Gauhati High Court
WP(C)/7204/2017 on 5 June, 2025
GAHC010051752017
2025:GAU-AS:7493
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
WP(C) NO.7204 OF 2017
1. Sri Mridul Rajkhowa,
S/o- Late Jughdhor Rajkhowa,
R/o- Quarter No-13/A,
New Colony, Lumding,
Pincode-782447,
District- Hojai, Assam.
2. Srimati Seema Rajkhowa,
W/o- Sri Mridul Rajkhowa,
R/o- Quarter No-13/A,
New Colony, Lumding,
Pincode-782447,
District- Hojai, Assam.
.......Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The District Legal Services
Authority, Nagaon district,
being represented by its
Chairman, Nagaon Town,
Pincode-782001, Nagaon
District, Assam.
2. The Secretary, District Legal
Services Authority, Nagaon
District, Nagaon Town,
Pincode-782001, Nagaon
District, Assam.
Page 1 of 27
3. Smti. Kanak Paul,
W/o- Sri Montosh Paul,
R/o- Lower Babu Patty,
Ward No-05, P.O. & P.S.-
Lumding, Pincode-782447,
District- Hojai, Assam.
4. Sri Montosh Paul,
S/o- Late Bhupen Ranjan Paul,
R/o- Lower Babu Patty,
Ward No-05, P.O. & P.S.-
Lumding, Pincode-782447,
District- Hojai, Assam.
.......Respondents
-BEFORE-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
For the Petitioner : Mr. S. Khound, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. K. M. Mahanta, Advocate for
respondent Nos. 3 & 4.
Date of Hearing : 05.06.2025.
Date of Judgment : 05.06.2025.
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. S. Khound, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. K. M. Mahanta, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 & 4.
2. Pertinent that though notices have been duly
served upon respondent Nos. 1 & 2 as is apparent from the
Office Note dated 30.12.2019, there has been no
representation on behalf of the aforesaid two respondents.
3. The pleadings having been completed, the writ
petition is taken up for final disposal at the stage of
Admission with the consent of the learned counsels
appearing for the parties.
4. By way of this writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the petitioners are assailing the
award dated 13.02.2016, passed by the National Lok
Adalat, conducted by the District Legal Services Authority,
Nagaon, in C.R. Case No.1161/2015, which was
pending in the Court of Munsiff-cum-Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Hojai, Nagaon (hereinafter
referred to as the Judicial Magistrate Court).
5. The brief facts of the case are that in the year
2004, the petitioner No.1/accused person had borrowed
money from the respondent No.4, and in connection with
the aforesaid loan, the petitioners/accused persons had
issued certain cheques, which, upon being dishonoured, a
complaint case was filed, being C.R. Case No.1161/2015,
by the respondent No.3/complainant against the
petitioners/accused persons under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, read with Section 142 of
the said Act (as amended up-to-date), before the Judicial
Magistrate Court. In the said complaint case, on
13.02.2016, when the case record was put up before the
National Lok Adalat, of which prior notices were sent to
both the parties, including the petitioners as well as the
respondent No.3/complainant, and upon parties appearing
before the National Lok Adalat on the scheduled date, and
in terms of the amicable settlement arrived at between the
parties, the National Lok Adalat, by award dated
13.02.2016 disposed of the case in terms of such
settlement arrived at between the parties.
6. It is the specific case of the petitioners/accused
persons that though the petitioners/accused persons were
reluctant to appear before the National Lok Adalat on
13.02.2016, however, due to the threat given by the
respondent No.4, the petitioners/accused persons had to
appear before the National Lok Adalat and, upon being
misrepresented, signed the compromise deed. Situated
thus, the present writ petition has been filed.
7. Mr. S. Khound, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners/accused persons, submits that the
petitioners/accused persons have been coerced to sign the
settlement compromise deed before the National Lok
Adalat, and therefore, the order of the National Lok Adalat
impugned in this writ proceeding is illegal and void ab
initio. He further submits that the procedure contained in
Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
(hereinafter referred to as the "LSA Act") has not been
followed, for which the impugned order of the National Lok
Adalat warrants interference from this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
8. Per contra, Mr. K. M. Mahanta, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 & 4, submits that the
writ petition is not maintainable inasmuch as the impugned
award of the National Lok Adalat has been passed on the
basis of the amicable settlement arrived at between both
the parties. He further submits that under Section 21 of
the LSA Act, every award made by a Lok Adalat is final and
binding on all the parties to the dispute. In support of the
aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decisions of the
Apex Court in the case of:
(i) K. N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C. D. Shaji, reported
in (2012) 2 SCC 51.
