Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/2 vs Bharat Biswas And 3 Ors on 4 February, 2025

                                                               Page No.# 1/20

GAHC010267082024




                                                         undefined

                      THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
  (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                          Case No. : RSA/239/2024

         MARAN BISWAS AND 5 ORS
         S/O LATE GAURANGA BISWAS, R/O VILL- THANGBHANGA, P.O.-BORPAK,
         MOUZA AND P.S.-MAYONG, DIST- MORIGAON, ASSAM

         2: BUDHI BISWAS
          S/O LATE GAURANGA BISWAS
          R/O VILL- THANGBHANGA
          P.O.-BORPAK
          MOUZA AND P.S.-MAYONG
          DIST- MORIGAON
         ASSAM

         3: SMTI NIYASA BISWAS
         W/O SRI MAHINDRA BISWAS
          D/O LATE GAURANGA BISWAS
         VILL- DHIPUKI PATHAR
          P.O.-KAMALPUR
          P.S.-CHANDRAPUR
          DIST- KAMRUP
         ASSAM

         4: SMTI ARATI BISWAS
          D/O LATE GAURANGA BISWAS
         W/O SRI LADDU BISWAS
          R/O VILL- DIPRANG ADABARI
          P.O.-BORPAK
          P.S.-MAYONG
          DIST- MORIGAON
         ASSAM

         5: SMTI BHARATI BISWAS
          D/O LATE GAURANGA BISWAS
         W/O SRI KAMAL BISWAS @ MANDAL
         VILL- RAJABORI
                                                                        Page No.# 2/20

             P.O.-GARUA GAON
             P.S- BHURAGAON
             DIST- MORIGAON
             ASSAM

            6: SMTI. RUPA BISWAS
             D/O LATE JOGENDRA BISWAS
            W/O SRI GAURANGA BISWAS
            VILL- BAGISABAT
             P.O.-HAHARA
             P.S.-KHETRI
             DIST- KAMRUP (M)
            ASSA

            VERSUS

            BHARAT BISWAS AND 3 ORS
            S/O LATE CHANDRA DHAR RAI, R/O VILL- THANGBHANGA, P.O.-BORPAK,
            MOUZA AND P.S.-MAYONG, DIST- MORIGAON, ASSAM-782411

            2:GANGA BISWAS
             D/O LATE BABU LAL BISWAS
            W/O SRI PASAN BISWAS
            VILL- DIPUGI PATHAR
             P.O.-KAMALPUR
             P.S.-CHANDRAPUR
             PIN-781380
             DIST- KAMRUP
            ASSAM

            3:SMTI. DURPADI RAI
            W/O SRI BHARAT RAI
             R/O VILL- THANGBHANGA
             P.O.-BORPAK
             MOUZA AND P.S.-MAYONG
             DIST- MORIGAON
            ASSAM-782411

            4:DINU RAI
             S/O SRI BHARAT RAI
             R/O VILL- THANGBHANGA
             P.O.-BORPAK
             MOUZA AND P.S.-MAYONG
             DIST- MORIGAON
            ASSAM-78241

Advocate for the Petitioner   : MR. A ROSHID, MS. T BEGUM,MS. R CHOUDHURY
                                                                              Page No.# 3/20

Advocate for the Respondent : ,




                                     BEFORE
                        HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN

                                           ORDER

Date : 04.02.2025

Heard Ms. R. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants.

2. This second appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 19.09.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Morigaon, in Title Appeal No. 5/2024.

3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and decree dated 19.09.2024, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Morigaon ('first appellate Court', for short) had upheld the judgment and decree, dated 05.01.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Morigaon ('trial Court', for short), in Title Suit No. 61/2017, by which the learned trial Court had dismissed the suit of the appellants/plaintiffs.

4. The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, are briefly stated as under:

"The appellants as plaintiffs instituted a title suit, being Title Suit

No. 61/2017, before the learned trial Court praying for following relief(s):

(i) a decree for declaration of all right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the suit land, described in Schedule-'A' and 'B' of the plaint;

(ii) a decree for confirmation of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land, described in Schedule-'A' of the plaint;

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(iii) a decree of recovery of khas possession of the suit land, described in Schedule-'B' by removing the temporary house of the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 from Schedule-'B' land and also for delivery of khas possession;

