partly allowed the
said application and directed the respondent -
husband to pay Rs.50,000/- towards the
compensation, however against the said order, the
petitioner approached the learned District &
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Sessions Court by filing Criminal Appeal and as
there was delay caused in filing said appeal,
separation application for condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also
preferred, which was registered as Criminal Misc.
Application No.3662/2019, wherein notice was
issued and in pursuance thereto, the respondent -
husband appeared and after considering the
submissions made on behalf of the parties and
after considering the material available on
record, the learned Appellate Court has rejected
the said application for condonation of delay,
therefore, the present petition has been filed.
5. Learned advocate submitted that at the time of
submission of the delay condonation of
application, specific reasons were assigned by the
petitioner specifically stating that after the
passing of the order by the learned Magistrate,
talks of settlement were going on, therefore, the
petitioner decided not to challenge the said
order, however, as the talks of settlement could
not be materialized, the aforesaid appeal was
preferred and as there was delay, separate
application for condonation of delay was also
filed explaining the delay. Learned advocate,
however, submitted that the said application had
not been entertained solely on the ground that the
reasons explaining the condonation of delay has
not been sufficiently explained. Learned advocate
submitted that if the observations made by the
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learned Appellate Court are examined, in that
event, it would be found out that the learned
Appellate Court has observed that the learned
advocate for the respondent - husband raised
objection about the grounds taken by the
petitioner about talks of settlement between the
parties, therefore, the grounds mentioned in the
application are far from the truth and reliance
cannot be placed upon.
6. At this stage, learned advocate has placed
reliance upon following decisions,
(1) the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 INSC
932;
(2) the decision of this Hon'ble Court in case
of Kamdhenu Auto Enterprise Vs.
Gajendrasinh Gulamsinh Solanki, reported in
2023 (0) ACD 1012;
7. Referring to the observations made by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as well as this Hon'ble Court,
learned advocate submitted that the case of the
petitioner is squarely covered by those decisions.
It is also submitted that over and above
decisions, in various decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as well as this Hon'ble Court, it is
observed that in such matters of condonation of
delay, the approach should be liberal. It is,
therefore, urged that the present petition may be
allowed quashing and setting aside the impugned
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order and the learned Appellate Court may be
directed to hear the appeal on merits.
8. On the other hand, learned APP Mr. Joshi has
opposed the present petition contenting that there
is no error committed by the learned Appellate
Court while passing impugned order and in such
matters of condonation of delay, law is very
settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as
this Hon'ble Court in number of matters that the
delay is required to be explained properly but in
the present case, except averments, the petitioner
has failed to produce on record relevant
documentary evidence, therefore, the impugned
order does not require any interference at the
hands of this Hon'ble Court. It is, therefore,
urged that the present petition may be rejected.
9. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the
parties and having gone through the material and
available available on record, the only question,
that falls for my consideration is whether the
learned Appellate Court has committed any error
while rejecting the application for condonation of
delay?
10. It is found out that the petitioner and the
respondent are married to each other long back,
however after the marriage, disputes were cropped
up, which resulted into filing of an application
by the petitioner under the provision of the
Domestic Violence Act before the court of the
learned 8th Judicature Magistrate First Class,
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Ahmedabad being Criminal Misc. Application
No.435/2014, wherein notice was issued and
pursuant thereto, the respondent - husband
appeared through advocate and contested the said
application, however thereafter, on the strength
of the submissions made on behalf of the parties
and after examining and scrutinizing the material
available on record, the learned Magistrate partly
allowed the said application and directed the
respondent - husband to pay Rs.50,000/- towards
the compensation to the petitioner, however being
aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner
approached the learned Appellate Court by filing
Criminal Appeal after a period of 17 months and
thus, as there was delay caused in filing said
appeal, separation application being Criminal
Misc. Application No.3662/2019 was also filed,
wherein also, notice was issued and pursuant
thereto, the respondent - husband appeared and
contested the said application through advocate
and after considering the submissions made on
behalf of the parties, the learned Appellate
Court, by impugned order, rejected the said
application for condonation of delay, therefore,
the said order is assailed by the petitioner
before this Court by filing present petition.
11. Therefore, before adverting to the merits of the
instant petition, this Court deems it imperative
to satisfy itself with regard to the issue of
alleged laches and delay that occurred on behalf
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of the petitioner in pursuing remedy available
under the law. The underlying principle governing
doctrine of delay and laches has emerged from the
common law principle of estoppel and perhaps, the
statutory application of the same can be
identified under various statutes wherein a
limitation period is prescribed thus, creating
instances for non-consideration of condonation in
certain circumstances. The word "laches‟ meaning meaning
"negligent and slackness", has been derived from
the French language which basically bars parties
to approach the Courts if there is an unreasonable
delay in pursuing a claim involving an equitable
relief while causing prejudice to the other party.
Further, the common law doctrine essentially
expects the Courts exercising public law
jurisdiction to not encourage agitation of a
belated and stale claims and reviving matters
where rights of third parties may have accrued in
the interregnum.
