* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 24th MARCH, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
I.A. 10757/2023
IN
+ CS(OS) 190/2023
SHEETAL YADAV @ KOYAL .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Nitin Bhardwaj, Mr. Rohit Pratap
Singh, Advocates
versus
SWAPNIL YADAV @ SONU & ORS. .....Defendants
Through: Mr. Harvinder Singh, Advocate for
D-1 & D-2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1. The present application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ["CPC"], has been filed on behalf of the Defendants No.1
& 2 for rejection of the Plaint on the ground that the Suit is not maintainable
as it is barred by law and also does not show any cause of action.
2. The present Suit has been filed by the Plaintiff seeking partition,
mandatory and permanent injunctions, rendition of accounts and mesne
profits in respect of several immovable properties situated in Village
Kapashera, Delhi. The parties to the Suit belong to the same family and are
the legal heirs of Late Sh. Chandan Singh Yadav.
3. To adjudicate the present Application it is necessary to bring out the
Plaint averments to see as to whether the Plaint is liable to be rejected under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC or not. The averments in the Plaint are as
under:
a. Late Sh. Chandan Singh Yadav was the son of Late Sh. Shri
Ram, who was the common ancestor of the parties and owner of
various ancestral properties situated in the revenue estate of
Village Kapashera, Delhi. It is stated that during the lifetime of
Late Sh. Shri Ram, the ancestral properties were amicably
partitioned among his legal heirs pursuant to a family
settlement deed dated 18.01.2000, whereby Late Sh. Chandan
Singh Yadav came into possession of certain immovable
properties forming part of the ancestral estate.
b. Late Sh. Chandan Singh Yadav died intestate in December
2000, leaving behind four legal heirs, namely the Plaintiff (his
daughter), Defendant No.1 Swapnil Yadav @ Sonu (his son),
Defendant No.2 Meenakshi Yadav (his wife), and Defendant
No.3 Jayotsana Yadav (his daughter). Upon the death of Sh.
Chandan Singh Yadav, the properties which had come to his
share pursuant to the family settlement devolved upon these
four legal heirs by way of intestate succession, each becoming
entitled to an undivided 1/4th share in the estate of Late Sh.
Chandan Singh Yadav.
c. The properties inherited by the legal heirs of Late Sh. Chandan
Singh Yadav include several immovable properties situated in
Village Kapashera, Delhi. One of the principal properties
comprises land measuring 1210 sq. yards forming part of
Khasra Nos. 1291, 1293 and 1294 situated in the extended Lal
Dora Abadi of Village Kapashera, containing approximately 9
shops in the front portion on the ground floor and 4 shops in the
rear portion, while the remaining portion and the first floor
consist of nearly 100 rooms with common washrooms and
toilets, which have been rented out by Defendants No.1 and 2,
who are receiving rental income from the said property. This
property is referred to in the plaint as Suit Property No.1.
d. Another property forming part of the estate is land measuring
720 sq. yards out of the same Khasra numbers, also located in
the extended Lal Dora Abadi of Village Kapashera, which
contains eight shops on the ground floor, out of which six shops
are rented out while two shops are being used by Defendant
No.1 for conducting a pharmacy business under the name M/s
Tondak Consumer Goods Pvt. Ltd.. There is also an office on
the first floor which has been let out to M/s Kranti Travels. This
property is described as Suit Property No.2 in the plaint.
e. The estate also includes another property measuring 2000 sq.
yards forming part of Khasra Nos. 26/6, 15, 17 and 16, situated
on the phirni of the extended Lal Dora Abadi of Village
Kapashera. The property is surrounded by high boundary walls
and is presently being used by a tenant who runs a scrap or
kabadi business therefrom. This property has also been rented
out by Defendants No.1 and 2 and is referred to as Suit Property
No.3.
f. Further, another property measuring 700 sq. yards forming part
of the same Khasra numbers exists in the same locality and
comprises of three shops in the front portion on the ground
floor along with approximately 70 rooms on the ground and
first floors with common washrooms and toilets, which have
also been rented out by Defendants No.1 and 2. This property is
described as Suit Property No.4.
