Gujarat High Court
Ishwarbhai Balubhai Patel vs Gujarat Revenue Tribunal on 7 January, 2025
Author: Nikhil S. Kariel
Bench: Nikhil S. Kariel
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 977 of 2023
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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ISHWARBHAI BALUBHAI PATEL
Versus
GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR. NISHIT P GANDHI(6946) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
ADITYA R GUNDECHA(8869) for the Respondent(s) No. 4,5,6,7
MR JK SHAH, ASST. GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Respondent(s) No.
2,3
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL
Date : 07/01/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned advocate Mr.K.B.Virvadia appearing for
learned advocate Mr.Nishit Gandhi on behalf of the petitioner,
learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.J.K.Shah on behalf
of the respondent - State and learned advocate Mr.Aditya
Gundecha on behalf of respondents no. 4 to 7.
2. By way of this petition, the petitioner challenges an
order dated 11.10.2022 passed by the Gujarat Revenue
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Tribunal whereby delay in preferring revision application had
not been condoned on the ground of sufficient cause not being
made out.
3. Learned advocate Mr.Virvadia on behalf of the petitioner
would submit that the petitioner was challenging an order
passed by the Deputy Collector before the GRT and whereas,
while the order passed by the Deputy Collector was dated
23.01.2019, the revision application had been preferred on
25.02.2022.
3.1. It is submitted that in the interregnum, the country was
faced with the Covid-19 pandemic leading to lockdown from
25.03.2020 and whereas, it is submitted that while the period
after 25.03.2020 would not be counted for calculating the
total period which had taken place in filing the application for
condoning the delay along with the revision application and
whereas, while the delay of 365 days had taken place, the
GRT had erred in not condoning the delay. Learned advocate
would submit that the petitioner had preferred an application
for condoning delay where sufficient reasons were made out
and hence, the GRT had committed an error in rejecting the
said application.
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3.2. Learned advocate Mr.Virvadia would emphasize that the
petitioner had originally approached the Mamlatdar under
Section 70(B) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Act more particularly for being declared as a tenant and
whereas, the said application had been allowed vide order
dated 18.10.2017 and whereas, the said order had been
challenged by the private respondents herein before the
Deputy Collector, Pardi by preferring Appeal No.22/2017
which came to be allowed vide order dated 23.01.2019.
3.3. It is submitted by learned advocate Mr.Virvadia that a
substantive right which had been recognized by the
Mamlatdar and ALT, Umargam vide order dated 18.10.2017
had been set aside by the Deputy Collector vide the order
impugned before the GRT and whereas, it is submitted that
the GRT, not considering the application on merits and
rejecting the application on the ground of delay, has trampled
upon the substantive rights which has been recognized and
therefore also, interference is called for.
4. On the other hand, the present petition is vehemently
contested by learned advocate Mr.Gundecha on behalf of the
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private respondents. Learned advocate tenders a copy of
affidavit-in-reply which is directed to be taken on record.
4.1. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would submit that the
application for condonation of delay does not raise any
grounds whatsoever and whereas, the same had been rightly
rejected by the learned Tribunal. Learned advocate
Mr.Gundecha would submit that the petitioner, except for
stating that he is a poor person, having very less knowledge of
law and coming from the lowest strata of the society namely
the Scheduled Tribes, has not made out any cause for
condoning the delay.
4.2. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would submit that as
such, while it was attempted to be submitted before the
Tribunal that the petitioner did not know about the legal
proceedings till some times near about when he had filed the
revision application, yet, it is submitted that while on one
hand the petitioner did not challenge the order of the Deputy
Collector, on the other hand, the petitioner had somewhere in
the year 2019 i.e. prior to June, 2019 preferred a Regular Civil
Suit No.21/2019.
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4.3. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would draw the
attention of this Court to an application preferred by the
private respondents, who are arraigned in the said civil suit as
defendants, under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC more
particularly learned advocate would emphasize on the date
when the application had been filed i.e. on 15.07.2019.
Learned advocate would further emphasize on a panchnama
which is annexed with the present petition which is a site
inspection report of the land in question in the civil suit and
whereas, the site inspection had been drawn on 05.05.2019.
