Gujarat High Court
Gram Panchayat, Kandhi vs Heirs Of Rambhai Khimabhai Harijan on 7 January, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 64 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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GRAM PANCHAYAT, KANDHI
Versus
HEIRS OF RAMBHAI KHIMABHAI HARIJAN & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR VISHAL C MEHTA(6152) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 07/01/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed under Article 227
of the Constitution of India by Gram Panchayat,
Kandhi through its Sarpanch, seeking following
reliefs:-
"A. A writ of certiorari or any other writ,
order or direction may kindly be issued to
quash and set aside the judgement and
order dated 20-09-2024 passed by the
Court of 2nd Additional District Judge, Gir-
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Somnath at Una in Miscellaneous Civil
Application No. 31 of 2023, at Annexure -
'D' by allowing the said application,
preferred by the Petitioner, as prayed for,
in the interest of justice.
B. Pending hearing and final disposal of
the present Special Civil Application, the
Respondents may kindly be directed to
maintain status quo in respect of the lands
in question, in the interest of justice.
C. Any other and/or further reliefs that
may be deemed necessary and expedient
in the interest of justice may kindly be
granted."
2. The parties will be referred to as per the
original position in Regular Civil Suit No. 150 of
1994 in question.
3. FACTS OF THE CASE:-
3.1. The petitioner happens to be the plaintiff,
and the respondents are the defendants of
Regular Civil Suit No. 150 of 1994 filed before the
Joint Civil Judge (S.D.), Una. The suit appears to
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have been filed seeking a permanent injunction
against the defendants. After hearing the parties
and considering the evidence on record, the Trial
Court, vide its judgment and decree dated
4.9.2000, dismissed the suit.
3.2. The dismissal of the suit was challenged by
the plaintiff by way of a Regular Civil Appeal
before the District Court under Section 96 read
with Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (for the sake of brevity, hereinafter referred
to as 'the Code'). As there was a delay of 8285
days in filing such appeal, the plaintiff - petitioner
had filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of
2023 in the appeal.
3.3. The defendants appear to have objected to
such a long, inordinate, and unexplained delay on
the part of the plaintiff in filing the First Appeal by
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filing their reply.
3.4. After hearing the parties and considering the
averments made in the application, the 2nd
Additional District Judge, Gir-Somnath at Una,
rejected the delay application, vide its impugned
order dated 20.9.2024.
3.5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
rejection of the delay application of the plaintiff -
petitioner by the 2nd Additional District Judge,
Gir-Somnath at Una, vide its impugned order
dated 20.9.2024, passed in Civil Miscellaneous
Application No. 31 of 2023, the present petition
has been filed.
4. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:-
4.1. Learned Advocate Mr. Vishal C. Mehta for the
petitioner would submit that the learned District Court,
without appreciating the averments made in the
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application and without appreciating the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Apex Court of India while adjudicating
the delay application, has erroneously rejected the
application of the plaintiff in filing its First Appeal.
4.2. He would further submit that the non-intimation
of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the
Trial Court by the advocate engaged by the plaintiff
resulted in the delay in filing the Regular Appeal.
4.3. He would further submit that once the petitioner
came to know about the passing of decree in its suit
when received summons in a suit filed by defendant in
year 2001, the advocate engaged by the applicant has
ill-advised that petitioner is not requires to challenge
the judgement and decree passed by the Trial Court
as a countersuit came to be filed by the defendants,
being Regular Civil Suit No. 98 of 2021 against the
plaintiff, which was pending at the relevant point of
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time.
4.4. He would further submit that there is no malafide,
or dilatory tactic used by the office of the plaintiff, and
there is no ill-intention on the part of the plaintiff to
file the appeal after a delay of 8285 days. He would
further submits that there is no negligence and or
gross negligence on the part of the petitioner in filing
the appeal after this much delay.
4.5. To buttress his argument, he relied upon the
decision rendered in the case of Dodidya Hajabhai
Naran v. Shri Jilla Panchayat Junagadh Through
District Development Officer, 2023 (0) AIJEL-HC
247283. Para Nos. 11 and 12 are reproduced as
under:
"11. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe it
was held that whether or not there is
sufficient cause for condonation of delay is
a question of fact dependent upon the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. In
Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath it was held that the
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appellant had sufficient cause for not filing
the appeal within the period of limitation.