(iv) a decree for cancellation of chitha mutation, dated 24.04.1987, granted in the name of Babulal Biswas and Chini Ram Biswas, son of Late Harendra Biswas as inheritance over the suit land described in Schedule-'A' and 'B' and subsequent chitha mutation of the said land in the name of the defendant No. 4 as inheritance on 26.11.2007 and to declare the same as illegal and to cancel the same;

(v) a decree for restraining the principal defendants, their heirs, servants, agents or anyone claiming under them from entering the Schedule-'B' land after execution of decree;

(vi) a precept to the Circle Officer, Mayong Revenue Circle to cancel the chitha mutation of the defendant No. 4 granted on 26.11.2007 and chitha mutation granted in the name of the predecessor of the defendant No. 4, namely, Babulal Biswas and Chini Ram Biswas, son of Late Harendra Biswas on 24.04.2017, holding them illegal;

(vii) costs of the suit, and;

(viii) any other relief or reliefs.

The claim of the appellants is that a plot of land measuring 2 kathas 15 lechas (bari land), covered by Dag No. 171 and another plot of land measuring 3 kathas 10 lechas, covered by Dag No. 172 of Periodic Page No.# 5/20

Patta No. 62 of village Thengbanga kissam, under Mouza Mayong in the Morigaon district is the subject matter of the suit and the same was under

the peaceful possession of the original pattadar, namely, Jugendra Biswas. Said Judgendra Biswas died about 32 years back, leaving behind his son, namely, Gauranga Biswas, who is the father of the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 5 and his sister plaintiff No. 6, namely, Rupa Biswas. Gauranga Biswas and Rupa Biswas were in peaceful possession of the suit land and Gauranga Biswas died about 10 years back leaving behind his two sons, namely, Maran Biswas and Budhi Biswas and three daughters, namely, Niyasa Biswas, Arati Biswas and Bharati Biswas. The mother of the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 5, namely, Maloti Biswas predeceased her husband and after the death of Gauranga Biswas, his landed properties are inherited by the present plaintiffs, who are illiterate persons and did not visit the Office of the Circle Officer, Mayong and their father was also illiterate and he too during his lifetime, did not visit the Office of the Circle Officer, Mayong and taking advantage of illiteracy of the plaintiffs and their predecessor, one Babulal Biswas, father of the defendant No. 4 and one Chini Ram Biswas, uncle of the defendant No. 4, mutated their names in respect of the suit land on 24.04.1987, as successor in place of the predecessor of the plaintiffs, without being the sons of the deceased Jugendra Biswas. Subsequently, the name of the defendant No. 4 was also mutated in place of Babulal Biswas and Chini Ram Biswas on 26.11.2007, on the basis of inheritance and illegally without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs came to know about the mutation only after obtaining certified copy of the jamabandi from the Circle Officer, Mayong Revenue Circle on 01.09.2017.

It is also the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 Page No.# 6/20

are in permissive possession of the suit land described in Schedule-'B' since 01.12.2012 and the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have no suitable land for dwelling and on being asked by defendant No. 1, the plaintiff No. 1 allowed him to stay in some portion of the suit land described in Schedule- B and the defendant No. 1 had agreed to vacate the land whenever the plaintiffs need the same. Thereafter, the plaintiffs came to know that the Government of Assam had offered one pucca house to the defendant No. 1 and paid the money to the defendant No. 1 in cash and with the said money, the defendant No. 1 purchased brick, rod etc. and gathered the same at the suit land and after being confronted, he told that he wanted to build a pucca house over the suit land and when the plaintiffs restrained him, the defendant No. 1 threatened that the defendant No. 4 is a pattadar of the suit land and they refused to vacate the suit land described in Schedule-'B'. Then, being aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred the title suit, claiming the aforesaid reliefs.

The defendants/respondents herein had filed their written objection and contended that one Harendra Biswas, the predecessor-in- interest, was the possessor and owner of half portion of the suit land measuring 3 kathas 2½ lechas and he had been erecting a house over the land covered by Dag No. 171 till his death and after his death, his two sons, namely, Babulal Biswas and Chini Ram Biswas lived in that house for 60 years and thereafter, Chini Ram Biswas died without leaving any legal heir, except Babulal Biswas, as his brother. Thereafter, Babulal Biswas died leaving behind his daughter, namely, Ganga Biswas/defendant No. 4 and after the death of Babulal Biswas and Chini Ram Biswas, their sole legal heir, Smti Ganga Biswas became the owner and possessor of half portion Page No.# 7/20

of the suit land. Thereafter, Ganga Biswas had allowed the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to stay over the suit land by executing an affidavit on 02.02.2017 and since then, the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have been residing there without any interruption. The predecessor-in-interest of the defendant No. 4 was residing in the suit land for 60 years by erecting dwelling house and occupying the half portion of the suit land and got ownership over the suit land prior to 1972, and the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant No. 4, namely, Babulal Biswas and Chini Ram Biswas were mutated on 24.04.1987, when the name Gauranga Biswas, the predecessor of the plaintiffs, was mutated on the basis of inheritance.