4.4. Learned advocate would submit that while the order
passed by the Deputy Collector which was impugned before
the GRT was dated 23.01.2019, while, it is the case of the
petitioner that he was not aware about the further course of
action and that he was a poor person, on the other hand, after
the order had been passed by the Deputy Collector, the
petitioner had preferred a civil suit before the competent Civil
Court and whereas, the petitioner had also contested the
same. Learned advocate would submit that thus, as far as the
reasons stated in the application for condonation of delay, the
same may not be countenanced.
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4.5. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would further rely upon
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sagufa
Ahmed vs. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd.,
reported in (2021) 2 SCC 317, whereby according to
learned advocate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a
view that while the period of limitation, as per the order of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020 would stand
extended during the period when the nation was afflicted with
the Covid-19 virus, yet, in cases where the prescribed period
had elapsed even before the pandemic period, then the party
could not be permitted to take shelter under the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court extending the period of limitation
on account of Covid-19 virus. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha
would also rely upon decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkumar
Choudhary, reported in 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 74355 dated
29.11.2024 in support of his submissions.
5. Learned advocate Mr.Virvadia in rejoinder would submit
that since a substantive right has been recognized by the
Mamlatdar which has been set aside by the Deputy Collector,
a sympathetic and lenient view may be taken. Learned
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advocate would further submit that insofar as the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sagufa Ahmed (supra)
that the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was with
regard to an application filed after the limitation period before
the Tribunal which did not have the power to condone the
delay beyond a period of 45 days, i.e. before the NCLAT and
whereas, learned advocate would submit that since the facts
are different, the said decision would not be applicable to the
facts of the present case. Thus submitting, learned advocate
would request this Court to allow the present writ petition.
6. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties and
perused the documents on record. The only issue which arises
for consideration of this Court is whether the present
petitioner had made out sufficient cause for condonation of
delay before the GRT and whereas, whether the order of the
GRT requires any interference whatsoever.
6.1. To this Court, it would appear that the GRT had rightly
come to a conclusion that sufficient cause was not made out
and had refused to condone the delay. The reasons for coming
to the above conclusion being that a perusal of the application
for condonation of delay which is preferred along with the
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revision application would reveal that the main reason, as
stated for condonation of delay, is an averment that the
petitioner was an illiterate person who had no knowledge
about law more particularly he did not know as to whether the
revision application was to be filed within a particular time
period and also a submission that the petitioner belongs to the
Tribal Community and resides at one of the farthest places of
the State. It is also averred that when the petitioner had come
to Ahmedabad for some social function, he had met a learned
advocate who had advised him to file a revision application
and thus, the revision application had been immediately filed.
6.2. To this Court, it would appear that the reasons made out
in the application are not sufficient at all. While it would
appear that the GRT having perused the reasons had come to
a conclusion that per-se the reasons were not sufficient, to
this Court, it would appear that the reasons may not show a
sufficient cause on account of a different intervening fact all
together. It would appear, as noticed hereinabove, that the
order of the Deputy Collector which was impugned before the
GRT was dated 23.01.2019. The petitioner, as per the reply
filed by the private respondents, had preferred Regular Civil
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Suit No.21/2019 on 26.04.2019. It would appear that a
panchnama had been drawn in the civil suit on 05.05.2019. It
would also appear that the private respondents had preferred
an application under Order 7 Rule 11 on 15.07.2019 and
ultimately, vide an order dated 23.09.2023, it would appear
that the suit had been rejected on the ground of not disclosing
a cause of action.
6.3. Again, it would be relevant to refer to the observations
of the learned Civil Court at para-6.1 of the order whereby the
plant which had been rejected more particularly whereby the
Civil Court also observers that the petitioner, after order
dated 23.01.2019 passed by the Deputy Collector, never
approached the GRT and whereas, that would raise a question
as to why the said option was left unexplored in spite of the
same being obvious. While it is true that by the time the order
in the civil suit had been passed by the learned Civil Court,
the petitioner had already preferred the revision application
before the Tribunal, yet, the fact of a revision application
being available to the present petitioner to challenge order
dated 23.01.2019 was also noticed by the learned Civil Court.