This Court under Article 136 can reassess
the ground and in appropriate case set
aside the order made by the High Court or
the tribunal and remit the matter for
hearing on merits. It was accordingly
allowed, delay was condoned and the case
was remitted for decision on merits.
12. In O.P.Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh a
Bench of three Judges had held that if the
refusal to condone the delay results in
grave miscarriage of justice, it would be
aground to condone the delay. Delay was
accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land
Acquisition v. Katiji a Bench of two Judges
considered the question of limitation in an
appeal filed by the State and held that
Section 5 was enacted in order to enable
the court to do substantial justice to the
parties by disposing of matters on merits.
The expression 'sufficient cause' is
adequately elastic to enable the court to
apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice that
being the life purpose for the existence of
the institution of courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been making
a justifiably liberal approach in matters
instituted in this Court. But the message
does not appear to have percolated down
to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This
Court reiterated that the expression 'every
day's delay must be explained' does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be
made. The doctrine must be applied in a
rational, common sense, pragmatic
manner. When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against
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each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a
nondeliberate delay. There is no
presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable
negligence, or on account of mala fides. A
litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk. Judiciary is not respected on account
of its power to legalise injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable
of removing injustice and is expected to do
so. Making a justice-oriented approach from
this perspective, there was sufficient cause
for condoning the delay in the institution of
the appeal. The fact that it was the State
which was seeking condonation and not a
private party was altogether irrelevant. The
doctrine of equality before law demands
that all litigants, including the State as a
litigant, are accorded the same treatment
and the law is administered in an
everhanded manner. There is no warrant
for according a step motherly treatment
when the State is the applicant. The delay
was accordingly condoned."
4.6. He also relied upon the decision of this Court
rendered in the case of State of Gujarat v.
Arunkumar Sukhdevbhai Trivedi passed in
Second Appeal No. 3619 of 2020. Paras 14, 15,
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and 16 of the same are as under:
"14. It is to be remembered that in every case of
delay some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned can be attributed. Albeit alone it is not
enough to turn down the plea and to shut the door
of litigant forever. The explanation if does not
smack of malafide or it is not put forth as a
dilatory tactics, the Court must show
consideration to the aspect. Opposite position can
also be invented while the Court has reasonable
ground to believe that delay was caused by the
party deliberately to gain time, then the Court
should lean against acceptance of expression. We
may also refer to the observations of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in case of Maniben Devraj Shah
(supra) as under :
"24. What colour the expression 'sufficient
cause' would get in the factual matrix of a
given case would largely depend on bona
fide nature of the explanation. If the Court
finds that there has been no negligence on
the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona
fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on
the other hand, the explanation given by
the applicant is found to be concocted or
he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting
his cause, then it would be a legitimate
exercise of discretion not to condone the
delay.
25. In cases involving the State and its
agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can
take note of the fact that sufficient time is
taken in the decision making process but
no premium can be given for total lethargy
or utter negligence on the part of the
officers of the State and / or its agencies /
instrumentalities and the applications filed
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by them for condonation of delay cannot
be allowed as a matter of course by
accepting the plea that dismissal of the
matter on the ground of bar of limitation
will cause injury to the public interest."
15. What could be understood that for explanation
of the sufficient cause if Court finds that there has
been no negligence on the part of the applicant and
the explanation shows that the delay does not
smack of malafide then the Court may condone the
delay. On the other hand, if the explanation is
found to be concocted or negligent in prosecuting
his case, the Court can decline to condone the
delay. If State is litigant, seeking condonation of
delay though law of equity demands that State
should be put a par with other litigant, some
latitude should be given to the State. Recently, the
Supreme Court has thoroughly discussed this issue
in case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) (supra), after
referring various judgments on the subject matter
including its judgment in the case of Esha
Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others - (2013)
12 SCC 649 as well as judgment in the case of Mst.
Katiji (supra), in para 29, 30, 31 and 37, Hon'ble
Apex Court has observed as under:
"29. Considering the aforementioned
decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that
this Court has stepped in to ensure that
substantive rights of private parties and the
State are not defeated at the threshold simply
due to technical considerations of delay.
