Gauhati High Court
Dr. Niranjan Das vs The Union Of India And 5 Ors on 17 October, 2025
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GAHC010085682024
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/2380/2024
DR. NIRANJAN DAS
RETD. SR. POSTMASTER , SILCHAR H.O,
S/O- LATE TARAK CHANDRA DAS,
R/O- 6, KALIMANDIR PATH, DHIRENPARA, GUWAHATI-781025
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA,
DEPARTMENT OF POSTS (DOP), MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION, DAK
BHAWAN, SANSAD MARG, NEW DELHI, PIN-110001
2:THE CHIEF POST MASTER GENERAL
ASSAM CIRCLE
MEGHDOOT BHAWAN
PAN BAZAR
GUWAHATI-78101
3:THE SECRETARY
UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
(SANGH LOK SEVA AYOG)
DHOLPUR HOUSE
SHAHJAHAN ROAD
NEW DELHI-69
4:THE DIRECTOR
OF POSTAL ACCOUNTS
ASSAM CIRCLE
GUWAHATI-08
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5:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF POSTS (DOP)
POSTAL DIRECTORATE
DAK BHAWAN
SANSAD MARG
NEW DELHI
PIN-110001
6:THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL
(VLG-I)
GOVT. OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND IT
DEPARTMENT OF POST
DAK BHAWAN
SANSAD MARG
NEW DELHI
PIN-11011
For the petitioner : Dr. GJ Sharma,
Mr. DN Sarma, Advocates
For the respondents : Mr. SS Roy, CGC for
Dr. A. Todi, Advocate for
Respondent No.3
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-BEFORE-
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
17-10-2025
(Ashutosh Kumar, C.J.)
We have heard Dr. GJ Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Mr. SS Roy, learned Central Government Counsel for the respondent
Nos.1, 2, 4 & 5.
2. The order dated 20.02.2024 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred as 'Tribunal'), Guwahati Bench passed
in O.A. No.040/00007/2019, whereby the punishment awarded to the
petitioner of withholding 15% of the monthly pension for a period of 5
years has not been interfered with, is under challenge.
3. The brief facts of the case are that while the petitioner was serving
as Senior Postmaster, Silchar Head Office, he was served with a charge-
sheet in the departmental proceeding initiated against him. There were
two articles of charges, namely, (i) while working as Superintendent of Post
Offices, Nalbari between 12.10.1999 to 05.02.2003, he had received
payment of 4 money orders of Rs.34,000/- sent by the Circle Welfare
Fund, Guwahati but the same was not credited to the Government
Account towards adjustment of the financial assistance paid by drawing
cash advance from the Post Office; and (ii) at the time of sanctioning of
the aforesaid amount to the respective family members of the deceased
employees, he did not adjust the amount against the amount which
should have been credited as unclassified receipt. Since the petitioner
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denied the charges, the department proceeded against him. An inquiry
authority and the Presenting Officer were appointed about which no
information is said to have been given to the petitioner. However, from
the records, it is found that a communication regarding appointment of
Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer was sent to the petitioner by
post and also by messenger but the same was refused to be accepted.
The petitioner never participated in the proceeding and, therefore, the
inquiry had to be conducted ex-parte. The inquiry report was submitted
on17.01.2017 to the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner made a
representation stating that there had been violation of principles of
natural justice inasmuch as the inquiry report was forwarded to him with a
tentative finding of the disciplinary authority that it agreed with the report
of the Inquiry Officer, thus, rendering the opportunity of defending himself
only illusory and mere formality. He had also objected to the non-
furnishing of the information about the appointment of the Inquiry Officer
and the Presenting Officer about which, as has been noted above, it was
found that he had refused to accept that information also.
4. Finding the reply of the petitioner to be totally unsatisfactory, the
disciplinary authority referred the matter to the UPSC for advice and
confirmation on the issue of quantum of punishment to be imposed upon
the petitioner, which advice was accepted by the Minister of State (C&IT)
and the disciplinary authority. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority
awarded the punishment of withholding of 15% of the monthly pension of
the petitioner for a period of 5 years.
5. The entire proceeding and the punishment awarded to the
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petitioner has been challenged on the ground of non-observance of the
required formalities during the departmental proceeding.
6. On behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted by Mr. Sharma that true it
is that the inquiry was conducted behind the back of the petitioner for
the reason that he had not participated in the same; nonetheless it left
the department with greater responsibility of following all the relevant
rules and observing the required formalities to make the proceedings
bias-free.
7. In that context, it has been argued that the relevant provisions of
the CCS Rules and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others vs. B. Karunakar and others [(1993) 4 SCC
727] put an obligation on the disciplinary authority not to form any
opinion on the inquiry report before the reply of the delinquent was
received and considered.
