Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/14 vs The State Of Assam And 5 Ors on 8 May, 2025
Page No.# 1/14
GAHC010243132022
2025:GAU-AS:5780
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/1626/2023
SHRI SHRI CHATURBHUJ DHAM ( NARAYAN), DEITY
REPRESENTED BY SRI DIPENDRA NATH CHAKRAVORTY AND BY ITS
SECRETARY SHRI SIBENDRA NATH RAY OF SHRI SHRI CHATURBHUJ
SURAKSHA SAMITY, VILLAGE RAM RAI KUTHI PART II, PO CHATRASAL,
PS GOLOKGANJ, DIST DHUBRI, ASSAM 783335
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DHUBRI, ASSAM 783301
2:THE SETTLEMENT OFFICER
DHUBRI
DIST DHUBRI
ASSAM 783301
3:ASSISTANT SETTLEMENT OFFICER
DHUBRI
ASSAM 783301
4:THE CHIEF SECRETARY
GOVT. OF ASSAM
DISPUR
GUWAHATI 6
5:THE ASSISTANT SETTLEMENT OFFICER
AGAMONI
PO AGOMONI
PS GOLOKGANJ
DIST DHUBRI
Page No.# 2/14
ASSAM 783301
6:SHRI SHRI RAMRAI KUTHI SATRA
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
VILLAGE RAMRAI KUTHI PART II
PO CHATRASAL
PS GOLOKGANJ
DHUBRI
ASSAM 78333
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR C GOSWAMI,
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, MR H P GUWALA (R-6),H P NEOG (R-6),MR. B K
DAS (R-6)
Linked Case :
SHRI SHRI CHATURBHUJ DHAM ( NARAYAN)
DEITY
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS. F
------------
Advocate for : MR C GOSWAMI
Advocate for : appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS. F
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND
JUDGMENT
Date : 08-05-2025
1. Heard learned counsel Mr. C. Goswami for the applicant Shri Shri Chaturbhuj
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Dham, (Narayan), DEITY, represented by the President, Shri Dipendra Nath
Chakraborty, and Secretary, Shri Sibendra Nath Ray, of Shri Shri Chaturbhuj
Suraksha Samity.
2. The State of Assam represented by the Deputy Commissioner- Dhubri; The
Settlement Officer-Dhubri; The Assistant Settlement Officer- Dhubri; The Chief
Secretary- Government of Assam at Dispur, and Assistant Settlement Officer-
Agamoni are arrayed as Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 respectively, and Shri Shri
Ramrai Kuthi Satra is represented by the President i.e., the Proforma respondent
No. 6.
3. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that a regular second appeal has
been filed before this Court challenging the Judgment and Decree dated
19.04.2017, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Dhubri, in Title Appeal No.
55/2014. The applicant ought to have filed the appeal on or before 07.07.2017,
within the period of limitation of 90 days for filing a second appeal before the
High Court as prescribed under Article 116 of the Limitation Act of 1963, (the
Act of 1963 for short), but there was a delay and appeal was filed on
24.11.2022.
Thus, an application under Order 41, Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure,
(CPC for short), and Section 5 of the Act of 1963 has been filed with prayer for
extension of the period of limitation of 1,208 days for filing the regular second
appeal (RSA for short).
It is submitted that the President, Sri Dipendra Nath Chakravorty has been
suffering from old age ailments and has been bedridden for the last 4 to 5
years. He was more conversant with the Court cases relating to the DEITY. Over
and above his health conditions, owing to some political and social
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responsibilities and the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, no meeting was
convened to take up necessary steps to file the second appeal by the committee
of the Shri Shri Chaturbhuj Suraksha Samity, and to maintain harmony, every
endeavour was made to resolve the disputes outside the Court. A general
meeting was convened only on 12.06.2022 and the secretary of the Shri Shri
Chaturbhuj Suraksha Samity was empowered to look after the court cases and
to take necessary steps to file second appeal.
It is further submitted that a majority of the devotees are not financially stable
and owing to the shortage of funds, additionally there was delay in filing this
appeal.
4. It is submitted that the applicant came to Guwahati to consult with the
engaged counsel. On 22.10.2022 and then again on 12.11.2022, as the
applicant had to return to Guwahati along with the necessary documents of the
connected Title Suit No. 461/2009, and this hesitation resulted in the delay. It is
further submitted that the learned engaged counsel had to go through the
records and to draft the present appeal. Thus, it is apparent that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause for not filing the present appeal within the
period of limitation. It is submitted that there was no wilful negligence on his
part and the delay was not intentional. It is submitted that the appeal may be
admitted to merits as the appellant has a good case. Thus, this application
furthers the cause of justice rather than aborting the proceedings.
5. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the proforma respondent No. 6,
Shri Jitendra Nath Prodhani stating that he is the President of Ramrai Kuthi
Satra Of Shri Shri Chaturbhuj Dham. He has contended that there was a delay
of 1238 days in filing this second appeal against the Judgment and Order in
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Title Appeal No. 55/2014, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Dhubri.
6. It is submitted that sufficient grounds were not projected by the applicant
to condone the inexplicable delay. It is contended that the medical certificate
dated 27.09.2022, reveals that the applicant was examined by the doctor only
on 27.09.2022, and thus there is no explanation except that the applicant was
unable to resume his normal duties only owing to his old age as certified on
27.09.2022. Prior to 27.09.2022, a meeting was convened on 12.06.2022,
authorizing the Secretary of Shri Shri Chaturbhuj Suraksha Samity to approach
this Court against the Judgment and Order dated 19.04.2017.
Thus, prior to issuance of medical certificate on 27.09.2022, the petitioner was
presumably not ailing from any infirmities. Therefore, there is no explanation of
delay for the period between 19.07.2017 up to 12.06.2022, when the meeting
was convened.
7. It is further contended by the respondent No. 6 that owing to the outbreak
of COVID-19, the limitation period from 15.03.2020 up to 28.02.2022, was
extended by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Suo Moto PIL No. 03/2020 and for the
period between 19.07.2017 upto 15.03.2020, the petitioner has failed to explain
the inexplicable delay of 968 days.
8. It is further contended that after consultation with the engaged counsel on
22.10.2022 and 12.11 2022, the petitioner has failed to provide explanation for
delay in filing the appeal. In reply to this submission, the petitioner has
submitted that the reasons of delay has already been explained and the
petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector
Land Acquisition, Anantanag Vs. Katiji and Ors reported in 1987 (2) SCC 107,
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wherein it is held that:-
" 3. Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a
pedantic approach should be made Why not every hour's delay every
second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. "
8. The petitioner has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Ramnath Sao @Ram Nath Sahu and Ors Vs. Gobardhan Sao and Ors reported
in 2002 (3) SCC-195, wherein it is held that:-
"In the case of Sital Prasad Saxena (dead) by LRs v. Union of India and
others, AIR 1985 Supreme Court. the Court was dealing with a case
where in a second appeal, appellant died and application for substitution
after condonation of delay and setting aside abatement filed after two
years by the heirs and legal representatives was rejected on the ground
that no sufficient cause was shown and the appeal was held to have
abated. When the matter was brought to this Court, the appeal was
allowed, delay in filing the petition for setting aside the abatement was
condoned, abatement was set aside, prayer for substitution was granted
and High Court was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits and while
doing so, it was observed that once an appeal is pending in the High
Court, the heirs are not expected to keep a constant watch on the
continued existence of parties to the appeal before the High Court which
has a seat far away from where parties in rural areas may be residing i
inasmuch as in a traditional rural family the father may not have informed
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his son about the litigation in which he was involved and was a party It
was further observed that Courts should recall that "What has been said
umpteen times that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice
and should be so interpreted and not to make them penal statutes for
punishing erring parties."
9. The petitioner has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
reported in 2013 (12) SCC 649, wherein it is held that:-
" 15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be
culled out are:
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not
supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.
(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard
being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and
are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the
ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule
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the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and
a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine
of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be
taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is
that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of
justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot
be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should
be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face
such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse
to the technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm
of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning
and not on individual perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable
latitude."
10. The petitioner has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in University of Delhi Vs. Union of India and Ors reported in 2020 (13) SCC
745, wherein it is observed that:-
" From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the
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decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal
approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay The
consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of
the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a
different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render
even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of
long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse
consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective in that
background while considering condonation of delay, the routine
explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of
indicating "sufficient cause" to justify the delay which will depend on the
backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the
Courts based on the fact situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire
conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus.
However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein
was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking
condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted
against the consideration that was required to be made on merits
regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per
cent."
