Gujarat High Court
Deputy Collector vs Malivad Pratapbhai Masurabhai ... on 25 April, 2022
Bench: Gita Gopi
C/CA/1330/2019 ORDER DATED: 25/04/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1330 of 2019
In
F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 9573 of 2019
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DEPUTY COLLECTOR
Versus
MALIVAD PRATAPBHAI MASURABHAI (DECEASED)
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Appearance:
MR SOAHAM JOSHI, ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3
DECEASED LITIGANT for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1.1,1.2,1.3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
Date : 25/04/2022
ORAL ORDER
1. Rule has been served on the proposed legal heirs.
However, none has appeared to resist this application for
condonation of delay.
2. This Civil Application has been filed by the applicants
praying for condonation of delay of 386 days in filing of
the above First Appeal.
3. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Soaham Joshi
submitted that there is a delay of 386 days in filing the
First Appeal against the judgment and award dated
22.03.2016 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Lunawada in Land Reference Case No.543 of 2010.
It is further submitted that the judgment and award was
C/CA/1330/2019 ORDER DATED: 25/04/2022
pronounced on 22.03.2016. The certified copy was
applied for on 06.09.2016 and the Certified copy was
reeived on 06.09.2016. It is submitted that after having
received the Certified copy, the concenred District
Government Pleader had submitted an opinion for
preferring an Appeal. Thereafter, on 21.05.2018, the
Additional Engineer, Kadana Project Division submitted
proposal which was received by the concerned
Department on 28.05.2018. The State Government
through the Narmada Water Resources, Water Supply and
Kalpsar Department gave permission for placing the case
before the Land Acquisition Committee on 01.08.2018. It
is submitted that on 01.09.2018, the Revenue Department
granted permission for preferring an Appeal with
instructions that the file was to be placed before the
Legal Department. The Legal Department granted the
approval on 07.09.2018, and it was forwarded to
Superintending Engineer on 24.09.2018 with an
instruction to contact the Office of the Government
Pleader. Thereafter, the procedure was followed for
drafting of the Appeal.
3.1. It is further submitted that for following the process
of taking the instructions from the concerned Officer on
receipt of the file by the Government Pleader and during
the process of receiving all the certified copies finally,
the Appeal came to be filed with a delay of 386 days. It
C/CA/1330/2019 ORDER DATED: 25/04/2022
is also submitted that time was taken in the Government
process and stated that the delay has been sufficiently
explained which is a sufficient cause and hence, this
application may be allowed.
4. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and
Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987
SC 1353 it has been observed as under :-
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay
by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in
order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties
by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient
cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to
enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner
which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-
purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
But the message does not appear to have percolated down to
all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is con- doned the highest
that can happen is that a cause would be decided
on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay?
C/CA/1330/2019 ORDER DATED: 25/04/2022
The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence,
or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he
runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not
on account of its power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective,
there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which
was seeking condonation and not a private party was
altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law
demands that all litigants, including the State as a liti- gant,
are accorded the same treatment and the law is admin-
istered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for
according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the
applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experi-
ence shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in-herited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file
pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is
less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve.
In any event, the State which represents the collective cause
of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata
status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the
spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression "suffi- cient cause". So also
the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to
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matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed
justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles
a decision on merits."
5. Thus, taking into consideration the principle as laid down
in the above referred judgment and when the delay of
386 days is sufficiently explained, the same is condoned.
The application is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Rule
made absolute.
Sd/-
(GITA GOPI, J)
CAROLINE
