Gauhati High Court
Review.Pet./246/2025 on 24 October, 2025
Page No.# 1/8
GAHC010144792022
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Review.Pet./246/2025
P. Nyambemo Jami, S/o-Shri Pithungo Jami
R/o- House No.273, United Colony, Ward No.20, Half
Nagarjan, District: Dimapur, Nagaland, PIN:797112.
........Review Petitioner
-Versus-
1. Life Insurance Corporation of India, represented by
its Chairman, Having its Central Office at Yogakshema,
Jeevan Bima Marg, P.B. No.19953, Mumbai-400021.
2. The Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of
India, 4 CR Avenue, Hindustan Building, Kolkata-
700072.
3. The Senior Division Manager (Disciplinary Authority),
Life Insurance Corporation of India, Jorhat Divisional
Office, Rajabari, Jorhat-785014.
4. M.K. Gogoi, Enquiry Officer, Administrative Officer
(Land HPF), SR. No.330384, Life Insurance Corporation
of India, Divisional Office, Rajabari, Jorhat, PIN:
785014.
5. Prodip Borah, Presenting Officer, Administrative
Officer (NB), SR No.338246, Life Insurance Corporation
of India, Jorhat Divisional Office, Rajabari, Jorhat-
785014.
.....Respondents
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-B E F O R E -
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
For the Review Petitioner(s) : Mr. S.K. Srivastava, Advocate.
: Mr. N.Z. Lotha, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Dutta, Senior Advocate
Date of Hearing : 14.10.2025.
Date of Judgment : 24.10.2025.
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(Ashutosh Kumar, CJ)
We have heard Mr. S.K. Srivastava, learned Advocate assisted by
Mr. N.Z. Lotha, learned Advocate for the review petitioner and Mr. S.
Dutta, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent Nos.1 to 3.
2. The instant review petition has been filed against the judgment and
order dated 04.08.2021 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in WA
11/2021, whereby the order dated 20.11.2020 passed by the learned
Single Judge (Kohima Bench) in WP(C) No.266 (K)/2017 allowing the writ
petition of the petitioner herein and setting aside the order of his removal
from service, was upturned and the punishment imposed upon the
petitioner by the disciplinary authority was upheld.
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3. We are referring to only those facts which are necessary to dispose
off the present review petition.
The petitioner while working as a Higher Grade Assistant in the LIC
Branch of Dimapur in Nagaland in the year 2010 was subjected to a
departmental proceeding for having committed financial irregularities
which were detected in an audit done in the year 2012. In the audit,
referred to above, anomalies were detected regarding disbursement of
money which was payable to the policy-holders on maturity. The
preliminary enquiry revealed that it was not inadvertent but was
deliberate. The petitioner was thus charge-sheeted and was served with
eight specific charges. The Enquiry Officer found all the charges to be
fully proved. The Disciplinary Authority/Appointing Authority accepted
the enquiry report and imposed the punishment of removal from service.
The petitioner was removed from service vide order dated 12.01.2017.
The departmental appeal against the afore-noted order of removal was
dismissed. The Memorial preferred by the petitioner before the Chairman
of the LICI was also rejected.
Thereafter, the petitioner is said to have filed the writ petition [WP(C)
No.266 (K)/2017] which was allowed by holding that no doubt financial
irregularities were committed in the Dimapur Branch of LIC, but the
petitioner could not be squarely blamed for the same and that no other
person was subjected to any departmental proceeding. It is appeared to
the learned Single Judge that the petitioner was singled out. The learned
Single Judge also held that the petitioner might have signed the cheques
but it was done only after proper scrutiny at various levels, including the
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Branch Manager and, therefore, in the long chain of administration, it
was improper and unjust to single out the petitioner only. The order of
removal from service of the petitioner was set aside and quashed.
4. The LIC preferred an appeal against the afore-noted judgment of
the learned Single Judge wherein it was argued that the rationale for
giving clean chit to the petitioner was flawed in as much as it would be
no good reason to let go the petitioner only because the learned Single
Judge was of the view that there could be many other players in such
embezzlement/financial irregularities. The case was proved on the
preponderance of probabilities and the learned Single Judge was not
correct in adopting the yardstick of the allegations to be proved beyond
all reasonable doubts.
5. Countervailing arguments were made by the petitioner in the
appeal that since he was facing the departmental proceeding for a
major punishment, the proceedings ought not to have been conducted
in a casual manner. There were several irregularities in the departmental
proceedings in as much as the cheques and the other documents
presented before the Enquiry Officer were only the photocopies of the
original documents, which were never produced.
6. The response to the afore-noted argument was that the appellants
could not produce the original cheques as those were destroyed after a
particular period of time and that the veracity of those cheques were
never questioned by the petitioner.
