[Cites 31, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Lalu Prasad Yadav vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 24 March, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Reserved on: 19th January, 2026
Pronounced on: 24th March, 2026
+ W.P.(CRL) 1845/2025
LALU PRASAD YADAV .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. Maninder
Singh, Senior Advocates with
Mr. Varun Jain, Mr. Navin
Kumar, Mr. Sumit Singh, Ms.
Aekta Vats, Ms. Aparajita
Jamwal, Ms. Janvi Narang and
Mr. Satish Kumar, Advocates.
versus
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION .....Respondent
Through: Mr. S.V. Raju, ASG with Mr.
D.P. Singh, ASG and SPP with
Mr. Manu Mishra, Ms. Garima
Saxena, Mr. Imaan Khera, Ms.
Shreya Dutt, Mr. Samrat
Goswami, Mr. Hitarth Raja,
Ms. Aditi Andley, Advocates
with Insp. Ramendra Diiman.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
JUDGMENT
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ["Cr.
PC"] for quashing of FIR No. RC2202022E0007 under sections 120-
B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ["IPC"] read with Sections 11, 12,
13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ["PC
Act" or "the Act"] (pre-2018 amendment) dated 18.05.2022 and
charge sheets dated 07.10.2022, 01.07.2023 and 07.06.2024, filed in
FIR/RC and also the quashing of the cognizance orders dated
27.02.2023, 22.09.2023 and 25.02.2025 along with consequential
orders passed by learned Special Judge (PC Act).
Brief facts of the case:
2. A preliminary enquiry (PE No. 220/2021/E0002) was registered
by CBI, EOU-IV, New Delhi on 23.09.2021 concerning alleged
irregular appointments of Substitutes in Group-D posts in various
Zonal Railways during the period 2004-2009. It was alleged that
unknown public servants of the Indian Railways appointed and later
regularized substitutes without adhering to the prescribed guidelines,
without issuing any advertisement or public notice, and by showing
undue haste in processing applications. Several appointees, though
residents of Patna, Bihar, were appointed in distant Railway Zones
such as Mumbai, Jabalpur, Kolkata, Jaipur and Hajipur, with
applications that were improperly addressed yet processed and
approved within a few days.
3. The enquiry revealed seven specific instances where land
situated in Patna was transferred by the appointees or their family
members to the family members of the petitioner, then Union Minister
for Railways, or to M/s AK Infosystems Pvt. Ltd., a company later
controlled by his family. These transactions included five sale deeds
and two subsequent gift deeds in favour of Smt. Rabri Devi, Smt.
Misha Bharti and Smt. Hema Yadav, daughters and wife of the
petitioner. In consideration of these transfers, twelve individuals or
their relatives were allegedly appointed as substitutes in six different
Railway Zones. The enquiry noted that the lands were purchased at
prices significantly below prevailing circle rates, often shown as paid
in cash, and later gifted at substantially higher values.
4. In total, about 1,05,292 sq. ft. of land, presently valued at
approximately Rs. 4.39 crore as per current circle rates, was allegedly
acquired by the family members of the petitioner through these
transactions. The enquiry prima facie indicated abuse of official
position by the petitioner to obtain pecuniary advantage for his family
in exchange for railway appointments, with the beneficiaries of
appointments also acting as participants in the alleged offence.
Accordingly, FIR No. RC2202022E0007 was filed at Police Station
EO-II Delhi. Subsequently, chargesheet was filed under Sections 120-
B of IPC read with Sections 11, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act,
1988 (pre-2018 amendment), against the petitioner, his family
members, the appointees, railway officials and other private
individuals.
Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioner:
5. Mr. Kapil Sibal learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner,
submitted that the Petitioner has been subjected to grave persecution
and prolonged harassment on account of a wholly mala fide and
vexatious investigation. The alleged offences pertain to the period
between 2004 and 2009, whereas the impugned RC/FIR dated
18.05.2022 came to be registered after an unexplained delay of nearly
fourteen years. It was urged that for the very same allegations, the CBI
through its various zones had earlier conducted investigations between
2009 and 2014 by registering PEs and RCs, which culminated in
closure reports that were accepted by the competent courts by separate
judicial orders.
