Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 5994 Guj
Judgement Date : 18 August, 2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18361 of 2018
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18367 of 2018
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18364 of 2018
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ?
========================================================== CHANDRAKANT SHANKERLAL SHAH THRO POA KANTIBHAI P THAKKAR Versus LIQUIDATOR ANAND PEOPLES CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD & 5 other(s) ========================================================== Appearance:
MR MASOOM K SHAH(6516) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MS JEENAL ACHARYA, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 4,5 MR ARVIND R YADAV WITH MR MIT S THAKKAR(11223) for the
MR P B PRAJAPATI(11275) for the Respondent(s) No. 3 MR. MH SHEKHAWAT(7194) for the Respondent(s) No. 3
MR AMIT R JOSHI for the Respondent(s) No. 3 & 4( SCA NO.18364/2018) ==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
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Date : 18/08/2023
CAV JUDGMENT
1.Heard learned advocate Mr. Masoom K. Shah for
the petitioner, learned advocate Mr. Arvind
R. Yadav for Mr. Mit S. Thakkar for
respondent no.1, learned advocate Mr. Amit R.
Joshi for respondent nos. 3 and 4 in Special
Civil Application No.18364/2018 and learned
Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Jeenal
Acharya for the respondent State.
2.Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate
Mr. Arvind R. Yadav for Mr. Mit S. Thakkar,
learned advocate Mr. Amit R. Joshi and
learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.
Jeenal Acharya waives service of notice of
rule for the respective respondents.
Considering the issue arising in a narrow
compass with the consent of the learned
advocates, these petitions are taken up for
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hearing.
3.As the controversy arising in these petitions
are similar with regard to the challenge to
the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2018
passed by the Gujarat State Cooperative
Tribunal, Ahmedabad (For short "the
Tribunal") in Appeal No.21 of 2013 as well as
order dated 11.11.2009 passed by the
Registrar Cooperative Societies, Gandhinagar
and orders dated 02.11.2015 and 19.11.2015
passed by the State Government for extending
the term of liquidation of Anand Peoples Co-
Operative Bank Ltd. (In Liquidation), the
same were heard analogously and are disposed
of by this common judgment.
4.Special Civil Application No. 18361/2018 is
treated as a lead case and the facts taken
from the said matter are as under:
4.1) The petitioner was guarantor of the
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Anand Peoples Co-Operative bank Ltd. (In
Liquidation) (For short "the bank").
4.2) On 22.02.2001, the respondent no.1
bank sanctioned the hypothecation loan in
favour of respondent no.2 for an amount of
Rs. 40 Lakh. Respondent no.3 and the
petitioner stood as guarantors for the said
loan.
4.3) As respondent no.2 failed to pay the
outstanding dues of the bank, Lavad Case
No.1558 of 2005 was filed by the liquidator
of the bank before the Board of Nominees
under the provisions of Gujarat Co-operative
Societies Act, 1961 (For short, "the Act,
1961") for recovery of Rs.42,36,920.86.
4.4) By Judgment and Order dated
27.04.2010, the Board of Nominees, Anand,
passed the decree against respondent nos. 2,
3 and the petitioner to make payment of
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outstanding dues of the bank.
4.5) The petitioner preferred an appeal
under section 102 of the Act, 1961 on
11.09.2012 before the Tribunal challenging
the order passed by the Board of Nominees
with an application to condone the delay.
4.6) The Tribunal by order dated
29.01.2013 refused to condone the delay in
Misc. Application (Delay) No. 26 of 2012.
4.7) The petitioner therefore preferred
Special Civil Application No.8307 of 2013
before this Court challenging the said order.
This Court, by order dated 14.10.2013 allowed
the said petition by condoning the delay in
preferring the appeal against the final
judgment and order passed by the Board of
Nominees, Anand in Lavad Case No.1558 of
2005.
4.8) The Tribunal by judgment and order
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dated 12.09.2018 rejected the appeal of the
petitioner upholding the Judgment and Decree
passed by the Board of Nominees.
4.9) It is the case of the petitioner
that on 22.10.2005 the final order of
liquidation qua the bank was passed under
section 107 of the Act, 1961 by the
Registrar, Cooperative Societies and
liquidator was appointed for three years.