7. The appellate Court, therefore, found that the departmental
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proceeding was conducted in accordance with law, following the due
process and all norms of procedure, including the principles of natural
justice and that the logic and rationale employed by the learned Single
Judge in setting aside the order of punishment was not at all sustainable
in the eyes of law. In fact, the learned Single Judge was found to have
not taken into account that the other officers of the organisation were
also proceeded against, but ultimately they were found to be not
involved in such misdemeanour; rather they were only found to be
negligent. For their negligence, it was submitted before the appellate
Court that they had been given minor punishment of stoppage of two
increments.
8. For the afore-noted reasons, the judgment of the learned Single
Judge was upturned by the Division Bench in appeal.
9. The SLP against the afore-noted appellate order preferred by the
petitioner was also dismissed by the Supreme Court.
10. The present review petition has been filed taking the plea that the
refusal of the Supreme Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India does not take away the rights of an
aggrieved litigant to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Order
XLVII, Rules 1 & 2 of CPC, 1908 for statutory review of the order of the High
Court. The petitioner has referred to Khoday Distilleries Ltd. -Vs- Sri
Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., Kollegal (Under
Liquidation) :: (2019) 4 SCC 376; M/s Mckinsey Knowledge Centre India
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. PCIT, Delhi 6, judgment dated 16.04.2019, R.P.
No.360/2018, ITA No.461/2017 and other judgments of the Delhi High
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Court.
11. By referring to various documents, namely, (i) the LIC (Staff
regulations), 1960; (ii) the Show Cause Notice dated 08.11.2016 issued to
the petitioner; (iii) the final order dated 12.01.2017 passed by the LIC
of India; (iv) the reply of the petitioner to the Show Cause Notice dated
07.12.2016; (v) the LIC Dimapur office communication dated 23.06.2008
regarding signing of cheques; (vi) the enquiry report of the Enquiry
Officer; and (vii) the provisions of The Departmental Inquiries
(Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses & Production of Documents)
Act, 1972, the petitioner has argued that the Division Bench did not
notice the deceitful practice of LIC of making cheques in its own name
for policies that had matured and had retained those cheques to induce
policyholders to hold money with LIC, which blame was put squarely on
the petitioner as a desperate cover-up.
It was further argued that the original cheques were never insisted
for and that a new finding was recorded that money was credited in the
accounts of the brother and wife of the petitioner but there was no such
finding ever by the enquiry authority or by the learned Single Judge. Even
if that were true, that was no charge in the enquiry or at any stage of the
litigation.
It was also argued that merely because another view was possible,
the verdict of the learned Single Judge ought not to have been
upturned in appeal.
12. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in extenso
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and have also perused the records.
13. All the grounds raised by the petitioner are neither new nor newly
discovered facts which despite due diligence could not have been
known by the petitioner. There does not appear to be any error apparent
on the face of the record. In fact, no good reason has been cited by the
petitioner for us to exercise our review jurisdiction in this case.
14. It is well settled that review jurisdiction is limited in scope, and
cannot be equated with an appeal. The primary object of review is to
correct patent errors, inadvertent mistakes; or manifest injustice and not
to enable the parties to re-argue their cases.
15. The Supreme Court in M/s. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. -Vs-
Lt. Governor of Delhi :: (1980) 2 SCC 167; Meera Bhanja (SMT) -Vs-
Nirmala Kumari Choudhury :: (1995) 1 SCC 170; Lily Thomas & Ors.
-Vs- Union of India & Ors. :: (2000) 6 SCC 224 and Kamlesh Verma -Vs-
Mayawati & Ors. :: (2013) 8 SCC 320, has clearly laid down that review
proceedings are not akin to appeal and have to be strictly confined to
the scope and ambit of the Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. It is an
exceptional jurisdiction and must be exercised sparingly. Mere
disagreement with the judgment or a different view does not justify any
review.
16. The finality of the judicial decisions is an essential feature of the
administration of justice. Review is not meant to allow parties to revisit the
settled issues on points that could have been raised previously. The error
pointed out must be self-evident and glaring. No review is possible only
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because the party is dissatisfied with the decision.
17. All that the petitioner has attempted to do through this review
petition is to re-argue the facts and law which have already been
considered. There is no contention of the petitioner that the Court
overlooked any binding precedent or ignored any material fact or
documents.
18. The opinion of the appellate Court in upturning the judgment of the
learned Single Judge, whereby the imposition of punishment on the
petitioner was set aside, was found to be unsustainable in the eyes of
law, which in our estimation is justifiable.
19. Thus for having found that the disciplinary proceeding against the
petitioner was carried out by following all procedural norms and
following the principles of natural justice as also for the utter failure of the
petitioner to make out any case for review, we are constrained to dismiss
this review petition but we make it cost easy.
The review petition is dismissed.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Comparing Assistant