However, these decisions notwithstanding, we
reiterate that condonation of delay being a
discretionary power available to courts,
exercise of discretion must necessarily
depend upon the sufficiency of the cause
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shown and the degree of acceptability of the
explanation, the length of delay being
immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of
sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable
explanation being proffered, delay of the
shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long
periods can be condoned if the explanation is
satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the
courts must distinguish between an
'explanation' and an 'excuse'. An
'explanation' is designed to give someone all
of the facts and lay out the cause for
something. It helps clarify the circumstances
of a particular event and allows the person to
point out that something that has happened is
not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care
must however be taken to distinguish an
'explanation' from an 'excuse'. Although
people tend to see 'explanation' and 'excuse'
as the same thing and struggle to find out the
difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real. An
'excuse' is often offered by a person to deny
responsibility and consequences when under
attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling
something as just an 'excuse' would imply
that the explanation proffered is believed not
to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that
caters to all situations and, therefore, each
case for condonation of delay based on
existence or absence of sufficient cause has
to be decided on its own facts. At this stage,
we cannot but lament that it is only excuses,
and not explanations, that are more often
accepted for condonation of long delays to
safeguard public interest from those hidden
forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a
meritorious claim does not reach the higher
courts for adjudication.
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30. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in
mind that we are not hearing an application
for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal
over a discretionary order of the High Court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay.
In the case of the former, whether to condone
or not would be the only question whereas in
the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the
prayer for condonation would be the question.
Law is fairly well-settled that "a court of
appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the
discretion exercised by the courts below". If
any authority is required, we can profitably
refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa
v. Tammanasa12, which in turn relied on the
(2003) 10 SCC 390 decision in Gujarat Steel
Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
Sabha13 where it has been held that "an
appellate power interferes not when the order
appealed is not right but only when it is
clearly wrong".
31. The order under challenge in this appeal is
dated 21st December 2011. It was rendered
at a point of time when the decisions in Mst.
Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra), Chandra
Mani (supra), K.V. Ayisumma (supra) and
Lipok AO (supra) were holding the field. It is
not that the said decisions do not hold the
field now, having been overruled by any
subsequent decision. Although there have
been some decisions in the recent past [State
of M.P. v. Bherulal14 is one such decision
apart from University of Delhi (supra)] which
have not accepted governmental lethargy,
tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals
within time as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of
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discretion by the High Court has to be tested
on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented
approach expounded in the aforesaid
decisions which have been referred to above.
We find that the High Court in the present
case assigned the following reasons in
support of its order:
a. The law of limitation was founded on
public policy, and that some lapse on the
part of a litigant, by itself, would not be
sufficient to deny condonation of delay as
the same could cause miscarriage of
justice.
b. The expression sufficient cause is elastic
enough for courts to do substantial justice.
Further, when substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against
one another, the former would prevail.
c. It is upon the courts to consider the
sufficiency of cause shown for the delay,
and the length of delay is not always
decisive while exercising discretion in such
matters if the delay is properly explained.
Further, the merits of a claim were also to
be considered when deciding such
applications for condonation of delay.
d. Further, a distinction should be drawn
between inordinate unexplained delay and
explained delay, where in the present case,
the first respondent had sufficiently
explained the delay on account of
negligence on part of the government
functionaries and the government counsel
on record before the Reference Court. e.
The officer responsible for the negligence
would be liable to suffer and not public
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interest through the State. The High Court
felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since
the negligence therein did not border on
callousness.
*** *** ***
37. Having bestowed serious consideration to the
rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's
decision to condone the delay on account of the
first respondent's inability to present the appeal
within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does
not suffer from any error warranting interference.
As the aforementioned judgments have shown,
such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call
for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the
Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to
the State. The hidden forces that are at work in
preventing an appeal by the State being presented
within the prescribed period of limitation so as not
to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the
legality and validity of an order of a lower court and
thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored.
Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of
governmental functions have to be removed by
taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the
competing interests."
16. Given the reasons it appears that opponent has
failed to point out any malafide or negligence on the
part of the applicant in not filing the second appeal
within time. The negligence of GP offices or their
officers, which is mainly argued by learned advocate
Mr.Solanki, may suffer the responsible officer but no
public interest which the State is espousing through.
The pragmatic view is required to be taken in the
matter and in background of this aspect the
explanation of delay of 703 days is to be seen and
considered. They are not found to be colossal delay
compared to the public interest involved in the
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matter. In facts and circumstances of the case, the
judgments relied upon by the learned advocate
Mr.Solanki would not avail any benefit to his case.
4.7. Mr. Mehta ld. advocate would concluded his
argument with the request that, considering the fact
that the petitioner is a Gram Panchayat being a Public
Authority, it requires legal advice from its panel
advocates/advocate engaged for prosecuting any legal
remedy, and ordinarily, the officer concerned would
follow the legal advice given to them. So, he would
request that, on suitable conditions/cost, if this Court
deems it fit to impose upon the plaintiff, the delay
may be condoned.
