Gujarat High Court
Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co ... vs Amrutben Mohanbhai on 21 April, 2022
Bench: Gita Gopi
C/CA/383/2021 ORDER DATED: 21/04/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 383 of 2021
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 29371 of 2020
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IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD
Versus
AMRUTBEN MOHANBHAI
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Appearance:
MR RATHIN P RAVAL(5013) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
Date : 21/04/2022
ORAL ORDER
1. Mr. Rathin Raval, learned advocate submits that there is
a delay of 1150 days in filing the captioned first appeal.
Relying on the affidavit, learned advocate submitted that the
applicant was totally unaware of the judgment and award
dated 22.11.2016 and the intimation of the execution petition
was received on 17.09.2018 and the insurer immediately
appointed an investigator to obtain claim papers and the panel
advocate at Jamnagar was appointed to collect the papers and
judgment and for that purpose the judgment was received in
January 2019.
1.1 Learned advocate for the applicant submitted that the
investigation report was received in March 2019 and the
insurance company immediately contacted the claimant
advocate to find out the way for settlement, however, the talks
failed.
C/CA/383/2021 ORDER DATED: 21/04/2022
1.2 Learned advocate for the applicant submitted that as per
the Rojnama the summons/notice of the original matter
appears not to have been received by the company. He stated
that the entire awarded money has been deposited and the
compliance cheque was sent on 30.01.2020.
2. Rule though served, none has appeared to resist the
petition.
3. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and
Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC
1353 it has been observed as under :-
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'.
The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to
apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves
the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of Courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably
liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But
the message does not appear to have percolated down
to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a
liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and
cause of justice being defeated. As against this when
delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a
C/CA/383/2021 ORDER DATED: 21/04/2022
cause would be decided on merits after hearing the
parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not
every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine
must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic
manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim
to have vested right in injustice being done because of
a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the
delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it
was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not
a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine
of equality before law demands that all litigants,
including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same
treatment and the law is administered in an even
handed manner. There is no warrant for according a
step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant
praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience
shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by
the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the
inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the
note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand
C/CA/383/2021 ORDER DATED: 21/04/2022
though more difficult to approve. In any event, the
State which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant non-grata status.
The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit
and philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So
also the same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the end in view to
do even handed justice on merits in preference to the
approach which scuttles a decision on merits."
4. The cause for delay has been sufficiently explained.
The money as stated in compliance of the order has already
been deposited. There is no reason to doubt the bonafides.
Thus, taking into consideration the principle as laid down in
the above referred judgment and when the delay of 1150
days is sufficiently explained, the same is condoned. The
application is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Rule is made
absolute with no order as to costs.
(GITA GOPI,J)
A.M.A. SAIYED