Upon the aforesaid pleadings, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues:

(i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to right, title and interest over the Schedule-'A' and 'B' of the plaint?

(ii) Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are only in permissive possession of the suit Schedule-'B' land?

(iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to confirmation of possession over suit Schedule-'A' land?

(iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of khas possession over suit Schedule-'B' land?

(v) Whether the mutation dated 24.04.1987 in the name of Babulal Biswas and Chini Ram Biswas by way of inheritance over the suit Schedule-'A' and 'B' land and the subsequent mutation of the said land in the name of defendant No. 4 by way of inheritance is Page No.# 8/20

illegal?

(vi) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree as prayed for?

(vii) To what relief/reliefs the parties are entitled?

Thereafter, hearing the learned Advocates of both the parties, the learned trial Court had dismissed the suit.

Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs/appellants preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate Court and the learned first appellate Court discussed the grounds of appeal in issue-wise, as framed by the learned trial Court and thereafter, dismissed the appeal by upholding the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned trial Court."

5. Being aggrieved the appellants have preferred this second appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, suggesting the following substantial questions of law:

(i) Whether the learned trial Court is correct in deciding the issue Nos.

I, II & III thereby holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled for any relief over the suit land, in presence of clear admission by defendants in their written statements that they are owner of only half portion of the suit schedule land?

(ii) Whether the findings, so arrived at by both the learned Courts, are at all tenable before law for non-consideration of the material pleadings and evidences adduced by both the parties in its proper perspective?

(iii) Whether non-consideration of the settled principle of law as enumerated under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872 by both the learned Courts, have vitiated the judgment and decree passed Page No.# 9/20

by both the Courts?

(iv) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Morigaon is in accordance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

(v) Whether any other substantial questions of law that may arise at the time of hearing?

6. Ms. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned judgment and decree suffers from perversity as it was passed without considering the evidence and pleadings of the defendants and also without considering the provision of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Ms. Choudhury further submits that while deciding the appeal, the learned first appellate Court had not considered the provision of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC, and therefore, Ms. Choudhury has contended to admit this appeal as there is substantial questions of law, to be heard by this Court.

7. Having heard the submission of Ms. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants, I have carefully gone through the memo of appeal and the suggested substantial question of law mentioned therein, and also perused the impugned judgment and decree dated 19.09.2024, passed by the learned first appellate Court, in Title Appeal No. 5/2024 and the judgment and decree dated 05.01.2024, passed by the learned trial Court, in Title Suit No. 61/2017.

8. In view of the submissions advanced by Ms. Choudhury, the issue, to be answered by this Court is:-

Whether any substantial question of law, as suggested herein this case by Ms. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the appellants is involved or not.

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9. That a bare perusal of the first, second and third suggested substantial question of law indicates that all these questions revolves around the same point i.e. whether the learned trial Court is correct in deciding the issue Nos. I, II and III ignoring the settled principle of law, as enumerated under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, while there was clear admission by defendant No.4 that she is the owner of only half portion of the suit schedule land. In this context, it is necessary to peruse the relevant provision of law i.e. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, which read as under:-

58. Facts admitted need not be proved.

No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:

Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.

9.1. Now, going through the impugned judgment and decree, so passed by both the learned courts below, I find that the learned trial Court had decided Issue Nos. I, II & III by holding that the appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled for any relief over the suit land. The learned trial Court, having discussed the evidence on the record, held that the plaintiffs are admittedly, the sons, daughters and sister of Late Jugendra Biswas, the original owner of the suit land, and as such, it can safely be concluded that the plaintiff have acquired the right, title and interest over the suit land by virtue of inheritance. The learned trial Court also held that Harendra Biswas was the brother of Jugendra Biswas Page No.# 11/20

