Gujarat High Court
Synergy Techno Solutions Private ... vs Sharanya Belachhikkate Rathnakar on 10 January, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 257 of 2024
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SYNERGY TECHNO SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
Versus
SHARANYA BELACHHIKKATE RATHNAKAR & ORS.
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Appearance:
ADITYA C YAGNIK(8228) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2
JAYANI B SHAH(8495) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2
MR DIPEN K DAVE(3296) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 10/01/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. The present appeal from order is filed under Order 43,
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter
referred to as the Code, 1908), by the original plaintiffs against
the rejection of their injunction application filed below Exhibit
5 dated 9th October 2024 in Special Civil Suit No. 266 of 2024
by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad Rural.
The parties will be referred to by their original positions.
2. The short facts which are necessary to decide the appeal
are narrated herein under:
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2.1 Appellants (plaintiffs) have filed Special Civil Suit No.
266 of 2024 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge,
Ahmedabad, against respondent (defendants) seeking a
permanent injunction and damages. According to the case of
plaintiffs, due to the acts of the defendants defaming the
plaintiffs' image in public at large, they have suffered huge
embarrassment at personal and business levels, which also
harmed their dignity, reputation, and goodwill. Thus, narrating
the set of facts in he plaint and alleged acts of defamation by
the defendants, the plaintiffs have prayed for damages of
₹1,00,00,000 against the defendants and also asked for a1,00,00,000 against the defendants and also asked for a
mandatory injunction to remove articles published on social
media and online portals. They have also sought a permanent
injunction restraining the defendants from making news items
concerning the plaintiffs and their business activities on online
platforms and social media.
2.2 Plaintiff No. 1 is a private limited company situated in
Ahmedabad, whereas Plaintiff No. 2 is the director of Plaintiff
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No. 1, residing in Gandhinagar. Defendant No. 1 appears to be
the sister-in-law of Plaintiff No. 2, whereas Defendant No. 2 is
a media house, and Defendant No. 3 is an editor of such
media house, namely Belagina Chaligala Patrike.
2.3 As per plaint, Plaintiff No. 2 was born in Karnataka into
a middle-class yet well-reputed farmer family. Plaintiff No. 2,
being highly educated and hardworking, earned huge respect
in her native place. After her marriage, Plaintiff No. 2 shifted
with her husband to Ahmedabad. It is further the case of the
plaintiffs that due to their hard work, they jointly started
Company being Plaintiff No. 1, which was incorporated in
2006. Plaintiff No. 2 has been the director of Plaintiff No. 1
since its incorporation. Its registered office is situated in the
Anand Nagar area, falling within the jurisdiction of the District
Court, Ahmedabad.
2.4 It is further stated that Defendant No. 1 married with the
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brother of Plaintiff No. 2 in or around year 2009. After the
unfortunate demise of her brother in 2023, due to disharmony
between Defendant No. 1 and her in-laws, including Plaintiff
No. 2, Defendant No. 1 filed false complaints before the police
and the concerned court in Karnataka. The details of such
complaints and the relationship between the parties were
highlighted in plaint. At the instance of Defendant No. 1,
certain news items was published by Defendant No. 2 (a daily
Kannada newspaper) on 13th June 2024. The said newspaper,
having wide circulation in Karnataka, published these items in
the regional language and on the Facebook page of Defendant
No. 2.
2.5 When Plaintiff No. 2, through her well-wishers, came to
know about the news items, a legal notice was issued to
Defendant No. 2, calling upon Defendant No. 2 to withdraw
such articles from the social media pages and further publish
an unconditional apology in its newspaper.
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2.6 It is further the case of the plaintiffs that on 19th June
2024, another media house published similar articles. Such
media house, knowing the real facts, assured the plaintiffs that
no further publications tarnishing the image of the plaintiffs
would be made. Nonetheless, Defendant No. 2 did not respond
to the notice or show any willingness to tender an
unconditional apology or remove the articles from its social
media pages, forcing the plaintiffs to file a suit on 3rd July
2024.
2.7 The notice was served upon the defendants. Defendant
No. 1 filed a written statement opposing the injunction
application filed by the plaintiffs. However, Defendants Nos. 2
and 3 have chosen not to appear or contest the suit.
2.8 After hearing the parties at length, the trial court, vide
its impugned order dated 9th October 2024, rejected the
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injunction application of the plaintiffs.
2.9 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order,
the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal.
3. Submission of the Appellants - plaintiffs
3.1 Learned advocate Ms. Jaini B. Shah appearing for the
appellants / plaintiffs would submit that the trial court has
committed a gross error of law while rejecting the injunction
application filed by the plaintiffs. She would submit that when
the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case, establishing on
record that the defendants committed acts of defamation by
publishing false information in its publication dated 13th June
2024 in the newspaper as well as on social media, thereby the
image and goodwill of the plaintiffs have been severely
affected.