Thereafter by order dated 04.09.2008
proceedings for the purpose of winding up was
extended for a further period of one year
from 27.10.2008 to 26.10.2009 which was
further extended for one year by order dated
11.11.2009 and 19.09.2011 and thereafter
extended by order passed in October 2012 and
subsequently, it was extended from time to
time every year upto 26.10.2017 by passing
orders under section 114 of the Act, 1961.
The State Government thereafter extended the
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liquidation period from 27.10.2017 to
26.10.2018 by order dated 18.10.2017
exercising powers under section 161 of the
Act, 1961. The petitioners therefore
contended that there is illegal extension of
liquidation process initiated in the year
2005 with regard to the winding up process
of the bank and it has continued till the
date of filing of the petition.
5.Learned advocate Mr. Masoom Shah for the
petitioner submitted that the respondent
authorities could not have exercised powers
under sections 114 and 161 of the Act, 1961
to extend the time to complete the
liquidation process contrary to the
provisions of the Act, 1961. It was submitted
that in view of illegal extension of
liquidation process, the respondent bank
cannot continue the recovery process against
the petitioners as respondent no.1 liquidator
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of the bank is not empowered to continue the
winding up process in view of such orders of
extension passed by the respondent
authorities being contrary to law.
5.1) However, learned advocate Mr. Shah
fairly submitted that the issue now is
concluded by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme
court in case of Goa State Cooperative Bank
Limited v. Krishna Nath A. (Dead) through
legal representatives and others reported in
(2019) 20 Supreme Court Cases 38 wherein
while dealing with pari materia provisions of
Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
recovery rights of the bank are not defeated
under the provisions of the said Act by
virtue of liquidation/winding up provisions
prescribed in sections 109 and 110 of the
Act.
5.2) In view of such submission, the main
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grievance of the petitioners would not
survive as the Hon'ble Supreme Court after
detailed analysis and discussion has held
that recovery right can be pursued by the
Registrar of Cooperative Societies or
liquidator of the bank as under:
"(15.) The Society and the liquidator had filed recovery cases against all the defaulting members of the society to whom loans were advanced. The bank in total advanced Rs.250 lakhs to the society and on taking charge by the Bank as liquidator of the said society, the bank had outstanding of Rs.241 lakhs as principal amount and Rs.233 lakhs towards interest. The arrears due to the efforts of the liquidator bank were reduced to Rs.37 lakhs towards principal and Rs.154 lakhs towards interest. It is pertinent to mention that the bank has further pointed out that out of the cases filed against the defaulting members, in 42 cases appeals had been filed before the Cooperative Tribunal wherein stay orders were granted. It is also pointed out that 80 cases were pending with the Zonal Recovery Offices, i.e., Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Society s Sales and Recovery Officer under section 156 of the Act. Therefore, the termination of the winding up under section 109 of the Act, cannot be
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strictly applied so as to defeat the very purpose of the legislative intent of recovery of amount.
(16.) It is also submitted that by lapse of time under section 109(1) of the Act, recovery proceedings cannot come to an end. It is further pointed out that the recovery of public money from defaulting members is absolutely necessary failing which huge financial loss would be caused to the appellant bank. The interim stay granted by the tribunal cannot come to the prejudice of the bank. Thus, the provisions of Section 109 have to be construed in such a fashion so as to enable continuance of the proceedings for recovery. As the interim order of the court cannot work to the prejudice of any of the parties, the provision of section 109 of the Act should be construed in a manner that it is not used to interdict recovery from the defaulting members.
(17.) It is apparent from the facts of the instant case that the winding up of the Society has been ordered and liquidator has been appointed as the Society has utterly failed to achieve its avowed objectives in disbursement of loans to proper persons and in its recovery. No doubt about it that the liquidation of the Society has come to an end after a particular period of time as fixed under section 109. However, on lapse of time as fixed under sub
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section (1) of section 109 of the Act, proceedings have to be terminated by the Registrar on receipt of final report from the liquidator as ordered under section 109(2). However, at the same time, the Registrar has power to extend the period of 6 years fixed under section 109(1), not exceeding one year at a time and four years in the aggregate, and maximum for 10 years. In case time is not extended, the winding up comes to an end on the expiry of 6 years or at the end of the extended period. The total period can be 10 years. The second proviso to section 109 makes it clear that if the Registrar comes to a conclusion that the work of liquidation could not be completed by the liquidator due to the reasons beyond his control, he shall call upon the liquidator to submit his report. After getting the report, if the Registrar is satisfied that the realisation of assets, properties, sale of properties still remains to be realised, he shall direct the liquidator to complete the entire work and carry out the activities only for the purposes of winding up and submit his report within such period not exceeding one year reckoned from the date of receipt of the report from the liquidator.