and he was the son of original pattadar of the suit land, namely, Sitanath Biswas, and Harendra Biswas is the owner and possessor of half portion of suit land measuring 3 kathas 2 and ½ lechas and he has been living there by constructing a house over the plot of land covering Dag No. 171, till his death and after his death his two sons namely, Babulal Biswas and Chiniram Biswas were living there for last 60 years and Chiniran Biswas died without leaving any legal heirs and Babulal Biswas died leaving only daughter Smti Ganga Biswas, the defendant No.4. The learned trial Court had also held that plaintiff No.1, namely, Moron Biswas had admitted that Harendra Biswas, the grandfather of defendant No.4, was the son of Sitananth Biswas, the original pattadar of the suit land and he also admitted that the land, except the land belonging to Ganga Biswas, belongs to him and the plaintiff had, nowhere, mentioned the said fact and the copy of Jamabandi also established that Harendra Biswas is the father of Babulal Biswas and concealing this material fact, the plaintiffs show that they are not approaching the Court with clean hands.

9.2. The learned trial Court also held that the defendant No.4 had exhibited one affidavit as Exhibit 'Kha' which shows that defendant No.1, 2,and 3 are the permissive possessor of a plot of land measuring 1 katha, out of 1 katha 7.5 lecha (out of total 2 kathas 15 lechas of land), owned by her, and said affidavit was prepared by Advocate Mohon Ch. Sarkar, who was the Advocate of plaintiffs side.

9.3. The learned trial Court also held that the burden to prove that the plaintiffs are the owner of suit land 'B' lies upon them and mere submission that the defendants are not the legal heirs of original pattadar is not sufficient and that the defendants have claimed that they have been possessing the suit land Page No.# 12/20

for last 60 years, which could not be refuted by the plaintiffs by adducing any evidence. And as such, the plaintiff side had failed to prove that the defendants side has illegally possessing the suit land. It had also been held that the suit land was not partitioned between the parties and as such it becomes difficult to declare right, title and interest of either of the parties to the suit land and thereafter, decided all the three issues against the plaintiffs.

9.4. The learned first appellate Court had also held that the plaintiff No.1, namely, Moron Biswas, in his cross-examination admitted that Harendra Biswas, the grandfather of defendant No.4, was the son of Sitaram Biswas and he further admitted that his grandfather had three brothers including Harendra Biswas, being the grandfather of defendant No.4 and he further admitted that Exhibit-1, the Jamabandi of the suit patta, the name of Babulal Biswas, the father of the defendant No.4 is mentioned as pattadar No.5, and he further admitted that he does not know when the name of Babulal Biswas was mutated in respect of the suit patta, and admittedly, he also does not know if the suit lands were partitioned amongst Jugendra, Mahendra and Harendra, which goes to show that the defendant No.4 and plaintiffs are the successor of one Sita Nath Biswas, and in fact Exhibit-1 shows that the name of the plaintiffs and defendant No.4 are mutated in respect of suit patta No.62 and there is no materials to suggest that defendant No.4 and her father Babulal Biswas had mutated their names in the suit land fraudulently. And as such, the plaintiffs do not have exclusive right, title, and interest over the Schedule 'A' and Schedule 'B' land.

9.5. The learned first appellate Court had also held that Exhibit-2, the Trace Map of the suit land does not show that the plaintiffs have exclusive right, title and interest over the Schedule 'A' and 'B' land and Exhibit-3 and 4, the certified Page No.# 13/20

copy of Chitha, pertaining to dag No. 171 and 172 shows the names of Jugendra Biswas as pattadar of Annual Patta and the said documents are also inconclusive to show the exclusive right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the Schedule-'A' and 'B' land.

9.6. Further, the learned first appellate Court had held that Exhibit-'Ka', the certified copy of jamabandi of suit patta No.62 produced by the defendant No.4 shows that her name is recorded as pattadar way back in the year 1974-75, in respect of the suit land on the basis of inheritance and that Exhibit-'Ka' negates the claim of the plaintiffs that they have exclusive right, title and interest, over the Schedule-'A' and 'B' land and that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they have exclusive right, title and interest over the suit land and thereafter, decided the Issue No.1 in negative against the plaintiffs.

9.7. It also appears that the learned first appellate Court, on the basis of Exhibit -'Kha' had held that the defendant No.1,2 and 4 are the permissive possessor of Schedule-'B' land recorded concurrence with the finding so recorded by the learned trial Court and decided the Issue No.2 accordingly.

9.8. In respect of Issue No.3, the learned first appellate Court, held that the suit lands are not partitioned between the plaintiffs and defendant No.4, and therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have possession over the Schedule- 'A' land. And as the plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have exclusive right, title and interest, over the Schedule-'A' and 'B' land, it cannot be said that they have exclusive possession over the Schedule-'A' land and accordingly, decided the issue in negative. The learned first appellate Court also held that though a stand was taken by the plaintiffs that the suit lands were self-acquired property of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, namely, Jugendra Biswas, yet, nothing has been produced to substantiate the same.

