State Of Gujarat vs Narshibhai Bhimabhai Bhaskar
2021 Latest Caselaw 4237 Guj

        C/SCA/15077/2020                                   ORDER




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

          R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15077 of 2020

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                         STATE OF GUJARAT
                                Versus
                    NARSHIBHAI BHIMABHAI BHASKAR
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Appearance:
MR AKASH CHHAYA AGP (1) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2
NOTICE SERVED(4) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
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 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.G.URAIZEE

                           Date : 16/03/2021

                            ORAL ORDER

1. The State of Gujarat has preferred the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to assail the award dated 6.10.2017 passed by the Labour Court, Junagadh in Reference (T) Case No.45 of 2015 wherein the reference is allowed and the respondent is ordered to be reinstated on his original post with continuity of service, but without backwages.

2. The facts of the petition are not many and move in a narrow compass. As per the case of the respondent, he was working with the petitioner as daily wager since May 2005 and he was paid remuneration of Rs.4900/­ per month. His service were terminated orally on 20.5.2014. Being aggrieved by oral termination, the respondent raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court, Junagadh which came to be registered as Reference (T) Case No.45 of 2015. The Labour Court vide judgment and award dated 6.10.2017 allowed the claim of the respondent and directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent on original post without backwages and continuity of service. The petitioner is also saddled

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with cost of Rs.1000/­ to be paid to the respondent. Being aggrieved, the State has preferred the present petition.

3. I have heard Mr. Akash Chhaya, learned AGP for the petitioner.

4. Mr. Chhaya, vehemently submits that the court below has fallen in error in not appreciating the fact that the respondent had not worked for continuous period of 240 days in any of the years prior to his oral termination. He submits that the court below ought to have considered the fact that the respondent has never worked with the petitioner and under the circumstances the conclusion of the Labour Court that the respondent was working with the petitioner and had worked for 240 days is erroneous. He submits that the Labour Court ought to have considered the fact that the work done by the respondent was not of permanent nature and the same was seasonal one. It is his further submission that the respondent had stopped coming to work on his own and his services were never terminated by the petitioner. He, therefore, submits that the present petition deserves consideration.

5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned AGP. I have also perused the award impugned in this petition.

6. It emerges from the award impugned that the services of the respondent were orally terminated on 20.5.2014 and thereafter he had promptly raised the industrial dispute which was registered as Reference (T) Case No.45 of 2015. The reference was finally decided by the Labour Court by judgment and award dated 6.10.2017. The petitioner has assailed the award of 2017 by way of

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the present petition after around three years.

7. The submission of Mr. Chhaya that the respondent has not worked for 240 days in any year is misconceived. It needs to be noted that it was the petitioner who had produced the breakup of the number of days the respondent had worked in the Labour Court from 1.5.2005 to 30.4.2014. From this breakup itself, it is very clear that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days from 1.5.2013 to 30.4.2014. The Labour Court relying upon this statement has recorded a finding that the respondent has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding year before termination.

8. The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Gopal reported in LAWS(SC) 2020 1 91 has very lucidly captured the concept of delay and laches as under:­

"14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the Respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its redressal (in 1990).

15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar situation where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 153, held as follows:

"2. ... if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971.

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... In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. ...It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters......"

16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479, this Court observed thus:

"17. It is also well­settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". ...It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment."

9. Not only the State has approached this court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to assail the judgment and award rendered by the Labour Court in the year 2017, even such a delay in approaching the court is not at all explained in the

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petition. It appears that the State has assumed that the impugned award of the Labour Court is illegal and, therefore, it can agitate its validity at its sweet will which cannot be in my considered view countenanced.

10. The consideration of unexplained delay and inordinate laches are always relevant in writ jurisdiction and the constitutional court is normally reluctant in exercising discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have exhibited lackadaisical approach and indolence in approaching the court for redressal of their grievance.

11. It is thus eminently clear that the sole ground that the respondent workman having not worked for 240 days in the preceding year before this termination is misconceived and also the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and accordingly the same is dismissed. Notice is discharged.

(A.G.URAIZEE, J) Z.G. SHAIKH