(18.) Section 109(2) of the Act contains a non obstante clause which empowers the Registrar to terminate the liquidation proceedings on receipt of the final report from the
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liquidator. The liquidator shall state in the report that the liquidation proceedings of the society have been closed, and how the winding up has been conducted and the property and the claims of the society have been disposed of and shall include a statement showing a summary of the account of the winding up including the cost of liquidation, the amount, if any, standing to the credit of the Society in liquidation, after paying off its liabilities including the share or interest of members and suggest how the surplus should be utilised.
(19.) Section 110 of the Act deals with disposal of surplus assets. They should either be divided by the Registrar, with the previous sanction of the State Government, amongst its members, if they specify that such a surplus shall be utilised for the particular purpose or may be utilised for both the purposes.
(20.) It is apparent that on the termination of the liquidation proceedings, liability of the members for the debts taken by them does not come to an end. There is no such provision in the Act providing once winding up period is over, the liability of the members for loans obtained by them which is in their hands, and for which recovery proceedings are pending shall come
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to an end. No automatic termination of recovery proceedings against the members is contemplated. On the other hand, on completion of the period fixed to liquidate the society, final report has to be submitted as to the amount standing to the credit of the society in liquidation after paying off its liabilities including the share or interest of members. Thus, even in the case of liquidation the accountability remains towards surplus and liabilities do not come to an end. Even if the period fixed for liquidation of society is over, that does not terminate the proceedings for recovery which have been initiated and appeals are pending.
(21.) It is a settled law that when there is stay of proceedings by court, no person can be made to suffer for no fault on his part and a person who has liability but for the interim stay, cannot be permitted to reap the advantages on the basis of interim orders of the court. In Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan, (2010) 1 SCC 417, it was held that no person can suffer from the act of court and unfair advantage gained by a party of interim order must be neutralised. The Court should never permit a litigant to perpetuate illegality by abusing the legal process. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to abuse the legal process must be
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effectively curbed and the court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain for anyone by the abuse of process of the court. No one should be allowed to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains or unjust profits. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved unless the courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases. The Court observed:
"18. In Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620, this Court examined the similar issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO, (1980) 2 SCC 191 and held that no person can suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed and the petitioner takes advantage thereof and ultimately the petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised."
(emphasis supplied)
(22.) The principle of restitution enjoins a duty upon the courts to do complete justice to the party at the time of final decision, and to do away with the effect of interim
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order in the fact situation of the case. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648, it was observed that no party can take advantage of litigation, it has to disgorge the advantage gained due to delay, in case lis is lost.
(23.) The concept of restitution is a common law principle and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The court cannot be used as a tool by a litigant to perpetuate illegality. A person who is on the right side of the law, should not have a feeling that in case he is dragged in litigation, and wins, he would turn out to be a loser and wrong doer as a real gainer, after 20 or 30 years. Thus, the members who have obtained stay in appeal or on recovery proceedings or the case is pending, cannot take advantage of the fact that the period fixed for Liquidator under the Act is over.
(24.) Once a report has been submitted, the Registrar has to take action in terms of the report and in such circumstances when the proceedings for recovery are pending against the members and the Society has taken loan from the banks for its member, the actual money has to go to the creditor i.e., to the bank who is going to be benefited by recovery of public money in the hands of members. In such cases it would be appropriate for the
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Registrar to send notice of the proceedings to a person who is to be benefited from the recovery. In the instant case, the bank itself is a prime lender cum liquidator. The proceedings cannot come to the end. Thus, in our considered opinion, it is open to the bank to continue with the recovery proceedings and make recoveries from the defaulting members. Merely on the liquidation of Society, or the factum that the period fixed for liquidation is over, liability of the members for the loans cannot be said to have been wiped off. The disbursement of loan in an arbitrary manner and failure to recover was the very fulcrum on the basis of which winding up of the Society was ordered.