(ii) Bhargavi Constructions and another v.
Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and Ors, reported in
(2018) 13 SCC 480,
(iii) P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job, reported in (2005) 6
SCC 478.
He further submits that the allegation that
respondent No.4 coerced the petitioners/accused persons
to appear before the National Lok Adalat and sign the
subject settlement deed is unbelievable inasmuch as,
pursuant to the settlement, the petitioners/accused
persons had already deposited the first installment of
Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two lakhs) in terms of the award
dated 13.02.2016 of the National Lok Adalat, and it is only
after more than 1 ½ years that the petitioners/accused
persons for the first time filed a petition alleging coercion,
and after the same being rejected by the Judicial
Magistrate Court, the instant writ petition has been filed on
20.11.2017.
9. I have given my prudent consideration to the
arguments advanced by the learned counsels for both the
contending parties, and have perused the material
available on record. I have also considered the citations
submitted at the bar.
10. The issue at the outset that arises for adjudication
in the instant writ petition is whether the award of the
National Lok Adalat can be assailed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. Lok Adalat is a forum where the
disputes/cases pending in the court of law or at the pre-
litigation stage are settled/compromised amicably. The Lok
Adalat has been given statutory status under the LSA Act.
11. Apropos that the object of the LSA Act is to
provide for the composition of statutory legal authorities
and to provide statutory backing to Lok Adalats and its
awards. The statement of objects and reasons of the
aforesaid Act reads as hereunder: -
"STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
Article 39A of the Constitution provides that
the State shall secure that the operation of the legal
system promotes justice on a basis of equal
opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free
legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in
any other way, to ensure that opportunities for
securing justice are not denied to any citizen by
reason of economic or other disabilities.
2. With the object of providing free legal aid,
Government had, by Resolution dated the 26th
September, 1980 appointed the „Committee for
Implementing Legal Aid Schemes‟ (CILAS) under
the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as
he then was) to monitor and implement legal aid
programmes on uniform basis in all the States and
Union territories. CILAS evolved a model scheme
for legal aid programme applicable throughout the
country by which several legal aid and advice
boards have been set up in the States and Union
territories. CILAS is funded wholly by grants from
the Central Government. The Government is
accordingly concerned with the programme of legal
aid as it is the implementation of a constitutional
mandate. But on a review of the working of the
CILAs, certain deficiencies have come to the fore. It
is, therefore, felt that it will be desirable to
constitute statutory legal service authorities at the
national, State and District levels so as to provide
for the effective monitoring of legal aid
programmes. The Bill provides for the composition
of such authorities and for the funding of these
authorities by means of grants from the Central
Government and the State Governments. Power
has also been given to the National Committee and
the State Committees to supervise the effective
implementation of legal aid schemes.
3. For some time now, Lok Adalats are being
constituted at various places in the country for the
disposal, in a summary way and through the
process of arbitration and settlement between the
parties, of a large number of cases expeditiously
and with lesser costs. The institution of Lok
Adalats is at present functioning as a voluntary
and conciliatory agency without any statutory
backing for its decisions. It has proved to be very
popular in providing for a speedier system of
administration of justice. In view of its growing
popularity, there has been a demand for providing
a statutory backing to this institution and the
awards given by Lok Adalats. It is felt that such a
statutory support would not only reduce the
burden of arrears of work in regular courts, but
would also take justice to the door-steps of the poor
and the needy and make justice quicker and less
expensive.
4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above
objects."