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3.2 She would further submit that the trial court erroneously
concluded that there is nothing against Plaintiff No. 1 (the
company) and only the name of Plaintiff No. 1 is referred to
in the article because Plaintiff No. 2 happens to be its director.
3.3 She would contend that the trial court did not consider
the articles in the correct perspective and arrived at the
erroneous conclusion that the content of the article contained
no defamatory words and was merely published as a news
item based on a complaint.
3.4 She would submit that the publication made by
Defendant No. 2 was baseless as no formal complaint was
registered either with the police or any court, meaning that no
such information was available in the public domain.
Therefore, Defendant No. 2 could not have published such an
article, which maligns the image of the plaintiffs by portraying
them as fraudsters or cheaters.
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3.5 She would further submit that much later, after the
publication of the news item, Defendant No. 1 filed a private
complaint before the learned Magistrate in Karnataka against
family members of Plaintiff No. 2 and her mother on 6th July
2024. However, this complaint was stayed by the Hon'ble High
Court of Karnataka, which is observed in the impugned order
itself that no prima facie case is made out against the accused.
3.6 She would submit that due to the publication of the news
item on social media, one of the business associates of Plaintiff
No. 1, through a letter dated 28th June 2024, informed
Plaintiff No. 1 that the primary vendor registration of the
company was put on hold due to the publication.
3.7 She also pointed out that on 30th August 2024, a
Chartered Accountant firm, MGP & Associates, wrote to
Plaintiff No. 1, stating that the article published on social
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media could negatively affect the financial credit ratings and
upcoming IPO planning of the company.
3.8 Lastly, she would submit that considering the material on
record, not only was a prima facie case made out, but the
balance of convenience and irreparable loss also tilted in favor
of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing the
injunction application.
3.9 Based on these submissions, the learned advocate for the
appellants requested this court to allow the present appeal,
thereby to grant the injunction application of the plaintiffs
filed below Exhibit 5.
4. Submission of Respondent No. 1 - Defendant No.1
4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Dipen K. Dave, appearing for
Respondent No. 1, strongly opposed the admission and
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granting of the injunction in favour of plaintiffs. He submitted
that the appeal filed by the plaintiffs is nothing but a misuse
of the process of law and sheer harassment to Defendant No.
1, who is a lady aggrieved after the loss of her husband due
to cancer and was cheated by her in-laws, including Plaintiff
No. 2. This forced her to file a police complaint against them.
4.2 Learned advocate Mr. Dave would submit that no law
can prevent a person from filing a police complaint against
someone if they have reason to believe that such a person
committed acts of cheating and fraud. Once a complaint is
filed with the police, and any related article is published in
the newspaper, the concerned individual cannot claim
defamation by filing a suit against the complainant or media
house.
4.3 He would state that the police complaint was filed on
10th June 2024, and a copy was provided to Defendant No. 2,
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following which the news item was published on 13th June
2024 in the newspaper and on its social media page. He would
further submit that having no action taken by the police, who
might have filed closer report, defendant No.1 has preferred a
private compliant before the local Magistrate concern in State
of Karnataka, wherein process has been issued. He would
further submit that letter of business associates as well as
Chartered Accountant dated 20th June 2024 and 30th August
2024 respectively referred by the learned advocate for the
appellant are got up one as business associate having its
corporate office and factory in Bangladesh and representative
office in Hongkong could not have send the translated copy of
news item dated 13th June 2024 to plaintiff No.1. The letter of
Chartered Accountant is prima facie given an impression that it
is an in-house Chartered Accountant of plaintiff No.1 or might
be assisting plaintiff No.1 in any respect. He would
empathetically submit that there is no reference of those letters
in the suit but such copies are submitted at the fag end before
the trial Court when relevant queries put tto them and when
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asked by the concern Court. Learned advocate Mr. Dave made
a statement at bar that having himself appeared before the
trial Court, he is making the aforesaid statement.
4.4 According to the submissions of learned advocate for
Defendant No.1, no cause of action as disclosed by plaintiff
No.1 to file the suit and having no defamatory statement made
against plaintiff No.2, suit itself is frivolous requires to be
rejected at threshold and for such reason, Defendant No.1 has
already moved an appropriate application under Order 7 Rule
11 of the Code, 1908.
4.5 He would lastly submit that plaintiffs having not
established any prima facie case to maintain the suit and in
absence of any threat or any apprehension made out on record
by the plaintiffs in regards to any future publication by the
defendants, there is neither any balance of convenience nor
irreparable loss cause to the plaintiffs. So, after making
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aforesaid submissions, he would request this Court to dismiss
this appeal being merit-less.
No other end further submissions are made.
