Kanayalal Bhagwandas Tekwani vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
2021 Latest Caselaw 12551 Guj

     C/SCA/16794/2017                                JUDGMENT DATED: 26/08/2021




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

               R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16794 of 2017


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA

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1     Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed
      to see the judgment ?

2     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

3     Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy
      of the judgment ?

4     Whether this case involves a substantial question
      of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
      of India or any order made thereunder ?

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                         KANAYALAL BHAGWANDAS TEKWANI
                                     Versus
                        AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
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Appearance:
MR HARDIK C RAWAL(719) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MRS MH RAWAL(2851) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR DEEP D VYAS(3869) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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    CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA

                                 Date : 26/08/2021

                                ORAL JUDGMENT

Heard learned advocate Mr.Hardik C. Rawal for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.Deep D. Vyas for the respondent.

1. By this petition under Article 226 of the

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Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs :

"8. The petitioner therefore prays that this Hon'ble Court may ;

(A) be pleased to allow this petition.

(B) be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction by quashing and setting aside the impugned order at Annexure -- A dated 12-08-2016 as well as the impugned order at Annexure -- F dated 08-03-2016 to the extent to which it denies the benefits of seniority, promotion and arrears of salary as well as increments and / or further be pleased to direct the respondents to make payment of arrears of full salary from the date of suspension till the date of actual reinstatement including increments, seniority and promotion with 18% interest.

(C) pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to direct the respondent to calculate and deposit the entire amount of arrears of full salary from the date of suspension till the date of actual reinstatement including increments, seniority and promotion with 18% interest in the registry of this Hon'ble Court.

(D) be pleased to pass such other and further orders may be deemed just and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of the justice."

2. The brief facts of the case are that the Petitioner herein was serving as Junior clerk with the Respondent Corporation. It is the case of the petitioner that in pursuance to a criminal complaint dated 02.11.1993 the petitioner was convicted by the City Sessions Court in Special (ACB) Case No. 17 of 1994 by Judgment dated 18.02.1999. On registration of complaint the petitioner was put under suspension by order

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dated 30.12.1993.

2.1. It is the case of the petitioner that on being convicted by the Learned Sessions Judge, on the basis of the same, the petitioner was dismissed by order dated 13.09.1999. The petitioner challenged his conviction before this Court by filing Criminal Appeal No.252 of 1999.

2.2. It is the case of the petitioner that this Court by judgment dated 30.01.2015 allowed the appeal and quashed and set aside the order of conviction as well as sentence on merits by holding that the petitioner was convicted only on the ground of presumption. The judgment of this Court was challenged before the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 9951-9952 of 2015 and the same were also dismissed by the Supreme Court by order dated 08.07.2015.

2.3. It is the case of the petitioner that in pursuance to the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the petitioner made various representations to reinstate him with all benefits including arrears. After nine months by the impugned order dated 08.03.2016 the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated with direction that the entire period from suspension till dismissal and from dismissal till the actual reinstatement was to be treated as on duty but

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the entire period was to be treated as notional without benefit of arrears. The petitioner has therefore filed this petition to challenge the impugned order to the extent it denies the benefits of arrears, seniority and promotion. The petitioner was reinstated on 14.03.2016. The petitioner thereafter made representations for the benefit of arrears, seniority as well as the promotion on the next higher post. The representation of the petitioner was rejected by impugned order dated 12.08.2016. As the petitioner was constantly facing humiliation and discrimination after reinstatement, the petitioner applied for voluntary retirement which was permitted by the respondent by order dated 14.07.2017 with effect from 31.07.2017.

3.1. Learned advocate Mr.Rawal appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned orders dated 08.03.2016 and 12.08.2016 to the extent to which it denies the benefits of seniority, promotion and arrears of salary as well as increments to be paid to the petitioners are liable to be quashed and set aside because the respondent without giving any reason denied such benefits to the petitioner.

3.2. It was further submitted that it was oral stand of the respondent that benefit of arrears would be given to only those employees who come with the orders of this Court and not to the

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petitioner. It was therefore submitted that the petitioner was compelled to file this petition.