6. It was further submitted that despite the aforesaid earlier
investigations, the Respondent-CBI initiated a fresh preliminary
enquiry on 23.09.2021 by concealing the existence of its previous
enquiries. After conducting the said preliminary enquiry for nearly
eight months, the CBI registered the present regular case bearing RC
No. RC2202022E0007 on 18.05.2022. According to learned senior
counsel, the very initiation of the preliminary enquiry and the
subsequent registration of the FIR are vitiated on account of
suppression of material facts and constitute a clear abuse of the
investigative process.
7. Mr. Sibal, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the instant
RC/FIR was registered under Sections 120B IPC read with Sections
11, 12 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988 (as it
stood prior to the 2018 amendment), without obtaining prior sanction
as mandatorily required under Section 17A of the PC Act, 1988, as
amended on 26.07.2018. It was contended that in the absence of such
sanction, the initiation of the preliminary enquiry, investigation, and
all consequential proceedings are non est in the eyes of law.
8. It was pointed out that the CBI itself admits that sanction under
Section 17A is necessary for enquiry or investigation in respect of acts
performed by public servants in discharge of official functions. It was
further submitted that during the course of investigation, the CBI
obtained sanction under Section 17A against other accused persons,
yet no such sanction was either sought or granted qua the Petitioner.
On the contrary, the CBI has taken a plea that Section 17A was not
attracted as the alleged acts were not in discharge of official duty,
while simultaneously obtaining sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
against the Petitioner on 01.09.2023, thereby acknowledging that the
alleged acts were performed in official capacity.
9. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the entire case of the
prosecution proceeds on the allegation that the Petitioner, by virtue of
his position as the then Minister of Railways, had issued oral
instructions to the General Managers of various Railway Zones for
appointment of substitutes in Group-D posts. The preliminary enquiry
report, FIR, charge-sheets and even the cognizance orders record that
such instructions were allegedly issued by the Petitioner in his official
position. It was emphasized that it is not the prosecution case that the
Petitioner lacked authority or acted dehors his office. Even assuming
the allegations to be correct on their face, the acts complained of were
integrally connected with the official functions of the Petitioner as a
public servant and therefore squarely attract the protection of Section
17A of the PC Act and prior approvals should have been taken before
enquiry/inquiry.
10. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of coordinate Benches
of this Court in Naresh Kumar Mittal & Ors. v. CBIW.P.(Crl.)
2365/2023, affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated
01.03.2024, and Lambodar Prasad Padhy v. CBI W.P.(Crl.)
3270/2023, wherein it has been categorically held that prior sanction
under Section 17A of the PC Act is mandatory for registration of FIR.
It was further submitted that the reliance placed by the CBI on Fertico
Marketing & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI(2021) 2 SCC 525 is
misconceived, as the concept of "consent" under Section 6 of the
DSPE Act cannot be equated with "sanction" under Section 17A of
the PC Act. Reliance was placed upon Shashi Kumar Shivanna v.
Governement of Karnataka rep by Home Secretary and ors. (2020)
SCC OnLine Kar 5018. In view thereof, it was urged that the entire
enquiry and investigation initiated against the Petitioner being without
mandatory prior sanction are non est and liable to be quashed.
Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent/CBI:
11. Mr. S.V. Raju, learned ASG appearing for the Respondent/CBI
submitted that the present petition suffers from gross delay and laches.
It was submitted that the Petitioner was fully aware of the proceedings
since inception, including the registration of the PE 220 2021 E0002
on 23.09.2021, FIR dated 18.05.2022, issuance of notices, filing of
multiple charge-sheets, grant of sanctions, and successive orders of
cognizance passed by the learned Special Judge. The Petitioner
actively participated in the investigation, joined proceedings pursuant
to notice dated 07.03.2023, received relied upon documents, sought
inspection of unrelied records, and availed remedies under Section 207
CrPC. Despite such participation, the present petition was filed only
after more than two years of proceedings, and at the stage when the
matter had proceeded to framing of charge, rendering the petition
liable to dismissal on the ground of delay and laches.Reliance was
placed upon Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 19
SCC 62, Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India W.P. (Civil)
699/2016 and Court on its Own Motion v. Union of India W.P. (Crl)
1542 of 2020 in support of such submission.
