Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/17 vs The Union Of India on 9 May, 2025

                                                                       Page No.# 1/17

GAHC010084662025




                                                                  2025:GAU-AS:5771

                              THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
   (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                               Case No. : Bail Appln./1286/2025

            LAKSHMAN RAY
            S/O VILASH RAY
            R/O KRIPALTOLA, MOJIPUR
            P.O. FATUHA
            P.S. NADI THANA
            DIST. PATNA, BIHAR
            PIN CODE- 803201



            VERSUS

            THE UNION OF INDIA
            REP BY SC, NCB



Advocate for the Petitioner   : MR. Y S MANNAN, MR. T HUSSAIN

Advocate for the Respondent : SC, NCB,
                                                                         Page No.# 2/17

                         BEFORE
          HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MITALI THAKURIA
                                     ORDER

Date : 09.05.2025

Heard Mr. Y. S. Mannan, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. N. Deka, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. S. C. Keyal, learned Standing Counsel, NCB for the respondent/Union of India.

2. This is an application under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 praying for grant of bail to the accused/petitioner, who has been arrested in connection with NDPS Case No. 20/2023, arising out of NCB Crime No. 23/2022, under Sections 8(c)/20(b)(ii)(C)/29/ 35/54 of NDPS Act, 1985, pending before the Court of learned Special Judge, Kamrup, Amingaon.

3. Scanned copy of the case record has already been received and I have perused the same.

4. It is submitted by Mr. Mannan, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the present accused/petitioner is innocent and nothing has been seized from his conscious possession. He got arrested in connection with this case on 29.11.2022 and for last 2 (two) years & 6 (six) months, he has been in custody. However, till date, out of 16 (sixteen) numbers of cited witnesses, only 8 (eight) witnesses have been examined by the prosecution. Thus, he submitted that there is no possibility of completion of trial within a short period as lots of vital witnesses are yet to be examined by the prosecution and hence, considering his Page No.# 3/17

period of long incarceration, the accused/petitioner may be released on bail. However, he, being the permanent resident of his addressed locality, will appear on each and every date to be fixed by the Court.

5. In that context, Ms. Mannan also relied on following decisions:

(i) Shariful Islam @ Sarif Vs. the State of West Bengal [Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 4173/2022]

(ii) Anjan Nath. Vs. The State of Assam [Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 9860/2023]

(iii) Chitta Biswas @ Subhas Vs. the State of West Bengal [Criminal Appeal No(s). 245/2020 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 8823/20190]

(iv) Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan Vs. the State of Bengal [Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 5769/2022]

(v) Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh Vs. The State of Gujarat [Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 5530/2022]

(vi) Md. Muslim alias Hussain Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023 SCC OnLine SC 352]

(vii) Amit Kumar Vs. Union of India [Bail Appln. No. 3805/2024, Page No.# 4/17

decided on 16.12.2024]

(viii) Anil Yadav Vs. Union of India & Anr.[Bail Appln. No. 434/2024, decided on 03.12.2024]

(ix) Rabi Prakash Vs. State of Odisha [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109]

6. Further Mr. Mannan submitted that the present was arrested in connection with this case only on the basis of the statement of the co-accused recorded under Section 67 of NDPS Act. However, it is the settled position that the statement of the co-accused or the voluntary statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is not admissible at the time of trial or that cannot be the basis for conviction as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(2021) 4 SCC 1], wherein it has been held that the statement of the co-accused person recorded under Section 67 NDPS Act is not tenable in the eye of law and it cannot be the basis of the conviction.

7. Apart from the ground of long incarceration, Mr. Mannan, learned counsel for the petitioner, further submitted that admittedly the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the present accused/petitioner nor to his family members in the Arrest Memo as well as in the Notices under Sections 47 & 48 of BNSS, corresponding to Section 50 & 50A of Cr.P.C., which itself is in violation of Article 21 & 22(1) of the Constitution of India. It is the mandate of the Constitution of India that the accused/petitioner as well as his family members should be Page No.# 5/17

intimated the grounds of arrest.

8. In this context also, Mr. Mannan, learned counsel for the petitioner, cited the following decisions:

(i) Vihaan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269.

(ii) Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2024) 8 SCC 254.

9. Mr. Mannan, learned counsel for the petitioner, also submitted that though in the case of commercial quantity, the rigor of Section 37 NDPS Act follows, but in cases where there is violation of the constitutional provision as mandated under Articles 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India, the statutory restriction will not affect the power of the Court to grant bail in such circumstances. More so, non-mentioning of grounds of arrest while issuing the Arrest Memo as well as in the Notices under Sections 47 & 48 BNSS is itself in violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and hence, without even going into the detail of the merit of the case, the present petitioner is entitled to bail.