12. It is required to be noted that as per the various
judicial pronouncements, it is a settled position
of law that in order to do complete justice to the
parties under exceptional circumstances, this
Court has discretionary powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India to condone the delay
under extraordinary circumstances. It is noted
that upon expiry of the period of limitation,
condonation of delay is not a matter of right
rather, it is a discretion that may be exercised
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by the Courts as with the lapse of time, the party
in whose favour the right is accrued, treats it to
be binding on the parties and may proceed on such
assumption thus, creating new rights. Considering
the above fact, it is observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision that the
foundation of the legal maxim interest reipublicae
up sit finis litium is propounded. The aforesaid
maxim connotes that it is for the general welfare
of the society that a period be put to litigation
as the idea is to keep a remedy alive only for a
fixed period of time as conferred by the
legislature.
13. Furthermore, inordinate delay in approaching a
Court of law must not be condoned as a matter of
routine and rather it must be based upon sound
reasoning. The intent behind the principle of
condonation of delay is to cater to genuine cases
and should not be extended to a person who is
oblivious to his/her rights and entitlements.
Therefore, a person must state sufficient cause
which is founded upon bonafide and is well-
reasoned.
14. The Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in case of Tilokchand Motichand Vs. H.B.
Munshi, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 110, extensively
carved out the principle pertaining to the
"doctrine of delay and laches‟ meaning. The relevant
portion of the judgment is reproduced herein:
"14. Article 32(2) of the Constitution confers a
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judicial power on the Court. Like all
judicial powers, unless there is an express
provision to the contrary, it must be
exercised in accordance with fundamental
principles of administration of justice.
General principles of res judicata were
accordingly applied by this Court in Daryoo
v. State of UP and Amalgamated Caulfields
Ltd v Janapada Sabha, Chindwara understand
that one of the fundamental principles of
administration of justice is that, apart
from express provisions to the contrary,
stale claims should not be given effect to.
But what is a stale claim? It is not denied
that the Indian Limitation Act does not
directly apply to a petition under Article
32. Both the English Courts and the
American Courts were confronted with a
similar problem. In the United States the
Federal Courts of Equity solved the problem
thus:
"Except, perhaps, where the statute by
its express terms applies to suits in
equity as well as to actions at law, or
where the jurisdiction of law and equity is
concurrent, the rule appears to be that
Federal Courts sitting in equity are not
bound by state Statutes of limitation.
Nevertheless, except where unusual
conditions or extraordinary circumstances
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render it equitable to do so, the Federal
Courts usually act in analogy to the State
statutes of limitation applicable to cases
of like character." (Vol. 34, American
jurisprudence, Limitation of Actions.
Section 54)
15. In Courts of Admiralty, where the statutes
of limitation do not control proceedings,
the analogy of such statutes is ordinarily
followed unless there is something
exceptional in the case (ibid).
16. Story on Equity Jurisprudence states the
legal position thus:
"It was, too, a most material ground,
in all bills for an account, to ascertain
whether they were brought to open and
correct errors in the account recenti
facto, or whether the application was made
after a great lapse of time. In cases of
this sort, where the demand was strictly of
a legal nature, or might be cognizable at
law, courts of equity governed themselves
by the same limitations as to entertain
such suits as were prescribed by the
Statute of Limitations in regard to suits
in courts of common law in matters of
account. It therefore, the ordinary
limitation of such suits at law was six
years, courts of equity would follow the
same period of limitation. In so doing they
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did not act in cases of this sort (that is,
in matter of concurrent jurisdiction) so
much upon the ground of analogy to the
Statute of Limitations, as positively in
obedience to such statute. But where the
demand was not of a legal nature, but was
purely equitable or where the bar of the
statute was inapplicable courts of equity
had another rule, founded sometimes upon
the analogies of the law, where such
analogy existed, and sometimes upon its own
inherent doctrine, not to entertain stale
or antiquated demands, and not to encourage
laches and negligence. Hence, in matters of
account, although not barred by the Statute
of Limitations, courts of equity refused to
interfere after a consider- able lapse of
time, from considerations of public policy,
from the difficulty of doing entire
justice, when the original transactions had
become obscure by time, and the evidence
might have been lost, and from the
consciousness that the repose of titles and
the security of property are mainly
promoted by a full enforcement of the
maxim, vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura
subveniunt. Under peculiar circumstances,
however, excusing or justifying the delay,
courts of equity would not refuse their aid
in furtherance of the rights of the party,
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since in such cases there was no pretence
to insist upon laches or negligence, as a
ground for dismissal of the suit and in one
case carried back the account over a period
of fifty years." (Third Edn. p. 224,
Section 529)
