Gauhati High Court
N. Shanti Meitei @ Chinglemba ... vs National Investigation Agency ... on 25 March, 2021
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GAHC010233322019
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : I.A.(Crl.)/795/2019
N. SHANTI MEITEI @ CHINGLEMBA MANGANG @ TAKHELCHANGBAM
HEMANTA SINGH
S/O LATE DANABIR SINGH, R/O VILL. WAHENG LEIKAI, P.S. IMPHAL
WEST, DIST. IMPHAL WEST, MANIPUR, PIN 795001
VERSUS
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA)
REPRESENTED BY SC, NIA
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, NIA
Linked Case : Crl.A./245/2018
N. SHANTI MEITEI @ CHINGLEMBA MANGANG @ TAKHELCHANGBAM
HEMANTA SINGH
S/O LATE DANABIR SINGH
WAHENG LEIKAI
P.S. IMPHAL WEST
DIST. IMPHAL WEST MANIPUR
PIN 795001
VERSUS
NIA
REPRESENTED BY SC
NIA
------------
Advocate for : MR. M G SINGH
Advocate for : SC
NIA appearing for NIA
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BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MIR ALFAZ ALI
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANISH CHOUDHURY
ORDER
Date : 25-03-2021
(M.A. Ali, J)
Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. D.K. Mishra assisted by Mr. B. Prasad for the applicant
and the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury assisted by Addl.
P.P. Mr. Satya Narayan Mishra.
2. This application u/s 389 CrPC has been filed by the applicant Shri N. Shanti Meiti @
Chinglemba Mangang @ Takhelchangbam Hemanta Singh with the prayer to suspend the
sentence and also for releasing him on bail. The applicant was convicted u/s 20 of U.A. (P)
Act read with Section 120 (B) IPC, Section 10/38/40 of U.A. (P) Act as well as u/s
468/471/419/490 IPC by the learned Special Judge, NIA, in Special NIA Case No.01/2014.
Upon conviction, the applicant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment and to pay fine for
all the offences as under :-
"U/s 20 of UA (P) Act
read with Section 120(B) of IPC RI for ten (10) years and to pay a
fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default to
undergo SI for 6 months.
U/S 10 (a) of UA (P) Act RI for 1 years and to pay a fine of
Rs. 3,000/- and in default to
undergo SI for 2 months.
U/S 38 and 40 of UA (P) Act RI for 5 years.
U/S 386 of IPC RI for 5 years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-
i/d to suffer SI for another 3 months.
U/S 468/471/419/420 IPC RI for 2 years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-i/d to suffer SI
for another 3 months.
The sentences were ordered to run
concurrently."
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3. Challenging the judgment dated 30-06-2018, the petitioner filed an appeal which has
already been admitted. The previous application u/s 389 CrPC for suspension of sentence and
bail filed by the applicant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 10-10-2018, passed in
IA (Crl.) 600/2018.
4. Learned senior counsel Mr. D.K. Mishra submits, that except the sentence of
imprisonment awarded u/s 20 of the U.A. (P) Act, all other sentences of imprisonment
awarded to the applicant were for a term of five years or less and he has already spent more
than three years in jail. Learned counsel further submits that although, the applicant was
convicted u/s 20 of the UA(P) Act by the learned trial court, holding that he was a member of
a terrorist organization, viz., PREPAK--- UPPK, prosecution could not adduce any evidence to
show that the applicant was a member of any terrorist organization. Learned senior counsel
Mr. Mishra referring to the schedule appended to the UA (P) Act as well as various
notifications submits that PREPAK--UPPK, of which the applicant was the President, is not a
terrorist organization or unlawful organization, inasmuch as, PREPAK-UPPK has not been
declared as terrorist organization by the Govt. as per the schedule of the UA(P) Act. Further
submission of Mr. Mishra is that the conviction of the applicant on the premise, that PREPAK--
UPPK was a wing of a terrorist organization "PREPAK was also dehors evidence, inasmuch as,
no evidence could be brought on record to that effect, and as such, the conviction of the
applicant u/s 20 UA (P) Act shall not be sustainable. It is also the contention of the learned
senior counsel, that the Govt. has already entered into a peace agreement with the
organization of the applicant, which was not a terrorist organization and therefore, the
applicant deserves to be released on bail.
5. Resisting the prayer for bail, the learned Asstt. Solicitor General of India, Mr.
Choudhury submitted, that the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel for the
applicant has already been rejected by this Court and the present application does not reflect
any fresh ground, and as such, the present interlocutory application is liable to be rejected.
Mr. Choudhury further contends, that while considering the bail application u/s 389 CrPC,
court is required to consider materials on record for a prima facie assessment and cannot
assess the evidence in detail. This Court already having recorded a finding, that the materials
on record prima facie implicated the applicant, there is no scope for reconsideration of bail on
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the same ground, as the same would amount to review of the earlier order, submits Mr.
Choudhury.
6. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while rejecting the bail application of the applicant
in IA (Crl.) 600/2018 held as under :-
"10. From a perusal of the evidence led by the prosecution witness during trial, what can be seen is that the
petitioner has been identified as an active member of PREPAK-UPPK and he has collected funds for the
organization by means of extortion. This evidence can be appreciated from the deposition of prosecution witness
Nos. 4, 10, 11, 12, 17, 21, 35 and 40 amongst others. Section 40 of the UA(P) Act provides that a person commits an
offence of raising funds for a terrorist organization with intention to further all the activity of the terrorist
organization if he invites another person to provide money or other property and intends that it should be used
or as reasonable cause to show that it might be used for the purposes of terrorism besides others shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term not extending 14 years or with fine or with both. As already noticed,
there are materials available on record which implicates the applicant to have committed offences under the
UA(P) Act. PW-45 in his cross-examination has stated that during his investigation, he did not find any specific
instance of terrorist act committed by the applicant amongst others. However, these being no dispute that the
applicant is a member of a terrorist organization, which is involved in terrorist act, having regard to the
provision of Section 20 of the UA(P) Act, we are of the opinion that the same will not have any bearing."
6. From the above, it appears that this Court has already considered the submission of the
learned counsel, which is being made now and had taken a prima facie view that the
applicant was a member of a terrorist organization and that the materials on record
implicated him. Therefore, there is no scope for re-consideration of the prayer for bail once
again on the same ground. The learned counsel for the applicant tried to impress upon this
Court, that the finding/observation of this Court in the earlier bail application was perverse,
and as such there is no bar in re-considering the prayer for bail in spite of rejection of the
first application. We are unable to accept the above submission of the learned counsel, for
the simple reason, that re-consideration of the prayer for bail on the same facts and ground
in view of the earlier order, would amount to review, which is not permissible under the law.
Though, a second bail application is not barred under the law, such application must be on
some new ground or because of change in circumstances. The observation of the Supreme
Court in Kalyan Ch. Sarkar etc- Vs.- Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and Anr. (2005) AIR SCW
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536 can be profitably referred, where the Apex Court held as under :-
"Therefore, even though there is room for filing a subsequent bail
application in cases where earlier applications have been rejected, the same can
be done if there is a change in the fact situation or in law which requires the
earlier view being interfered with or where the earlier finding has become
obsolete. This is the limited area in which an accused who has been denied bail
earlier, can move a subsequent application. Therefore, we are not in agreement
with the argument of learned counsel for the accused that in view of the
guarantee conferred on a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it
is open to the aggrieved person to make successive bail applications even on a
ground already rejected by courts earlier including the Apex Court of the
country "
7. Being of the above view, we find the instant bail application to be devoid of merit and
accordingly stands dismissed.
JUDGE JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