g. In addition to the above, there exists a residential property
measuring 500 sq. yards bearing No.120, Gali No.2, Rao
Harnath Marg, Village Kapashera, Delhi, which consists of a
basement, ground floor and first floor. The ground floor and
first floor comprises of bedrooms, kitchen and other residential
facilities. The Plaintiff states that she remains in possession of
one room on the first floor and stays there whenever she visits
the property, while the Defendants are otherwise occupying and
using the house. The wife of Defendant No.1 is also running a
physiotherapy clinic in the basement of this property. This
property is described as Suit Property No.5.
h. Apart from the above properties, there was also another
ancestral property measuring 400 sq. yards out of Khasra
Nos.1291, 1293 and 1294, which, according to the Plaintiff,
was sold by Defendant No.2 in April-May 2022 for a
consideration of more than Rs.1.5 crores. The Plaintiff alleges
that the sale was carried out without her knowledge or consent
and that neither the details of the sale nor the details of the
property allegedly purchased in Gurugram from the sale
proceeds were disclosed to her. She further asserts that she was
entitled to 1/4th share in the said property as well but has not
received any portion of the sale proceeds.
i. The Plaintiff states that she first came to know about the said
sale transaction in the first week of August 2022. Thereafter, on
27.08.2022, she asked Defendant No.1 to disclose the details of
the property that had been sold and the property allegedly
purchased from the sale proceeds in Gurugram. However, the
Defendants allegedly refused to provide any information and
became hostile towards her. Following this refusal, the Plaintiff
began demanding partition of the properties and her lawful
share in the estate of her deceased father.
j. It is stated that from September 2022 onwards, the Plaintiff
repeatedly requested Defendants No.1 and 2 to disclose the
rental income derived from the properties and to distribute the
same in accordance with her entitlement as a co-owner. Despite
these requests, the Defendants allegedly refused to render
accounts, disclose the details of income, or effect partition of
the properties.
k. It is stated that the Plaintiff again approached the Defendants on
19.02.2023 and made a final attempt to amicably resolve the
matter by requesting them to give her separate share in the Suit
Properties and provide details of the income and transactions
relating to the properties. However, according to the Plaint, the
Defendants refused the request and threatened that they would
sell the remaining properties and create third party interests so
that the Plaintiff would not receive any share and would be
forced to litigate for years.
l. The Plaintiff has, therefore, approached this Court seeking
partition, mandatory injunction, permanent injunction, rendition
of accounts, mesne profits, and other consequential reliefs.
4. Summons in the Suit were issued on 21.03.2023. Written Statements
have been filed by the Defendants No.1 & 2 on 16.05.2023. Issues have yet
not been framed.
5. The present Application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC has
been filed by the Defendants No.1 & 2. The principal ground raised by the
Defendants is that the succession to the properties of Late Sh. Chandan
Singh Yadav is governed by the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,
1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Delhi Land Reforms Act). According
to the Defendants, Late Sh. Chandan Singh Yadav died in December 2000
and at that time the law governing succession to agricultural land in Delhi
was Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. Under the said provision,
the bhumidari rights in the land devolve upon the male lineal descendants in
the male line of descent. The Defendants, therefore, contend that upon the
death of Late Sh. Chandan Singh Yadav, the entire interest in the land and
properties devolved exclusively upon Defendant No.1, Swapnil Yadav, who
is the only son and male lineal descendant of Late Sh. Chandan Singh
Yadav. It is, therefore, stated that the Suit Properties are not entitled to be
partitioned and the Suit is not maintainable in light of Section 50 of the
Delhi Land Reforms Act. Defendants places reliance on the Judgment
passed by the Apex Court in Har Naraini Devi v. Union of India, (2022) 18
SCC 470, which has upheld the vires of Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land
Reforms Act. It is stated that Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act
was challenged as unconstitutional being ultra vires Article 14, 15, 254 & 21
of the Constitution of India and the Apex Court vide the abovementioned
Judgment has upheld the vires of Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms
Act. According to the Defendants, the Delhi Land Reforms Act is a special
statute governing succession to agricultural land in Delhi and its provisions
prevail over the general law contained in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It
is further submitted that the rights of inheritance stood settled and
crystallized at the time of the death of Late Sh. Chandan Singh Yadav in the
year 2000 when the land had yet not been urbanised and it cannot be
unsettled or reopened on account of any subsequent change in law, including
the amendment made to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in 2005 which does
not have any retrospective effect and since the properties had been devolved
on Defendant No.1 in 2000 itself, when the land had yet not been urbanised,
the present Suit for partition is not maintainable in law.
6. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material
on record.
7. Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act is reproduced herein for
ready reference and the same reads as under:
"50. General order of succession from males.--
Subject to the provisions of Sections 48 and 52, when a
bumidhar or Asami being a male dies, his interest in
his holding shall devolve in accordance with the order
of the succession given below :
(a) male lineal descendants in the male line of the
descent :
Provided that no member of this class shall inherit if
any male descendant between him and the deceased is
alive:
Provided further that the son or sons of a predeceased
son howsoever low shall inherit the share which would
have devolved upon the deceased if he had been then
alive:
(b) widow;
(c) father;
(d) mother, being a widow;
(e) step mother, being a widow;
(f) father's father;
(g) father's mother, being a widow;
(h) widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line
of descent;
(i) unmarried daughter;
(j) brother being the son of same father as the
deceased;
(k) unmarried sister;
(l) brother's son, the brother having been a son of the
same father as the deceased;
(m) father's father's son;
(n) brother's son's son;
(o) father's father's son's son; and
(p) daughter's son."
8. Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act has been held to be a
valid piece of legislation by the Apex Court in Har Naraini Devi (supra).
9. Be that as it may, it is to be remembered that the Delhi Land Reforms
Act applies only to agricultural land and not any other land. Land has been
defined in Section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act which reads as
under:
"3(13) "land" except in sections 23 and 24, means
land held or occupied for purposes connected with
agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry
including pisciculture and poultry farming and
includes-
(a) buildings appurtenant thereto,
(b) village abadis,
(c) grovelands,
(d) lands for village pasture or land covered by water
and used for growing singharas and other produce or
land in the bed of a river and used for casual or
occasional cultivation, but does not include- land
occupied by buildings in belts of areas adjacent to
Delhi town and New Delhi town, which the Chief
Commissioner may by a notification in the official
Gazette declare as an acquisition thereto."
(emphasis supplied)
10. Sections 23 & 24 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, which are relevant
for the present case, reads as under:
"23. Use of holding for industrial purposes.
(1) A Bhumidhar or Asami shall not be entitled to use
his holding or part thereof for industrial purposes,
other than those immediately connected with any of the
purposes referred to in section 22, unless the land lies
within the belt declared for the purpose by the Chief
Commissioner by a notification in the official Gazette:
Provided that the Chief Commissioner may, on
application presented to the Deputy Commissioner in
the prescribed manner, sanction the use of any holding
or part thereof by a Bhumidhar for industrial purposes
even though it does not lie within such a belt.
(2) Where permission for industrial purposes is
accorded the provisions of this Chapter relating to
devolution shall cease to apply to the Bhumidhar with
respect to such land and he shall thereupon be
governed in the matter of devolution of the land by
personal law to which he is subject.
24. Reversion to agriculture -
(1) Whenever any land held by a Bhumidhar which is
used for industrial purposes has become land used for
purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or
animal husbandry, which includes pisciculture and
poultry farming, the Deputy Commissioner on being so
satisfied, may with the sanction of the Chief
Commissioner make a declaration to that effect and
thereupon the Bhumidhar shall, as respects the land,
be subject to the provisions relating to devolution in
this chapter.
(2) Upon the grant of the declaration under sub-
section (1) in respect of any land any person other than
the Bhumidhar in possession of the land shall
(a) If he holds it under any contract or lese, which is
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this chapter,
be deemed to be an occupant liable to ejectment under
section 84.