12. It was further submitted that cognizance of offences has already
been taken by the learned Special Judge in respect of the first, second,
supplementary and final charge-sheets, and process has been duly
issued. The statutory remedy available to the Petitioner against such
orders was by way of revision within the prescribed period of
limitation of ninety days. Having failed to avail the said remedy, the
Petitioner cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to
overcome statutory limitation or to stall the progress of trial. It was
contended that once cognizance stands taken, interference under
Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC ought not to be exercised,
particularly when no jurisdictional error is demonstrated. Reliance was
placed upon this Court's decision in Sanyam Bhushan v. State Crl
M.C. 1675 of 2022.
13. The learned ASG further submitted that Section 17A of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not apply retrospectively to
offences alleged to have been committed prior to the amendment of
2018. It was argued that Section 17A creates substantive rights and
liabilities and was consciously made prospective by the Legislature
with effect from 26.07.2018. Since the alleged offences pertain to a
period prior to the amendment, the investigation cannot be rendered
invalid on the ground of absence of approval under Section 17A. It
was contended that extending the protection retrospectively would
frustrate the very object of the PC Act and result in shielding corrupt
public servants, particularly where the prosecution also involves
serious offences under the Indian Penal Code.
14. It was further argued that Section 17A does not have blanket
applicability and is attracted only when the alleged offence relates to
any recommendation made or decision taken by a public servant in
discharge of official functions. According to the Respondent, the
Petitioner was neither the recommending authority nor the decision-
making authority in the process of recruitment of Group-D substitutes
in the Railways. The appointments were made by the concerned
Railway officials, namely the General Managers and Chief Personnel
Officers, against whom permissions under Section 17A of the Act
were duly obtained. No recruitment file was ever placed before the
Petitioner for approval, and therefore the alleged acts attributed to him
cannot be construed as recommendations or decisions contemplated
under Section 17A of the Act. Reliance was placed upon the decision
Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Tejmal
Chaudhary Crl. A. 1647 of 2021.
15. Learned ASG lastly submitted that even assuming any
procedural irregularity in investigation, the same would not vitiate
cognizance or subsequent proceedings unless failure of justice or
prejudice is demonstrated. It was contended that illegality in
investigation does not ipso facto nullify prosecution. It was also
emphasized that sanctions for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC
and Section 19 of the PC Act were duly obtained against the Petitioner
after application of mind, thereby eliminating any allegation of
prejudice. The reliance placed by the Petitioner on earlier verifications
or closure reports was stated to be misleading, as no prior
investigation had ever been conducted against him. Further reliance
was placed upon Hon'ble Supreme Court's decisions in H.N. Rishbud
v. State (1954) 2 SCC 934, Fertico Marketing v. CBI (2021) 2 SCC
525 and CBI v. Narayan Niryat India Pvt. Ltd.Crl. Appeal. 4390 of
2025 It was therefore submitted that the petition is devoid of merit and
deserves dismissal.
Analysis and Conclusion:
16. The Court has given careful consideration to the rival
submissions and have perused the documents placed on record.
17. The principal and, indeed, the sole ground urged by the
Petitioner for quashing of the impugned FIR, charge-sheets and
cognizance orders is the alleged non-compliance with Section 17A of
the PC Act, 1988. According to the Petitioner, absence of prior
approval before initiation of the preliminary enquiry and registration
of the FIR renders the entire investigation non est in law. No
independent challenge is laid to the factual foundation of the
allegations or the existence of material collected during investigation.
18. At the outset, this Court finds that Section 17A, introduced by
Act 16 of 2018 with effect from 26.07.2018, does not evince either
expressly or by necessary implication any legislative intent to operate
retrospectively. The provision places a fetter on the initiation of
enquiry or investigation against a public servant in respect of
recommendations made or decisions taken in discharge of official
functions. Such a restriction, which directly impacts the power of
investigation, cannot be retrospectively applied unless the statute so
mandates in clear terms.
19. In Tejmal Choudhary (supra), the Supreme Court
unequivocally held that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, inserted with effect from 26.07.2018, is prospective in operation,
being a provision that creates substantive rights and liabilities, and in
the absence of any express or implied legislative intent of
retrospectivity, cannot invalidate or nullify investigations or FIRs
registered prior to its enforcement, as any such interpretation would
defeat the object of anti-corruption law and render pending
investigations infructuous. The relevant paragraphs read as under;
"4. The said FIR has been quashed mainly on the
ground that the Investigating Authorities had failed
to obtain previous approval of the State Government
under Section 17(A) of the PC Act before registering
the said FIR against the accused persons.