10. Ms. Deka, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the learned Standing Counsel, NCB, submitted in this regard that the charge-sheet of this case was filed on 25.05.2023 and the charge was accordingly framed on 22.09.2023 and till date, 8 (eight) witnesses have already been examined by the prosecution and the learned Trial Court is making every endeavour to procure the Page No.# 6/17

attendance of the other witnesses and thus, the case is proceeding in good pace and there is every possibility of completion of trial within a reasonable period. She further submitted that the role of the present petitioners is also discussed in detail in the charge-sheet wherein it is seen that the present petitioner, along with other co-accused persons, is fully involved in the alleged offence which is an organized crime. The contraband was recovered from the conscious possession of the present accused/petitioner and from his disclosure statement, it is seen that the ganja was supposed to deliver to one Lakshman Ray at Fatuha, Patna, Bihar and thus, it cannot be held that the present accused/petitioner was not aware about the contraband in the vehicle.

11. Ms. Deka further submitted that the period of incarceration of the accused/petitioner also cannot be considered as a sufficient ground to grant him bail complying the provision of Section 436A of Cr.P.C., which is also applicable in the case of NDPS Act.

12. For ready reference, Section 436A of Cr.P.C. reads as under:

"Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties;

Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties.

Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the Page No.# 7/17

period of investigation inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under the law."

13. Ms. Deka further submitted that while dealing with a case of NDPS Act, the object and purpose of the Act has to be considered and if such kind of offender is allowed to go on bail, the very purpose and object of the Act itself will be frustrated. In that context, he also relied on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Narcotics Control Bureau Vs. Kashif, reported in 2024 0 Supreme(SC) 1264, and emphasized on paragraph No. 39 of the judgment, which reads as under:

"39. The upshot of the above discussion may be summarized as under:

(i) The provisions of NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the scheme, object and purpose of the Act; as also the impact on the society as a whole. It has to be interpreted literally and not liberally, which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and Preamble of the Act.

(ii) While considering the application for bail, the Court must bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act which are mandatory in nature.

Recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is sine qua non is known for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act.

(iii) The purpose of insertion of Section 52A laying down the procedure for disposal of seized Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, was to ensure the early disposal of the seized contraband drugs and substances. It was inserted in 1989 as one of the measures to implement and to give effect to the International Conventions on the Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

(iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 52A lays down the procedure as contemplated in sub-section (1) thereof, and any lapse or delayed compliance thereof would be merely a procedural irregularity which would neither entitle the accused to be released on bail nor would vitiate the trial on that ground alone.

(v) Any procedural irregularity or illegality found to have been committed in conducting the search and seizure during the course of investigation or thereafter, would by itself not make the entire evidence collected during the course of investigation, inadmissible. The Court would have to consider all the circumstances and find out whether any serious prejudice has been caused to the accused.

(vi) Any lapse or delay in compliance of Section 52A by itself would neither vitiate the trial nor would entitle the accused to be released on bail. The Court Page No.# 8/17

will have to consider other circumstances and the other primary evidence collected during the course of investigation, as also the statutory presumption permissible under Section 54 of the NDPS Act."

14. She also relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of The State of Meghalaya Vs. Lalrintluanga Sailo & Anr. [Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 16021/2023], wherein the Apex Court has expressed the view that the bail cannot be granted even to a HIV patient only on the sole reason of illness and if the twin conditions under Section 37 NDPS Act are not satisfied. Further it is held that while considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under NDPS Act a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 NDPS Act is impermissible. He further emphasized on paragraph Nos. 8 & 10 of the judgment, which read as under:

"8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra revealing the consistent view of this Court that while considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under NDPS Act a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.

...

10. The subject FIR viz., FIR No. 06(02)23 under Section(s) 21(c)/29 of the NDPS Act, would reveal that the quantity of the contraband involved is 1.040 kgs of heroin. The impugned order granting bail to accused-Smt. X, dated 29.09.2023 would reveal, this time also, the bail was granted on the ground that she is suffering from HIV and conspicuously, without adverting to the mandate under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act, even after 6 taking note of the fact that the rigour of Section 37, NDPS Act, calls for consideration in view of the involvement of commercial quantity of the contraband substance. When the accused is involved in offences under Section 21(c)/29 of NDPS Act, more than one occasion and when the quantity of the contraband substance viz., heroin is 1.040 Kgs, much above the commercial quantity, then the non-consideration of the provisions under Section 37, NDPS Act, has to be taken as a very serious lapse.