5. Findings of the Court
5.1 Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties and gone through the paper book containing the
documents which are submitted by the parties before the trial
court in the suit. Nonetheless, learned advocates for plaintiffs
only relied upon article dated 13th June 2024 for legal otice
and aforesaid two letters and no other doucments are relied
upon.
5.2 At the outset, it is required to be considered that after
examining the controversy in detail, the trial court has not
exercised the discretion in favour of the plaintiff and thereby
rejected their injunction application.
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5.3 Before adverting into the issue germane in the appeal,
scope and limitation under Order 43 of the code requires to be
taken into consideration, for which, I would like to refer and
rely upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in
case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. Repoted
in 1990 Supp. SCC 727. The relevant paras are as under:
"13.On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the
appellate bench fell into error on two important
propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the
very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the
limitations on the powers of the appellate court to
substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against
a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities
in the ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged
user of the trademark on which the passing-off action is
founded. We shall deal with these two separately.
14.The appeals before the Division Bench were against the
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals,
the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of
discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its
own discretion except where the discretion has been shown
to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or
perversely or where the court had ignored the settled
principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory
injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said
to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not
reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion
different from the one reached by the court below if the
one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the
material. The appellate court would normally not be
justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under
appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the
matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary
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conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial
court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the
appellate court would have taken a different view may not
justify interference with the trial court's exercise of
discretion. After referring to these principles
Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v.
Pothan Joseph, (1960) 3 SCR 713 . (SCR 721)
"... These principles are well established, but as has been
observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton and Co. v.
Jhanaton 1942 AC 130 '...the law as to the reversal by a
court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the
exercise of his discretion is well established, and any
difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well
settled principles in an individual case'."
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this
principle."
5.4 As per the ratio laid down by the Honorable Apex court
of India in aforesaid decision that if the discretion used by the
trial court while adjudicating the injunction application, the
appellate court normally should not interfere in such discretion
used by the trial court be it granting or refusing injunction, as
the case may be. It is also well settled that mearly because a
second view is possible it is not open for an appellate court to
substitute its view by upsetting the view taken by the trial
court except in exceptional circumstances, wherein the view
taken by the trial court is erroneous, perverse or contrary to
the principal of law.
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5.5 After hearing both the sides and analyzing the evidence
and submissions, the trial court rejected the injunction
application filed by the plaintiffs. It observed that the plaintiffs
failed to establish a prima facie case of defamation against
Defendant No. 1 or Defendant No. 2. The trial court concluded
that the articles in question do not contain any explicit
defamatory remarks against Plaintiff No. 1 (the company). The
reference to Plaintiff No. 1 in the article was solely due to
Plaintiff No. 2 being its director, and no separate allegations
were made against the company.
5.6 The trial court further noted that the news item
published by Defendant No. 2 was based on the police
complaint filed by Defendant No. 1. Since the complaint was
already filed prior to publication, Defendant No. 2, being a
media house, was within its rights to report on it. The court
emphasized that no additional evidence was presented to show
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malice or intent to defame on the part of Defendant No. 2.
Even the trial Court has after gone through the article came to
the conclusion that same is not defamatory. Pirma facie, this
Court would agree with such view as article is published as
per the police complaint.
5.7 The trial court also highlighted that the publication did
not cause irreparable damage to the plaintiffs, as no further
publications were made after the news item dated 13th June
2024. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the balance of
convenience did not favour the plaintiffs and declined to grant
the injunction.
5.8 It is worth to note that reading translated version of
alleged defamatory news item published on 13.06.2024, prima
facie, there is no whisper against plaintiff No.1 except referring
its name into bracketed portion after the name of plaintiff
No.2 who happens to be Director of plaintiff No.1. Thus, I am
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in agreement with the trial Court that there is nothing against
plaintiff No.1 - company. Thereby, it cannot claim that its
image is affected in public, as alleged in the suit.
5.9 So far as the case of plaintiff No.2 is concerned, prima
facie, if any media house published any news item as per the
police complaint, according to my view, no injunction can be
granted against such media house, not to publish any news
against the plaintiffs. It is to be recognized in democratic
country like India, that media is a forth pillar whose job is to
make people aware about events which are important and
requires to be known to public at large. It is not out of place
to mention that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India
allow every citizen to have right for free speech and
expression. Such fundamental rights of citizens cannot be
lightly interfered with by the Court unless there is strong
prima facie case made out against the plaintiffs to prove that
with an ulterior motive and misuse of its authority, media
house is maligning the image of plaintiffs which is not made
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out in the present case. It is also equally true that under the
guise of right of free speech and expression, person cannot be
allowed to publish anything for defaming anyone.