5. Section 17(A) of the PC Act, which is set out
hereinafter for convenience, has been incorporated
by amendment of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, with effect from 26th July, 2018. It reads as
under:
"17A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of
offences relatable to recommendations made or
decision taken by public servant in discharge of
official functions or duties.--No police officer shall
conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into
any offence alleged to have been committed by a
public servant under this Act, where the alleged
offence is relatable to any recommendation made or
decision taken by such public servant in discharge of
his official functions or duties, without the previous
approval--
(a) in the case of a person who is or was employed,
at the time when the offence was alleged to have
been committed, in connection with the affairs of the
Union, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is or was employed,
at the time when the offence was alleged to have
been committed, in connection with the affairs of a
State, of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority
competent to remove him from his office, at the time
when the offence was alleged to have been
committed:
Provided that no such approval shall be necessary
for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on
the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any
undue advantage for himself or for any other
person:
Provided further that the concerned authority shall
convey its decision under this section within a
period of three months, which may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing by such authority, be extended
by a further period of one month."
6. In this case, the FIR was filed on 01.01.2018
before the said provision came into force. The main
question involved in these appeals is whether
Section 17A of the PC Act would apply to an
investigation which had commenced before Section
17A was enacted/enforced.
7. It is a cardinal principle of construction that
every statute is prospective, unless it is expressly or
by necessary implication made to have
retrospective operation. There is a presumption
against retrospectivity. An express provision should
ordinarily be made to make a statute retrospective.
The presumption against retrospectivity may also be
rebutted by necessary implication as held by this
Court in Akram Ansari v. Chief Election
Officer reported in (2008) 2 SCC 95, which has been
referred to and relied upon by the Kerala High
Court in its judgment in K.R. Ramesh v. Central
Bureau of Investigation reported in 2020 SCC
OnLine Ker 2529. The device of a legal fiction can
also be used to introduce retrospective operation.
Generally, it is considered that every statute dealing
with substantive rights is prima facie prospective
unless it is expressly or by necessary implication
made retrospective.
8. In T.N. Bettaswamaiah v. State of
Karnataka being W.P. No. 29176/2019 (GM-RES),
decided on 20.12.2019, which is reported reported
in 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3564, the Karnataka High
Court referred to the judgment of this Court
in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602, and
rightly held:
"21. ... But in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 it is held that a
statute which not only changes the procedure but
also creates new rights and liabilities shall be
construed to be prospective in operation unless
otherwise provided either expressly or by necessary
implication. A careful reading of both Section 17A
as also Section 19 do not contain any express
provision to show that they are retrospective in
nature nor it is so discernable by implication.
22. In Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Dr. Manmohan
Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64it is held that any anti-
corruption law has to be interpreted in such a
fashion as to strengthen fight against corruption and
where two constructions are eminently reasonable,
the Court has to accept the one that seeks to
eradicate corruption than the one which seeks to
perpetuate it."
9. Reference may also be made to the judgment of
this Court in GJ Raja v. Tejraj Surana" reported
in (2019) 19 SCC 469, cited by Mr. Saurav Roy,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, where this Court followed the judgment of
this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) and
held that a statute which affect substantive rights is
presumed to be prospective in operation unless
made retrospective and unless textually impossible a
statute which merely affects procedure is presumed
to be retrospective. However, a statute which not
only changes the procedure but also creates new
rights or liabilities is to be construed to be
prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided
either expressly or by necessary implication.
10. In State of Telangana v. Managipet alias
MangipetSarveshwar Reddy reported (2019) 19 SCC
87, this Court rejected the arguments that amended
provisions of the PC Act would be applicable to an
FIR, registered before the said amendment came
into force and found that the High Court had rightly
held that no grounds had made out for quashing the
proceedings.
11. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that
the legislative intent in the enactment of a statute is
to be gathered from the express words used in the
statue unless the plain words literally construed give
rise to absurd results. This Court has to go by the
plain words of the statute to construe the legislative
intent, as very rightly argued by Mr. Roy. It could
not possibly have been the intent of the legislature
that all pending investigations upto July, 2018
should be rendered infructuous. Such an
interpretation could not possibly have been
intended.