6.4. Be that as it may, the crucial aspect being that the
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petitioner was legally aware and literate enough to have
preferred a civil suit after the order of the Deputy Collector
without challenging the same before the GRT and whereas,
the circumstance of the civil suit having been preferred would
go against the present petitioner inasmuch as the present
petitioner would not be able to claim benefit of an illiterate
person or even a person belonging to the lowest strata of
society or a person not having proper knowledge of law. The
petitioner being so much vigilant that he had filed a civil suit
when the order of the Deputy Collector was staring at his
face, could not be permitted to contend that he was not aware
about the legal process and thus, to this Court, it would
appear that sufficient cause, as pleaded in the application for
condoning delay, cannot be countenanced.
6.5. Furthermore, it would appear that the petitioner, in the
application for condonation of delay, has counted the period of
delay as thirty days from the date of order till the date of filing
i.e. 23.02.2022 and whereas, while the Tribunal has felt it
appropriate not to condone the delay of 365 days, to this
Court, it would appear that the submission made on behalf of
the private respondents that the decision of the Hon'ble
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Supreme Court extending the prescribed period on account of
Covid-19 virus would not be available to the petitioner.
6.6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in decision of the Sagufa
Ahmed (supra) has inter alia observed that if any
proceedings were to be instituted after the prescribed period
of limitation, then the litigant would not be entitled to claim
benefit of order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated
23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.03/2020 more
particularly whereby the period of limitation had been
extended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on account of Covid-
19 pandemic. Paragraphs No.19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of
the said decision being relevant for the present purpose, are
quoted hereinbelow for benefit:-
"19. But we do not think that the appellants can take
refuge under the above order. What was extended by
the above order of this Court was only "the period of
limitation" and not the period upto which delay can
be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by
the statute. The above order passed by this Court
was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were
prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown,
from initiating proceedings within the period of
limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is
needless to point out that the law of limitation finds
its root in two latin maxims, one of which is
Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt
which means that the law will assist only those who
are vigilant about their rights and not those who
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sleep over them.
20. It may be useful in this regard to make a
reference to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 which reads as follows:
"10. Computation of time - (1) Where, by any 19
[Central Act] or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding
is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any
Court or office on a certain day or within a
prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is
closed on that day or the last day of the
prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be
considered as done or taken in due time if it is
done or taken on the next day afterwards on
which the Court or office is open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply
to any act or proceeding to which the Indian
Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), applies.
(2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts]
and, Regulations made on or after the fourteenth
day of January, 1887."
21. The principle forming the basis of Section 10(1)
of the General Clauses Act, also finds a place in
Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as
follows: - "4. Expiry of prescribed period when court
is closed.-- Where the prescribed period for any suit,
appeal or application expires on a day when the court
is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be
instituted, preferred or made on the day when the
court reopens.
Explanation.-- A court shall be deemed to be closed
on any day within the meaning of this section if
during any part of its normal working hours it
remains closed on that day."
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22. The words "prescribed period" appear in several
Sections of the Limitation Act, 1963. Though these
words "prescribed period" are not defined in Section
2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the expression is used
throughout, only to denote the period of limitation.
We may see a few examples:
(i) Section 3(1) makes every proceeding filed
after the prescribed period, liable to be
dismissed, subject however to the provisions in
Sections 4 to 24.
(ii) Section 5 enables the admission of any appeal
or application after the prescribed period.
(iii) Section 6 uses the expression prescribed
period in relation to proceedings to be initiated
by persons under legal disability.
23. Therefore, the expression "prescribed period"
appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean
anything other than the period of limitation. Any
period beyond the prescribed period, during which
the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a
person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken
to be "prescribed period".
24. In Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage
Board Versus Subash Projects and Marketing Limited
1, this Court dealt with the meaning of the words
"prescribed period" in paragraphs 13 and 14 as
follows:(2012) 2 SCC 624
"13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963
Act are "prescribed period". What is the meaning
of these words?
14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines" "2(j)
'period of limitation' which means the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by the Schedule, and 'prescribed
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period' means the period of limitation computed
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context
of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply
clear that the prescribed period for making an
application for setting aside arbitral award is three
months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso
that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996
Act is not the 'period of limitation' and, therefore, not
'prescribed period' for the purposes of making the
application for setting aside the arbitral award. The
period of 30 days beyond three months which the
court may extend on sufficient cause being shown
under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the 'period of
limitation' or, in other words, 'prescribed period', in
our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all,
attracted to the facts of the present case."
25. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim the benefit
of the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, for
enlarging, even the period up to which delay can be
condoned. The second contention is thus untenable.
Hence the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly, they are dismissed."
6.7. While learned advocate Mr.Virvadia had attempted to
contend that the said judgment would not be applicable on the
facts since the Tribunal where the application was preferred
after the period of limitation was not empowered to condone
the delay, yet, to this Court, it would appear more particularly
from the quoted portion above that the aspect of the Appellate
Tribunal not being empowered to condone the delay was not
the ground on which the Hon'ble Supreme Court had come to
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a conclusion that a party who has preferred a litigation after
the prescribed period, would not be entitled to take benefit of
the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020.
Thus, for such reasons, the petitioner not being entitled to
claim benefit of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated
23.03.2020, as rightly pointed out by learned advocate
Mr.Gundecha, the delay would not be 365 days, rather the
delay would be approximately more than 1100 days which is
all the more reason for not entertaining the petition
challenging the order of the GRT refusing to condone the
delay.
6.8. Furthermore, insofar as the decision of the Ramkumar
Choudhary (supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as relied
upon by learned advocate Mr.Gundecha, it would appear that
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has inter alia after relying upon
the earlier decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid
down that when a case had been presented in the Court
beyond the period of limitation, then the petitioner has to
explain the cause which had prevented the party to approach
the Court within the limitation and it is further observed that
even though limitation may hardly affect the right of the
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party, the same has to be applied with all its rigours as
prescribed by the statute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
also held that discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously, based on the facts and circumstances of
each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides is attributed to the party. Paragraphs no.4, 5 and 5.1 of
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court above is quoted
hereinbelow for benefit:-
"4. Evidently, there was enormous delay
occurred at every stage i.e., from the date of receipt
of the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court
to till the date of filing the second appeal by the
State. The judgement was passed by the First
Appellate Court on 21.08.2014 and the same was
communicated by the Government Advocate
representing the State to the Collector, only on
25.08.2015 i.e., after a delay of one year. Causing 3
months' delay, by letter dated 10.12.2015, the
Collector informed to the Principal Secretary,
Revenue Department, about the passing of the
judgment against the State and preferring a second
appeal against the same. Thereafter, the Law
Department took three years' time and gave
permission for filing appeal on 26.10.2018, which
was sent to the Collector on 31.10.2018. Based on
the said opinion, after preparation of the appeal
papers, the State filed the second appeal only on
18.10.2019.
5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
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enough reason which prevented him to approach the
Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy
Sridevi4 , it was held by this Court that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it
has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed
by statute. A reference was also made to the decision
of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram (2023 SCC
Online SC 92) wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC
81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause
has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to
be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing
any condition whatsoever. The application is to
be decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake
in dismissing the delay condonation application
of the present appellant."
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Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone
the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on
facts and circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir (2024 INSC 262
: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489) , wherein, one of us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to
various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it
very clear that we are not going to look into the
merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been made
out for condonation of such a long and inordinate
delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India when it
comes to condoning the gross delay of more than
12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the
court long after the lapse of the time prescribed
under the relevant provisions of the law, then he
cannot turn around and say that no prejudice
would be caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date
the respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of
justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and
158 days and once again ask the respondent to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
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26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach
of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost his right to have the matter considered
on merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay
and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start
with the merits of the main matter. The court
owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of
the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the
principles of sound public policy and principles of
equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of
Damocles' hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to
the conclusion that the High Court committed no
error much less any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
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35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity. Rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to prove that
they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the delay
is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of
the present case, we are of the opinion that the High
Court correctly refused to condone the delay and
dismissed the appeal by observing that such
inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no
sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no
plausible reason was put forth by the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at
the threshold."
7. Having regard to the discussion as hereinabove and the
observations and conclusions based thereupon, to this Court,
it would appear that the GRT having not committed any error
in condoning the delay, the present petition does not require
any interference and is hereby rejected.
(NIKHIL S. KARIEL,J)
Bhoomi