12. Section 20 of the LSA Act, which empowers the
Lok Adalats to take cognizance of cases, reads as
hereunder:-
"20. Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats.--(1)
Where in any case referred to in clause (i) of sub-
section (5) of section 19,--
(i)(a) the parties thereof agree; or
(b) one of the parties thereof makes an
application to the Court, for referring the case
to the Lok Adalat for settlement and if such
court is prima facie satisfied that there are
chances of such settlement; or
(ii) the court is satisfied that the matter is an
appropriate one to be taken cognizance of by
the Lok Adalat, the Court shall refer the case
to the Lok Adalat:
Provided that no case shall be referred to the
Lok Adalat under sub-clause (b) of clause (i) or
clause (ii) by such court except after giving a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to the
parties.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
cither law for the time being in force, the Authority
or Committee organising the Lok Adalat under sub-
section (1) of section19 may, on receipt of an
application from any one of the parties to any
matter referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of
section 19 that such matter needs to be determined
by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to the Lok
Adalat, for determination:
Provided that no matter shall be referred to the Lok
Adalat except after giving a reasonable opportunity
of being heard to the other party.
(3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat
under sub-section (1) or where a reference has
been made to it under sub-section (2), the Lok
Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or
matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement
between the parties.
(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any
reference before it under this Act, act with utmost
expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement
between the parties and shall be guided by the
principles of justice, equity, fair play and other
legal principles.
(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on
the ground that no compromise or settlement could
be arrived at between the parties, the record of the
case shall be returned by it to the court, from which
the reference has been received under sub-section
(1) for disposal in accordance with law.
(6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on
the ground that no compromise or settlement could
be arrived at between the parties, in a matter
referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall
advice the parties to seek remedy in a court.
(7) Where the record of the case if returned under
sub-section (5) to the court, such court shall
proceed to deal with such case from the stage
which was reached before such reference under
sub-section (1).]"
13. Reading the aforesaid provision, it is clear that
upon the parties agreeing, the Lok Adalat can dispose of a
matter by way of a compromise or settlement between the
parties. The terms "compromise" and "settlement"
appearing in subsection (3) and (5) of Section 20 assumes
significance. Black's Law Dictionary Seventh Edition defines
"compromise" as an agreement between two or more
persons to settle matters in dispute between them.
"Settlement" as per Black's Law Dictionary Seventh Edition
means an agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit <the
parties reached a settlement the day before trial>. In other
words, a compromise is always bilateral and means mutual
adjustment whereas settlement is termination of legal
proceedings by mutual consent. Therefore, there has to be
first an agreement between the parties to the dispute and
under such agreement, there has to be a mutual
consensus between the parties to settle the dispute. Once
such agreement is arrived at between the parties, the
dispute could be said to have been settled. In short, it
amounts to termination of the legal proceedings.
Therefore, in such event the Lok Adalat is empowered
under subsection (3) of Section 20 to dispose of the case
as per the compromise and/or settlement arrived between
the parties. However, where no compromise could be
arrived, the Lok Adalat cannot pass an award, and in such
event, the record of the case is to be returned to the court
from which the reference has been received.
14. Apt to refer to Section 21 of the LSA Act, which
reads as hereunder: -
"21. Award of Lok Adalat.-[(1) Every award of
the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a
civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any
other court and where a compromise or settlement
has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case
referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the
court-free paid in such case shall be refunded in
the manner provided under the Court Fees Act,
1870 (7 of 1870).]
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be
final and binding on all the parties to the dispute,
and no appeal shall lie to any court against the
award."
15. Reading the aforesaid provision, it appears that
the award made by the Lok Adalats is deemed to be the
decree of a Civil Court and is final and binding on all
parties and no appeal lies before any court against its
award. In short, parties to such proceeding are bound by
the award passed by the Lok Adalat, and the same attains
finality as far as the dispute between them is concerned.
There is no quarrel to the argument made by Mr. K. M.
Mahanta, learned counsel for the respondent that against
the Lok Adalat award, no appeal shall lie. However, that
does not mean that against such award, writ shall also not
lie.
16. Apt in this regard to refer to the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Bhargavi Constructions and
Anr. (supra), wherein the Apex Court in no uncertain
terms, has held that challenge to the award of Lok Adalat
can be done only by filing a writ petition under Article 226
and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High
Court and that too on very limited grounds. Relevant
paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court
are reproduced hereunder for ready reference: -
"22 The question arose before this Court (three-
Judge Bench) in State of Banjab as to what is the
remedy available to the person aggrieved of the
award passed by the Lok Adalat under Section 20
of the Act. In that case, the award was passed by
the Lok Adalat which had resulted in disposal of
the appeal pending before the High Court relating
to a claim case arising out of the Motor Vehicles
Act. One party to the appeal felt aggrieved of the
award and, therefore, questioned its legality and
correctness by filing a writ petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition holding it to be
not maintainable. The aggrieved party, therefore.
filed an appeal by way of special leave before this
Court. This Court, after examining the scheme of
the Act allowed the appeal and set aside the order
of the High Court. This Court held that the High
Court was not right in dismissing the writ petition
as not maintainable. It was held that the only
remedy available with the aggrieved person was to
challenge the award of the Lok Adalat by filing a
writ petition under Article 226 or/and Article 227
of the Constitution of India in the High Court and
that too on very limited grounds. The case was
accordingly remanded to the High Court for
deciding the writ petition filed by the aggrieved
person on its merits in accordance with law.