11. The Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 has submitted that it
has been erroneously mentioned that the delay was for 1208 days whereas, the
delay was for 1937 days. The second appeal has no merits against the
concurrent decisions of two Courts. Initially, relief was sought from the Deputy
Commissioner, Dhubri, and thereafter, the applicant approached the Court. The
land was allotted in the year 1989 and the applicant/appellant has raked up and
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tried to unsettle an already settled matter. The appeal is devoid of merits and is
liable to be dismissed.
12. The applicant has failed to project sufficient grounds for the inexplicable
delay of 1937 days. The application is liable to be rejected as the applicants
have been sleeping over their rights for a prolonged period of time and thus
they are not entitled to any relief. Even at this stage, there is every possibility of
amicable settlement and there is lack of bonafide in this application.
13. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 6 that the dispute is
only between two individuals whereas, the Committee and the society at large is
not aggrieved. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the
proforma/defendant No. 6 is in reality a defendant/ respondent and not a
proforma defendant/respondent.
14. I have considered the submissions at the bar with circumspection.
15. The respondent No. 6 has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagjit Singh and Ors, reported
in 2010 (8) SCC 685, wherein it has been held that:-
"34. Liberal construction of the expression "sufficient cause" is intended
to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or
inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is
imputable There can be instances where the court should condone the
delay. equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its
discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or
where it does not reflect sufficient cause" as understood in law (Advanced
Law Lexicon. P Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997)
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35. The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and
adequate reasons The word "sufficient" means adequate enough, as
much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces
no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices
to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances
and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious
men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court,
in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one
These prestons give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a
law in a meaningful manner. while assuring that the purpose of enacting
such a law does not stand frustrated.
16. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 has also relied on the decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries
Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Ors, reported in
2010 (5) SCC 459, wherein it has been held that:-
"14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation
a is founded on public policy The legislature does not prescribe limitation
with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that
they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The
idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by
the legislature To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a
period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal
injury At the same time, the b courts are bestowed with the power to
condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy
within the stipulated time
15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the
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Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in
dealing with the c applications for condonation of delay, this Court has
justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the
delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is
inordinate Collector (LA) v Katiji N. Balakris man v M. Krishnamurthy and
Vedabai v Shantaram Baburao Patil
16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on d
behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while
emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the
applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the
State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the
latter case because the State represents collective cause of the
community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow
pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table
consumes considerable time causing delay-G. Ramegowda v. Land
Acquisition Officer State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, State of U.P. v.
Harish Chandra, State of Bihar v Ratan Lal Sahu, State of Nagaland v.
Lipok AO and State (NCT of Dlhi) v. Ahmed Jaan."
**** **** ****
28. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the
High Court is set aside and the application for condonation of delay filed
by the respondents is dismissed."
17. I find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. The
respondent No. 6 and the applicant is the same entity that is the same DEITY
with different names. The dispute is relating to the nomenclature adopted to
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identify the DEITY. Earlier, the applicant was aggrieved by the decision of the
District Commissioner/ Deputy Commissioner. The applicant thereafter filed the
Title suit and aggrieved by the decision of the Trial Court in connection with T.S.
No. 461/2009, the applicant preferred an appeal and is also aggrieved by the
decision of the First Appellate Court in connection with T.A. No. 55/2014. The
applicant/appellant has filed this appeal. It is apparent that this dispute is
indeed a conciliable matter. Gross negligence is discernible on the conduct of
the applicant. Sufficient grounds were not ascribed to justify the inexplicable
delay in filing the connected appeal. The inexplicable delay has been explained
in a haphazard manner accentuating the laches on the part of the applicant.
18. In a way it appears that the applicant may not be highly prejudiced if the
appeal is not admitted to merits. Rather the decision relied on by the applicant
in connection with the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (Supra), clearly reflects that
gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of and
lack of bonafides is imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact. The ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Ramnath Sao (Supra) is not applicable to this case. The
ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector Land
Acquisition, Anantanag (Supra), is also not applicable to this case. In this
case, the applicant cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non deliberate delay.
19. I have considered the submission on behalf of the respondents that even at
this stage, there is possibility of amicable settlement relating to the grievance of
the applicant. The applicant can explore possibility of amicable settlement.
20. Therefore, in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Balwant Singh (Supra), and Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited
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(Supra), it is thereby held that this application is bereft of merits and is liable to
be dismissed.
20. Thereby, application with prayer for condonation of delay is dismissed.
21. No order as to costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