3.3. Learned advocate Mr.Rawal in support of his submission relied upon the decision of this Court in case of Vipulkumar Atmaram Parekh and Others Vs.State of Gujarat through Secretary and Others dated 24.03.2009 in Special Civil Application No.1314 of 2009 as well as the decision in case of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel Vs. Municipal Commissioner, AMC and another dated 03.03.2017 in Special Civil Application NO.10548 of 2011 and other allied matters.

3.4. Learned advocate Mr.Rawal also relied upon the decision of this Court dated 04.02.2020 in case of Sureshbhai Vitthalbhai Prajapati Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in Special civil Application No.15914 of 2017. He also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Raj Narain V/s. Union of India1.

4.1. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Vyas appearing for the respondent-Corporation relied upon the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply :

"6. It is respectfully submitted that the petitioner herein as such is not entitled reliefs and the order passed by the authority is just and legal and therefore the petition is required to be dismissed at the threshold. That, not only the petitioner has been granted continuity of service, but has also been given benefits 1 2019 (5) SCC 809

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of higher pay, which are applicable when the person is not been granted/could not receive promotional benefits. It is further submitted that there is requirement for annual confidential reports i.e. A.C.R., for promotion, for preceding 3 years and as such there is no rule of outright promotion for the post, which are also referred in the office orders of promotion. Copy of the said order is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE R/1.

7. It is submitted that the petitioner was an accused in the case under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, wherein a report dated 26.11.1993, was addressed by the Joint Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ahmedabad to the Respondent-Corporation, conveying the petitioner caught red-handed while accepting bribe, copy of which is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE R/2. It is submitted that thereafter on initiation of the prosecution, the petitioner was put in suspension on 30.12.1993.

8. It is submitted that the petitioner was convicted by the criminal court by judgement and order dated 18.02.1999 imposing sentence and fine, which came to be communicated to the authorities by the Anti-Corruption Department. It is submitted that the petitioner was issued final show cause notice dated 17.04.1999, calling upon to show cause and thereafter the petitioner was dismissed from employment by order dated 13.09.1999, passed as per Section 56 (2) of the B.P.M.C. Act-1949.

9. It is submitted that the respondent appears to have preferred criminal appeal along with other accused, wherein he came to be acquitted by order dated 30.01.2015. It is submitted that the acquittal was due to technical defects and the petitioner was given benefit of doubt.

10. It is submitted that a period of about 17 years had been lapsed, moreover where the petitioner had also not worked during the intervening period, since the petitioner was criminally prosecuted and came to be convicted. It is submitted that after taking into consideration, the petitioner was granted benefits of continuity of service with a further order to treat the period as notional.

11. It is submitted that the petitioner has also been granted various monetary benefits on the basis of the Said order, more particularly while reinstating, he has been granted the benefits of 6th as well as 7th pay commission and since there was no promotion, he was also

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granted the benefits of higher pay scales on the basis of his continuity in service. That, it would also not be out of place to mention, that the petitioner during the suspension was also paid subsistence allowance at 50% and thereafter at 75% allowance as per regulations.

12. That, while rendering the benefits of pay commission and higher pay scales, the petitioner was placed in the pay scale of 39900-126600 and a copy of the petitioners last pay-slip is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE R/

3. That, the petitioner thereupon by hardly putting a year's service, given voluntary retirement, wherein the following benefits were released: -

P.F.                                      Rs.99,768/-
Pension(Monthly)                          Rs.16,460/-
Gratuity                                  Rs.9,69,600/-
Leave Encashment(10 Month)                Rs.4,52,516/-
Commutation of Pension
(Length of 32 Years of service)           Rs.10,38,926/

It is submitted that the applicable benefits as well as all other retiral benefits have been paidon the basis of continuity of service by the petitioner on demur and without any objection of protest.

13. It is submitted that the contentions raised by the petitioner for his entitlement of backwages instead of notional, is not correct and as such he was not entitled for back wages for the period between termination on superannuation, wherein he never worked. It is submitted that the intervening period is about 17 years, wherein the additional emoluments of backwages, is yet to be precisely calculated, but the same would be about or more than Rs. 40 Lacs.