23. This is what their Lordships held in para 12:
(Jalour Singh case, SCC p. 600, para 12)
'12. It is true that where an award is made by the Lok
Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the
parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed
to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and
binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes
executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no
appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants
to challenge such an award based on settlement, it
can be done only by filing a petition under Article
226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on
very limited grounds. But where no compromise or
settlement is signed by the parties and the order of
the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but
directs the respondent to either make payment if it
agrees to the order, or approach the High Court for
disposal of appeal on merits, if it does not agree, is
not an award of the Lok Adalat. The question of
challenging such an order in a petition under Article
227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a
situation, the High Court ought to have heard and
disposed of the appeal on merits.'
24. In our considered view, the aforesaid law laid
down by this Court is binding on all the courts in
the country by virtue of mandate of Article 141 of
the Constitution. This Court, in no uncertain terms,
has laid down that challenge to the award of Lok
Adalat can be done only by filing a writ petition
under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the
Constitution of India in the High Court and that too
on very limited grounds. In the light of clear
pronouncement of the law by this Court, we are of
the opinion that the only remedy available to the
aggrieved person (respondents herein/plaintiffs)
was to file a writ petition under Article 226 and/or
Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High
Court for challenging the award dated 22-8-2007
passed by the Lok Adalat. It was then for the writ
court to decide as to whether any ground was
made out by the writ petitioners for quashing the
award and, if so, whether those grounds are
sufficient for its quashing.
25. The High Court was, therefore, not right in by-
passing the law laid down by this Court on the
ground that the suit can be filed to challenge the
award, if the challenge is founded on the
allegations of fraud. In our opinion, it was not
correct approach of the High Court to deal with the
issue in question to which we do not concur."
17. Reading the aforesaid finding of the Apex Court, it
is clear that the key remedy against an award passed by
the Lok Adalat is by way of a writ petition under Article 226
and/or 227 of the Constitution of India; however, the
grounds of such a challenge in a writ petition are limited,
primarily including allegations of fraud, misrepresentation,
or the absence of a valid compromise. That being so, I
shall now decide as to whether any ground for
quashing/setting aside the impugned award of the Lok
Adalat is made out by the petitioners/accused persons and,
if so, whether those grounds are sufficient for this court to
exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
18. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, it
appears that in the subject complaint case, on 13.02.2016,
the case record was put up before the National Lok Adalat,
wherein the respondent No.3/ complainant and the
petitioners/accused persons were present in pursuance of
the notice issued to them. Thus, it is clear that the matter
was referred by the Judicial Magistrate to the Lok Adalat
under subsection (1)(ii) of Section 20 of the LSA Act.
19. It further appears that on that date the
petitioners/accused persons and the respondent
No.3/complainant filed a compromise deed before the
National Lok Adalat. Apt to refer to the compromise deed
dated 13.02.2016, which reads as hereunder: -
"Compromise Petition
In the Hon‟ble Court at Sankardev Nagar, Nagaon
Present: Sri/Smti.....
Complainant/Plaintiff/1st Part: Smt Kanak Paul
W/o- Santosh Paul
R/o- Lower Babupatty, Lumding
P.S.-Lumding,
Dist. Nagaon (Assam)
Accused/Defendant/2nd Party:1) Sri MridulRajkhowa,
S/o- Late Yugadhar Rajkhowa
2) Smt Kanak Paul
W/o- Sri Mridul Rajkhowa
Both are R/o- Railway Colony, Quarters No.A/13
P.S.- Lumding,
Dist. Nagaon (Assam)
On this 13th February 2016, the two parties
mentioned above have compromised the matter
(case) in the National Lok Adalat held in the Court
campus of Nagaon on the following terms and
conditions. Neither of the parties has put threat or
pressure on each other to come to the settlement.