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9.9. I have carefully, gone through the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court as well as the first appellate Court in the light of the materials placed on record by both sides and I find that though the learned counsel for the appellants has challenged the findings of the learned Courts below in respect of Issue Nos. I, II and III, yet, it could not demonstrate anything to suggest that the concurrent findings, so recorded by the learned courts below suffers from any perversity. Nothing could be demonstrated which part of the pleading of the parties were not considered by the learned Courts below.

9.10. It is a fact that defendant No.4 had admitted in written statement that she is the owner of the half portion of the schedule land and this admitted fact received due consideration of both the learned Courts below. It is a settled proposition of law that facts admitted need not be proved. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act provides for the same. But, despite both the Courts below decided Issue No. III in negative on the ground that the suit lands are not partitioned between the parties, and as such, it becomes difficult to declare right, title and interest of either of the parties to the suit. The learned counsel had failed to demonstrate how this reasoning is perverse. Having taken into account all the materials placed on record, the Courts below had arrived at a reasoned finding and to the considered opinion of this Court, the finding so recorded appears to be justified and reasonable and on such count, no substantial question of law appears to be involved herein and as such, the same warrants no interference of this Court.

10. Now, coming to the fourth suggested substantial question of law, i.e. whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Morigaon is in conformity with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I find that the law in this regard is well settled in Page No.# 15/20

catena of decisions by Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and Others v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 849, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue has taken note of its earlier decisions in Malluru Mallappa (Dead) through Lrs. vs. Kuruvathappa and others reported in (2020) 4 SCC 313, Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179, and Laliteshwar Prasad Singh and others vs. S.P. Srivastava (Dead) thru. Lrs. reported in (2017) 2 SCC 415, in para No. 30 held as under:-

"30. Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient."

10.1. Thereafter, referring to some other decisions in G. Amalorpavam and others vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court held as under:

"The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements Page No.# 16/20

of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC."

10.2. In the case in hand perusal of the judgment of the learned first appellate Court, it becomes apparent that the learned first appellate Court, though not formulated any point for determination, yet, it had discussed the Page No.# 17/20

evidence brought on record in issue wises which were framed by the learned trial Court. Therefore, as held in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and Others(supra) it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Thus, there appears to be substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard. Therefore, this substantial question of law does not arises at all here in this appeal.

11. It is well settled in a catena of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court that sitting in second appeal; this Court cannot re-appreciate the facts and disturb the concurrent finding of facts by the learned courts below. It is also well settled that in order to admit an appeal, under Section 100 of the C.P.C., there must be substantial question of law.

11.1. Reference in this context can be made to a decision in Chandrika Singh (Dead) by LRS & Anr. vs. Sarjug Singh & Anr., reported in (2006) 12 SCC 49, wherein its has been held that the High Court, under Section 100 CPC, has limited jurisdiction. To deal with cases having a substantial question of law, the Court has observed as under:-

"12. ... While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court is required to formulate a substantial question of law in relation to a finding of fact. The High Court exercises a limited jurisdiction in that behalf. Ordinarily unless there exists a sufficient and cogent reason, the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below are binding on the High Court..."

11.2. Again, in the case of Chacko & Anr. v. Mahadevan, reported in Page No.# 18/20

(2007) 7 SCC 363, while dealing with the jurisdiction under Section 96 and 100 CPC, this Court laid down as under:-

"6. It may be mentioned that in a first appeal filed under Section 96 CPC, the appellate court can go into questions of fact, whereas in a second appeal filed under Section 100 CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact of the first appellate court, and it is confined only to questions of law."

11.3. In the case of Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 545, the principles relating to Section 100 CPC is summarised as under:-

"(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express Page No.# 19/20

provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

(iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where:-

(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence;

(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or

(iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding."

12. Thus, this Court, having adjudged the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants, and also considering the materials placed on record and after going through the impugned judgments and decrees, unable to find out any substantial question of law here in this appeal.

13. In the result and for the reason discussed here in above, and applying the Page No.# 20/20

proposition of law laid down in the case of Chandrika Singh (Dead) by LRS (supra), Chacko (supra) and also in the case of Hero Vinoth (supra) no substantial question of law is found to be involved here in this appeal.