(25.) The decision of the High Court to the contrary, deserves to be and is hereby set aside. Though the Liquidator cannot continue once the proceedings are over. Notice in such cases should be issued by the Registrar to the creditors and to persons for whose benefit recovery is to be made, to continue the pending proceedings in the instrumentality of court/ tribunals/ recovery officers etc. We hold that appellant Bank can continue the pending proceedings. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent."
5.3) Learned advocate Mr. Shah further
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submitted that the respondent bank could not
have initiated the proceedings under the
provisions of the Act, 1961 as the respondent
bank was required to initiate the proceedings
under the provisions of section 13 of the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (For short "the SARFAESI
Act") or under the provisions of Recovery of
Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 in view of the
decision of the Apex Court in case of
Pandurang Ganpati Chaugule v. Vishwasrao
Patil Murgud Sahakari Bank Limited reported
in (2020) 9 Supreme Court Cases 215.
5.4) It was therefore, submitted that the
respondent bank is required to comply with
the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 in view of definition of 'bank' as
provided in section 2(1)(c) of the SARFAESI
Act which has been amended by the parliament
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to include Multi-State Cooperative bank by
inserting sub-clause(iv-a) which would also
cover cooperative bank registered under State
law and multi-State Cooperative bank
registered under Multi-State Cooperative
Societies Act, 2002 in section 5(c) of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It was
therefore, submitted that the impugned orders
passed by the Tribunal and the Board of
Nominees could not be enforced by respondent
no.1.
5.5) Reliance was also placed on the
judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court dated
31.12.2021 passed in W.A. No.1680/2017 and
allied matters, wherein it is held that in
view of the judgment delivered by the
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in case of Pandurang Ganpati Chaugule
(supra), the action initiated under the
Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act,
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1964 was certainly a nullity and the bank was
having a remedy of filing an application
under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy
Act, 1993 and the order passed by the learned
Single Judge was quashed and set aside by the
Division Bench and the writ petitions were
allowed by quashing and setting order passed
by the Tribunal declaring that the Sale
Certificate issued to the petitioners were
held valid and they were held to be entitled
to delivery of possession of the property
mentioned therein from the borrower or other
persons in possession thereof.
5.6) Relying upon the aforesaid decision,
it was submitted that the impugned orders
passed by the Board of Nominees and Tribunal
are required to be quashed and set aside and
respondent no.1 should file an application
under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts
and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 or under the
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provisions of SARFAESI Act and no recovery
proceedings should be continued against the
petitioner pursuant to the orders passed by
the Board of Nominees and the Tribunal.
5.7) Learned Advocate Mr. Shah submitted
that Board of Nominees passed the judgment
and decree without providing any opportunity
of hearing as the petitioner could not file
an application for leave to defend before the
Board of Nominees. It was submitted that the
Tribunal also did not entertain the appeal as
the right to defend was not available with
the petitioner without entering into the
merits.
5.8) Learned advocate Mr. Shah in support
of such submissions referred to and relief
upon the decision of Apex Court in case of
G.N.R. Babu alias S.N.Babu v. Dr. B.C.
Muthappa and Others reported in 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1158 wherein in context of
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provisions of Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (For short "the Code"),
question was decided as to whether it was
open for the defendants to agitate in the
regular appeal against the decree that the
trial Court had no justification for
proceeding ex-parte against the appellant
when the defendant did not avail the remedy
under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. The Apex
Court held that in such case though the
appellant would not be entitled to lead
evidence in appeal for making out a
sufficient cause for his absence before the
trial Court, he can always argue on the basis
of the record of the suit that either the
suit summons was not served upon him or that
even otherwise also, the trial Court was not
justified in proceeding ex- parte against
him. It was therefore, submitted by the
learned advocate Mr. Shah that the Tribunal
could not have dismissed the appeal of the
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petitioner without considering the plea of
the petitioner as to whether the summons
issued by the Board of Nominees was served
upon the petitioner or not. It was therefore,
submitted that in this context, the impugned
Judgment and Order passed by the Tribunal is
required to be quashed and set aside.
6.On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.