Both the parties have settled the matter in the court
on this day itself.
Signature of complainant/plaintiff/1st Party: After
going through the terms and conditions I put my
signature.
Sd/Kanak Paul.
Signature of accused/defendant/2nd Party:
1) Sd/ Mridul Rajkhowa
2) Sd/Sima Rajkhowa
Terms and Conditions:
On basis of the demand made by the
complainant, the two accused persons has agreed
to pay the amount of Rs. 8,00,000/- in four equal
installments, i.e., Rs. 2,00,000/- per installment to
the complainant with interest as per annual
interest rate fixed by banks from the 1st week of
the month of June. The complainant has accepted
the said terms and conditions in sound health and
mind and withdrawn the case on compromise.
Both the accused persons be directed that they
shall pay the amount as per the terms and
conditions failing which they shall have to face
legal consequences.
Signatures of the persons present:
1) Sd/Nazrana Akhtar
2) Sd/ Om Prakash Pandy"
20. Reading the aforesaid compromise deed, it
appears that both the parties, i.e., the petitioners as well
as the respondent Nos. 3/complainant, were present
before the National Lok Adalat on 13.02.2016. It further
appears that the parties, including the petitioners, have
admitted that none of the parties have put threats or
pressure on each other to come to the settlement and that
both parties have settled the matter in court amicably. It
further appears that the aforesaid compromise deed is
signed by the respondent No.3/complainant and the
petitioners/accused persons in the presence of witnesses.
It further appears that both the parties have agreed that in
terms of the demand made by the respondent
No.3/complainant, the two petitioners/accused persons
have agreed to pay the amount of Rs.8,00,000/- (rupees
eight lakhs) in 4(four) equal installments i.e., Rs.2,00,000/-
(two lakhs) per installment, to the respondent
No.3/complainant with interest as per the annual interest
rate fixed by banks from the 1st week of the month of
June. It further appears that the respondent
No.3/complainant has also agreed to withdraw the case on
compromise. It is thus clear that the petitioners/accused
persons and the respondent No.3/complainant arrived at a
compromise between them to settle the dispute.
Therefore, the Lok Adalat is competent and empowered to
dispose of the subject case under subsection (3) of Section
20 of the LSA Act.
21. Apt to refer to the award dated 13.02.2016 of the
National Lok Adalat, which reads as hereunder: -
"13.02.2016:
Case record is put up before the National Lok
Adalat. The complainant and the accused persons
are present in pursuance of the notices. Both the
parties had amicably settled the case in terms and
conditions mentioned in the compromise deed/from
who is kept with the case record. This case is
disposed off accordingly in the Lok Adalat. Send
the case record is sent to the Court concern for
necessary order."
22. Reading the aforesaid award, it appears that after
hearing the parties including the petitioners/accused
persons and the complainant/respondent No.3, and in view
of the amicable settlement arrived at between them as per
the terms and conditions mentioned in the compromise
deed dated 13.02.2016, the National Lok Adalat passed the
aforesaid award. Hence, I am of the unhesitant view that
the aforesaid award is in terms of Section 20 of the LSA
Act. It is pertinent that the petitioners/accused persons
have neither raised any objection before the Lok Adalat
and/or the Judicial Magistrate Court as regards the issue of
procedural violations under Section 20 of the LSA Act as
argued, nor have pleaded the same in the writ petition.
Hence, the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners is rejected.
23. It further appears that the National Lok Adalat,
after making the award, returned the case record to the
court of Judicial Magistrate and upon receipt of the case
record, the same was put up before the Judicial Magistrate
Court, whereafter the Judicial Magistrate Court, upon
perusing the award of the National Lok Adalat and being
satisfied that the parties had settled their disputes
amicably as per the terms and conditions of the
compromise deed, by order dated 13.02.2016, was pleased
to fix the case on 08.06.2016 for payment. It further
appears that on 08.06.2016, since both the parties were
absent without step, the matter was fixed on 30.07.2016
for the necessary order.
24. It appears that on 30.07.2016, accordingly, the
petitioners/accused persons appeared before the Judicial
Magistrate Court and deposited a cheque bearing
No.472473 of Rs. 2,00,000/- (rupees two lakhs) as first
installment as per the terms of the compromise deed.