17. In England, as pointed out by Bachawat, J.
the Court of Chancery acted on the analogy
of Statute of Limitation (vide Halsbury,
Vol. 14, p. 647, Article 1190)
18. It seems to me, however, that the above
solution is not quite appropriate for
petitions under Article 32. A delay of 12
years or 6 years would make a strange bed-
fellow with a direction or order or writ in
the nature of mandamus, certiorari and
prohibition. Bearing in mind the history of
these writs I cannot believe that the
Constituent Assembly had the intention that
five Judges of this Court should sit
together to enforce a fundamental right at
the instance of a person, who had without
any reasonable explanation slept over his
rights for 6 or 12 years. The history of
these writs both in England and the USA
convinces me that the underlying idea of
the Constitution was to provide an
expeditious and authoritative remedy
against the inroads of the State. If a
claim is barred under the Limitation Act,
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unless there are exceptional circumstances,
prima facie it is a stale claim and should
not be entertained by this Court. But even
if it is not barred under the Indian
Limitation Act, it may not be entertained
by this Court if on the facts of the case
there is unreasonable delay. For instance,
if the State had taken possession of
property under a law alleged to be void,
and if a petitioner comes to this Court 11
years after the possession was taken by the
State, I would dismiss the petition on the
ground of delay, unless there is some
reasonable explanation. The fact that a
suit for possession of land would still be
in time would not be relevant at all. It is
difficult to lay down a precise period
beyond which delay should be explained. I
favour one year because this Court should
not be approached lightly, and competent
legal advice should be taken and pros and
cons carefully weighed before coming to
this Court. It is common knowledge that
appeals and representations to the higher
authorities take time, time spent in
pursuing these remedies may not be excluded
under the Limitation Act but it may
ordinarily be taken as a good explanation
for the delay."
15. Upon perusal of the aforementioned judicial
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dictum, it can be inferred that, the Courts
exercising writ jurisdiction shall not encourage
agitation of stale claims hence, fence-sitters
cannot be allowed to raise a dispute or challenge
the legality of an order after considerate amount
of time has passed post its conclusion especially
in cases where the right of third parties have
crystallized in the interregnum. Not only that, if
a claim is barred under the Limitation Act, 1963,
and unless there are exceptional circumstances,
prima facie it is a stale claim and should not be
entertained by the Courts and even if a claim is
not barred under the Limitation Act, it may not be
entertained by the Court if on the facts of the
case there exists unreasonable delay on account of
the party asserting such right.
16. Applying the principles enunciated in the
aforesaid paragraphs to the facts of the instant
petition, this Court is of the considered view
that the petitioner has approached this Court with
mala fide intentions as it has failed to establish
reasonable grounds which led to filing of an
application for condonation of delay caused in
filing criminal appeal against the order of
learned Magistrate, and prima facie the grounds
taken to explain the delay seem to be merely an
afterthought. Further, the petitioner has utterly
failed to explain the delay as per the settled
position of law and pleads sympathy on account of
the talks of settlement going on between the
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parties, which this Court does not find sufficient
in order to condone the considerable amount of
delay. At this stage, it is required to be noted
that when the delay application was filed before
the learned Appellate Court, it was contested by
the respondent - herein and specifically denied
the submission and averment of the petitioner and
stated in a very categorical terms that there was
no talk of compromise between the parties after
the order passed by the learned Magistrate. It is
required to be noted that though the contention
was raised by the petitioner before the learned
Appellate Court with regard to the talks of
settlement going on between the parties, the
petitioner has failed to produce any document in
that regard. Not only that, when the pertinent
query was raised by this Court on the said
contention asking the petitioner to produce any
single document, the petitioner has also failed to
produce such document before this Court also. I
have also considered the impugned order passed by
the learned Appellate Court and found that the
aforesaid aspect has been taken into consideration
by the learned Appellate Court while passing
impugned order and specifically observed that it
can be said that the applicant has mentioned false
and frivolous grounds for condoning the delay of
17 months.
17. I have also considered the decisions relied upon
by the learned advocate for the petitioner. There
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cannot be any dispute with regard to the ratio
laid down in the same. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case on hand and this being
discretionary relief, which requires to be granted
judiciously, the said decisions would be of no
help to the present petitioner at this juncture.
18. At this stage, I would like to place reliance upon
the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case of Union Of India Vs.Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His Lr., reported in 2024
INSC 262, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after
referring to various decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, has made observations in Paragraph
Nos.26, 27, 34 and 35 as under,
"26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that
a party has lost his right to have the
matter considered on merits because of his
own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in
such circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against
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the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of
delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of
the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring
into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging
over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached
to the conclusion that the High Court
committed no error much less any error of
law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising
its supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court,
it has been said that delay should not be
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excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning
the delay is not satisfied in this case."
19. Thus in view of the aforesaid observations as well
as facts of the case coupled with the decisions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as stated above, I am of
the considered view that the conduct of the
petitioner in challenging the impugned order by
way of the instant petition is a blatant disregard
to the settled position of law behind the
principle of delay and laches. The petitioner like
any other vigilant citizen, was expected to assert
her rights within a reasonable time and she failed
to do the same thus, the instant petition is
nothing but assertion of a stale claim as this
Court cannot condone a delay of merely on
sympathetic grounds.
20. Accordingly, the present petition is bereft of
merits and is hereby rejected. Notice is
discharged.
Sd/-
(DIVYESH A. JOSHI, J.)
Gautam