4.8. No other and further submissions being made by
learned advocate of the petitioner.
5. ANALYSIS / REASONING
5.1 I have gone through the averments made in the
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petition as well as the documents annexed and also
perused the impugned delay application as well as the
impugned order passed thereon by the District Court
concerned which is under challenged.
5.2. It appears from the documents available with the
petition that the judgment and decree challenged in
the appeal were passed on 4.9.2000. Its copy, which is
placed along with the petition (page 19), does suggest
that the certified copy of such judgment was applied
on 11.9.2000 and was delivered on 12.9.2000. The
plaintiff, in its delay application, averred that initially,
the learned advocate engaged by the plaintiff had not
informed about the passing of such judgment and
decree, but the same came to the notice of the
plaintiff when it received notice of Regular Civil Suit
No. 98 of 2001 filed by the defendant. Thereafter, it
has been further averred that, because of the ill
advice of the advocate, no appeal was filed, though
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the plaintiff was made aware of the passing of such
judgment and decree in question. According to the
plaintiff, it followed the advice of the advocate, who
opined that there was no need to file any appeal
against such judgment and decree as the suit of the
defendant was pending for adjudication. As such,
except the bare averments made in the application
about ill advice, nothing has been placed on record
about any communication exchanged between the
advocate and the plaintiff regarding receiving such ill
advice. Be that as it may, this cannot be considered a
ground for condonation of delay, as much as any
advice received by the litigant who is an authority at
least to understand the sensitivity of the nature of
proceedings, which was initiated at its instance by
filing a suit that culminated in its dismissal. When the
advocate engaged by the plaintiff initially did not
inform about the passing of such judgment and
decree, and the very advocate was engaged by the
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petitioner/plaintiff in the subsequent suit filed by the
defendant, it speaks volumes about the conduct of the
official of the plaintiff regarding conducting legal
matters in the Court of law.
5.3. Though it is stated in para 2 of the application
that the certified copy of the judgment and decree
passed by the Trial Court was applied for on 19.1.2023
and the same was delivered to the plaintiff on
21.1.2023, this is factually incorrect because, as
stated hereinabove, the copy annexed with the
petition (page 19) clearly suggests that the certified
copy was applied for on 11.9.2000 and delivered on
12.9.2000. Thus, the statement made by the
applicant-plaintiff in its delay application is factually
incorrect and misleading.
5.4. The learned advocate Mr. Mehta, appearing for
the petitioner, has relied upon two decisions of this
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Court, whereby he would emphasize that a liberal
approach should be taken by the Court when there is
no negligence on the part of the applicant and there is
no malafide attributed or alleged by the other side
upon the authorities. Then, to do substantial justice
between the parties and without taking any hyper-
technical approach in the matter, the delay requires to
be condoned by the Court.
5.5. I have gone through both these decisions passed
by the learned Single Judge of this Court, referring to
the case law of the Hon'ble Apex Court of India on the
aspect of condonation of delay viz-a-viz sufficient
cause. There is no cavil that, wherever a delay
application is filed wherein a sufficient cause is made
out and no negligence/malafide/dilatory tactics are
used by the applicant, ordinarily the approach of the
Court would be deemed towards granting such an
application, thereby allowing the matter to be decided
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on merits. It is required to be noted here that, in
Dodidya Hajabhai Naran (supra), the challenge in
the petition was against granting condonation of delay
by the appellate Court, and there was a delay of 240
days in filing the appeal. After considering the
averments made in the application, the discretion
used by the appellate Court in favor of the applicant,
and the absence of negligence/malafide on the part of
the appellants/applicants of that case, this Court found
that no interference was required while exercising its
power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Once the trial Court or appellate Court exercises
discretion while condoning the delay, this Court, in its
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, ordinarily should not interfere with such
discretion used by the Court concerned unless such
discretion is used arbitrarily or manifestly contrary to
the records germane to the delay application. [see
Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through LRS & ORS V/S
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Union of INDIA & ANR reported in 2023 (10) SCC 531]
5.6. In the case of Arunkumar Sukhdevbhai Trivedi
(supra), wherein there was a delay of 703 days at the
instance of the State in filing the appeal before this
Court, it was observed by this Court that there was no
malafide or negligence on the part of the applicant in
not filing the second appeal, and the delay was
condoned. But the facts on hand speaks volume about
sheer negligence on the part of petitioner being public
authority in pursuing legal remedy available to the
litigant than ratio of the said decision would not apply
in this case.