12. In his usual fairness, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent does not
seriously dispute the proposition of law that Section
17A does not have retrospective operation. Learned
Senior Counsel, however, argues that the Court
might have looked into the merits and, in particular,
the fact that investigation had ultimately been
closed. We need not go into that aspect since the
High Court has quashed the proceedings only on the
ground of permission not having been obtained
under Section 17A of the PC Act.
13. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed and the
impugned judgment and order is accordingly set
aside."
20. The Kerala High Court in K.R. Ramesh v. CBI, 2020 SCC
OnLine Ker 2529 authoritatively held that Section 17A of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, inserted by the 2018 Amendment, is
purely prospective in operation, as it neither expressly nor impliedly
provides for retrospectivity, is intended only to protect honest officers
from vexatious harassment without diluting investigative powers, and
any contrary interpretation would unjustly invalidate investigations
and trials commenced prior to 26.07.2018, thereby defeating the very
object of the Act. The relevant paragraphs read as under;
"43. Yet another contention set up by the
petitioners was that in the light of section 17A of
the amended Act, the investigation followed by
prosecution without prior approval was non est
and liable to be quashed. As indicated above,
there is nothing in the statute to indicate that it
was retrospective. Section 17A prohibits any
enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any
offence, without the approval of the authorities
mentioned in section 17A alleged to have been
committed by a public servant under the Act,
where the alleged offence is relatable to any
recommendation made or decision taken by such
pubic servant in discharge of his official
functions or duties. The approval as
contemplated under the Act, is basically to
protect honest and upright officers and to
insulate them against unnecessary victimization
or harassment consequent to taking of
administrative decisions. It is also intended to
embolden upright and honest officers in taking
independent decision in public interest.
Essentially, the purpose of the Prevention of
Corruption Act is to eradicate corruption in
administration and to punish corrupt officers. It
also has to strengthen the vigilance wing of the
Government empowered to investigate
corruption in administrative set up. Hence no
provision of the Statute, can be interpreted to
dilute the object of the Act, and which may have
the effect of weakening the powers of
investigation agencies entrusted with such task.
If the Amendment is held to be retrospective,
several cases pending trial in which
investigation commenced prior to amendment
which are in the various stages of trial or
investigation will be prejudicially affected. All
those cases will be bad for absence of prior
approval under section 17A of the Amended Act.
Such an interpretation cannot be given in the
absence of any provision explicitly or impliedly
indicating retrospectivity.
44. Hence, the Prevention of Corruption
(Amendment) Act 2018 has to be held to be
prospective and has no application to cases
registered prior to amendment and pending under
various stages of investigation and to cases in
which investigation has been completed and are
pending trial. This seems to be in consonance with
the decisions in Syam Sunder's Case (supra) and
other similar cases and the view expressed by this
Court in M.C. Chandrasekaran Nair v. State of
Kerala (2015 (4) KLJ 603), wherein the
retrospective operation of Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 came up for consideration. Similar view
was expressed by a learned Single Judge of Madras
High Court, in Crl. Appeal. No. 488 of 2018 wherein
scope of application of Amendment Act 2018 came
up for consideration. It was held to be not
retrospective. Delhi High Court in Madhu Koda's
case (Supra) also, shared the same view. I agree
with those views."
21. The argument that Section 17A is merely procedural and hence
retrospective cannot be accepted. The provision confers a substantive
immunity upon a class of public servants by putting the condition of
the very initiation of enquiry or investigation upon prior executive
approval. Such a safeguard materially alters the legal regime
governing investigation and cannot be characterized as a mere matter
of procedure. The Legislature, being conscious of this consequence,
deliberately made the provision prospective.
22. It is significant that the alleged offences pertain to the period
between 2004 and 2009, whereas Section 17A was introduced only in
2018, therefore, the alleged acts cannot be construed as
recommendations or decisions taken by the petitioner in discharge of
official functions so as to attract the requirement of prior approval
under Section 17A of the Act.