25. Apt to refer to the order dated 30.07.2016 passed
by the Judicial Magistrate Court reads as hereunder:-
"30.07.2016
Complainant is absent with step vide
petition No.2448.
Heard, perused. Allowed.
Accused persons are present and vide
petition No.2933 money have deposited a
cheque bearing No.472473 worth of
Rs.2,00,000/- in compliance with order
dated 13.01.2016 of this receipt in this
case.......
C.A. is to do the needful."
26. It further appears that on 08.08.2016, the
respondent No.3/complainant received the said cheque of
Rs. 2,00,000/- from the Judicial Magistrate Court. It further
appears that after the aforesaid first installment, no further
installment as agreed was made by the petitioners/accused
persons to the respondent No. 3/complainant. It appears
that, accordingly, the respondent No.3/complainant filed a
petition before the Judicial Magistrate Court bringing to the
notice the aforesaid non-compliance of the
undertaking/terms and conditions of the compromise deed
based on which the National Lok Adalat had passed the
award.
27. It appears that thereafter, since the
petitioners/accused persons have not deposited the
subsequent installment in terms of the award passed by
the National Lok Adalat, the Judicial Magistrate Court
issued notice vide dated 07.08.2017 to the
petitioners/accused persons to appear before the court on
12.09.2017 and deposit the second installment i.e.
Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two lakhs), failing which the
petitioners/accused persons were put to notice that orders
as necessary will be passed against them. It further
appears that on 12.09.2017, the petitioner No.1/accused
person appeared before the Judicial Magistrate Court and
filed a petition bearing petition No.3877 seeking exemption
from making further payment.
28. Apt to refer to the said petition dated 12.09.2017,
which reads as hereunder: -
Complainant: Kanak Paul
Vrs
Accused : Mridul Rajkhowa & Ors,
1. That the petitioner accused got notice of the
marginally noted case.
2. That after notice the petitioner accused met
Montosh Paul, Husband of the complainant to
know about the filing of the case. He told the
petitioner to go to court with him. The petitioner
came to Lumding then in connection with his
service. The petitioner not acquainted with others.
So the petitioner came to court with him and he told
the petitioner to put signature in a paper to
compromise the case. Believing him the petitioner
and his wife put signatures. He told me the
petitioner to pay Rs. 2 lacs to make an end of the
case, the petitioner paid accordingly.
3. That from the notice the petitioner came to know
that the petitioners have to pay another 6 lacs of
rupees and to pay the same in instalment of 2 lacs.
4. That Sir the signatures of the petitioner were
taken by misrepresentation of actual fact. The
petitioner have not taken Rs. 8 lacs from him/her
to sell land. The petitioner got no land as
described.
5. That for treatment of the daughter the petitioners
took Rs. 70,000/- as a loan from Montosh Paul. He
recovered from the petitioner Rs. 7 lacs and 2 lacs
through court. Even the petitioner could not save
daughter. She died.
6. That the case against the petitioner is false.
7. That the petitioners were not aware that they
have to pay more 6 lacs.
8. That there is no award of payment of Rs. 8 lacs
in the case and for execution no proper step has
been taken.
It is therefore prayed to exempt the
petitioner from payment of further
amount and exempt the petitioner from
the case and oblige."
29. Reading the aforesaid petition, it appears that the
petitioner No.1/accused person alleged that he was
coerced by the respondent No.4 to go with him to the
Judicial Magistrate Court and upon being misrepresented,
he along with his wife/petitioner No.2 signed the subject
compromise deed without knowing that the amount stated
therein is Rs.8,00,000/- (rupees eight lakhs) instead of
Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two lakhs).
30. It appears that thereafter, the Judicial Magistrate
by order dated 12.09.2017, rejected the aforesaid petition
of the petitioner No.1. Apt to refer to the order dated
12.09.2017, passed by the Judicial Magistrate Court, which
reads as hereunder: -
"12.09.2017
Complainant is present.
Accused persons are also present.
Seen and perused the petition No.
3877 filed by the accused persons praying
for time to honour the except notice.
Heard. Prused. Allowed.
After seen and perused the Petition
No. 3806 (A) filed by the Accused persons
praying for exempting them from making
further payment.
Heard both sides.
Perused the C.R.