Arvind R. Yadav with learned advocate Mr. Mit
S. Thakkar for the respondent no.1 submitted
that in view of decision of the Apex Court in
case of Goa State Cooperative Bank Limited
(supra), the main contention of the
petitioner with regard to extension of
winding up process by the respondent
authorities would fail and therefore, the
petition deserves to be dismissed on that
ground.
6.1) It was further submitted that the
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submissions made by the petitioner on merits
cannot be accepted as the petitioner did not
avail the opportunity to defend Lavad suit
and therefore, the petitioner is bound by the
Judgment and Decree passed by the Board of
Nominees.
6.2) With regard to the contention raised
on behalf of the petitioner of deciding the
appeal by the Tribunal without considering
the ground of service of summons upon the
petitioner is concerned, it was submitted
that the petitioner has not raised such plea
before the Tribunal and therefore, the same
could not have been raised before this Court
in writ petition filed under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
6.3) With regard to the reliance placed
by the petitioner upon the decision of Apex
Court in case of Pandurang Ganpati
Chaugule(supra), it was submitted that the
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said decision does not negate the provisions
of the Act, 1961 ultra vires the Constitution
as alleged and sought to be declared by the
petitioner. It was submitted that the remedy
for recovery of dues provided under the
provisions of SARAFESI Act and the
proceedings under the Act, 1961 would co-
exist and the respondent bank has already
initiated the proceedings under the
provisions of the Act, 1961. Respondent no.1
is entitled to effect the recovery of the
dues of the bank in liquidation from the
petitioner, borrowers and other guarantors.
6.4) It was further submitted that the
directions came to be imposed by the Reserve
Bank of India under section 35A of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 upon the bank on
30.08.2022 precluding the bank from carrying
out banking business and activities including
selling, transferring or otherwise disposing
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of any of its properties or assets without
prior permission from RBI and thereafter
license of the bank was also cancelled by
order dated 26.10.2005 under section 22 of
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 by the RBI.
It was therefore, submitted that winding up
proceedings were initiated against the bank
and the liquidator was appointed by the
Registrar, Cooperative Societies in exercise
of powers conferred under the provisions of
section 115A(2) read with sections 107 and
108 of the Act, 1961 by order dated
27.10.2005 and hence in such circumstances,
as the bank was not entitled to carry on the
banking business, the only remedy available
to respondent no.1 is to file Lavad Suit
before the Board of Nominees and recovery
procedure initiated would continue to subsist
under the provisions of Act, 1961 and the
Rules framed thereunder in addition to
recourse to SARFAESI Act for recovery of dues
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of the bank from the defaulting borrowers. It
was therefore, submitted that respondent no.1
is entitled to continue the recovery
proceedings and the petitions therefore,
deserve to be dismissed.
6.5) Learned advocate Mr. Thakkar
referred to and relied upon the decision of
this Court in case of Modi Harnishkumar
Hasmukhlal v. People's Cooperative Credit
Society Ltd. reported in (2014) 3 GLH 778,
wherein it is held that when the Tribunal
concluded that the petitioner lost the
opportunity to defend the suit, the
petitioner cannot challenge the condition
imposed while granting leave to defend. The
said decision is followed in case of
Rohitbhai Jayantilal Shah and others v.
Dhrangadhra People's Cooperative bank Limited
and others (Order dated 02.12.2016 passed in
Special Civil Application No.6995/2015),
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wherein it is held as under:
"5. In Modi Harnishkumar Hasmukhlal vs. People State Co-operative Society Limited. [2014 (3) GLR 1996], this Court held that once the defendant failed to deposit the money as condition imposed by the Board of Nominees, he would lose right to defend the suit.
5.1 The Court held as under,
"12. There appears a difference between the provisions of Order 37 of the Code and Section 99(4) (5) of the Act as well as Rule 41A of the Rules as regards condition for leave to defend and the effect of non-compliance of the condition. Under the provisions of Order 37, discretion is available with the Court to grant unconditional leave whereas subsection (4) and (5) of section 99 of the Act with Rule 41-A mandates to impose condition of deposit of 33.5% amount of the claim of dispute or such less amount as may be fixed by the learned Board of Nominees. Clause (e) of sub section (5) of section 99 of the Act provides that non- compliance of the condition may result in passing of award against the defendant as if the defendant has not been granted leave to defend.