5.7. Both these judgments would not be applicable to
the facts of the present case inasmuch as the District
Court concerned has not exercised its discretion in
favor of the applicant, rightly so, because neither any
sufficient cause was made out by the plaintiff, nor can
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such an approach on the part of the District Court be
said to be arbitrary in nature, which requires
interference by this Court in its jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5.8. True, the length of delay is not material while
considering any delay application, but when there is
gross delay, like in the present case on hand, i.e.,
8285 days of delay in filing the appeal (almost 22
years plus), there is some relevance to length of such
gross delay. After going through the documents
annexed to the petition, I am of the opinion that it is a
case of gross negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
being a public authority, in dealing with the legal
remedy available to it.
5.9. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to and rely
upon a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India in the case of K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur
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Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in 2024
(4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the
aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has held as under:
"10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the
discretionary power of a court to condone
delay must be exercised judiciously and it is
not to be exercised in cases where there is
gross negligence and/or want of due
diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji
Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi &
Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is
also not supposed to be exercised in the
absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or
appropriate explanation for the delay (See
P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and
Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is
apparent that the words 'sufficient
cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
can only be given a liberal
construction, when no negligence, nor
inaction, nor want of bona fide is
imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj
and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.,
(2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which
are to be kept in mind for condonation
of delay were succinctly summarised by
this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC
649, and are reproduced as under:
"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal,
pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic
approach while dealing with an application
for condonation of delay, for the courts are
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not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The
terms "sufficient cause" should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy
and purpose regard being had to the fact
that these terms are basically elastic and
are to be applied in proper perspective to
the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii)
Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should
not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be
attached to deliberate causation of
delay but, gross negligence on the part
of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable
to a party seeking condonation of delay
is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that
adherence to strict proof should not
affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the
ultimate eventuate there is no real
failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal
approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction
between inordinate delay and a delay
of short duration or few days, for to the
former doctrine of prejudice is
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attracted whereas to the latter it may
not be attracted. That apart, the first
one warrants strict approach whereas
the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration.
It is so as the fundamental principle is
that the courts are required to weigh
the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go by
in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is
concocted, or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation."
5.10. It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of
the Hon'ble Supeme Court of India in the case of case
of Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81
wherein it is held as under:-
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
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case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want
of bonafide on his part in the facts
and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently
or remained inactive, there cannot
be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay
by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning
the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature."
Thus, in view of above law and averment made in the
delay application which was factually incorrect, delay
application requires to be rejected on this ground as
well.
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5.11. Last but not least, it is also profitable to refer to
and rely upon ratio laid down by recent past decision
of Honourable Supreme Court of India in a case of
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/
S Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024
INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 : 2024 (4) Scale 846
wherein after referring to its previous decisions,
summarized the case law on the issue of limitation vis-
a-vis condonation of delay in context of "sufficient
cause". It has been so observed and held as under,
"[26] On a harmonious consideration
of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by
this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon
public policy that there should be an
end to litigation by forfeiting the right
to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not
been exercised or availed of for a long
time must come to an end or cease to
exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation
Act have to be construed differently,
such as Section 3 has to be construed
in a strict sense whereas Section 5
has to be construed liberally;
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(iv) In order to advance substantial
justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in
mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the
Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise
discretion to condone the delay if
sufficient cause had been explained,
but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not
be exercised even if sufficient cause
is established for various factors such
as, where there is inordinate delay,
negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained
relief in similar matter, it does not
mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for
the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not
required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application
has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning
the delay and condoning the delay
for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory
provision."
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5.12. Keeping in mind the ratio laid down in the
aforementioned decisions and applying it to the facts
of the case on hand, I am of the opinion that this is a
classic case of gross negligence on the part of the
public authority while pursuing the legal remedy
available to them under the law. In view of the
aforesaid ratio of the Honourable Apex Court's
decisions, I am of the opinion that the District Court
has not committed any error of law, much less any
apparent error of law and or any jurisdictional error,
which requires interference by this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5.13. At last, I would also like to observe that
whenever a public authority comes with a plea of
sufficient cause by filing a delay application, true and
correct facts are required to be stated in the
application, failing which no equitable relief can be
granted in favor of the authority, as the application of
law would apply equally to a private individual and
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the State. As observed hereinabove, there is a
misstatement made by the plaintiff regarding the
application for and receipt of the certified copy of the
judgment and decree of the trial court. That would
also be an additional ground against the applicant for
not condoning the huge and inordinate delay in filing
its appeal. By now, it has been a well-settled
proposition of law that if any misstatement made by
public authority in its delay application then it is self-
sufficient to reject such delay application. As per the
decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer,
Jalgaon Medium Project, (2018) 7 SCC 448,
wherein held as:-
"11. Whether the respondent
made incorrect statement in the
application seeking condonation of
delay?