(b) if he holds it under any contract or lease, which is
not inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
chapter, be entitled to the rights in the land determined
in accordance with the provisions thereof.
(3) Any contract or lease referred to in sub-clause (a)
of sub section (2) which in inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, become void with effect from the date of
declaration:
Provided that any mortgage with possession existing
on any such land shall, to the extent of the amount due
and secured on such land, be deemed to have been
substituted by a simple mortgage carrying such rate of
interest as may be prescribed."
11. A perusal of Section 3(13), Section 23 and Section 24 of the Delhi
Land Reforms Act reveals that for the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms
Act to apply the land has to be used for the purpose of connected with
agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and
poultry farming and includes buildings appurtenant thereto, village abadis
and grovelands. Only such lands which are used for the abovementioned
purposes are governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act. The Suit Properties
involved in the present case do not, on the face of the averments in the
Plaint, show that they fall within the definition of "land" under the Delhi
Land Reforms Act. The Suit Properties include shops which have been put
up for commercial use, buildings, etc. Whether the Suit Properties comprise
of agricultural land to which the Delhi Land Reforms Act would apply or
not are all matters to be decided by leading evidence and only when it is
proved after leading evidence that the Suit Properties are indeed agricultural
land, the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act would apply.
12. This Court in Anand J. Datwani v. Geeti Bhagat Datwani & Ors.,
2013 (137) DRJ 146, has observed as under:-
"8. The contention of the learned counsel for the
Plaintiff is that though the land/Suit property in
question was an agricultural land but having regard to
the fact that no agricultural activity was ever carried
on it and the fact that two independent residential units
have been built on it out of which one was used by the
Plaintiff and the Defendant no. 1 as their residence and
the other was rented out, the Suit property has ceased
to be an agricultural land therefore it no longer comes
within the purview of the provisions of the Delhi Land
Reforms Act, 1954.
*****
21. After having heard both the parties and perusing
the judgments being relied upon by them, I am of the
view that the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms
Act shall not apply to a land which at the outset was
an agricultural land but is no longer being used for
the agricultural purposes.
*****
26. Above discussion makes it amply clear that an
agricultural land must be used for the agricultural
purposes only if the Land Reforms Laws are to be
made applicable and if it is not so used, it will cease to
be an agricultural land. In the instant case,
admittedly, the land in question has not been used for
any purposes contemplated therein under the Land
Reforms Act, instead, the land has been built upon.
Admittedly, two residential units have been
constructed on the land in question out of which one
is used by the parties as their residence and the other
one was rented out and so far, the land has not been,
in fact had never been used for the agricultural
purposes. It is not the case of the Defendants that
they are carrying out any agricultural activity or any
other allied permissible activity on the land in
question. Therefore, as per the aforesaid reasoning
and the view taken consistently by this court in
number of judgments, the land in my considered view,
has ceased to be an agricultural land and will no
longer be governed by the provisions of the Delhi
Land Reforms Act. Thus, the jurisdiction of civil
court cannot be said to be barred by virtue of the
provisions of section 185 of the Act." (emphasis
supplied)
13. Another Coordinate Bench of this Court in Harpal Singh v. Ashok
Kumar & Anr., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4860, while dealing with the
objections under Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act in a Suit for
injunction has observed as under:-
"9. This Court is of the view that insofar as the
property's character was changed because of
unauthorised constructions, as averred in the Suit and
as the Suit was decreed ex parte, any party aggrieved
by the said decree would have to pursue his/her remedy
as per law in an appeal. The Executing Court rightly
cannot override the decree which has attained finality.
The proceeding under Delhi Land Reforms Act deals
only with agricultural land, but insofar as the Suit
property has changed its character from agricultural
land to unauthorised colony because of a boundary
wall having been raised, and other alleged
constructions in the neighbourhood, which
development was not contested by the present
petitioner, therefore, it cannot be said that the decree
was obtained by fraud. Insofar as the petitioner-
objector/Defendant had ample opportunities to
contest the Suit, which was not so done, it cannot be
said that the decree was based upon fraud. Therefore,
reliance upon the precedents, as cited by the learned
counsel for the petitioner is misplaced. The petition is
without merit and is accordingly dismissed."