Petition NO. 3846(A) stands
disallowed being no maintainable as
because this case has already been
disposed of on compromise before National
Lok Adalat dated 13.02.2016.
Fixing 23.10.17 for payment.
Sd/- Illegible
Judicial Magistrate
1st Class Hojai."
31. Reading the aforesaid order, it is clear that the
Judicial Magistrate Court after perusing the aforesaid
petition filed by the petitioners/accused persons,
disallowed the same as not maintainable in view of the
case having already been disposed of on compromise
before the National Lok Adalat on 13.02.2016. It further
appears that thereafter, the Judicial Magistrate Court was
pleased to fix the matter on 23.11.2017 for making
payment.
32. It appears that the petitioners/accused persons,
instead of making the payment or appearing before the
court on the scheduled date fixed by the Judicial
Magistrate Court, filed the instant writ petition on
20.11.2017, assailing, inter alia, the said award of the
National Lok Adalat.
33. Apt to refer to the relief sought in the instant writ
petition, which reads as hereunder:-
"17) That this petition is filed bonafide and for the
ends of justice.
In the premises aforesaid it is most
respectfully prayed that Your Lordship may
be pleased to admit this petition, call for the
records of the case, issue Rule calling upon
the Respondents to show cause as to why
A) Why a Writ in the nature of Certiorari may
not be issued for setting aside the Criminal
Complaint Case being C.R. Case No.1161 of
2015 (Annexure-1) pending in the Court of
the J. Das, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class,
Hojai and also for setting aside the Order &
Award dated 13-02-2016 passed before the
Lok Adalat in connection with CR Case
No.1161 of 2015 and the consequential
Orders thereto (Annexure-3,4) and/or,
setting aside and quashing the impugned
Notice dated 07-08-2017 (Annexure-6)
issued by the Court of the J. Das, Judicial
Magistrate 1st Class, Hojai, and/or, upon
hearing the parties may be pleased to make
the Rule absolutely and/or be pleased to
pass further Order or Orders as Your
Lordship may deem fit and proper."
34. The primary ground of challenge to the impugned
award of the National Lok Adalat is coercion and
misrepresentation. Merely alleging coercion or
misrepresentation is not sufficient for invoking writ
jurisdiction. It is only when such an allegation of coercion
or misrepresentation is established, a writ may lie. What is
striking in the face of the record is that the
petitioners/accused persons appeared before the National
Lok Adalat on 13.02.2016, after receiving the notice, and
have agreed to make the payment as demanded by the
complainant/respondent No.3, and have accordingly
entered into a compromise deed by putting their signatures
therein along with the complainant/respondent No.3. On
the basis of such a compromise deed, the National Lok
Adalat had passed the impugned award, and the
petitioners/accused persons have also deposited the first
installment before the Judicial Magistrate Court. However,
after making the aforesaid first installment, the
petitioners/accused persons stopped appearing before the
Judicial Magistrate Court on the dates fixed for making
subsequent installments, and after receiving the notice
from the Judicial Magistrate Court for appearance and
depositing the second installment, the petitioners/accused
persons, on the date fixed for appearance and making
payment for the first time, i.e., almost after 1 year & 7
months from the date of the signing of the compromise
deed, filed a petition before the Judicial Magistrate Court
alleging, inter alia, coercion, threat, and misrepresentation,
for which he signed the said compromise deed. Such
allegations of coercion, threat, and misrepresentation,
made belatedly, and that too after making the first
installment in terms of the award and the compromise
deed, do not inspire the confidence of this court. It is but
obvious that the petitioners/accused persons after failing to
deposit the remaining installment in terms of the
compromise deed, by way of an afterthought, have filed
the exemption petition wherein the allegation of coercion
for the first time was made before the Judicial Magistrate
Court.
35. As noted above, the award of the Lok Adalat can
be set aside on the grounds of the same being obtained by
fraud; however, fraud must be established. In the instant
case, it is an admitted position that after the compromise
deed was entered between the parties, based on which the
National Lok Adalat passed the award, and the order of the
Judicial Magistrate Court for making the 1st installment, the
petitioners/accused persons deposited the 1st installment in
the court. Moreover, neither in the petition filed before the
Judicial Magistrate Court nor in the writ petition, the
petitioners/accused persons have made any averment to
the effect that the petitioners/accused persons were
threatened or coerced to make the 1st installment of Rs.