23. The reliance placed by the Petitioner on decisions emphasising
the mandatory nature of Section 17A is misplaced, as those judgments
operate in a distinct temporal context where the alleged offences were
post-2018 or where the protection was otherwise attracted. None of
the cited authorities lay down that Section 17A applies retrospectively
to offences committed prior to its enforcement. On the contrary,
judicial discipline requires this Court to give effect to the settled
principle that statutes creating new protections or disabilities operate
prospectively unless expressly stated otherwise.
24. Even otherwise, the scope of Section 17A is confined to acts
involving recommendations made or decisions taken by a public
servant in discharge of official functions. But in this case the petitioner
was not in the position to make decisions about the appointment, but
could only influence. The prosecution case, as placed before the
Court, attributes the formal acts of appointment to the competent
Railway authorities, against whom approvals under Section 17A were
admittedly obtained. Whether the Petitioner exercised de facto
influence or issued oral directions is a matter of evidence and cannot,
at this stage, be determinative of the applicability of Section 17A.
25. In this context, it is essential to refer to exact words applied by
the statute, which reads as follows:-
"[17A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of
offences relatable to recommendations made or
decision taken by public servant in discharge of
official functions or duties.--No police officer shall
conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into
any offence alleged to have been committed by a
public servant under this Act, where the alleged
offence is relatable to any recommendation made or
decision taken by such public servant in discharge of
his official functions or duties, without the previous
approval-- (a) in the case of a person who is or was
employed, at the time when the offence was alleged
to have been committed, in connection with the
affairs of the Union, of that Government; (b) in the
case of a person who is or was employed, at the time
when the offence was alleged to have been
committed, in connection with the affairs of a State,
of that Government; (c) in the case of any other
person, of the authority competent to remove him
from his office, at the time when the offence was
alleged to have been committed: Provided that no
such approval shall be necessary for cases involving
arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of
accepting or attempting to accept any undue
advantage for himself or for any other person:
Provided further that the concerned authority shall
convey its decision under this section within a
period of three months, which may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing by such authority, be extended
by a further period of one month.]"
26. The crucial question that arises for consideration in these
proceedings is whether the previous approval from the competent
authority needs to be obtained for every enquiry, inquiry or
investigation, into every offences committed by the public servant.
The crux of the issue is thus as to whether provisions under Section
17-A of the PC Act is an omnibus, all pervasive pre-requisite for every
enquiry, inquiry or investigation into every act done by the public
servant in the discharge of its official duty. The object of PC Act is to
protect the honest and upright public officers and to ensure that they
are not unnecessarily dragged into litigation. The purpose is to ensure
that officers are protected against the motivated and mischievous
litigation. Such a protection enables the officers to take prompt and
bold decisions so that administrative work should not suffer.
Otherwise, public officials may become reluctant to take decisions,
apprehending false accusations of corruption. A close scrutiny of the
provisions contained in Section 17-A of the PC Act would reveal that
bar under Section 17-A of the Act operates against a police officer. It
prohibits a police officer from conducting any enquiry or inquiry or
investigation into any investigation, alleged to have been committed
by a public servant under the Act without the previous approval of the
prescribed authority. Such bar operates or applies only when the
offence allegedly committed by a public servant under the Act relates
to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant
in discharge of his official functions or duties. The requirement of
Section 17-A for prior approval thus pre-supposes that the offence
under the Act, allegedly committed by the public servant is relatable
to any recommendation made or decision taken by him in discharge of
the official functions or duties. The bar under Section 17-A of the Act
does not apply to the investigation conducted into all or every offence
under the Act, allegedly committed by the public servant. When any
recommendation or decision is made by a public servant which is not
directly or reasonably connected with his official functions or duties,
he is not entitled to get protection under Section 17-A of the Act. The
protection envisaged in Section 17-A of the PC Act is not a blanket
protection and when the act of any public official is ex-facie criminal
or constitutes an offence, prior approval of the competent authority
would not be required.
27. The CBI charge sheet lists the following procedure in practice
for engaging substitutes in Railways (including Central Railway)
during the relevant period:-
"1. Applications addressed to General Manager
were received in GM's office from various sources.
2. These applications were scrutinized by Secy./ GM
and segregated in terms of eligibility / ineligibility.