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In cases of like nature, granting bail solely on the ground mentioned, relying on the decision in Bhawani Singh v. State of Rajasthan3 would not only go against the spirit of the said decision but also would give a wrong message to the society that being a patient of such a disease is a license to indulge in such serious offences with impunity. In the contextual situation it is to be noted that in Bhawani Singh's case the offence(s) involved was not one under the NDPS Act. We have no hesitation to say that in the above circumstances it can only be held that the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are not satisfied and on the sole reason that the accused is a HIV patient, cannot be a reason to enlarge her on bail. Since the impugned order was passed without adhering to the said provision and in view of the rigour thereunder the accused-Smt.X is not entitled to be released on bail, the impugned order invites interference."

15. Ms. Deka further relied on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & Anr. [2005 0 Supreme(SC) 104], wherein it is held that " if a person accused of offences which are non bailable is liable to be detained in custody during the pendency of trial unless he is enlarged on bail in accordance with law. Such detention cannot be question as being violative of Article 21 since the same is authorized by law."

16. Ms. Deka further submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court had also observed in various decisions that in murder case, the accused commits murder of one or 2 persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instruments in causing death or inflicting death blow to number of innocent young victim who are vulnerable. In that context, she also relied on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Samujh & Anr., reported in (1999) 9 SCC 429.

17. She further submitted that the Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees personal liberty to everyone. However, the same cannot be taken Page No.# 10/17

away except in accordance with the procedures established by law. In criminal law, a person accused of an offence which is non-bailable is liable to be detained in custody during the pendency of trial unless he is enlarged on bail in accordance with law. Such detention cannot be questioned as being violative of article 21 since the same is authorized by law.

18. Ms. Deka also submitted that the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Vihaan Kumar (supra) is not applicable in the instant case as the judgment is pronounced particularly in PMLA Case. The purpose of the PMLA Act is quite different from the NDPS Act.

19. She further relied on following decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in support of her submissions:

(i) Hira Singh Vs. Union of India & Anr. [(2020) 20 SCC 272]

(ii) Narcotic Control Bureau Vs. Kishan Lal [(1991) 1 SCC 705]

(iii) Union of India Vs. Ram Samujh & Anr. [(1999) 9 SCC 429]

(iv) State of Punjab Vs. Rakesh Kumar [(2019) 2 SCC 466]

(v) Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav Vs. CBI [(2007) 1 SCC 70]

(vi) Pramod Kumar Saxena Vs. Union of India [(2008) 9 SCC 685]

(vii) State of Maharashtra Vs. Buddhikota Subba Rao [1989 0 Supreme (SC) 493] Page No.# 11/17

20. Citing the above referred judgments, it is submitted by Ms. Deka, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the learned Standing Counsel, NCB, that the long incarceration and the violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India or the delay in trial cannot be the ground for allowing the accused persons to go on bail in a heinous crime like NDPS case. She further submitted that Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the personal liberty to everyone, however the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with the procedures established by law. In a criminal law, a person accused of an offence, which is non-bailable, is liable to be detained in custody during the pendency of the trial unless he is enlarged on bail in accordance with law. Such detention cannot be questioned as being violative of Article 21 of since the same is authorized by law. When the seriousness of an offence is such, the mere fact that he was in jail for however long time should not be the concern of the court and in heinous crime, length of tenure in custody may not be the only factor of consideration for the grant of bail. She further submitted that the ground of long incarceration and applicability of Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be the sole ground for seeking bail in heinous crime like NDPS. She further submitted that these are the organized crime of the underworld and such illegal trafficking have led the drug addiction amongst the sizeable section of the public, specially the youths are being affected and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportion in the recent years. More so, granting bail to the accused/petitioner at this stage may hamper the trial of the case or there may be the influencing of witnesses who are yet to be examined and there is every likelihood of the accused jumping over the condition of bail.

21. More so, she submitted that the case is of commercial in nature and Page No.# 12/17

hence, rigor of Section 37 NDPS Act will follow wherein the twin condition has to be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the offence and there has to be a belief that the accused will not repeat or commit the same offence while on bail. But, from the materials available in the Case Record and Case Diary, it cannot be said that the present petitioner is innocent, he has not committed such offence nor there is any probability of committing similar kind of offence if he is released on bail. She further submitted that the present accused/ petitioner is a habitual offender and there are sufficient incriminating materials against him. Thus, she raised vehement objection and submitted that considering the nature and gravity of the offence, it is not at all a fit case to enlarge the accused/petitioner on bail at this stage.

22. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for both sides and also perused the materials available on record as well as the judgments cited by the learned counsels for both sides.