13. From the above provisions of the Act and Rules, what appears
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is that the defendant would lose his right to defend the suit if he does not comply with the condition of deposit of the amount for leave to defend. Such right would not be revived if the order imposing condition for leave to defend is allowed to attain finality by not challenging the same byway of revision application during the pendency of the suit.
14. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules like Order XLIII, Rule 1A of the Code which gives right to a party to challenge non appealable orders while challenging the final decree entitling the party to lavad suit to challenge any order made in the suit when appeal is filed before the Tribunal against the final award passed in the suit. Mr. Parikh however relied on Regulation No. 6(4) (f) of the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal Regulations, 1964 to contend that such order imposing condition can be challenged in appeal against the final award.
Such contention cannot be accepted. In the appeal under section 102 of the Act, the grounds available are to challenge the final award. In such appeal, the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the order imposing condition of deposit of amount for leave to
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defend the suit. The Tribunal has therefore, rightly held that the petitioners cannot challenge the condition for leave to defend. The Tribunal has also not committed any error in refusing to remand the matters to Board of Nominees. Simply because the petitioners were desirous to deposit the amount as per the condition for leave to defend is no ground to remand the matter to Board of Nominees. For remand of the matter, the Tribunal is to be satisfied that rehearing is necessary to meet with the ends of justice. No such case was made out by the petitioners. The petitions are therefore required to be dismissed. However, the amount deposited by the petitioners pursuant to the order dated 4.10.2013 passed in the present petitions shall be required to be adjusted towards the dues outstanding against the petitioners."
5.2 The aforesaid law laid down by this Court disentitles the petitioners who lost their right to defend the suit. It is held that such right cannot be revived by showing the readiness to deposit the amount in appeal. In Modi Harnishkumar (supra), the Court upheld the order of the Tribunal on the aforesaid ground.
6. Even otherwise, on attentively considering the facts on record and
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on carefully perusing the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal, it could be noticed that, the transaction of loan was proved by virtue of the documents executed in favour of the Bank. The petitioners were the guarantors of the loan amount. The loan was given at 18% interest by executing hypothecation deed, letter of lien, memorandum of deposit of title deeds and others documents accepting the loan transaction. The fact that the petitioners stood as guarantors could not be disputed. The petitioners did not avail the right to defend and lost such right. The Board of Nominees passed the decree legally and on the basis of the evidence. The judgment and order in appeal was also found to be proper and legal. From no stand-point, the petitioners could challenge the impugned judgment and decree and the confirmation thereof by the Tribunal as per the impugned order."
7.Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.
Jeenal Acharya adopted the arguments advanced
by learned advocate Mr. Mit Thakkar.
8.Having heard the learned advocates for the
respective parties and having considered the
controversy arising in these petitions in
light of the provisions of the Act, 1961,
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SARFAESI Act, the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 as well as decision of the Apex Court in
relation to exercise of the remedy to recover
the dues of the bank is concerned, the Apex
Court in case of Pandurang Ganpati
Chaugule(supra) after considering the various
provisions has come to the conclusion that
the cooperative bank can also initiate the
proceedings for recovery under the provisions
of SARFAESI Act. However, the Apex Court has
not precluded the cooperative society to
initiate the proceedings under the provisions
of Act, 1961 by filing Lavad Suit before the
Board of Nominees so as to get the Judgment
and Decree.
9.In facts of the case, the petitioner has
failed to appear before the Board of Nominees
and lead any evidence by filing an
application for leave to defend as provided
under the provisions of the Act, 1961 and
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therefore, the petitioner cannot now raise
any issue with regard to the merits of the
matter, more particularly, when the
petitioner has failed to demonstrate before
the Tribunal as well as before this Court
with regard to the non-service of summons by
the Board of Nominees. The Tribunal has
therefore, rightly rejected the appeal filed
by the petitioner without considering the
same on merits as the petitioner for the
first time has raised the controversy with
regard to the guarantee issued by him for the
amount borrowed by respondent no.2 from the
bank in these petitions.
10. Reliance placed by the petitioner on the
decision of the Apex Court in case of G.N.R.
Babu alias S.N.Babu(supra) would not apply to
the facts of the case as the petitioner has
failed to demonstrate before the Tribunal
about the fact with regard to service of
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summons. The Tribunal has therefore, rightly
rejected the appeal.