3. The eligible applications along with the
requirement of substitutes received from DRMs /
Heads of Units, through the Chief Personnel Officer,
was to be put up to General Manager.
4. Since the discretion lied personally with the
General Manager, he/she would decide which of
these applications would be processed. He/she
would endorse on the applications accordingly.
5. The selected applications would be forwarded to
the Personnel Department for verification of
certificates etc.
6. After due verification, Personnel Department will
put up the cases for General Manager's approval for
engagement as substitutes.
7. Keeping in view the exigencies of service and
suitability of the candidate, GM/CPO would decide
the Department and Division/ Unit where the
candidate was to be engaged.
8. Formal letter of engagement would be sent to the
Division/Unit by the Personnel Department.
9. To avoid any fraud / impersonation etc., the
Division/Unit would get the letter verified/
authenticated from CPO's office and then issue
engagement letter to the candidate, after completion
of required formalities."
28. The above-said procedure was reiterated vide Circular No. 24th
June 2009, issued by the Ministry of Railways, directing for strict
adherence to the same.
29. Also, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) in its
subsequent Circulars on engagement of Substitutes repeatedly directed
to exercise strict control to the number of Substitutes engaged and to
make serious attempts to bring down their numbers drastically. It was
also reiterated that the General Managers do not have unfettered
discretion to engage Substitutes and that the discretion to engage
Substitutes may be exercised with due caution.
30. Para 2.1 of Suppl. Circular no. 01 dated 04th November, 1992 to
the Master Circular No. 20/91, stipulates that any new face substitute
should be appointed only with the prior personal approval of the
General Manager.
31. In the present case, petitioner though serving as the Railway
Minister, was not the statutory or administrative authority empowered
to make or approve appointments of Group-D Substitutes in Railways,
as the process of such recruitment was handled by the competent
Railway functionaries with prior personal approval of the General
Manager. The prosecution case itself attributes the formal acts of
appointment to those competent functionaries and not to any decision
taken by the petitioner in the exercise of official power. The petitioner
was not in a position to make decisions about the appointment. The
prosecution case attributes formal acts of appointment to the railway
officials against whom provisions of Section 17-A were admittedly
obtained. Consequently, the alleged acts cannot be construed as
recommendations or decisions taken by the petitioner in discharge of
official functions so as to attract the requirement of prior approval
under Section 17-A of the Act.
32. The subsequent grant of sanction under Section 197 Cr. PC and
Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act further undermines the
Petitioner's plea of prejudice. It is well settled that any alleged
irregularity in investigation does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings
unless it results in a failure of justice. No such prejudice has been
demonstrated, particularly when cognizance has been validly taken
and the matter has progressed to an advanced stage.
33. The Supreme Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan
Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64 emphasized that corruption poses a grave
threat not only to constitutional governance but also to the
foundational values of Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The
Court observed that corruption undermines the core constitutional
ideals of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity and, if unchecked,
erodes public confidence in democratic institutions. It was therefore
held that anti-corruption laws must be interpreted in a manner that
strengthens the fight against corruption, and where two reasonable
interpretations are possible, the one that advances the eradication of
corruption must be preferred over the one that perpetuates it.
34. The Court is also persuaded by the submission of the
Respondent that permitting a belated challenge at this stage, solely on
a technical plea relating to prior approval, would defeat the orderly
administration of criminal justice. The Petitioner participated in the
investigation, availed statutory remedies, and allowed multiple
cognizance orders to attain finality. The extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C
cannot be invoked to bypass statutory limitations or to derail a
prosecution at the threshold of trial.
35. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is
to be exercised by the High Court in cases of apparent perversity and
illegality. In R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC
739, the Supreme Court held that the inherent powers under Section
482 Cr. PC must be exercised with great caution to prevent misuse of
criminal proceedings.
36. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that
Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is prospective
in operation and has no application to offences alleged to have been
committed between 2004 and 2009. The absence of prior approval
under the said provision does not vitiate the preliminary enquiry,
registration of the FIR, investigation, or the cognizance orders passed
by the learned Special Judge. Moreover, the bar under Section 17A of
the Act, shall not apply in the present case as the alleged act is not
relatable to any recommendations or decisions taken by the petitioner
in discharge of his official functions or duties. The petition, being
devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed.
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
MARCH 24, 2026/na/ RM