2,00,000/-. Therefore, the story which is now projected by
the petitioners/accused persons, which is almost after 1 ½
years since the payment of the 1st installment, appears to
be totally unbelievable and improbable. In view of the
foregoing, I am of the firm view that the compromise
arrived between the parties is valid and legal. That being
so, the award passed by the National Lok Adalat is final
and binding between the parties. Hence, no writ as prayed
for can be issued in the instant petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
36. That apart, this matter can also be viewed from
another angle. It is clearly established in the facts of the
instant case that the allegation of coercion, threat, and
misrepresentation as pleaded in the writ petition is
unbelievable and misrepresented on oath by a defaulting
party to the subject compromise and settlement in order to
mislead this court for achieving ulterior and oblique gain. It
is well settled that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not only extraordinary but also equitable
jurisdiction, and there is no equity in favour of a defaulting
party that justifies the interference by the High Court in the
exercise of its extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of the
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to assist a party not
to repay its debts. The aim of equity is to promote honesty
and not to be exercised in favour of a dishonest litigant.
Thus, the conduct of the petitioners/accused persons
cannot be ignored, and if the writ court is satisfied that the
petitioners are not honest and are making misleading
statement on oath, the writ petition is liable to be thrown
out at the threshold. Reference is made to the decision of
the Apex Court in the case of Andhra Pradesh State
Financial Corporation v. M/S GAR Re-Rolling Millis
and another, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2151; (1994) 2
SCC 647, wherein the Apex Court has held as under:-
"18. There is no equity in favour of a defaulting
party which may justify interference by the courts
in exercise of its equitable extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to assist it in not repaying its debts. The aim
of equity is to promote honesty and not to frustrate
the legitimate rights of the Corporation which after
advancing the loan takes steps to recover its dues
from the defaulting party. Thus, the intention of the
legislature in using the expression „without
prejudice to the provisions of S. 29 of the Act‟
clearly appears to be that recourse to the
provisions of S. 29 of the Act is not prohibited,
where an order or decree under Section 31 of the
Act obtained by the Corporation has not been
complied with or honoured by the defaulting
concern or is otherwise insufficient to satisfy the
dues of the Corporation and the Corporation with-
draws and abandons to pursue further
proceedings under Section 31 of the Act. Passing a
money decree for recovery of the outstanding dues,
not being within the jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 31 of the Act, the Corporation retains its
right to recover its dues by invoking the provisions
of Section 29 of the Act in the manner prescribed
therein notwithstanding any order, final or interim,
obtained by it under Section 31 of the Act by
withdrawing from and abandoning those
provisions at any stage of the proceedings. A court
of equity, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction
under Art. 226 of the Constitution must so act as to
prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the courts
are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith,
as far as it lies within their power. Equity is
always known to defend the law from clefty
evasions and new subtelities invented to evade
law. Since the legislature enacted Sections 29 and
31 with a view to aid the Corporation to recover its
legitimate dues etc. from the defaulting party, the
saving clause in Section 31 of the Act, preserving
the rights under Section 29 of the Act by giving up
the pursuit under Section 31 at any stage of the
proceedings is available to the Corporation. The
two provisions must be so harmonised as to
fecilitate the Corporation to recover its dues from
the defaulting party. The Act was enacted by the
Parliament with a view to promote industrialisation
and offer assistance by giving financial assistance
in the shape of loans and advances etc. repayable
in easy instalments. The Corporation has to recover
the loans and advances, so as to be able to give
financial resources assistance to other industries
and unless it recovers its dues, the money will not
remain in circulation for long. It is with this end in
view that the Parliament gave the Corporation the
right to proceed under Section 31 of the Act,
preserving at the same time its rights and remedy
under Section 29 of the Act, so that the
Corporations are not chocked by the defaulting
debtors by adopting frustrating or dialatory tactics
in the proceedings in the court initiated under
Section 31 of the Act."
37. In the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the
writ petitioners/accused persons have not filed the instant
writ petition in good faith, and therefore, the same is
nothing but an abuse of the court process. That being so,
on that score alone, the petitioners/accused persons are
not entitled to any relief whatsoever from this writ court.
Hence, in any view of the matter, the writ petition fails.
38. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed
and is disposed of.
39. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
No order as to costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