23. From the submissions made by the learned counsels for both sides, it is seen that basically there are 2 (two) issues raised in the present case, i.e. the period of long incarceration and non-communication of grounds of arrest to the present petitioner in the Arrest Memo as well as in the Notices under Sections 47 & 48 of BNSS, corresponding to Sections 50 & 50A of Cr.P.C. From the records, it is seen that till date, the prosecution could examine only 8 (eight) numbers of witnesses out of 16 (sixteen) numbers of cited witnesses and in the same time, it is also an admitted fact that the accused/petitioner is behind the bar for last more than 2 (two) years and 6 (six) months. Further it is also the admitted fact that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the Page No.# 13/17

petitioner as well as to his relatives in the Notices under Sections 47 & 48 of BNSS, corresponding to Sections 50 & 50A of Cr.P.C., as well as in the Arrest Memo. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Pankaj Bansal (supra), Prabir Purkayastha (supra) & Vihaan Kumar (supra), as referred above, had discussed in detail in regards to non-communication of the grounds of arrest to the accused persons and it is considered in various paragraphs of the judgments that non-compliance of same is in violation of Article 21 & 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

24. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra), as relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has held in paragraph Nos. 19, 21 & 48 of the judgment as under:

"19. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that any person arrested for allegation of commission of offences under the provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed about the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such written grounds of arrest have to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception at the earliest. The purpose of informing to the arrested person the grounds of arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as, this information would be the only effective means for the arrested person to consult his Advocate; oppose the police custody remand and to seek bail. Any other interpretation would tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

21. The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality 3 (2000) 8 SCC 590committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused.

48. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant difference in the phrase 'reasons for arrest' and 'grounds of arrest'. The 'reasons for arrest' as Page No.# 14/17

indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters, viz., to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer. These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the 'grounds of arrest' would be required to contain all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the 'grounds of arrest' would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be equated with the 'reasons of arrest' which are general in nature."

25. Further, in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held has under:

"14. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1). It will also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The procedure established by law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1). Therefore, when a person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well. In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal. On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second."

26. In the instant case also, as discussed above, it is seen that there is no Page No.# 15/17

mention of grounds of arrest in the Arrest Memo as well as in the Notices issued to the present accused/petitioner and his family members under Sections 47 & 48 of BNSS, corresponding to Sections 50 & 50A of Cr.P.C., and except the name, address and the case numbers, there is no mention about any other particulars of the offence as well as the grounds of arrest. So, from the proviso of Sections 47 & 48 of BNSS, corresponding to Sections 50 & 50A of Cr.P.C., it is seen that there is clear violation of mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and in such cases, in spite of the statutory restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, this Court is of the considered opinion that for the violation of the constitution mandate contained under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, the arrest of the petitioner is vitiated and it may be a sufficient ground to consider his bail application in spite of rigor of Section 37 of the NDPS Act which provides the restriction in granting bail in the cases of commercial quantity under the NDPS Act.

27. More so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra) has also held that even after filing of the charge-sheet, the arrest and the detention will be considered as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 21 & 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph No. 16 of the said judgment has held as under:

"16. An attempt was made by learned senior counsel appearing for 1st respondent to argue that after his arrest, the appellant was repeatedly remanded to custody, and now a chargesheet has been filed. His submission is that now, the custody of the appellant is pursuant to the order taking cognizance passed on the charge sheet. Accepting such arguments, with great respect to the learned senior counsel, will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a person based on orders of remand is Page No.# 16/17

also vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided under Article 22."

28. Further, it is also seen that the petitioner is behind the bar for last more than 2 (two) years & 6 (six) months and till date, only 8 (eight) witnesses have been examined out of 16 (sixteen) numbers of cited witnesses and hence, the probability of completion of trial within near future is also cannot be expected at this stage.

29. In view of the entire discussions made above, viz-a-viz, considering both the grounds of long incarceration of 2 (two) years & 6 (six) months as well as non-furnishing of grounds of arrest in the Arrest Memo and also in the Notices issued to the present accused/petitioner and his family members under Sections 47 & 48 of BNSS, corresponding to Sections 50 & 50A of Cr.P.C., and further considering the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case laws referred to hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has made out a case for grant of bail and therefore, I am inclined to grant the privilege of bail to the accused/petitioner.

30. Accordingly, it is provided that on furnishing a bond of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) only with 2 (two) sureties of like amount, provided that one surety has to be a government servant, to the satisfaction of the learned Special Judge, Kamrup, Amingaon, the accused, namely, Lakshman Ray, be enlarged on bail, subject to the following conditions:

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(i) that the petitioner shall appear before the Court of learned Special Judge, Kamrup, Amingaon, on each and every date to be fixed by the Court;

(ii) that the petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;