(emphasis supplied)
14. It is therefore now settled that once a land has been put to complete
non-agricultural use, the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act are not
applicable. A perusal of the Plaint indicates that the land in question has not
been used as an agricultural land. Whether the land in question is an
agricultural land or not, will be decided only after evidence is led.
15. For the adjudication of the present Application, it is pertinent to refer
to Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, which reads as under:
"11. Rejection of plaint.
The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the
Plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct
the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court,
fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the
plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the Plaintiff, on being required by the
Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a
time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the Suit appears from the statement in the
plaint to be barred by any law:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the
correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for
reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the Plaintiff
was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature
form correcting the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the
time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such
time would cause grave injustice to the Plaintiff."
16. The law relating to rejection of a Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC is crystallized through various judgments of the Apex Court. The
Apex Court in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff
Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510, has held as under:
"13. Before dealing with the factual scenario, the
spectrum of Order 7 Rule 11 in the legal ambit needs
to be noted.
14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1
SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule
11 of the Code that the relevant facts which need to be
looked into for deciding an application thereunder are
the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise
the power at any stage of the Suit -- before registering
the plaint or after issuing summons to the Defendant at
any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a)
and (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the averments
in the plaint are the germane; the pleas taken by the
Defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage.
15. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
[(1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question
to be decided while dealing with an application filed
under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real
cause of action has been set out in the plaint or
something purely illusory has been stated with a view
to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.
16. The trial court must remember that if on a
meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is
manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not
disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the
power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care
to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If
clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of
action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first
hearing by examining the party searchingly under
Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V.
Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467] .)
17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be
considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As
was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v.
Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487] only a part
of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of
action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be
rejected.
18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property
[(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments
in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out
whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 was
applicable.
19. There cannot be any compartmentalisation,
dissection, segregation and inversions of the language
of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is
adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of
interpretation according to which a pleading has to be
read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not
permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to
read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the
substance and not merely the form that has to be
looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it
stands without addition or subtraction of words or
change of its apparent grammatical sense. The
intention of the party concerned is to be gathered
primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings
taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne
in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted
to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.
20. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles the reliefs
sought for in the Suit as quoted supra have to be
considered. The real object of Order 7 Rule 11 of the
Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law Suits.
Therefore, Order 10 of the Code is a tool in the hands
of the courts by resorting to which and by searching
examination of the party in case the court is prima
facie of the view that the Suit is an abuse of the process
of the court in the sense that it is a bogus and
irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order 7
Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised."
17. In its latest judgment in Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust
Assn. v. Sri Bala & Co., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 48, the Apex Court has held
as under:
"6.1. ...
(i) In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4
SCC 467, this Court while examining the
aforesaid provision has held that the trial court
must remember that if on a meaningful and not a
formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious and meritless in the sense of not
disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise
the power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code
taking care to see that the ground mentioned
therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created
the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be
nipped in the bud at the first hearing by
examining the party searchingly under Order X of
the Code, as observed by Krishna Iyer, J.
(ii) The object of the said provision was laid down
by this Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant
Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137.
Similarly, in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State
Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC
510, this Court has culled out the legal ambit of
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.
(iii) It is trite law that not any particular plea has
to be considered, but the whole plaint has to be
read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal
Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill, (1982) 3 SCC 487,
only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if
no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a
whole must be rejected. Similarly, in Raptakos
Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7
SCC 184, it was observed that the averments in
the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out
whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order VII of the
Code is applicable.
(iv) It was further held with reference to Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code in Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557 that the relevant
facts which need to be looked into for deciding an
application thereunder are the averments in the
plaint. The trial court can exercise the power at
any stage of the Suit i.e. before registering the
plaint or after issuing summons to the Defendant
at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For
the purposes of deciding an application under
clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code, the averments in the plaint are germane;
the pleas taken by the Defendant in the written
statement would be wholly irrelevant at that
stage.