14. It is submitted that upon there being orders passed of termination and reinstated after being acquitted, the same would not make the petitioner entitled for all benefits, irrespective of his conviction and non- rendering services due to dismissal order and the respondent -- authority cannot be made liable to pay during the said period for which the services of the employee was not availed.

15. It is submitted that even otherwise the suspension period of the petition is wholly unjustified, more particularly where the petitioner who was criminally prosecuted, came to be convicted and terminated in services and upon subsequently be acquitted, would not be entitled to claim back wages as a matter of right, during

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the period from the date of his termination, when his services were dispensed with, view of conviction. It is submitted that the petitioner cannot equate with persons, who as such were never convicted and there was no termination order passed are against them and the principles were different applied and weighing factors were different."

4.2. Relying upon the aforesaid averments, learned advocate Mr.Vyas submitted that as the petitioner has convicted by the Criminal Court in the year 1999, and subsequently being acquitted by order dated 30.01.2015 by giving benefit of doubt and as the petitioner did not worked during the said period, the petitioner is not entitled to back wages for the period between termination on superannuation wherein he never worked.

4.3. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas relied upon the decision of this Court in case of Meenaben Kantilal Shrimali W/O Kantilal Vashrambhai Shrimali V/s. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation rendered on 31.07.2018 in Special Civil Application No.12740 of 2016 wherein, it is held as under :

"5. The question falls for consideration about entitlement of back wages to the said employee Kantilal Shrimali who was subjected to prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and who having been convicted by the trial court, came to be acquitted in the appeal. Departmental inquiry was not initiated against him. Upon acquittal, he was given all the benefits including the notional benefit for the interregnum between termination and superannuation but the back wages was not given to him.

5.1 In Union of India v. Jaipal Singh [2003 Law Suit (SC) 1066] the facts were similar as the respondent was faced

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with criminal case. The Court held that in respect of the period after the conviction was suffered by the respondent, when he was out of service, the appellant - employer could not be made liable to pay during the said period for which the services of the employee was not availed. The Court observed to held thus,

"... ... ... we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in 1996 (11) SCC 603. If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest or by department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges, a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be re-instated, in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondents for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages aspects and considerations. ... ... ..."

5.2 In another decision in Banshi Dhar v. State of Rajasthan [(2007) 1 SCC 374], the Apex Court observed with reference to the facts of that case that it may be true that reason for long pendency of trial or the criminal appeal filed by the accused - employee may not be attributed to his acts of omission and commission, but the fact remains that the period between 31st July, 1976 when he was terminated and the date when he reached the superannuation, he did not work. The facts of that case are akin to one on hand. Once the employee was convicted, thereafter upon his acquittal he was reinstated and directed to be paid his pensionary benefits. The continuity of service was not denied but the question was whether the back wages should have been granted to him.

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5.2.1 The Supreme Court held thus, "Departmental proceedings, however, could not be held as on the date of passing of the judgment of acquittal, he had already reached his age of superannuation. The learned counsel may be right that the decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore involved the respective appellants therein on charge of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, but, as noticed, it has also been laid down that each case has to be considered on its own facts. The High Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction having regard to the aforementioned decision of this Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) [(1996) 11 SCC 603]. We do not see any reason to take a different view. Grant of back wages, it is well settled, is not automatic. Even in cases where principles of natural justice have been held to have not been complied with, while issuing a direction of reinstatement, this Court had directed placing of the delinquent employee under suspension. (Para 11)"

5.3 Referring to the decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) relied on by learned advocate for the petitioner, the Supreme Court held that the basic principle was that the proceedings in a criminal case and the proceedings in departmental inquiry can go simultaneously except where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on same set of facts. It was sought to be pointed out that in thta case the Supreme Court directed reinstatement of the appellant on the post of Security Officer with entire arrears of salary together with allowances. Decision in G.M. Tank (supra) of the Apex Court laid down that if the employee was acquitted in the criminal trial honourably, a contrary finding recorded in the departmental proceedings would be unjust and oppressive. A dismissal order held not sustainable. In that case also, the petitioner was prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal, but without back wages. While the said directions were issued by the Apex Court in light of the facts attendant to the said controversy, decisions in Jaipal Singh (supra) and Banshi Dhar (supra) involved facts which were nearer to the facts of the present case to apply the principle of denial of back wages. The decisions in Jaipal Singh (supra) and Banshi Dhar (supra) were the decisions subsequent in point of time emanating the mandate.