8. Referring to the inquiry report, which was communicated to the
petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
disciplinary authority had made an endorsement that it was tentatively in
agreement with the report of the inquiry officer.
9. The other serious contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that
the advice of the UPSC with respect to the quantum of punishment was
also not communicated to him, which, in fact, was necessarily to be
furnished to him.
10. In that context, Mr. Sharma has pointed out the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. RP Singh [(2014) 7 SCC 340]
wherein, relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in S.N. Narula v.
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Union of India, [(2011) 4 SCC 591] , it was held that if the advice of the UPSC
is sought and accepted, it should be communicated to the delinquent
before imposition of the punishment, which would be in keeping with the
principles of natural justice.
11. In Managing Director, ECIL (supra), it has clearly been held that when
an inquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent
employee has a right to receive the copy of the inquiry report before the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt or
innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against
him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against
the charges levelled against him and any denial of that right would be a
denial and breach of the principles of natural justice.
12. From the records, it appears that the report was communicated to
him but with the endorsement that the disciplinary authority was
tentatively in agreement with the findings of the inquiry officer. This
statement of the disciplinary authority cannot be treated to be an
opinion framed already with respect to the guilt of the delinquent. To be
tentatively in agreement with a report does not amount to coming to a
conclusion with respect of the guilt. This statement was only meant to
communicate to the delinquent that there were no grounds of
disagreement with the inquiry report till the time the representation of the
delinquent was received and considered, or else, the point of difference
of the disciplinary authority with the findings of the Inquiry Officer would
also have been noted down.
13. We find that the proceedings were conducted in a just, fair and
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reasonable manner. It was only because the petitioner refused to
cooperate and participate in the proceedings that it had to be
conducted ex-parte. True it is that even the report of the UPSC with
respect to its advice on the quantum of punishment should have been
communicated to the petitioner but not doing so does not appear to
have caused any prejudice to the petitioner in the present case.
14. In Managing Director, ECIL (supra), a situation was envisaged when
the delinquent would not have been furnished the inquiry report or other
documents necessarily to be supplied to the delinquent before
imposition of punishment on him. The answer to such question was that it
had to be construed with relativity to the punishment awarded to the
delinquent. If an employee is dismissed or removed from service and the
inquiry is set aside because the report has not been furnished to him and,
in which case, the delinquent would have been seriously prejudiced,
reinstating the employee or giving him back-wages could be thought of,
in case the situation so warranted. But if such non-furnishing of
documents makes no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to
him, then setting at naught the conclusion of the departmental
proceeding would tantamount to stretching the concept of justice to
illogical and exasperating limits.
The Supreme Court has further clarified that in such a situation,
disagreement with the decision of the disciplinary authority on that count
might amount to an unnatural expansion of the concept of natural
justice, which in itself would be antithetical to justice, it would be
rewarding the dishonest and the guilty.
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15. In the present case, even with the risk of repetition, we say that the
petitioner refused to cooperate and participate in the proceeding. Even
the communication informing him regarding appointment of Inquiry
Officer and the Presenting Officer in the proceeding was not received by
him. The opinion of the UPSC on the quantum of sentence, if not
furnished to the petitioner, would actually have made no difference as
the punishment awarded to the petitioner in this case for having
temporarily embezzled public money, especially while discharging an
important function in the Post Office as a senior officer, is not on the
harsher side.
16. We have also taken note of the argument of the learned counsel
for the petitioner that the observation of the disciplinary authority that it
was tentatively in agreement with the reasoning of the Inquiry Officer
reflected its closed mind, is not correct. In fact, the Government of India
in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department
of Personnel & Training) has come out with an Office Memorandum
dated 12.11.2010 indicating that the disciplinary authority must forward or
cause to be forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any, held by
the Disciplinary Authority or where the Disciplinary Authority is not the
Inquiring Authority, a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority
together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any, with the
findings of the Inquiry Authority on any article of charge to the
Government Servant who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his
written representation or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within
fifteen days, irrespective of whether the report is favourable or not, to the
Government Servant. It further states that the necessity of following this in
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letter and spirit cannot be overstated and the communication of the
inquiry officer's report to the delinquent ought not to contain opinion of
the disciplinary authority as "article of charge is fully proved" or "article of
charge is fully substantiated". Such statement could be construed to
mean that the disciplinary authority is biased even before considering
the representation of the charged officer and that would be against the
letter and spirit of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
17. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has only recorded that
there is no ground of disagreement with the report of the Inquiry Officer
and therefore, the delinquent is required to give his explanation to the
report of the Inquiry Officer whereafter only a final decision would be
taken by the disciplinary authority.
18. Considering all these aspects, which were taken into account by
the Tribunal, we do not find that the petitioner has made out any case for
interference with the order dated 20.02.2024 passed by the Tribunal in
O.A. No.040/00007/2019.
19. There is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed
accordingly.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Comparing Assistant