5.10 At this stage, I would like to refer and rely upon a
decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in case of
Bloomberg Television Production Services vs. Zee Entertainment
Enterprises Ltd. Reported in 2024 (4) Scale 284, wherein it is
observed that;
"[5] The three-fold test of establishing (i) a prima facie
case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss
or harm, for the grant of interim relief, is wellestablished
in the jurisprudence of this Court. This test is equally
applicable to the grant of interim injunctions in
defamation suits. However, this three-fold test must not be
applied mechanically, Delhi Development Authority v.
Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd, 1996 4 SCC 622, para
38. to the detriment of the other party and in the case of
injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the
detriment of the public. While granting interim relief, the
court must provide detailed reasons and analyze how the
three-fold test is satisfied. A cursory reproduction of the
submissions and precedents before the court is not
sufficient. The court must explain how the test is satisfied
and how the precedents cited apply to the facts of the
case.
[7] Significantly, in suits concerning defamation by media
platforms and/or journalists, an additional consideration of
balancing the fundamental right to free speech with the
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right to reputation and privacy must be borne in mind, R.
Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1994 6 SCC 632. The
constitutional mandate of protecting journalistic expression
cannot be understated, and courts must tread cautiously
while granting pre-trial interim injunctions. The standard
to be followed may be borrowed from the decision in
Bonnard v. Perryman,1891 95 AllER 965. This standard,
christened the 'Bonnard standard', laid down by the Court
of Appeal (England and Wales), has acquired the status of
a common law principle for the grant of interim
injunctions in defamation suits, Holley vs. Smyth, 1998 1
AllER 853. The Court of Appeal in Bonnard (supra) held as
follows: " But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an
action for defamation is so special as to require
exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to
interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to
prevent an anticipated wrong. The right of free speech is
one which it is for the public interest that individuals
should possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise
without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is done;
and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong
committed; but, on the contrary, often a very wholesome
act is performed in the publication and repetition of an
alleged libel. Until it is clear that an alleged libel is
untrue, it is not clear that any right at all has been
infringed; and the importance of leaving free speech
unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing
most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim
injunctions." (emphasis supplied)
[8] In Fraser v. Evans, 1969 1 QB 349. the Court of
Appeal followed the Bonnard principle and held as follows:
"in so far as the article will be defamatory of Mr. Fraser,
it is clear he cannot get an injunction. The Court will not
restrain the publication of an article, even though it is
defamatory, when the defendant says he intends to justify
it or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest.
That has been established for many years ever since
Bonnard v. Ferryman,1891 2 Ch 269. 'The reason
sometimes given is that the defences of justification and
fair comment are for the jury, which is the constitutional
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tribunal, and not for a Judge. But a better reason is the
importance in the public interest that the truth should
out." (emphasis supplied)
[9] In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction against
the publication of an article may have severe ramifications
on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the
public's right to know. An injunction, particularly ex-parte,
should not be granted without establishing that the
content sought to be restricted is 'malicious' or 'palpably
false'. Granting interim injunctions, before the trial
commences, in a cavalier manner results in the stifling of
public debate. In other words, courts should not grant ex-
parte injunctions except in exceptional cases where the
defence advanced by the respondent would undoubtedly
fail at trial. In all other cases, injunctions against the
publication of material should be granted only after a full-
fledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the
respondent is given a chance to make their submissions."
5.11 At this stage, after going through the article which was
published by defendant No.2 on 13 th June 2024, prima facie, I
am of the view that no such defamatory words are used in the
article and the same is only based upon complaint filed by
defendant No.1. Prima facie, if contents of such complain is
referred and published in the article, such act of defendant
No.2 cannot amount to defame the plaintiffs in public.
6. So far as two letters which are referred by learned
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advocate for the appellants are concerned, prima facie, I am
inclined to accept the submission of learned advocate for the
defendant NO.1 that such letters having not referred in the suit
and place at the fag end of Exh.5 are not inspiring the
confidence about their genuinity. Nonetheless, at this stage, I
am not making any final opinion on it. In any case, when
there is nothing adverse stated in the article against plaintiff
No.1, the reference of aforesaid two letters pales into
insignificance.
7. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Honourable
Supreme Court and considering the totality of the facts and
circumstances, I am of the view that there is no error
committed by the trial court by rejecting the application of the
plaintiffs thereby, refused to grant injunction in favour of the
plantiffs as prayed for.
8. Conclusion:
8.1 In view of the aforesaid discussion, reasons and findings,
this court would not find any merit in the appeal, which
requires to be dismissed and the same is dismissed.
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8.2 It is made clear that observations which are made
hereinabove by this Court are tentative in nature and made
just to decide the present appeal. Any of such observations
made by these court will not come in the way of respective
parties. The trial Court shall decide the suit in accordance with
law as per the evidence made available on record and
accordingly adjudicate the issues in accordance with law.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
DRASHTI K. SHUKLA