There is no dispute whatsoever that the
respondent being the beneficiary of the
acquisition has been duly impleaded as a
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party respondent in the reference cases
as is required in law. It not only appeared
in the matter through a properly
instructed counsel but also filed its
written statement opposing the claim for
enhancement of compensation but did
not choose to lead any evidence
whatsoever. In the application filed in the
High Court the plea taken by the
respondent is as under:
"The applicant submits that, although the
applicant being Acquiring Body, was
arrayed as opponent in the said
reference, the opponent no. 4 herein
(Original Opponent No. 1) S.L.A.O. or his
subordinate contested the said reference
by filing written statement. Therefore,
this applicant was unaware about the
stand taken by S.L.A.O. as well as the
impugned judgment and award."
This averment in the application on the
face of it is totally incorrect. [12] The Law
& Judiciary Department as early as on
13.4.2000 i.e. to say within the period of
15 days from the date of the award of
the Reference Court communicated its
decision to acquiesce in the decision of
the Reference Court and communicated
the same to all the concerned including
the beneficiary of the acquisition.
It is not the case that the Executive
Engineer did not receive the said
communication. Having received the said
communication the respondent did not
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act in the matter and initiated any steps
for filing the appeals if it was really
aggrieved by the decision of the
Reference Court. There is no doubt
whatsoever in our mind that the
respondent made totally incorrect
statement in the application filed in the
High Court. We express our
reservation as to the manner in
which a public authority conducted
itself in its anxiety to somehow get
the relief from the court. In our
considered opinion incorrect
statement made in the application
seeking condonation of delay itself
is sufficient to reject the application
without any further inquiry as to
whether the averments made in the
application reveal sufficient cause to
condone the delay. That a party
taking a false stand to get rid of the
bar of limitation should not be
encouraged to get any premium on
the falsehood on his part by
condoning delay. [See: (1993)1SCC
572].
13. Whether the High Court properly
exercised its discretion?
The High Court in its order having
noticed the relevant fact in categorical
terms held that there was no substance
in the plea that it was unaware about the
judgment and award passed by the
Reference Court since it was a party
before the Reference Court and
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contested the matter. The High Court
also found that the decision of the Joint
Secretary to acquiesce was
communicated to the beneficiary of the
acquisition and therefore, its plea about
the unawareness of the award and
decision taken by the Government
cannot be accepted. The High Court in its
order emphatically rejected the ground
raised by the respondent in that regard.
In such view of the matter can it be said
that the High Court properly exercised its
jurisdiction? It is true that the power to
condone the delay rests with the court in
which the application was filed beyond
time and decide whether there is
sufficient cause for condoning the delay
and ordinarily the superior court may not
interfere with such discretion even if
some error is to be found in the
discretion so exercised by the court but
where there is no sufficient cause for
condoning the delay but the delay was
condoned, it is a case of discretion not
being exercised judicially and the order
becomes vulnerable and susceptible for
its correction by the superior court. The
High Court having found that the
respondent in its application made
incorrect submission that it had no
knowledge of the award passed by
the Reference Court ought to have
refused to exercise its discretion.
The High Court exercised its discretion
on wrong principles. In that view of the
matter we cannot sustain the exercise of
discretion in the manner done by the
High Court ."
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5.14. Thus, in view of the above said position of law and
the averment made in the delay application wherein
there is factually incorrect statement made, on this
ground also, delay application requires to be rejected.
6. CONCLUSION:-
6.1. The upshot of the aforesaid observation,
discussion, and reasons, I am of the opinion that the
order impugned in the petition does not require any
interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, as no sufficient cause is made out by the
petitioner while preferring the appeal almost after 22
years before the District Court after the passing of the
judgment and decree by the trial Court. Thus, there
are no merits in the petition, and the same is
dismissed in limine. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
MANISH MISHRA