6. The position of law emerges from the aforesaid decisions is that an employee who is criminally

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prosecuted but gets subsequently acquitted, would not be entitled to claim the back wages as a matter of right during the period from the date of his termination when his services were dispensed with in view of conviction and who retired after having subsequently secured acquittal from the appellate court. The employer could justifiably treat the period from the date of termination till the date of retirement of such employee, as a period sans back wages. While it is well settled that grant of back wages is never an automatic relief to follow, the theory of no-work-no-pay would apply.

6.1 The employee who had not worked for the said particular period would not be entitled to, and the employer who was unable to take work for the said period, would not be saddled with the payment of the salary in form of back wages for the said part. For deciding the question of granting or otherwise of the back wages, host of the factors would govern. One of the weighty factors for not granting the back wages would be that the employee had not worked for the period concerned. For an employee who was terminated from services on account of criminal prosecution, would not be able to claim back wages automatically and as a matter of course on the ground that he was subsequently acquitted.

7. Therefore, no case is made out to grant any relief to the petitioner. The petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged."

5. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the materials on record, the facts are not in dispute as the petitioner was put under suspension by order dated 30.12.1993 pursuant to the criminal complaint dated 02.11.1993. The petitioner was convicted by the Sessions Court in Special (ACB) Case No.17 of 1994 by judgment dated 18.02.1999 and thereafter the petitioner was dismissed by order dated 13th September, 1999 on the ground of conviction without holding any departmental inquiry after issuing the show-cause notice. This

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Court by order dated 30th January, 2015 acquitted the petitioner by allowing the Criminal Appeal No.252 of 1999. The Supreme Court also dismissed the Special Leave Petition by order dated 08.07.2015. The petitioner was reinstated by the respondent-Corporation by order dated 08.03.2016 but the entire period from the date of suspension i.e. 30th December, 1993 to the date of dismissal i.e. 13th September, 1999 and from the date of dismissal till date of reinstatement was considered as period on duty on notional basis without giving benefit of arrears. The petitioner thereafter voluntarily retired with effect from 31st July, 2017.

6. The grievance raised by the petitioner for the arrears of back wages from the date of suspension till the date of dismissal and thereafter from date of dismissal till date of reinstatement is concerned, such issue is decided by this Court. This Court (Coram : Hon'ble Mr.Justice Mohinnder Pal as his Lordship was then) in case of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel (Supra) has held as under :

"5. This Court has considered the submissions of both the sides. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are employees of the respondent-Municipal Corporation who were tried under Prevention of Corruption Act. It will be relevant to note that all the petitioners have been acquitted as the prosecution witnesses have not supported the case of the respondent when examined in the Court.

6. The respondents have not conducted any departmental proceedings against the petitioners. Once the respondents

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themselves have been granted the benefits of 6 th pay commission to the petitioners, denying the other benefits including the benefits during the suspension period will be nothing but an abuse of the process of the law.

7. As far as increments are concerned, the petitioners will also be entitled to same increments which are being paid to the other employees who are at par with them.

8. Under these circumstances, all these Special Civil Applications are allowed. The period for which the petitioners were placed under suspension will be treated as a period on duty. They will be released all the benefits which could have been released to the petitioners, had they remained on duty. The benefits so accrued to the petitioners will be paid to them within a period of 2 (two) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. However, such payment will be subject to final outcome of the appeals preferred by State Government before this Court. Rule is made absolute."

7. The aforesaid decision was followed by this Court (Coram : Hon'ble Mr.Justice Biren Vaishnav) in case of Sureshbhai Vitthalbhai Prajapati(Supra) wherein, it is held as under :

"8. Considering the relief prayed for by the petitioner and in view of the decision dated 3.3.2017 in Special Civil Application No.10548 of 2011 and allied matters in case of such similarly situated employees, wherein, they were constrained to approach this Court as that Present period of suspension were not regularized due to the pending appeals and when this Court specifically directed as so reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment and particularly when their case is considered for regularizing their suspension was passed, I see no reason that why similar relief cannot be extended the benefit to the petitioner. Hence, the petition deserves to be allowed.

9. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to see that the period of suspension from 29.11.2006 to 15.4.2010 in case of the petitioner is ordered to be regularized as if the petitioner was on duty for the aforesaid period. Such exercise shall be carried out within a period of Eight Weeks from the date

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of receipt of writ of this order. However, it is clarified that when such benefits are extended, the orders so granting such benefit shall specifically state that this order is subject to the final outcome of the Criminal Appeal No.146 of 2013."

8. The Apex Court in case of Raj Narain (Supra) has held as under :

"5. This Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) considered the case of an employee who sought back wages for the period he was kept out of duty during the pendency of a criminal case for his involvement in an offence under Section 302, IPC. The claim of the Petitioner therein was that he was entitled to full wages on his acquittal by the Criminal Court. This Court rejected the said submission by holding that the question of payment of back wages would arise only in case of termination of service, pursuant to findings recorded in a departmental enquiry. In the event of the dismissal order being set aside by the Court, the delinquent employee would be entitled to claim back wages as he was unlawfully kept away from duty by the employer. This Court was of the opinion that an employee against whom criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in comparison to an employee facing a departmental inquiry. The employee involved in a crime has disabled himself from rendering his services on account of his incarceration in jail. Subsequent acquittal by an Appellate Court would not entitle him to claim back wages.

6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) was followed by this Court in Union of India and Others v. Jaipal Singh (supra) to refuse back wages to an employee who was initially convicted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and later acquitted by the High Court in a criminal appeal. While refusing to grant relief to the Petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the behest of the department and the employee is acquitted, different considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the Appellant endeavored to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the employer. The observation made in the judgment in Union of India and Others v.

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Jaipal Singh (supra) has to be understood in a manner in which the department would become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the department vis-a-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.

7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the Appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The Appellant was placed under suspension on 23.10.1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983. It is clear from the record that the Appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental inquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry. Thereafter, the Respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23.10.1979 came to an end on 21.03.1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the Appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21.10.1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the I.A., we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his

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reinstatement on 20.01.2003. Further, the Appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987."

9. Reliance placed on behalf of the respondent on the decision in case of Meenaben Kantilal Shrimali (Supra) is concerned, this Court denied the benefit of back wages to the employee who had not worked for the period and it is held as under:

"6. The position of law emerges from the aforesaid decisions is that an employee who is criminally prosecuted but gets subsequently acquitted, would not be entitled to claim the back wages as a matter of right during the period from the date of his termination when his services were dispensed with in view of conviction and who retired after having subsequently secured acquittal from the appellate court. The employer could justifiably treat the period from the date of termination till the date of retirement of such employee, as a period sans back wages. While it is well settled that grant of back wages is never an automatic relief to follow, the theory of no-work-no-pay would apply.

6.1 The employee who had not worked for the said particular period would not be entitled to, and the employer who was unable to take work for the said period, would not be saddled with the payment of the salary in form of back wages for the said part. For deciding the question of granting or otherwise of the back wages, host of the factors would govern. One of the weighty factors for not granting the back wages would be that the employee had not worked for the period concerned. For an employee who was terminated from services on account of criminal prosecution, would not be able to claim back wages automatically and as a matter of course on the ground that he was subsequently acquitted.

7. Therefore, no case is made out to grant any relief to the petitioner. The petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged."

10. In view of the above conspectus of law to

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give benefit of back wages and arrears, the petitioner can be given the benefit of back wages only from the date of acquittal i.e. on 30th January, 2015 till date of his reinstatement i.e. 14th March, 2016 as per the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in case of Raj Narain (Supra) wherein the decision of Union of India and Others vs. Jaipal Singh2 is explained.

11. In view of the foregoing reasons, the petition is partly allowed. The petitioner is entitled to the benefit of back wages from the date of acquittal i.e. 30th January, 2015 till the date of reinstatement i.e. 14th March, 2016 only. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.

(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) PALAK

2 2004 1 SCC 121