11. It is also pertinent to note that the
petition is also filed by the power of
attorney holder of the petitioner namely,
Shri Kantibhai Thakkar who filed appeal
before the Tribunal challenging the order
passed by the Board of Nominees who passed an
ex-parte order in the year 2010 with an
application to condone the delay. This Court
(Coram: Hon'ble Mr.Justice C.L. Soni, As His
Lordship was then) while allowing the Special
Civil Applications condoning the delay in
preferring the appeal before the Tribunal
held that considering the fact that the
advocate of the petitioner was not present
when the decision was pronounced by the Board
of Nominees and therefore, it cannot be said
that such decision was communicated to the
petitioner in view of Rule 41(4)(c) of the
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Gujarat Cooperative Societies Rules, 1965.
Therefore, in absence of such communication,
the petitioner was entitled to file appeal
with delay which is required to be condoned.
12. Therefore, in view of the above findings
to condone delay cannot be justified to quash
and set aside the impugned Judgment and Order
passed by the Tribunal on merits which has
dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on the
ground of not defending the case before the
Tribunal.
13. The petitioner has also not been able to
point out with regard to the issue of service
of summons upon him by the Board of Nominees
as it is recorded in the impugned order of
the Board of Nominees that the advocate of
the petitioner remained present but no
defense was filed. The Board of Nominees has
also recorded in the Judgment and Order that
the summons were already served upon the
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petitioner.
14. In such circumstances, no interference
is warranted in the impugned Judgment and
Decree passed by the Board of Nominees as
well as the Appellate order of the Tribunal
on merits while exercising extra ordinary
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
15. The Division Bench of this Court in case
of Smitaben Mahin Modi v. State of Gujarat &
Ors. (Judgment dated 10.02.2021 passed in LPA
No.1011/2015 and allied matters) after
considering the decision of Apex Court in
case of Goa State Cooperative Bank Limited
(supra) disposed of the Letters Patent Appeal
in same terms as held by the Apex Court
confirming the order passed in Special Civil
Application by the learned Single Judge.
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16. As held by this Court in case of
Rohitbhai Jayantilal Shah and others(supra),
the petitioner is dis-entitled to defend the
suit when the petitioner has lost its right
to defend the suit before the Board of
Nominees and such right cannot be revived
even if the petitioner shows readiness to
deposit the amount in appeal, more
particularly, when the bank has proved the
transaction of loan by virtue of documents
executed in its favour and when the
petitioner was the guarantor of the loan
amount by executing hypothecation deed,
letter of lien, and other documents and the
fact that the petitioner stood as guarantor
is not in dispute. As the petitioners failed
to avail the right to defend the suit and
lost such right, the Judgment and Decree
passed by the Board of Nominees and confirmed
by the Tribunal on the basis of evidence
cannot be set aside by remanding the matter
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as the Judgment and Order in appeal was also
found to be proper and legal.
17. In view of foregoing reasons, the
petitions deserve to be dismissed and are
accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. No
order as to costs.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J)
Learned advocate Mr. Parth Thummar for
learned advocate Mr. Masoom K. Shah submitted
that by order dated 3.12.2018, this Court passed
the order in terms of para-9(B) whereby the
impugned Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2018
passed by the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal
was stayed.
It was therefore, submitted that the interim
relief granted during the pendency of the
petitions may be continued for a further period
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of four weeks.
Learned advocate Mr. Arvind Yadav for
respondent no.1 submitted that after grant of
interim relief by this Court, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in case of Goa State Cooperative Bank
Limited v. Krishna Nath A. (Dead) through legal
representatives and others reported in (2019) 20
Supreme Court Cases 38 has negatived the
contention of the petitioner with regard to issue
of extension of time of respondent no.1 under the
provisions of Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act,
1961.
During the course of hearing also, learned
advocate Mr. Masoom Shah has fairly submitted
that in view of decision of Goa State Cooperative
Bank Limited (supra), the issue with regard to
extension of time of respondent no.1 was squarely
covered by the aforesaid decision.
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In view of above, the request to extend the
interim relief granted by this Court on 3.12.2018
is not accepted and accordingly refused.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J)
RAGHUNATH R NAIR
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