(v) In R.K. Roja v. U.S. Rayudu, (2016) 14 SCC
275, it was reiterated that the only restriction is
that the consideration of the application for
rejection should not be on the basis of the
allegations made by the Defendant in his written
statement or on the basis of the allegations in the
application for rejection of the plaint. The court
has to consider only the plaint as a whole, and in
case the entire plaint comes under the situations
covered by Order VII Rules 11(a) to (f) of the
Code, the same has to be rejected.
(vi) In Kuldeep Singh Pathania v. Bikram Singh
Jaryal, (2017) 5 SCC 345, this Court observed
that the court can only see whether the plaint, or
rather the pleadings of the Plaintiff, constitute a
cause of action. Pleadings in the sense where,
even after the stage of written statement, if there
is a replication filed, in a given situation the same
also can be looked into to see whether there is any
admission on the part of the Plaintiff. In other
words, under Order VII Rule 11, the court has to
take a decision looking at the pleadings of the
Plaintiff only and not on the rebuttal made by the
Defendant or any other materials produced by the
Defendant.
(vii) In an application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the Code, a plaint cannot be rejected in part. This
principle is well established and has been
continuously followed since the 1936 decision
in Maqsud Ahmad v. Mathra Datt & Co. AIR
1936 Lah 1021. This principle is also explained in
another decision of this Court in Sejal Glass
Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants Private Ltd., (2018) 11
SCC 780 which was again followed in Madhav
Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC
(viii) In Biswanath Banik v. Sulanga Bose, (2022)
7 SCC 731, this Court discussed the issue whether
the Suit can be said to be barred by limitation or
not, and observed that at this stage, what is
required to be considered is the averments in the
plaint. Only in a case where on the face of it, it is
seen that the Suit is barred by limitation, then and
then only a plaint can be rejected under Order VII
Rule 11(d) of the Code on the ground of
limitation. At this stage what is required to be
considered is the averments in the plaint. For the
aforesaid purpose, the Court has to consider and
read the averments in the plaint as a whole."
18. Perusal of the above observations of the Apex Court shows that the
remedy under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is an independent and special
remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a Suit at the
very threshold, without proceeding to record evidence or conduct a trial, on
the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be
terminated on any of the grounds contained under Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a
litigation, which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive, should not be
permitted to occupy the time of the court.
19. While deciding an Application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC,
this Court is confined only to examining the averments in the Plaint and the
documents filed and to see as to whether a real cause of action has been set
out in the Plaint or not and to make sure that the plaint is not manifestly
vexatious and meritless.
20. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the material on
record, this Court is of the opinion that the present Application does not
merit acceptance. At the stage of deciding an application under Order VII
Rule 11 of the CPC, this Court is required to examine only the averments
contained in the Plaint and the documents filed by the Plaintiff, and not the
defence taken by the Defendants.
21. On a reading of the Plaint in its entirety, it does not appear that the
Suit Properties constitute agricultural land so as to prima facie attract the
provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. The averments in the Plaint
indicate that the Suit Properties consist of constructed premises comprising
shops, rooms and residential structures which are being used for commercial
and residential purposes. At this stage, while considering an Application
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Court is required to proceed only
on the basis of the averments made in the Plaint. The question as to whether
the Suit Properties fall within the definition of "land" under Section 3(13) of
the Delhi Land Reforms Act and whether the provisions of Section 50 of the
Delhi Land Reforms Act would govern the succession to the said properties
are matters which would require adjudication on the basis of evidence.
Consequently, it cannot be held at this stage that the Suit is barred by the
provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act so as to warrant rejection of the
Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
22. Accordingly, the present Application is dismissed.
23. However, it is always open for the Defendants to take up the ground
of Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act once it is established that
the Suit Properties are indeed agricultural land.
24. It is made clear that this Court has not made any observations on the
applicability of Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, the question as to
whether the land has been urbanised and the right of the Plaintiff after the
2005 amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 at this juncture.
CS(OS) 190/2023 & I.A. 5480/2023, I.A. 12140/2023, I.A. 9/2024
25. List on 11.08.2026.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
MARCH 24, 2026
Rahul
