Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 4656 Guj
Judgement Date : 24 March, 2021
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 299 of 2021
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12005 of 2020
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2021
In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 299 of 2021
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RAJESHBHAI BALUBHAI KOLIPATEL
Versus
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE
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Appearance:
MR ADIL R MIRZA(2488) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MS SHRUTI PATHAK, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
Date : 24/03/2021
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH)
1. Heard Mr.Adil Mirza, learned counsel for the
appellant and Ms.Shruti Pathak, learned Assistant
Government Pleader for the State respondents.
2. This Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of
the Letters Patent is filed by the appellant
challenging the judgment and order dated 02.12.2020
passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil
Application No.12005 of 2020, whereby the writ
petition challenging the order of preventive
detention was dismissed.
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
3. The appellant was detained pursuant to order of
detention dated 09.07.2020 passed by respondent No.1
in the backdrop of registration of three offences
against him before Dungara Police Station under
Sections 65(A)(E), 81 of the Gujarat Prohibition Act,
1949 based on FIRs dated 31.12.2019, 02.01.2020 and
10.10.2019. Pursuant to the above order, the
appellant is in jail.
4. In the challenge before the learned Single Judge
in the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, contentions were raised mainly
about the detention of the appellant that he was
arraigned in three offences and as such, the detenue
was not falling within the definition of
"Bootlegger" as defined under section 2(b) of the
Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Act,
1985 ("Act" for short), as no muddamal had been
recovered from the appellant. The detenue was wrongly
implicated in the above FIRs and therefore, cannot be
said to be a bootlegger. Various other contentions
were raised before the learned single Judge,
including that there was no breach of law and order
much less public order and that there were no past
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
antecedents against the detenue. The detenue did not
indulge in repeated crime nor he was externed and
without exhausting such alternative remedy, precious
fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India was
taken away in a casual manner.
5. Learned single Judge noticed that the subjective
satisfaction exercised by the detaining authority
deserves no interference and as such, the contention
of the learned counsel for the petitionerdetenue
came to be negatived by confirming the order of
detention.
6. Before us, similar grounds are raised to
challenge the order of the learned single Judge as
well as the order passed by the detaining authority
branding the appellantpetitioner as bootlegger as
defined under section 2(b) of the Act. Reliance is
placed on two decisions of this Court in the case of
Piyush Kantilal Mehta vs. Commissioner of Police,
Ahmedabad City and another, reported in AIR 1989 SC
491 and another decision being CAV Judgment dated
28.3.2011 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.2732
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
of 2010 in support of the contentions. It is,
therefore, submitted that the appellantdetenue
deserves to be released by quashing and setting aside
the order passed by learned Single Judge whereby the
order of detention is confirmed. It is next submitted
that a recent Division Bench judgment of this Court
dated 31.08.2020 passed in the case of Vijay Alias
Ballu Bharatbhai Ramanbhai Patni vs. State of
Gujarat, being Letters Patent Appeal No.454 of 2020,
squarely covers the case of the present appellant.
7. As against the above, Ms.Shruti Pathak, learned
Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the
respondents vehemently opposed the prayer of the
appellant on the ground that the learned Single Judge
has passed reasoned judgment and submitted that the
procedure adopted by the authority was followed in
accordance with law. It is submitted that the powers
conferred on the detaining authority and the
procedural safeguards are not devised to allow
persons to continue with criminal activities and take
advantage of technical loopholes. Therefore, the
order passed by the detaining authority as confirmed
by the learned Single Judge deserves no interference.
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the case and on a careful perusal of the order of
detention containing the grounds visavis subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority in
exercise of powers under section 3(1) of the Act and
the material placed on record, though the Court will
be loath in interfering with such subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority but at the
same time, all other aspects including that of
disturbance of public order, past antecedents of
crime and on consideration of the definition of
"bootlegger" as provided in section 2(b) of the Act,
the appellant cannot be said to be a bootlegger.
Further, in the absence of material about disturbance
to public order, we find that no compelling
circumstance was available with the detaining
authority to exercise power of prevention detention
and the overall facts do not reveal that preventive
detention of the detenue was warranted. Here we would
like to refer to the decision of this Court in case
of Aartiben W/o Nandubhai Jayantibhai Sujnani vs.
Commissioner of Police in L.P.A. No.2732 of 2010
dated 28.3.2011 in which observations made by Apex
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
Court in the case of Pushker Mukherjee vs. State of
West Bengal, reported in AIR 1970 SC 852 are quoted,
wherein distinction is drawn about public order and
law and order. The Supreme Court observed in the said
judgment as under:
"Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act."
9. In the judgment dated 31.08.2020 in the case of
Vijay alias Ballu (supra), the issue relating to
public order and law and order problem had been dealt
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
with in detail. Law of preventive detention has to be
construed not as in an ordinary criminal proceedings
of detaining or arresting a person who is said to have
committed crime where the procedure is provided and
the remedy is available. However, the law of
preventive detention is to be strictly followed as per
the statute and the settled law on the point. In the
present case, we find that the three FIRs related to
prohibition offences. By no stretch of imagination can
we hold that such incidents could describe a person as
a bootlegger.
10. Under the circumstances, in view of the judgment
of this Court in the case of Aartiben W/o Nandubhai
Jayantibhai Sujnani vs. Commissioner of Police & 2
others and considering the totality of circumstances,
in our opinion, the detaining authority has failed to
substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities
of the appellantdetenu adversely affect or are
likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public
order. Just because three offences have been
registered against the appellantdetenu under the
Gujarat Prohibition Act, that by itself, does not
C/LPA/299/2021 ORDER
have any bearing on the maintenance of public order.
The order of detention, therefore, cannot be
sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside.
11. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent
Appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by
the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application
No.12005 of 2020 dated 02.12.2020 is hereby quashed
and set aside. The order of detention dated 09.07.2020
passed by respondent No.1 is accordingly quashed and
set aside. The appellant is ordered to be set at
liberty forthwith if not required in any other
offence. Consequently, the connected Civil Application
stands disposed of.
(VIKRAM NATH, CJ)
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) GAURAV J THAKER
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